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CHRISTIAN

PSYCHOLOGY;

A NEW EXHIBITION OF THE

CAPACITIES AND FACULTIES OF THE HUMAN SPIRIT,

INVESTIGATED AND ILLUSTRATED FROM THE
CHRISTIAN STAND-POINT,

BY THE

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PREFACE.

NEXT in value to the noble science of Theology is the important science of Psychology. This science treats of the soul of man —his powers, capacities, condition, and consequent duties. As man, however, possesses a body as well as a soul, the full consideration of his nature embraces the two cognate sciences of Physiology and Psychology, the one treating of his material framework, the other of his spiritual endowments. From the nature of the subject, Psychology takes precedence over Physiology.

Although this science has occupied the minds of many superior writers, in different ages, it has not hitherto attained that maturity or settled stability which could ensure a future steady progress. What has been set up in one century has been pulled down in the following. And now in this generation we meet a revival of old exploded heathen notions on this subject, in the form of a pantheistic or materialistic philosophy, having great pretensions to learning, which impose on the half-educated, but is really the natural outcome of an infidel rationalism of the past generation. Refusing the aid of Heaven's revelation, such writers are justly rewarded by being landed in ancient heathen darkness.

The author was led to the investigation of this extensive and difficult subject from the duties of his office, as an expounder of the doctrines of christianity. Meeting in the sacred volume with the term "Conscience," as expressing a power which should regulate human conduct, the questions arose: What power is this? What authority does it exercise? What was its original purpose, and what its present condition? Questions relating to Conscience soon led to questions relating to the Emotional nature, the Intellect, and the Will. Unable to find satisfactory answers in all the works within reach, and constrained to differ widely from the arrangement. treatment, and general conclusions adopted by some of the mos

distinguished authorities on this science, the resolution was formed to explore the whole field from an original and independent position. The result is before the reader. It is not the production of a day, but of years. All real progress in the philosophy of mind is made by a careful induction of particular experiences, intellectual, emotional, executive, and normal. The man who can read, distinguish, and enumerate most accurately and completely these experiences, in the widest and most varied field of operations, can contribute to the science of Psychology what will prove a lasting acquisition.

Accepting the Scripture as the production of Him who made man, the author explored the hidden and intricate chambers of the human soul, with the light of human experience on the one hand, and of divine revelation on the other ; and he is not ashamed to add with entreaties for the illumination of that Great Spirit who gave to man all his spiritual powers, and by whom they are all well known. By such means dark paths may be illumined, and intricate perplexities resolved into order. In Nature's high-way, the explorer never fails to breathe the free atmosphere of Heaven's revelation, but when he leaves the one or the other, he is entangled in a thicket, or gropes in a mine.

The hope is entertained that this work will advance the science of Psychology, by stripping the subject of that obscurity, perplexity, and purely speculative treatment, which has debarred ordinary minds from entering on its consideration ; and that the departmental order, divisional arrangements, discussion, and illustrations, will meet the approbation of those who desire to see an important science assume a form of stability and progress. And not less, that the views of man's character and duty, of his fallen condition and of the method of Divine restoration, herein set forth, may result in the most intense longings for the restoration of that spiritual image which was once his distinguishing glory, and may again become his everlasting renown.

141, Darlinghurst Road, Sydney,
New South Wales.
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NOTE.—The figure on the cover is an original device to represent the tessarene endowment of the human spirit.

ERRATA.

Page 113. For "part" read "garb"
,, 217. For "Isaiah xix. 7" read "Isaiah xix. 17"
,, 352. For "halem" read "shalem"
,, 358. For "exegeties" read "exegetics"
,, 360. For "Timothy i 5" read "1 Timothy i. 5."

CHRISTIAN PSYCHOLOGY.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.

THE HUMAN SPIRIT A SUBJECT OF PROFOUND INTEREST.

The whole creation of God presents a vast field for interesting and profitable investigation. To man in his present stage of existence, only a circumscribed portion of this field is opened. His investigations are confined mainly to this earth, which is his temporary abode, and to himself, its sole, visible, intelligent occupant. Any knowledge of other worlds revolving in space in company with this earth, or in regions beyond this system, and of invisible intelligences of other grades visiting or haunting this earth, or occupying other spheres, is necessarily restricted and imperfect. His present domain offers to man wonders more than sufficient to engage his curiosity and task his powers of thought during the brief period allotted to him here.

Of all these wonders he is himself pre-eminently the chief; and of that marvellous compound of matter and spirit which constitutes the human being, the first place beyond question must be assigned to that department which embraces man's relation to a governing Power and to his fellow subjects of that Power. Hence, while examining into every department of the human spirit, and bringing to light each faculty in its place and power,

special attention should be given to this mysterious link of connection with the supreme governing Spirit, with the view of presenting in the plainest language all that can be apprehended of a spiritual endowment, in which is bound up man's honor and welfare for time and eternity.

When a survey has been made of man as a spiritual intelligence, it will be found that he is endowed with two great capacities, one intellectual and the other emotional, each possessed of a variety of separate energies or faculties; the one designed for the acquirement and utilizing of knowledge; the other for the infusion of energy in action, and for the safety and happiness of the sentient and intelligent being. With these two great capacities of thought and feeling are associated two prominent energies or powers, the Executive power and the Normal faculty; the one the energy by which the soul can grasp, control, and direct one or several of its own powers, mental and bodily, on any particular object or pursuit; and the other the energy or faculty which claims to be head and chief, a governing power, stimulating or restraining, approving or condemning, soothing or lacerating the soul, according to its light and sensibility on any particular design or action, and ever as a deputy assuming to reflect the judgment and feelings of a superior moral power.

To discover and distinguish each faculty in its place and relation to others, and to trace its development and operations singly and in combination with others in what is a spiritual substance ever-changing and of restless activity, a unity in complexity without tangible parts, is a task which they only can estimate who are endowed with sufficient mental power to subject their

own spirits to thorough, oft-repeated, protracted, and patient investigation. Nor must this investigation be continuous or secluded from the activities of life. Unbroken application will either disorder the mind, or make the particular department or faculty, which is the subject of study, assume proportions which are unnatural, and therefore untrue. The mind requires to be frequently relaxed from every pressure, that it may regain its elasticity, and recover the full orb of unburdened energies.

The psychologist with intellectual faculties burnished and invigorated, subjects man to closest observation. His movements are carefully pondered, with the view of apprehending the true condition and action of the moving power within. He is the object of keen discriminating reflection, whether alone or amidst a crowd; whether with a mind unbent developing an untutored nature, or with an intellect wrought to highest effort in a favorite study; whether bravely struggling with difficulties or calmly floating on the stream of prosperity; putting forth his utmost energy to avert a catastrophe, or calmly musing in inactivity; depressed and saddened by increasing disease, or rejoicing in the exuberance of health; the object of pitiless contempt, or of loudest applause; agitated with emotions as the storm-tossed ocean, or unruffled as the mirror-like lake; whether fickle as an aspen leaf from defective executive power, or firm as a rock from a strongly developed will; whether yielding to unlawful emotion he does violence to his moral nature, or, recognising the authority of God, he nobly takes his stand in maintenance of truth and right, and braves all threats of human violence: and not in the extremes only, but in every intermediate

stage of the swiftly or slowly oscillating emotions and volitions. From this painstaking scrutiny over this wide field of observation, are the facts gathered from which the mental chart, with its clearly defined boundaries and prominent natural features, is faithfully drawn up.

To the cultivated and mature intellect nature reveals treasures of fascinating power, which are veiled from the untaught and undeveloped mind. What order, beauty, forces, and analogies rise up before the admiring gaze of the spirit brightened by patient study and enlarged explorations, as he wanders through this beautiful creation of God! Place the educated man beside the thundering cataract, and he sees before him not merely the rush of mighty waters, but the law in operation by which the material universe is kept in order. Bring before him the beauties of earth, and sea, and sky, in the gorgeous flower, the beautiful shell, and the brilliant rainbow, and he traces all their glory to one source, the fountain of earth's material beauty, the sun. Let the lightning flash before him, and he sees Heaven's appointed messenger for man to bear his tidings round the globe more swiftly than the hurricane. Suspend the quivering needle in his sight, and he detects the guide chosen for the wanderer on sea and land more serviceable than sun or star, obscured by no clouds, and indifferent to the return of night. Let him gaze on the wide-spread pastures of our fertile lands, and he admires nature's soft and moisture-loving covering for her soil, the carpet ever spread for the repose of the weary limbs of animals, and the furnished table, often adorned with flowers, for the nutriment of those which are most useful to man. Lead him to the face of an

exposed cliff, where the strata of various deposits are clearly marked, and he is borne back in thought to by-gone ages when mighty denuding agencies swept over our globe, scraping the tops of mountains, scooping out valleys, heaping up mounds of gravel and clay, and burying vast stores of vegetable matter; and when these overwhelming waters left the work unfinished, volcanic fires burst up the encumbered strata to bring their rich deposits within the grasp of man, and poured forth their own contribution to the fertile soil of earth. Above all, let him stand on ocean's shore, and look out on the seemingly boundless waste of waters, his soul expands in the contemplation as he endeavours to grasp its vast area, and explore its mysterious caverns, and he sees the great conserver of animal and vegetable life on this planet, the fountain of its springs, the source of its rivers, and the waterer of its fields; and as the billows dash beneath him, an idea of immense power rises within his soul; what weight could not these waters bear up, and what could withstand their onset when impelled by earthquake violence! And turning the eye of his intelligence to the domain of life, what adaptation to place, rank, and circumstances appears throughout the vegetable and animal kingdoms, from the lowly mushroom, the product of a night, to the towering Wellingtonia, the growth of three thousand years, and from the feeble earthworm, forcing with difficulty its way through the soil, to the powerful elephant, rejoicing in trampling down the forest! And as the mind contemplates all this wondrous beauty, variety and life, desires spring up within the heaven-quickened soul which find their utterance in language such as this: Where is the Great Spirit which spread out, animated,

and beautified this earth as man's abode? Where is God, my maker; would that I could approach Him, and that He would commune with me!

In vital connection with this high intellectual endowment by which knowledge is obtained, classified, reconstructed, and retained, is a fountain of feeling, powerful and variable, the stimulator of vigorous thought, speech, and action. Touch the ebullient elements of this fountain, and thought no longer creeps the earth with slow and painful progress, but mounting on the wing scours the earth and sea, the hills and plains, in search of mental food; speech flows forth with continuous stream, and action becomes resolute, passionate, and even desperate. How diverse and how variable the streams of this fountain! Here flows the placid stream of love, refreshing and blessing all as it glides noiselessly along, there the turbid torrent of hate, disturbing and defiling all against whom it dashes. One moment the child deplores with streaming eyes the loss of a favorite toy, the next the gleam of joy shines through these unwiped eyes for the discovery of the much prized object. One hour the sea warrior inspired by rage is straining every muscle to destroy every living soul on board the ship of his antagonist, the next animated by compassion he exhausts every effort to rescue from death the survivors of that same ship which he has sunk in the ocean. Let a sound strike the ear, and this fountain of feeling is touched, the frame quivers, terror seizes the man, and flight is instantaneous, exhibiting in the case of a multitude all the desperation of a panic. Let the gleam of the military rocket fall upon the expectant eye, the signal is recognised for the assault on the besieged fortress, zeal bursts into ardour in every heroic breast,

and thousands of men impelled to utmost effort rush forward into the jaws of destruction, determined to wrest the stronghold from the foe or perish in the attempt. At times this emotional nature displays its exuberance by a double stream of feeling. As distinct intellectual faculties co-operate when the mind is roused to ardent exercise, so distinct emotions combine their streams and overflow the soul when the fountain of feeling is unusually stirred. The steady silent look of a fellow-man, reminding of ingratitude and crime, may cover the soul with shame, instantly followed by an overflow of grief, and their combined dark and bitter waters may inundate the soul for days and weeks. The sight on the door-step of a dear relative absent for years, unheard of and given up as lost, evokes at once an outburst of wonder which cannot subside before it is blended with a copious outflow of joy, which together disperse their bright and sparkling waters over the whole spirit. The public mention of a name as that borne by a successful rival, conjoined with the honours to which he has attained, excites in the mind of the narrow and inconsiderate a feeling of envy, and this cannot rest till it has evoked as its companion its twin-sister hate, and they flood for hours the unhappy spirit with their green and deadly waters. Emotions having no natural affinity combine to save the life in the hour of peril. A man is washed overboard from his ship. Instantly fear demands every effort to save himself from drowning. But another emotion, hope, rushes to the rescue, and pointing to the wheeling ship and lowering boat, thrusts under him her sustaining arm, and together with fear upholds the drowning man till his comrades have seized him and drawn him into their boat.

Now mark this human intelligence displaying his world-subduing energies, and thereby establishing his claim to be regarded as the lord (Ps. viii. 6) of this lower world. Unable to perform his work with his unaided hands, he fashions wood, stone, and metal, as his instruments. Finding his strength insufficient to whirl continuously the mill-stone, or to ply the oar, he obstructs the winds in their flight, and constrains them to drive his machinery, and bear his ships over the seas. Perceiving the mighty power of water, he treasures up its strength in reservoirs, and leads it out as a willing servant to saw his timber or to grind his corn. Discovering the fiery impulse of steam, he carefully produces it, and curbing and controlling the giant power, compels the puffing and impetuous worker to plough his fields, to thresh his corn, to card and spin his wool, to weave and dress his cloth, to saw and plane his timber, to load and unload his ships, and do an endless amount of work wholly beyond the limits of human strength. And pressing beyond the visible, he makes the magnetic current guide him over trackless seas and untrodden wilds, and despatches the electric spark with lightning speed to bear his message over continents or oceans. Restricted in his personal movements, and dissatisfied with the speed of the swiftest animals, he launches his steamship, or mounts his steam-car, and traverses thousands of miles of sea or land in a week. Impeded in his enterprize by formidable physical obstructions, he calls into exercise his constructive skill, and wide rivers are bridged, massive stone piers built, despite deep water and powerful currents, lofty mountains perforated by tunnels miles in length, and oceans are united by channels cut for the passage of ships.

But occupying a higher and more important place than either thought, feeling, or energy, as stimulating and often controlling every subordinate faculty of the soul, is the moral principle in man. This is that faculty which recognises the existence of a superior Being as ruler and lawgiver; and which seeks to subject and conform the whole man to the conceived will or law of this higher Being. An idea of relation lies at the foundation of all morality. This faculty is the judge of actions conceived to have a relation to law; in other words, of moral actions. But it is much more than a judge, as shall be seen in its proper place. It is distinguishable from reason or deduction, which is the forming of a judgment from a perception of the true relation of one thing to another, or of one or more parts to a whole, submitted for consideration ; and also from feeling, as it is often the exciter or soother of acute feelings. Under its prompting, the soul employs both : calling upon the intellect to examine the relation betwen a certain act and an acknowledged law, and declare its judgment, which however it may or may not accept ; and bidding feeling rise into a tempest or settle down into a placid calm, according as that act has been contrary to or in accordance with that law. Although often permitting the inferior faculties of the soul to follow their impulses, as if it had closed its eyes and retired to slumber within the recesses of the soul, it can, when appealed to, and on great occasions, come forth from its retirement, and assume at once the bench and the seat of authority in the soul, giving the most prompt decisions on questions of right and wrong, and the most peremptory orders—as the pilot to the man at the wheel—on the slightest deviation from the true course. To see man as the

deputy-lord of this world, we must see him take his stand under the impulse of what is commonly called an enlightened conscience. Then we behold him realizing the presence and recognising the authority of the great invisible Lawgiver, immovable as a rock amidst a tempest-tossed ocean. We hear him reply to an earthly sovereign's demand, that he should disregard the law of this invisible King, in the words of the Hebrews to their monarch on the plains of Babylon, in view of the fiery furnace : " Be the consequences what they may, we will not worship thy golden image " ; and with Luther, at Worms : " My conscience is a captive to God's word, and it is neither safe nor right to go against conscience. There I take my stand ; I can do no otherwise. So help me, God. Amen." And we see him as a man of veracity and honour, blind to all the endearments of home, deaf to the entreaties of friends, and regardless of life, unless unstained with dishonour, return like Regulus on his parole, to the disposal of his foes, now doubly inflamed by his high-toned and self-sacrificing patriotism. He may be in error, but he follows only what he conceives to be right, and that sanctioned by supreme law ; and under this conviction he will give his body to the flames, or to be devoured by wild beasts, rather than do violence to his moral nature.

And follow the random exercises of this buoyant intelligence, as untrammelled by material weights it disposes of space and time. In an instant it crosses the widest ocean, and looks out from the opposite shore. Spreading its wing, in a moment it has alighted on the moon, and begins to climb its rugged mountain steeps. Dissatisfied, it bounds off, and in a few seconds it stands on the dark surface of the sun, and gazes with awe on its

atmosphere of flame. Alarmed, it rushes through the first dark opening, and in a moment, espying the largest planet in the system, rests upon Jupiter. Restless still, it seeks the region of the stars, and floating over their milky way, it endows each star with satellites, and pauses to admire how gloriously they move, till, wearied by the boundless vision, it gladly returns to rest within its native home. Now he seizes the records of memory, and in a moment the pages revolve to the scenes of his childhood. The door-step where he sat and played; the brook where he waded, or the fields where he roamed; the table where he took his food, and those who sat beside him; the school-house, its forms and their occupants, with the presiding genius; and then the hour of leaving home; the strange abode and occupation; and then the passing of some lovely form that left an impress not to be effaced, but constantly returned, bringing a troop of pleasing emotions; and then there pass and pass those lights and shadows till some passing sound reminds the absent that the duties of the hour demand his attention. Again, unoccupied and at ease, he glides out, and with creative skill, clothes the earth with the softest verdure, surrounds himself with a beautiful grove hanging with garlands, a brook mumurs at his feet, soft breezes laden with perfume regale him; when, lo! a shining speck appears at his feet, he stoops to examine — it is gold! He has alighted on untold treasures: visions of wealth, grandeur, and glory, now float before him; a splendid estate; a beautiful mansion and high honour;—a gleam of benevolence arrests him, and a church and hospital are endowed, and rising in liberality for its attending honour, the debts of city, province, and nation are paid off; and then his name

becomes a household word, a score of towns adopt it, public halls are adorned with his portrait, and at the close a lofty monument is erected to his memory, when earth's utmost boundary being reached, the fascinating reverie slowly dissolves, and, as

> "The baseless fabric of a vision,
> Leaves not a wreck behind."

A spirit so variously and so richly endowed, must ever constitute a subject of deep interest to the thoughtful. Next to the knowledge of that Being who gave us existence, and of His government under which we live, should we rank an intimate acquaintance with the faculties with which we are endowed, and the condition in which we live. We may indeed perform the ordinary duties of life without an accurate knowledge of our mental powers, just as we may perform the important function of walking without a knowledge of the bones and ligaments which form our knee and ankle joints; but an investigation of our spiritual endowments, and of our physical structure, would add greatly to our ability for the healthful and profitable employment and conservation of both mind and body. Our faculties are limited, but fully adequate to the duties imposed on us in our present state of being. They ought to be wisely and fully employed. To do this, our mental attributes, emotional susceptibility, executive power, and moral nature must be carefully cultivated and guarded. Especially should it be our aim to restore our highest spiritual distinction and glory, the Normal faculty, to that close and vital contact with the supreme moral Intelligence of the Universe, that every thought, feeling, and act might be pleasing in His sight.

DEPARTMENT I.

INTELLECTUAL CAPACITY.

CHAPTER II.

1.—APPREHENSION.

BRANCH FORMS :

PERCEPTION—CONCEPTION—COMPREHENSION.

A CAREFUL examination of the exercises of the human spirit may enable us clearly to discover an intellectual capacity occupying the very front of man's spiritual energies, and this attended by an emotional susceptibility, and associated in vital connection with both, an executive energy ; while all three are presided over by a legislative and judicial authority.

These capacities or powers may properly be designated : the Intellectual, Emotional, Executive, and Normal Faculties.

Besides these, there are certain habitudes or acquired powers, the result of a special development, perversion or neglect of some faculty, generally an emotion, which often press into their service the chief energies of the soul. Although not classified with the natural or original powers, their great influence on the individual and on society demands their distinct recognition and treatment by the psychologist.

In this chapter we begin our investigation of man's intellectual capacity. Let us define our terms. What do we mean by intellectual capacity?—We mean that

capacity by which man acquires, classifies, applies, retains, and displays knowledge. What is this personal knowledge?—It is a conception, or the sum of acquired conceptions, on any or every subject of thought. The idea or conception formed may differ from the truth or reality of any subject, that is, the knowledge may be false; yet the mind accepts it as true, and regards it as an acquisition until further information deprives it of its assumed value. Knowledge may thus be true or false—reliable or unreliable; and it is the business of the educated, and of those who would be wise, to distinguish the true from the false—the valuable from the worthless.

How is our knowledge obtained?—Both through the senses and by independent mental exercises. From the earliest dawn of intelligence, two distinct impressions, convictions or ideas, are formed within the mind. The one is the impression or conviction of its own personal existence and individuality; the other, of a world or nature external to itself. As the child advances in years, its mental capacity is enlarged, and the impressions from the external world are multiplied. One sense aids another, or, to speak with more accuracy, the mind employs one or more senses to confirm or disprove the conception formed by an impression on another sense. The sense of touch assists that of sight. The artificial flower appears so natural that we must handle it to correct the conception. The sense of sight confirms the sense of hearing. When we think that we hear the voice of one out of sight whom we know, and are anxious to verify our apprehension, we move from our place till our eyes can rest upon the speaker. Taste or smelling may disprove the conception formed from sight. What

appears to be loaf-sugar, may, by taste, be proved to be salt. What appears to be medicine, may, by smelling, be known to be poison. So singularly impressible is the mind that it is constantly receiving impressions by sight and hearing, of which it apparently takes no notice at the time, but which may be discovered and called up at some future time by their connection with certain conceptions of which the mind had taken notice. But when in search of information, or when arrested by something interesting, it has formed conceptions, tested and proved them, they are considered as a treasure, and laid up as such. While these stores are accumulating, the mind is ever distinguishing ideas which differ, and carrying back these distinctions into its hidden recesses. As occasion demands, these ideas are brought forth, either in their simplicity, or blended in beautiful harmony, interwoven into a theory, or displayed in forcible reasoning; exhibited as a picture, or employed as apt illustrations.

But in all these acts of gathering, arranging, adorning, and exhibiting, the mind is one and indivisible—like a flame, often, indeed, burning low, but again shooting upwards with great vigour: at one time throwing out its whole strength in one direction, then again exhibiting a full-orbed outline; sometimes launching up a bright jet, as if some hidden reservoir of oil had been tapped, and then again displaying the brilliant coruscations of genius on every side. How interesting, to watch and mark this ever active and undying spirit, in its ever-varying acts and attitudes! We must calmly question it, and ask it to throw open its recesses and show us all its treasures of knowledge, and tell us how it obtained, and how it arranged them, and by what powers it can reconstruct, exhibit, dispose of, and yet retain them.

Let us begin at the foundation. By what power of mind is the simplest perception formed of something external to itself?—By that power which, as furnishing the hands by which the mind grasps the external world, we designate APPREHENSION. By it the mind lays hold of the impressions which have reached it through the senses, and forms ideas or thoughts, which are Perceptions, Conceptions, or Comprehensions, more or less distinct, respecting them. The grasp is mental. With the seizure of the impression, there is in most cases an instantaneous apprehension of the idea or thought, of which the impression is the vehicle or symbol. In its simplest form the mental apprehension, as grasping an idea, is called a Perception. The mind has, in an instant, grasped, as it were, the spirit conveyed to it in a certain form. The form may be immediately lost sight of, as of no consequence, while the living thought is detained, as of permanent value. When the impressions are novel, and the symbols not easily intelligible, the mind may seize the impressions, but be unable to form a distinct and satisfactory idea of their import. In these cases, other powers of the mind are called in to aid this faculty. When a satisfactory idea, whether true or false, has been reached, after more or less examination, and the aid of other intellectual powers, the Apprehension is properly designated a Conception. Often the utmost efforts are unavailing to form a satisfactory conception, and the man may be heard saying, "I cannot grasp the meaning—I cannot understand the writing!" When two or more subjects are presented together having a relation to one another, the apprehension of their character and relation may be designated a Comprehension. We perceive what is simple; we

conceive what is intricate; and we comprehend what is varied and extensive.

Impressions often reach the mind, which it cares not to apprehend; of which, in common speech, it takes no notice. Familiarized with certain sights and sounds, it heeds them not; carried away by some interesting thought, it is regardless of what is said or done in its presence; fatigued by labour, it refuses to stretch a hand to lay hold of what is pressed upon its acceptance. A man may live beside a cataract, and become so accustomed to the sight and sound of the torrent, that the ordinary duties of out-door life may be performed from day to day without a solitary thought formed from the voice of nature sounding in his ears. It would not be thus with him when first arrested by the roaring waters; and if removed far from the spot, lofty ideas of nature's grandeur might again, at times, rise within him. Looking from an eminence, a person may gaze with pleasure on wide-spread fields, with interspersed cottages and orchards; when, in a moment, the particular form of one cottage opens the gate for a mental excursion; years fly past as a flash of lightning, and the soul hurries through and around a house of former years, as if anxious to meet some one long loved and lost; and while thus absorbed, the eyes are open, but no field nor farm is seen. A friend speaks—the ears are open, but no sound is heard: the mind is regardless of impressions laid at its door. Or, again, it is the Sabbath-day and the house of God. The preacher is not dull, nor the hearer indisposed to listen. But the body is wearied by protracted labour, and the mind drowsy; or to speak more accurately, the organ of the mind—the brain—is fettered. Thus hampered, the

intellect allows whole sentences of the sermon to pass, of which it takes no notice. The articulated sounds rush upon the ear in succession—the brain is impressed,—but the mind stretches no hand to seize the impressions, and they seem to pass away without leaving behind a trace of their visit. I do not say that these sentences leave no impression on the mind. Perhaps it would be more correct to say that they have passed a sleepy sentinel unchallenged, and instead of being comprehended and appointed to appropriate quarters, they have located themselves in some hidden recess of the immortal spirit, from which they may come forth in eternity, if not in time, with all the freshness of the Egyptian paintings in the ruined palaces of Thebes.

But taking the mind in its ordinary mood, as following, and vitally and variously grasping, the impressions made through the senses, let us illustrate this power of Apprehension, as called into exercise by the senses of *Touch*, *Hearing*, and *Sight*.

The sense of Touch is extended over the whole body. It is generally so keen that the piercing of the fine point of a needle or the flap of the wing of an insect is instantly reported to the brain, and awakens apprehension. It is most valuable in preserving life. You may be walking under a scorching sun, when a sensation of unusual heat in the crown of the head warns you that danger is near, and you seek shelter without delay. Or you may be driving in a sleigh over the frozen regions of the north, when a peculiar numbness in the feet is forced upon the attention of the mind, and means are used to prevent your feet from being frozen. Or, you are camping at night at some distance from home. You go out in the dark to gather sticks to make a fire,

when your hand, while feeling for the object of your search, grasps something soft and supple; in a moment the mind apprehends that you have seized a snake, and the next instant the object is dropped. You may be mistaken: a visit to the spot in daylight may reveal that a piece of bleached rope occasioned your alarm. But we blame neither sense nor intellect—danger was apprehended, and the right action taken. The mind is responsive to the sense of touch, when temporarily deprived of the organs of sight and hearing. Stretch yourself beside a fire in the winter season, in a forest, and fall asleep. After a little, the sense of cold on the one side, or of heat on the other, communicates its notice of discomfort to the brain; the sleepless mind apprehends the complaint; and orders are given to the organs of motion to change sides. Or a hand, clothed in fur, is laid upon your face. With the vigilance peculiar to one accustomed to forest life, you are startled, and spring up, under the apprehension that the paw of a wild animal has been placed on your cheek. Where sight is impossible, by reason of darkness or blindness, the mind seizes with special acuteness the impressions from touch. A sailor is ordered aloft in a very dark night while the ship is labouring heavily in a storm. His sense of touch tells him where he is; when he has reached the crosstrees; when he has touched the yard, what rope he has seized; when he has placed his foot on the footropes, and what brace, or stay, or sheet, can be leaned on with safety. The blind man is largely guided by apprehensions of his whereabouts received through his staff. Aided also by hearing, he may move about with confidence over ground with which he is familiar. Experience promotes facility of apprehension. The printer may close his eyes

while standing before his case of types, and set up whole sentences, knowing by the sense of touch every type and space and point of punctuation. He may then read by feeling what he has set up, inverted though it be. Thus the blind are taught to read by passing their fingers over raised type, the mind at the same time, while in contact with matter, comprehending the import of these symbols. Those dealing in manufactures of silk, cotton, or wool readily perceive by handling, their quality, strength, and finish. And, to pass over illustrations innumerable, how often is it apprehended that the stream of life has ceased to flow by a pressure of the finger on the pulseless wrist.

To apprehensions obtained through Hearing, we are much indebted for safety, information, and pleasure. The fire-bell rings at midnight. We are roused from a profound slumber by its startling sounds. At once the mind apprehends fire and its consequence danger, for with these peculiar notes the idea of fire has become associated in the mind. We rise to see where it is, and are alarmed to find that it is in our immediate neighborhood, and demanding our instant attention. Or as soldiers in active warfare, we may have lain down on the earth, during the hours of darkness, to rest our weary limbs after a toilsome march, when, in an unexpected hour the bugle blast is heard calling to arms in haste. Apprehensions of the assaulting foe possess the soul, and every man is ready to defend himself to the utmost. The seaman hears the fog whistle, or the surf on the shore, when the land is obscured by mists, and alters his course or casts his anchor in time to save his vessel. How often has the cry of distress been answered by prompt relief! We apprehend that some one needs

succour, and we hurry to the spot to rescue the drowning, to save one exposed to the flame, or to give help to the oppressed. Who can estimate the quantity of information laid down at the doors of the intellect by this pneumatic train! Conversation pours in its packages for daily use. Lectures drop their occasional bales of mental manufactures. Speeches thrust upon us their multifarious cases in behalf of public policy, justice, and mercy. And sermons spread before us their selections of heavenly truth for the regulation of our conduct. Much, indeed, may pass not apprehended, or misapprehended; but much is also laid hold of and applied to immediate use, or stored up for future benefit. And what conceptions of harmony, liberty, and joy are formed from the pleasant sounds that reach us. We hear the merry laughter of children at their play, and we apprehend the freedom, simplicity, and joyousness of childhood. We listen to the songs of praise of a great congregation, adoring their Redeemer, and conjoined with our apprehension of the praise, there is an elevation of spirit; and, it may be, a vivid conception of the adoring multitude before the eternal throne. A single note is borne to our ear in the stillness of the evening; we pause to hear; other notes are wafted on; we apprehend, and recognise the tune as an old favourite: the memories of the past rush in, and visions come and go, while the brain is thrilled with the melodious vibrations of the atmosphere reaching from a distance.

Through the organs of Sight, as through flood-gates, streams of information constantly flow to the reservoir of the mind. These organs are ever employed taking photographs of objects before them, on which the mind may afterwards look at leisure after the objects are

removed from them. How amazing the capacity of the intellect for storing these away without confusion ! Every intelligent traveller can recall the pictures of the scenes which have deeply impressed him. No reckoning can be made of the innumerable facts of nature apprehended by the soul which have reached it through this illumined passage. Let the astronomer spend the night in the clear atmosphere of the equinoxes, when from an unclouded sky the brilliant lights of heaven send down their far-reaching rays. What apprehensions of distance, of magnitude, of motion, and of glory, are formed in that intellect which can measure these heavens ! Let the botanist roam over a field stocked with the varied productions of the vegetable kingdom, how is he delighted in recognising well-known forms of beauty, and how arrested and interested in what seems to baffle his skill to classify. We pass the wonders of animal life—of chemistry, of mineralogy, and of geology—and leave you to reflect on the countless thoughts and ideas to which a vision of their forms and movements, their colours and combinations gives rise. But we may not pass the world of information obtained by reading. Here most strikingly the power of apprehension, in its triple form, is exercised. The eyes glide from line to line, from sentence to sentence, and from page to page, the mind all the time keeping pace, and taking hold of the treasures of thought as they reach it through the printed symbols, and often proceeding a step further, and forming an opinion, favourable or unfavourable, of what it has apprehended. No voice is heard ; the very silence is conducive to ready apprehension. Before these avenues of light are brought these exponents of wisdom, divine and human, of ages past and present, which the grasping

spirit so covetous of knowledge, hesitates not to appropriate. Poetry, history, oratory, science, and theology deposit their rich stores by the same swift vehicle. So fascinating to the intellect do some pages appear, that the mind seizes them with an eagerness not surpassed by that which a starving man displays when seizing food offered to him. And so greedy of knowledge is this voracious spirit that it often works these doubly-refined instruments until they are either paralyzed by fatigue or totally destroyed. But generally they perform an amazing amount of work, with patience and power down to the close of life — lighting the path of the spirit through the past, the present, and the future, as these appear in legible records, conducting it through unknown geological periods, round the orbits of the planets, leading it up to the lighted glories of paradise and down to the gloomy recesses of the pit of despair. And, as if anxious to perform the last kind office, as the fashions of earth are passing for ever from its vision, it enables the soul from the pages of inspiration to apprehend a region where boundless explorations of surpassing interest shall be opened to it by the light of an eternal day.

CHAPTER III.

2.—APPLICATION.

BRANCH FORMS :

ATTENTION—PENETRATION.

FOLLOWING a natural order, the next intellectual power is,

APPLICATION.—The mind is universally known to possess the power, when in a healthy state, of applying itself to any object or subject to which pleasure, interest, or duty may engage it. Steady application receives the name of *Attention*; and close and persistent application assumes the form of *Penetration*. Attention and penetration are advanced forms of Application. Illustrations teem in every day life. The school-boy knows that he cannot work out a difficult question in arithmetic, or master a problem in geometry, without close application. And how long must he pore over books of dead languages before he can become familiar with their terms and skilful in their grammatical construction! He must bend his mind to the task, and keep steady at it—not for months merely, but for years. And how little progress can be expected unless attention is given to the instructions and directions of those whose knowledge and experience entitle them to the honourable position of teachers. The naturalist, in his rambles, discovers in a stratum of gravel the fragment of a bone, or a strange flower in the retired gorge of a mountain, and straight-

way applies his mind with all diligence to find out the particular species of animal or of plant to which the discovered object belongs. With what assiduity will men prosecute a favourite branch of science! They will exhaust mind and body, expend a fortune, and occupy a lifetime in persistent application to a particular study. If opportunity is afforded they may explore the Antarctic ocean, and climb the Himalayas, as did Sir Joseph Hooker, to enlarge the known domain of a chosen science. How much of the progress in the arts and sciences is due to application. To it we owe many of our chief discoveries in every department of knowledge. Its power has been strikingly displayed in antiquarian researches. Not only have tombs and temples and palaces long buried from sight been exhumed and explored, but the far more difficult task of reading their strange inscriptions has been mastered. Close and prolonged application has enabled the mind to bring its utmost sagacity and penetrating power to bear upon the unravelling of the mystery, and it has succeeded. The hieroglyphics of Egypt and Mexico are read, and the arrow-headed inscriptions of Nineveh and Babylon are interpreted. Champollion bent his penetrating intellect to decipher the Rosetta stone. Were the hieroglyphics ideographic only, or were they phonetic also? Years were spent in oft-repeated applications to solve the mystery. Young, the acute mathematician, threw out the suggestion that the hieroglyphics were exponents of sound as well as of ideas. Started on the right track, the penetrating Frenchman pressed his way to conclusions which were declared the greatest discovery of the century. The hieroglyphics were traced into the hieratics, and these into the demotics; and it was then

seen and proved that the hieroglyphics were not simply pictures containing ideas, but a junction of syllables also, in which a sign stood for a letter. To Grotsfend, of Hanover, belongs the honour of discovering the clue by which the cuneiform writings of ancient Assyria have been read. He tried key after key, until the mysterious lock responded to the skilful and persevering applicant in words of intelligence. Where philology was wanting, archæology and history came to his help ; and his unwearied application was rewarded by the deciphering of several well-known names. But it remained for those who came after to prosecute these researches. To the distinguished Rawlinson belongs the high honour of not only reading long and important inscriptions, but of adding largely to our knowledge of the history, grammar, law, and mythology of the ancient Assyrians, Medes, and Persians. In his opinion, the alphabet is both ideographic and phonetic. Let it not be supposed, however, that the whole exploration is completed. Much yet remains to task this noble power of intellect in this mysterious antiquarian lore.

We see attention leaning on her sister patience in the laboratory where the chemist watches the results of his experiments, in the constant changes of colour, weight, and form produced by his decompositions and combinations. Mark the acute and enterprising Humphrey Davy as he applies his tests for the decomposition of earths or alkalies. What attention, what close application is displayed, while one discovery after another opens before his enraptured vision. The gases were made his special study. Their utility and their danger were alike tested. Under his penetrating intellect the secrets connected with the growth and nutriment of

plants were made familiar to the public; and those who toiled in foul air and in constant danger, far below the surface of the earth, reaped the results of his skill and benevolence in the far-famed safety lamp.

We see the same power in the unwearied observations of the astronomer during the long hours of night, and specially when some unusual occurrence is passing. With what close and prolonged application must Nicolas Copernicus, the Prussian mathematician, have studied the movements of the heavenly bodies before his famous work, "De Revolutionibus Orbium," was completed. For over twenty years the work was on hand, receiving the development and finish which his utmost ingenuity and skill could afford. Nor did he fail in the reward of fame. The Copernican system bears testimony to the world-wide appreciation of his labours. He revived a long-forgotten theory. In the midst of much that is crude, fanciful if not ridiculous, he has demonstrated facts of the greatest importance in confirmation of his main position that the sun and planets did not move round the earth, but the earth and planets round the sun. It was left to the illustrious names of Kepler, Galileo, and Newton, to carry on to something like perfection the discoveries and calculations which have placed the theory on an immovable basis. As a modern illustration of the same power of intellect in the same noble science, we may point to Leverrier, whose exact observations led to the prediction of the precise position in which the unknown planet Neptune would be found. And this very year (1874) there will be a world-wide exercise of this faculty in the form of the closest possible Attention, in astronomical observations, to the transit of Venus across the face of the sun.

Penetration sometimes displays astonishing feats in a detective force. A singular robbery or murder has been committed, and all trace of the perpetrator seems to have disappeared. All the known facts, with every minute circumstance attached to them, are laid before the man whose office it is to ferret out criminals. Past experience, with every mental power that can aid, places its services at the call of application. The mind embraces the disjointed whole, until it has discovered in some incident the embryo of the scheme, the vitalizing centre which unites all parts, and points beyond mistake to the agent in the deed. In every department of duty, secular and sacred, the utility of this power is apparent. So important is it, that he who possesses it largely developed, is likely to overcome all that is surmountable, and he who is deficient in it is unstable as water and cannot excel.

CHAPTER IV.

3.—DISTINCTION.

BRANCH FORMS :

DIVISION—ABSTRACTION.

Our third intellectual attribute is

Distinction.—The mind may not only apprehend what is presented to it, and apply itself most diligently to comprehend what has been unknown, or only partially apprehended, but also distinguish the subjects which differ from each other in what is brought under its notice. It readily distinguishes in things material, as colours and forms, and less readily in things mental, as ideas, traits of character, and trains of reasoning. The bolder distinctions of colour delight alike the child and the savage; the finer shades attract the cultivated mind of the artist. The florist revels amidst a profusion of the beauties of nature. The artist deems it the highest attainment to copy the lights and shades, the brilliant and the sombre, the prominent and the recessed in nature. What a glorious painter is the sun? With one stroke of his beams he paints the heavens, earth, and sea with a combination of colours as he rises to chase away the gloom of night. Who that has ever beheld a sun-rise in the tropics in favourable circumstances, from the sea shore, can forget it. The clouds above are gorgeous, as if the very beauties of paradise were opened to view; the sea is sparkling

with its countless rainbow drops ; and all that is beautiful and fresh on earth holds out its gayest colours. Our ability to distinguish is the secret spring of our joy. To the geometrician a mere point or straight line has little attraction. But give him the angle, the square, and the circle, and he will expend his ingenuity in his distinction of figures. The angle will assume every form, from the most acute to the most obtuse; the square will be changed into every shape which a four-sided figure can assume ; and the circle will descend from its own perfection by successive stages to the most elongated ellipse. Man delights to exercise his skill in distinctions—to draw his circles within his squares, and his squares within his circles, and his angles within both. Yet the right angle, the square, and the circle, are all perfect, and every step of alteration is a step of reduction to the dull uniformity of a straight line. What power of distinction must the great Alexandrian mathematician Euclid have possessed when his figures and angles remain till this day, after the lapse of more than two thousand years, the wonder and delight of those who have made geometry their study. Close application, rigid discernment, and vivid distinction must have marked a mind so peculiarly gifted in apprehending the relation of parts to a whole, under every conceivable form of representation. The sculptor or carver cultivates the power of distinction. He will not give to every bust the same depth, breadth, and prominence ; nor will he form the cheeks, nose, and mouth of each face on the same model, but will seek to bring each feature by the finest touches to the closest approach to the original in nature or imagination.

In all the departments of natural science, the wider

distinctions of species are readily marked by the uncultivated, but it requires the practised eye, or in more correct language, the practised mind, to detect at once the finer distinctions where the points of similarity may be numerous. In proof of this, see the varied and splendid results of the labours of the distinguished naturalist, recently deceased, Louis Agassiz, in the field of ichthyology. Brought in contact, at an early period of life, with collections of fish gathered and preserved by travellers in South America, the talent with which he was so richly endowed was called into requisition; curiosity was excited; interest and ambition prompted to the exploration of a wider field; the finny tribes of Europe became the subject of closest investigation; when the living and modern had been explored, the ancient and fossil engaged attention; the new world, as well as the old, was ransacked for all that was rare and distinguishing; life, in its wider range, became the field of study, as the wonders of nature opened before the cultivated and inquisitive mind; and a career of utility and honour begun by the cultivation of this faculty of distinction, was closed in mature age in the very first ranks of the *savants* of natural history.

The distinction of ideas is exclusively a mental exercise. Those whose business lies with thought and its expression have constant recourse to this indispensable faculty. The power and elegance of writing depend upon the clear distinction of ideas which are appropriate to a subject, and the selection of terms which are best adapted to express these ideas. In the acquirement and formation of an unwritten language, as spoken by many barbarous tribes, this power is ever in demand. The modification of every term must be

distinguished, and the circumstances under which the modification takes place. And when the task of the lexicographer is undertaken, a main reliance must be placed on the ready and vigorous use of this faculty. To its exercise, long and carefully cultivated, we owe what may be considered as the most complete lexicon of our language. After twenty-one years of close investigation of the origin and structure of our language, Noah Webster gave to the world his monument of diligence and skill in the distinction of ideas as they are clothed in what now constitutes modern English. This period was appropriated to the preparation of the lexicon, but for more than twenty years previously the same faculty was occupied with the examination of the grammatical peculiarities of a language by no means free from puzzling irregularities. Endowed with this power in large measure, the dramatist describes, in terms that seem to live, each feature of human character, from the most simple to the most subtile ; and from the stainless to the double-dyed leopard. His keen sagacity in distinguishing the real from the pretended in the most difficult circumstances, and detecting ulterior designs carefully concealed under present appearances, and dividing to each the clothing most natural to his mental offspring, elicits our admiration.

Not less striking is the skill displayed by the casuist. We do not refer to the morality of his questions, but to that analysing power by which the same subject can be presented to the mind under an endless variety of forms from countless circumstances or suppositions. An illustration of this gift, both amusing and instructive in no common degree, can be

found in "Pascal's Provincial Letters." Pascal was one of the brightest lights to which France, a land rich in men of rare genius, has given birth. In him the moral nature received high culture, side by side with the intellectual. Born, and brought up in the church of Rome, he died within her pale. But his noble thoughts of God, the soul, and eternity, soared far beyond the limits of a sect. They belonged to the wide field of eternal truth. With a conscience educated in the fundamental principles of truth and right, and a piercing intellect that distinguished the real from the apparent as if by a glance, he was enlisted by friendly connection to lay bare the maxims of Jesuit morality, then sapping the foundations of integrity. With art and skill, playfulness and humour, truth and accuracy, he has presented arguments dressed in the garb of ridicule, that are as invincible as they are amusing. Yet all their point and force spring from the keen and scathing distinctions of the casuist.

This power is also the right arm of the metaphysician. Before him as a subject lies what appears a tangled mass of thoughts and feelings, volitions and decisions, how can he reduce to order this complexity. There is, indeed, variety and complication, but there is also unity and order. The mind is a world in itself, and its variety in unity, and its order in complication occasion the great difficulty in fully comprehending and exhibiting it. It will, however, yield to sharp-sighted distinction, aided by patient application. Its powers will yet be enumerated and arranged, a task not hitherto accomplished in a manner to secure general satisfaction, although some of the secret springs of action may still remain a mystery to

mortals. Few have attempted a task of such difficulty without being called to it as a public duty. All useful writers on the subject have had their peculiarities. Some, like Reid, have been marked by strong common sense; others, like Thomas Brown, for singularly subtle analysis; others, like Kant, for vigor of penetrating thought; and a few like Hamilton, for combined comprehensiveness and penetration. The successful explorer will need to possess, in measure at least, each of these peculiarities. It is not the man of one-sided genius that can map out this intricate complication. Vigor, penetrating power, comprehensiveness, shrewd common sense, patient investigation, and high power of distinction belong to the useful and successful psychologist. But it must not be forgotten that a perfect vision of the human soul in all its movements, attributes and relationships belongs to the Omniscient (Jere. xvii., 10).

In the lawyer we see an embodiment of this faculty. His official life is made up of distinctions. It is his to see that no foreign element be allowed in the evidence against his client. It is his to detect all false trains of reasoning, every lurking fallacy, and every illegitimate conclusion. He sits with mind intent to note every departure from accuracy in the opposing counsel, and mark every salient point from which the adversary may be dislodged. Distinction performs its highest service to man when it aids the Normal faculty to decide aright. The intimate connection between the intellect, especially the power of distinction, and the Normal faculty have led some metaphysicians to deny the existence of a separate Normal faculty, and others to invest the Normal faculty with distinct intellectual power peculiar to itself. Both, in our judgment, are

wrong. The Normal faculty, as will be seen in the subsequent department appropriated to its elucidation, is a distinct power of the human soul of the first importance, as regulating its connection with the supreme Spirit who gave man existence, and of whom he is a dependent subject. But this high faculty employs, that is, the soul under its influence employs, the ordinary intellectual faculties, and not any peculiar ones with which it has been supposed to be endowed, in reaching after a true discernment of the nature of the act, design, or thought called in question.

As an accomplished lawyer is of great service to the judge on the bench by the mass of sifted distinctions which he has laid before him, so this faculty is of great service to the soul when its movements are subjected to the examination of what is commonly called conscience, in enabling that faculty to arrive at a true judgment. The judge will exercise his own discernment in the application of statute law to each particular case, and the Normal faculty will apply its sense of right and wrong, that is, its constitutional law, more or less legible on the human heart, when summoned to act as a judge ; but the aid of distinction may be found as useful in the latter case as the aid of the lawyer in the former.

With distinction are associated its necessary concomitants—*division* and *abstraction.* When we have distinguished forms, colours, or ideas, we have already divided them from others from which they are seen to differ ; and when we have divided them they are mentally abstracted or drawn aside from one another. As application kept steadily in exercise assumes the form of attention, and closest attention results in

penetration according to the power of the intellect, so distinction, following its natural development, necessarily assumes the forms of Division and Abstraction. It is of the first importance in mental analysis that the root-power be distinguished from the branches, and that each be made to assume its proper place.

CHAPTER V.

4.—DISTRIBUTION.

BRANCH FORMS:

APPROPRIATION—CLASSIFICATION—SYMMETRIZATION.

Closely connected with the foregoing is the intellectual attribute which we designate

Distribution.—There is a principle of order in the human soul which, properly developed, tends largely to the progress of knowledge and to the happiness of the race. Associated with this principle, as its offspring, is the idea that there is a place for everything, and that everything is best in its place. Closely examined, this principle is seen to be a keen perception of the relation which one thing bears to another, and its fitness or otherwise for the position in which it is placed. Man likes variety, but not disorder. In a normal state of mind he cannot bear disorder in house or workshop, in Church or State. He will restore order wherever necessary, both by a right arrangement of materials, and by reducing to system all operations. Disorder is a loss of time and power; and who can estimate the value of both? See the workman turning over his box of tools twenty times a day for some instrument out of sight, instead of having a place for each where it could be seen and seized in a moment. See the accountant spending hours, when moments might suffice, in searching for an entrance which his want of system has misplaced.

When the mind has discovered, amidst a variety of things intermingled, several having points of similarity in colour, form, or destination, it seeks to classify them. In this Distinction goes hand in hand with Distribution. The faculty of distinction no sooner divides and abstracts things that differ, than the faculty of distribution begins to classify, by bringing together things which have points of agreement. If we have a mixture of black and white beans before us, we not only distinguish but we mentally classify, and the desire is formed to place all of one colour by themselves; in doing which a pleasure is experienced, as complying with a principle of order deeply seated in our constitution. In like manner material, or form, or size, may constitute the ground of classification. A box may be placed before us with specimens of gold, silver, tin, and lead in the ore. We are interested in marking the distinctions, but we also desire to take them out and place all the specimens of each ore by themselves that we may see each kind to advantage, and estimate the relative value. The mind is sometimes pleased with the sight of variety; but when numerous articles of the same kind are intermingled with others the principle of order comes to the front, with the suggestion to place by themselves things that agree in quality or purpose. The draper will not leave his silks blended with his cottons, nor will the farmer leave his hoes and spades with his ploughs and harrows. Sometimes the idea of symmetry and of want may call this faculty into operation. The artist is engaged on a painting. He must distribute both his figures and his colours. Here there must be enlargement, and there a diminution; here some additional

touches to deepen the colour, and there a reduction to lessen too great prominence. The general will distribute his forces on the field of battle, not by the colour of their facings or the number on their buttons, or the size or nationality of his men, but by the necessities of his position of offence or defence. Where there is weakness in position he will gather strength and raise defences ; where few men are needed few will be appropriated. The idea of local want, in order to completeness in efficiency, regulates his distribution. Thus, also, men in former days stuffed their garments to give their figure a desirable fulness ; and men and women now cover their heads with borrowed hair to supply a real or imaginary want. In such cases the ideal has taken the place of the actual. Men do not see at all times the objects of dissimilarity or the objects which display a want of symmetry before them to elicit abstraction and classification, but the mind supplies the defect. The full symmetrical outline is imagined, and to meet this standard of order and beauty distribution must be made.

Take some common illustrations. See the disorder that reigns for a time at the busy saw mill when the men are few. Boards and planks of all lengths and thicknesses are launched out as they came from the saw. They lie in a straggling and unshapely heap. This is not what the orderly sawyer desired. The fit day is chosen, and order reigns again around the mill. All the planks and boards are neatly piled in the order of their respective lengths and thicknesses, and also with due regard to their kind and quality. When the purchaser arrives he may see in a glance whether he can be supplied or not. The time of neither buyer nor

seller is wasted in searching for an article which is already exposed to view. Or passing by shape and size and having respect to quality or kind, visit the sea shore when the fishermen have drawn their seine to the shore, after enclosing a variety of fishes. The Gospel parable receives its literal fulfilment, for the good of different kinds, without respect to bulk or weight, are placed by themselves as a treasure, while the worthless, however large or attractive in appearance, are cast aside as of no account. Or take an illustration in respect to destination. You enter a general post office at a time when a large foreign mail has arrived. Bags are opened; the stamping is indiscriminate; after which, the classification begins. With the utmost alertness the eye seizes the point of destination in town or country, and the distribution is as prompt as the distinction. For fifty different inland offices, packages are made up with a facility and despatch known only to the expert distributor.

In science, the classification is sometimes made on the possession in common of some particular organ, or the form which the organ may assume. The general form, size, structure, and utility are then disregarded. For example, the conchologist divides his shells into univalves, bivalves, &c., without respect to size or ornament. And the botanist, taking the flower as his ground of distribution, may bind in one class the rose, the strawberry, the apple, the cherry, and the almond. See the facilities for examination and use afforded in a museum by a proper classification of articles; in a legal office, by the due filing of papers; and in a printing office, by a correct distribution of type. In the region of thought this faculty exercises a most beneficial influence

in co-operation with distinction, on which it waits, when ideas and illustrations are made to assume their proper place, and order and lucidity characterise the writing or the speaking as the natural outflow of the mental arrangement. The historian gathers his materials, arranges his divisions, selects his prominent points in civil or ecclesiastical affairs, and then distributes to each point the facts and figures, the persons and parties best fitted to bring out in vivid illustration the transactions of the period. With what elaborate art must this faculty have been exercised by the historian Gibbon during the eleven years (A.D. 1776-1787), in which the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire was passing through his brain. Bridging the chasm between the old world and the new, connecting the ancient with the modern over an expanse of thirteen centuries, many great and momentous events are distributed and decorated with a master's hand. Personages rise in their places to attract and arrest, as well as to instruct; and ornamentation is applied to set off the individual with unwonted luxuriance. While the faculty which precedes, and that which follows Distribution are ever in employment, especially Construction, the admirable exercise of this faculty, with the ample stores of facts and language always at hand, has enabled Gibbon to present a history not surpassed for attractiveness in the whole range of literature.

The public orator divides his subject, distinguishing the main ideas involved in it. He then appropriates or distributes to the introduction something easy and pleasant, to gain the attention and remove prejudice. His strong points are exhibited in all their native

power, purposely disdaining to give them any coloring, but taking care that they shall be seen from all sides; but around his weak points he distributes all his supports, reiterating his assertions to carry the mind by storm; and for his conclusion he reserves a strong force of arguments, illustrations, and exhortations, which, coming in rapid succession, clothed in bold language, and enforced by powerful gesticulation, are expected to carry conviction to every breast. Who can master the ideas so forcibly set forth by Demosthenes, the renouned orator of Greece, without feeling the glow of admiration for the skill displayed by him in the arrangement of materials. In all his great public orations, the art of the distributor is strikingly displayed. Having selected his point of attack, this intellectual champion, like an accomplished artillery officer, arranges his arguments like batteries for a concentrated fire on the object to be demolished, and, passing from one to another, pours in from every quarter a resistless storm of heavy words, till at last, gathering up all arguments, by the nearest approach to a simultaneous discharge from all sides, he seeks, by one grand effort, to leave no remnant of opposition visible. When we reflect on the overwhelming force of his oratory, we cease to wonder that Aischines, against whom the most elaborate oration was pronounced, fled from Athens and never ventured to return.

In the faithful pastor we see the distributor of the bread of life. With a heart quickened by the divine Spirit, a mind stored with sacred truth, and the tongue of the learned, he knows how to speak a word in season. Before him are various states of mind, but for each there is a portion. The ignorant require

instruction, the tempted need warning ; the slothful, a stimulus to action ; the desponding, encouragement ; the weak, strength ; the slumbering, something powerfully startling ; the diligent, approbation ; and the anxious, wise counsel. In the hands of a competent expounder, the inspired oracles, adapted to all conditions, afford the amplest materials for instruction to all classes.

In Appropriation, the mind perceives the relation or claim of a certain object or idea to a certain place, and proceeds to locate it there. In Classification, several objects are seen to bear points of similarity in shape, colour, material, or quality, and they are brought together in distinct classes in the mind, according as they are found to possess the chosen point or badge of resemblance, previous to, and independent of, the actual or possible manual distribution. And in Symmetrization, the mind has formed an ideal of perfection of form or beauty, and perceiving the deficiencies in the actual, as compared with the ideal, proceeds to distribute from its storehouse until every want is supplied, and the perfection of beauty elicits its admiration.

CHAPTER VI.

5.—CONSTRUCTION.

BRANCH FORMS :

ARCHITECTURE—COMPOSITION—IMAGINATION—SYLLOGIZATION.

A VERY slight reflection is sufficient to satisfy even the ordinary mind that the spirit of man is universally endowed with the intellectual power of Construction. He can put together ideas or thoughts on any subject that may engage his attention ; he can build up forms or figures of real or supposed utility or beauty, and he can link together the intellectual frame-work of architectural structures, before a stone or a beam has been placed one upon another. The external exponent of this internal work is what naturally engages general attention. Men listen to the words of conversation without troubling themselves on the process of thought from which it has sprung ; they fasten their eyes on a statue or picture without asking by what means the mental model was fashioned ; and they admire the ornate structure without going beyond the mechanical art of the builder. But it is right to reflect that the words which are so rapidly and wonderfully linked together by the organs of speech, are but the exponents of ideas still more rapidly and wonderfully linked together by the soul : that the beautiful form that has sprung from the painter's brush had first its existence it may be in still higher beauty, in

the mind ; and that the lofty architectural structure, with all its ornaments, or with all its massiveness, was first erected in the wide world of man's intellectual domain. The tongue and the hand give external reality, to the best of their limited ability, to the ideal compositions and constructions of the internal world.

This faculty is not only important but indispensable to man in his present vital connection with matter. It is called into requisition from the beginning till the close of life, by the child striving to frame words to convey its wants to a parent's ear, and by the aged mortal slowly uttering his last requests, by the youthful defence under serious accusation, and by the elaborate reasoning of the matured intellect, by the effort to construct a house of blocks or of sand in childhood's early years, or by the slowly-measured movements of the octogenarian in the formation of his own coffin. Material construction exhibits its richest powers where civilization and refinement reach their highest point. The native Australian in his barbarism will display no art in the construction of his gunyah; and the Maori will be contented with an indifferent whare, as the Micmac is with his bark wigwam ; but the mart of commerce and the seat of refinement will reveal what the cultivated intellect and ample resources can produce ; while the taste of the nobleman and the wealth and ambition of the sovereign elicit the higher displaysof this faculty in the stately mansion and the magnificent palace.

The ancient world has left us material monuments of this constructive power. The ruins of Greece and Italy, the buried palaces of Assyria, above all the stupendous pyramids of Egypt, testify to the energy and skill of the human intellect in material structures. But we need

not go beyond our own generation. See to what perfection machinery has been carried in all the general industries of life. Railroads and canals keep pace with civilization. Steamships cross every ocean—their marvellous machinery proving the constructive power of man. Sometimes an extraordinary effort calls forth the admiration of the world. It may be a timepiece of so extensive and complicated a nature that men may well marvel at the display of mechanical genius; or it may be the building of some monster ironclad, destined, so far as human intention can go, to bear down the largest ship afloat, or of some Great Eastern, with which the name of the illustrious Brunel must ever be associated, devoted to the unique task of uniting the continents of earth by what may be designated the speaking cable.

On this faculty the architect and the artist lean as on a right arm. The Maori will exhibit the plan of his pah, the Polynesian chief the picture of his intended war canoe, the educated and accomplished architect his cottage or palatial residence, his workshop or his warehouse, his college or his lighthouse; while the naval expert will exhibit the draught of his clipper yacht, or of the three-decked floating palace of an inland sea. The artist sits before his easel with palette in hand, and calling into play this noble faculty, there appears at his command the smiling countenance or the look of despair, the marriage group or the funeral procession, the lonely traveller or the crowded dwelling, the embowered cottage or the rugged mountain top, the silvery stream meandering through gardens or the tempest-tossed ocean. Not the natural only, but the unnatural also spring from his pencil or his brush. He can call forth the smile or the hearty laugh from the uncouth or the grotesque.

He can convey an idea of keenest point by a peculiar and speaking representation, or he can teach a lesson of highest morality or of noblest ambition by the simplest creation of his constructive art. How powerful and important the art of picture-making. Pictures teach. Their lessons are almost indelible on the tablets of the soul. They can ennoble, and they may degrade. They live in the memory when the artist is forgotten, and they continue to teach when the subject which they adorned has passed into oblivion.

By the aid of this faculty the whole race of deceivers ply their trade. If it be the forgery of a promissory note, or the grand mining scheme of swindling speculators; if it be the snaring of an owl or the capture of an imperial army, the constructive power is alike called into requisition. By it villains of every class are enabled for a time to elude the vigorous pursuit and the strong arm of justice. But the same ingenious faculty can put together the dismembered particles of evidence, until he who runs can read, as in bold type, the name of the secret transgressor.

In the domain of literature, this faculty has left monuments more enduring than brass. By it the simplest sentence and the most profound reasoning, are spread out to the sight or the hearing. To it the world is indebted for the plainest historical narrative, and for the grandest allegorical poem. It has left enduring displays of its power in Homer's Iliad, Milton's Paradise Lost, Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress, and hundreds of other works of less extensive fame, but of equal utility. Shakespeare called it into vigorous use with surprising effects, aided, as it was, with uncommon penetration and practical sagacity. In Sir Walter Scott it held high

prominence, and was subjected to incessant exercise in the production of poetry and novels. His vivid descriptions mark an acquired aptitude in literary construction. What appears on the page is but the transcript of the vision of the brain, and that vision the construction of this high intellectual power availing itself of the stores of information gathered from every quarter. In his wake follow the hundreds of novelists of the present day. More than any other author of modern days, he nourished, if he did not in many places create, the taste for the reading of tales. To many, novels are the chief intellectual food. If of the highest quality, and sparingly used, the effect might be beneficial. But the low and degrading character of many, and the utterly useless material of most, has an enfeebling and pernicious effect on society which will not vanish with the present generation. In the construction of all this class of works, this faculty assumes the form of imagination. This term is in common use, and conveys the idea of power to construct images from materials of recognised utility and truth. So limited, its operation may be highly useful. But too often the images are not true, though drawn from matters of fact, for the construction is defective. But this noble faculty is degraded and prostituted when materials having no real existence in nature, in fact, or in history, are strung together in a manner to deceive the judgment and inflame the emotions to deeds of crime or pollution. We will not bind the mind down to tread forever the path of those who have gone before, to repeat only the facts of past history, to strike out no new path, to originate nothing. But we would have the nimble steed to be furnished with strong reins, and the explorer to keep a sharp eye when on untrodden paths. By this faculty we

can bridge in a few seconds the ocean, and construct a ladder to the moon ; we can build a tower so high that we can overlook the sun ; or we can mount an airy chariot of our own fashioning, and ride round the great belts of Saturn. But what avails these castles in the air, these idle reveries ? They may set the mind free for a moment from its sordid cares, and teach us that although now confined to a material framework, we are endowed with a spirit to whom space is of small account when present restraints are removed.

In mental, as in physical warfare, construction occupies a conspicuous place. The form of the rifle, the cannon or the battery, is of the first importance. In the construction of each, this power is exercised. So, in the formation of a sentence, the construction of a syllogism or the extended display of many separate arguments, this faculty is indispensable. Here the connection between Psychology and Logic is apparent. In the ordinary syllogism, we have Distinction, Distribution, Construction, and Deduction at work. Distinction furnishes a selection of terms, Distribution arranges the particulars which belong to these terms, Construction unites these propositions in their proper order; and Deduction, our next intellectual power, draws the conclusion. As the eyes, hands, and feet often co-operate in one work, as in the turning lathe, the sewing machine, and the loom, so different intellectual faculties constantly co-operate and manifestly in the ordinary course of reasoning. The incessant changes arising from this co-operation occasion a prime difficulty in mapping out the mental powers.

CHAPTER VII.

6.—DEDUCTION.

BRANCH FORMS :

SAGACITY—RATIOCINATION.

PURSUING the chosen order of exercise, we now reach the Intellectual power, which we designate

DEDUCTION.—We occasionally hear a remark passed concerning a particular man, that "he is a man of good common sense"; of another, that "he is a man of great practical sagacity"; and of a third, that "he is a man of clear and sound judgment." These different expressions point alike to the possession of a deductive faculty, a power, in addition to, and in advance of simple Apprehension. What is common sense ?—It is, in ordinary language, the prompt discernment of what is fitting, proper, or becoming, amid the ever-varying circumstances of life. And what is practical sagacity ?—It is the keen deduction of the issues resulting from any cause or causes now in operation, or supposed to be in operation. And what is sound judgment ?—It is a deduction from an accurate apprehension of the relation which one thing bears to another. Thus, Solomon concluded, that is, deducted, that she was the true mother of the child who could not bear to see it cut in halves.

When this power, called by some discernment, apprehension, or intuition, is closely examined, it is found in each case to be a deductive faculty. There is an apprehension, intuition or discernment in the mental

process, but there is something more. Beyond apprehension, in its most enlarged form of comprehension, there is a subsequent mental act, the drawing out of an additional truth from the truths or facts which have been compared. This truth now produced may be involved in the previous facts apprehended, as a part in the whole; or it may be something totally different, a result of two co-operating agencies; but in either case, the mental act of which this is the result, is properly designated a *deduction*, and not an intuition or direct apprehension. In common sense there is a swift collation of the act or word contemplated, with some rule, custom, or usage, followed by a prompt deduction that the word or act is proper or improper, becoming or unbecoming. Repetition or experience renders the decision, that is, the deduction, almost instantaneous. In practical sagacity there is a collation of knowledge or experience of past operations, both causes and effects, with the work in contemplation, when from a comparison of causes and circumstances an opinion is deduced according to the keenness of discernment or apprehension. In sound judgment there is a deduction or drawing out of a particular object or person from a general mass to which it is seen to belong, and of which certain characteristics are affirmed. In Solomon's deduction above referred to, the process ran thus: All true mothers have a tender regard for their offspring, and cannot bear to see them wounded or slain; this mother has a tender regard for this infant, and cannot bear to see it slain, but will rather relinquish all claim to it; therefore she is a true mother, and in the circumstances, having regard to the total want of feeling on the part of the other, she is *the* true mother of this child.

The consideration of this faculty touches on several questions on which metaphysicians have been divided in opinion. They relate to intuition and the law of causation. We shall give our own deliberate judgment. What is an intuition?—It is a direct apprehension of the mind, as distinguished from a deduction. The mind instantly seizes the truth, without any intermediate process of reasoning, however swift or subtle. We think that Dr. McCosh, a distinguished metaphysician of the present day, in dealing with this subject, has not been sufficiently careful in the use of terms. He says (Div. Gov., p. 534, appendix, 4th ed.): "Every faculty in its primitive exercise is intuitive, and every true original faculty furnishes cognitions which are intuitive." Is it so, that an act of attention or penetration, of classification or construction, be it ever so primitive, is an intuition? This question carries its own answer. Apprehension, or if you will, intuition, accompanies each of these acts, but is itself distinct from them, as the eyes are distinct from the hands, with which they co-operate. Is there not such a power or faculty in the mind as judgment or deduction, that by which we draw a conclusion from given premises? Is not such a faculty "in its primitive exercise" essentially deductive, and not intuitive? Either there is no such original faculty as deduction, or it is only another name for direct apprehension, or Dr. McCosh has confounded things that essentially differ. Adopt the opinion of McCosh, and you blend all the powers of the mind into one, and this one you call Intuition. If we wish to have any accuracy in terms, we cannot pass off as an intuition what is a deduction. It may be said that in drawing the

conclusion from the premises, there is simply a keen apprehension of the secreted existence of the conclusion in the premises, as a part in the whole. Admitting the clearest apprehension of the relation of the propositions, and also the full scope of the ideas involved in them, there is still the *drawing out* from the general truths, and the moulding into form of this particular truth or predicate. If there is to be any enumeration of mental faculties, we cannot ignore, with all the subtle distinctions that can be drawn, the broad line of demarkation between apprehension, simple, direct, intuitive, and deduction often an elaborately drawn out result of the protracted comparison of detached facts or ideas.

We also differ from Sir W. Hamilton, McCosh, and others, in respect to causation. What is the law of causation ?—It is that principle, or the abiding conviction, that every effect must have a cause, and a cause adequate to the effect. Is this conviction acquired, or is it intuitive ? Does it grow with us, or is it intuitively apprehended without experience ? McCosh holds distinctly (Divine Gov., p. 540), that it is intuitive. Clearly, in this case, McCosh's intuition is the conviction of an experienced, if not a matured intellect. Our decided opinion is that the conviction or principle, so far as it is our own, is the result of knowledge and experience ; in other words, that it is acquired. We certainly are born without ideas. We have a variety of powers in the germ, which are developed as we grow older. At a period so early that we cannot trace their origin, two convictions spring up within us. These are, our personal existence and the existence of an external world. As our acquaintance with mind and matter increases, we observe that certain results are produced by the operation of

certain causes on mind or matter. Extending our observations, we perceive that dead matter is devoid of the power of moving itself—that when moved it is operated upon by some power from without. In our ignorance we might attribute the change to a. very inadequate cause. But experience is ever growing, and from an accumulation of facts we learn to demand a force proportioned to the change produced. With experience we expect to see the same result occur when the same causes are set in operation in precisely the same circumstances. In the same way we expect that every modification in the cause or operating force will have a corresponding modification in the result. An artillery officer has discovered by trial that a certain charge of gun-power will carry his ball to the fort which he is besieging; he expects that as often as that charge is placed in his cannon the ball will reach the fort. But when he wishes to strike nearer or further off, he will take care to vary his charge, and also the position of the muzzle of his gun. The principle is the same in an operation by which a pane of glass is broken, and a city is laid in ruins; by which a spadeful of earth is lifted, and a lofty railway embankment is constructed. We must have a cause, force, or power adequate to the effect produced, whatever that may be. When there is no previous knowledge or experience of the power or force in the cause, it is impossible to conceive what the result may be. The savage who has neither seen nor known what a rifle is, can form no conception of the result that will follow from pulling the trigger when the rifle is ready to be discharged. Let him see it discharged in this way, and he may expect a similar report by simply pulling the trigger when the rifle is unloaded.

Experience will correct his mistakes, and he will learn that every effect must have a suitable cause. Can we say that the connection of a uniform sequence after various satisfactory experiments, is an intuitive conviction. To me it appears most evident that it is a deduction from past experience or observation, and falls directly under the operations of the faculty which we are now considering. If intuitive, we had no need of experience. Intuition in causation belongs to the Omniscient. He alone knows, before experiment, the whole inherent force in any cause, and the whole powers of resistance in any object acted upon, and the ultimate sequence of any action.

In tracing back from effects to causes we have what Kant calls a *regressus ad infinitum*. It is true in a certain sense. We do go back, step by step, till we reach the first great Cause of finite mind and matter. McCosh's reply (530) to Kant is—"When we have found a power in the Divine Being adequate to produce all the effects which we see in the universe, the *regressus* ceases." . . . . "We hold that the intuition goes back to a substance in which power resides, but that on reaching this point it is satisfied." . . . . "When we at last reach a substance which bears no traces of being an effect, we may stop, for the mind is satisfied." If intuition, that is direct apprehension, is not exercised when we look for a return of the effect from a reapplication of the cause, but rather the power of deduction acting on past knowledge, is it exercised when we are "going back to the substance in which power resides?" We think not. There is indeed apprehension, but there is also application and distinction united to deduction, operating on all past knowledge or experience,

to discover if each cause, as it comes up, is not itself an effect. When the mind gets back to a Being, "in whom power resides," is it satisfied? We think not; for another and higher Being may have given that residing power. Are we satisfied when the mind has "reached a substance which leave no traces of being an effect?" No; for the thought will occur that it only requires a higher power of penetration to discover these traces. Does the *regressus* cease when we have found a Being "adequate to produce all the effects which we see in the universe?" No; for we can conceive a creation or universe superior to the present, and requiring the exercise of higher powers than now possessed by the cause which produced these effects. Where then do we rest? Where Kant said, though in a different sense of the terms, "*ad Infinitum*." We reach the Infinite One. We cannot go behind Him. He is Self-existent. When we reach the self-existent, and as a consequence the eternal, the unchangeable, and the omnipotent, we do rest; for we have reached the end, or rather the Beginning. Beyond Him no flight of soul can carry us —wherever we rest He is—and therefore we cease and are satisfied, because we deduce the conclusion that when we have reached the infinitely perfect and good we neither can nor need go further. It may not be unnecessary to add that, while differing from McCosh and Hamilton in their wide application of intuition, we are supported in our views on the point in hand by such men of great intellectual power as Sir John Herschel, Dr. Thomas Brown, John Stuart Mill, and others.

In the everyday movements of life deduction is in constant exercise. When the subjects are familiar, the decision is swift, as if by intuition; when they are

strange and intricate, a just inference is the result of patient and undisturbed investigation. But in Mathematics and Logic this faculty has a peculiar field. With angles and sides given, the mathematician is ever deducing equalities or differences. He proceeds on certain axioms. Are these axioms directly apprehended as true? We are not prepared to say that they are all so apprehended at first sight. The truth of some of them at least is not seen by all minds until the test of experience is applied. To minds familiar with the study, their truth is apparent at first sight. With accepted data the progress of deduction accords with the simplicity or complexity of the problem. The logician only asks an array of facts. He will throw them into form, and present you with the conclusion. He will apprehend the meaning of terms; distinguish those that differ; distribute each to its place; construct his syllogism; and finally he will, with ease or difficulty, according to the nature of the subject, in the exercise of this faculty, deduce the correct or natural inference. To the geometrician and arithmetician, deduction and construction are the right and left arms. They constantly co-operate. When construction has done its work the way is prepared for deduction, and when the latter has performed its requisite task the further work of construction may proceed, if the desired conclusion is not yet reached. Hence, in all great financial problems, the vigorous power of deduction is of the first importance. Without it extensive trade enterprises would speedily collapse, and the monetary transactions of an empire fall into inextricable confusion. By its steady exercise, guided by clear apprehension of the law and of the deed under

examination, the judge is enabled, through much conflicting testimony, to draw the just inference and declare his judgment of the case submitted to his adjudication. The clear mental vision finally arrived at is not the intuition which some modern psychologists delight to harp upon, but the result of numerous threads of evidence all drawn separately out and fashioned into one whole *deduction*, which carries universal conviction with it. Under its operation the supreme Judge, the Man Christ Jesus, will finally deliver the legitimate inference infallibly drawn from a comparison of human conduct with the law and light afforded to each for the regulation of life. Let us then live as those whose thoughts, words, and deeds are subject to an inferential deduction, from which there is no appeal.

CHAPTER VIII.

7.—INQUISITION.

BRANCH FORMS:

INTROSPECTION—RETROSPECTION—PROSPECTION.

One of the most valuable powers possessed by the human intellect is that of self-inspection. The intelligent man knows that he has the power of reflection, that he can turn the eyes of his understanding upon himself, that he can explore his own thoughts, and search out some idea or vision of the past which he wishes to revive and examine. This power of sight and search we have chosen to designate Inquisition. If disposed to add to the swelling vocabulary of our language, we might have restored the old term *Spectation*, or framed from the Greek the equally expressive word *Theoretion*. But it is better to employ a common term in a new way, and all the more as that term gives prominence to the important idea of search, which is something beyond sight.

Inquisition embraces Introspection, Retrospection, and Prospection. We can look within and examine the past and present, and prospect or search into the future. The first step in the inquiry into the operations and condition of the soul is a turning of the mental vision from the external world, with which it is so naturally in contact, upon the soul itself. The mind can look upon itself, and so become conscious of what is passing

within it. A question may here arise: Is the mind always conscious of what is passing within it? If by conscious we simply mean aware of or alive to impressions or feelings operating in the soul, we say this belongs to sentient, intelligent existence, and only ceases with non-existence. But if by conscious we are to understand a distinct knowledge of the particular thought or feeling moving in the soul, we say this is the result of introspection, a looking within on the operations of the soul, a simple inquisition. We cannot ignore the fact that the mind is receiving literally millions of impressions from without, of which it takes, at the time, no distinct notice so far as to inquire what they are, or why they come; nor can we say that these so-called vague impressions are mere useless lumber in the recesses of the intellect. But it is better to confine the term conscious to a distinct perception of what is occupying the mind at any time, the thought or feeling with which it is engaged, and that perception or cognition, the result of introspection.

The mind will bear to be looked at and examined. At first it is very intolerant of restraint, and shows great impatience and restlessness under examination. But if approached with gentleness and patience, as the tamer approaches the wild animal which he would subdue, it will by degrees suffer itself to be closely inspected, and finally to be minutely searched. It is difficult to form a just estimate of this faculty. As the external organs of vision furnish the mind with a large measure of its knowledge of external nature, so this power furnishes to the mind a knowledge of its own thoughts, plans, desires, and habits. By it we read the condition and doings of the soul. We may mark the

indulgence of a wrong train of thoughts, and check their further progress. We may see the rise of an improper feeling, such as envy, jealousy, anger, and before it can assume control, we can suppress it. We may discover the influence which a certain habit had begun to assume over our thoughts, and either take alarm from its evil nature, or feel encouraged from its elevating and ennobling effects. Especially are our plans and purposes the objects of scrutinizing attention. The origin and issue of such are inspected, that we do not wrong on the plea of a good motive, and that right be not done from a bad motive. "Know thyself," is a maxim of the first importance to a responsible being. To obey it, we must be endowed with the power of introspection, and exercise that power to the extent of close self-examination. Better it would be to be deprived of eyesight than to be devoid of this inner vision. This personal inquisition is generally aided by the exclusion of external sights and sounds. When the eyes are closed, in the silence of the night, or better still, the early dawn, the mind can survey its own domain, inspect its own apparatus, and explore its own treasures. Cooled and refreshed as if by the dews of the night, it will pass and repass over its own territory with brightened vision and sprightly vivacity. For this, however, it requires training. No tyro in mental inquisition can rein in and guide this restless spirit.

Mysterious being! It knows no rest. In midnight hours, when profound slumber enfolds and fetters the body, it is active as a bird released from a cage, or an animal relieved from a burden. It takes the opportunity to roam at random, construct the most surprising visions, and perform the most difficult operations.

But when the morning comes it can examine the doings of the night, and read its joys and fears from the impressions of those dark and silent hours. To dreams in general we attach no importance ; they are but the disordered remembrance of the past, or the broken anticipations of the future. But we should run counter to a very wide experience if we did not admit that at times certain events, with their circumstances, are presented, we say not from what sources, in the visions of the night to the mind of one who may be particularly interested in these events. The agitation has sometimes been so great by these mental impressions that the slumber has been broken ; when the mind immediately calling into operation the faculty of inquisition, searched into every lineament of the dream and took notice of every circumstance for future use. Many such visions have been fulfilled to the very letter.

In Retrospection this power is still more largely exercised. We are very frequently looking back on past impressions and ideas. Yet this looking back is all within the soul, and is simply an inquisition for something we want amid the stores of the mind. At this point we touch what has been called the association of ideas. It is apparent to all reflecting persons that ideas, facts, impressions are so associated in the mind, or so cohere to each other, that the calling up of one is the bringing up of others along with it, or the discovery of one is the sight of others beside it. Things naturally cohere which have been together in time and place. The mind abhors disorder, and it is disposed to group together ideas which have occurred together ; in other words, the impressions are stored away as they

come, and as they are seen to refer to each other. Take the case of one hearing for the first time the strange notes of an unseen bird. When first heard, there is no conception of the form or colour of the bird present in the mind, but when once the bird has been seen, while giving utterance to these notes, there is associated with these peculiar sounds the conception of the figure and colour of the bird, so that whenever they are again heard, the conception or idea associated with them follows instantly. Or take the case of a national flag. When we know not the nation to which it belongs we may only think of its shape and colours; but so soon as we know the nation of which it is the emblem, a new idea is associated with it, and the sight of the flag anywhere brings up with it the nation to which it belongs. Sometimes a long chain of incidents is linked with the explanatory idea. When the connected idea has been very faint from, it may be, a simple impression, we may have some difficulty in discovering it. We see a stranger and are told his name. We have not looked on him very closely, nor have we repeated his name; we meet the same face some weeks after, we know that we have seen him before, but are quite unable to recall his name, at least at once. But let us meet him several times and hear his name repeated while we are looking on him; the person and the name become linked together; in other words, with the impression of the man is associated an idea or name—they lie together in the mind; the sight of the one is the sight of the other.

In the arrangement of its stores the mind seeks some distinguishing mark as of time or place. The events of a year are often passed over, or overhauled, to use a

sailor's phrase, and the idea of the year labelled to them. Hence, in making inquiry for a certain fact or event, you ask in what year it happened, and finding *that* you go with the precision of a druggist to his labelled boxes, to search among the events of that year, in the order of time as they occurred. In this inquisition you are greatly aided by the idea of place. With the name of a certain place in which you have resided for a longer or shorter period, many impressions are associated. Take the case of a man going round the world in one of our mail steamers. He may go east round to the west, or west round to the east; and he may have in all a dozen of stopping places. With each of these are linked many ideas of persons, places, and scenes, so that the recalling or discovering of the name of the place will bring with it a train of impressions of sights and sounds. We see the same cohesion or concatenation in music or singing. A man who cannot read the notes of music may yet learn to sing with great accuracy by practising, after hearing others. The notes, long and short, high and low, become linked in a certain order, that the sounding of the one is followed naturally by the sound next in order. In this case there is little doubt but the nervous and muscular action of the voice has much to do with the regularity of repetition, as in the acquired facility in the use of the fingers in playing the piano. When words accompany the notes the association of ideas appears as in other cases.

Again, we notice that an apprehended resemblance between an object now seen and one formerly known brings out a chain of thoughts and impressions. The traveller remarks: That hill reminds me so much of

such a place—and that lake or bay of such another. A person in the street remarks: That lady passing reminds me so much of one I met in such a place many years ago. How is this explained? Where have these impressions been during the years that have rolled by? And how are they now brought to light? The explanation seems to be as follows: The mind is ever receiving the impressions, some of which are of figure and form, others of ideas or conceptions, which are treasured up naturally in the order of time. It is possible that no impression is ever lost which is received by a healthy or ordinary mind, at least while the texture of the brain is undisturbed. These impressions may be afterwards re-arranged, and in a manner labelled, by certain distinguishing marks. Every repeated presentation to the mind, or as often as it is seen or looked at by it, the impression is deepened, and the mind becomes familiar with it. When a new or strange impression reaches the mind, it is viewed by it in contact with its past stores, as if with the question, What is this? or, To what does this belong? when its identity, or similarity, or points of dissimilarity, with some past impression or idea may soon be distinguished, and the man may be heard saying, I saw this before—I saw a person very like that man yesterday—or how changed from what he once was, how worn, and haggard, and grey, after those years of absence in a foreign land. When the new object has been subjected to this inquisitorial faculty, and the stores of the past have been ransacked for something at all resembling it, and in vain, the impression is declared to be novel, strange, mysterious, and the mind takes notice of it as such. Such would be the sight of

a foreigner some time ago in the interior of China, or the sight of a steamer in former years in the bay of some Polynesian isle.

When a man resumes a subject of conversation or writing in which he has been interrupted, he looks back or within, that is, in ordinary language, he tries to recollect, the most recent conception or idea connected with that subject, and constructs a sentence that will properly grow out of, or belong to, that last idea. When asked to recollect some fact of the past as occurring in a certain place, he calls this faculty of inquisition into vigorous use, and seeks for the impression or conception of the place in which it was said to occur, and then of the time, in the hope that with the conception of the place and such a time will be found each event that took place in the order of occurrence. The impressions have followed each other in order, the mind has stored them in that order; many of them are transparencies—the sight of one is the sight of a group; in a moment, a whole scene is the object of vision, as if a panorama had been rolled out, and all by the prying application of a term or name, which, as a spring, acting doubly, has rolled up the present and rolled out the past.

The power of retrospection, commonly called memory, is often referred to by materialists in proof of their theory. But the argument is far from conclusive in their favour. If mind is refined matter, mind must change with the change of matter. Physiology informs us that the material of the human body is ever being renewed while life lasts; and it is asserted that once in seven years the whole has been changed. If matter is so renewed, and mind is matter, this mind must be so renewed. But we find that the memory of the events

of childhood remain with old men, proving that the person has continued the same, whatever changes have passed over the body. As the body is ever undergoing change, and the mind remains substantially the same, the body and the mind must be radically distinct, and therefore the mind cannot be matter such as the tissue of the body is. It may be said that the mind, if matter, could be so renewed piece-meal as not to disturb its identity over the lapse of years. Our reply is, that it is incomprehensible that the innumerable impressions of events and attendant circumstances, could be renewed on the material of the brain without the renewal of the sensations and reflections which first produced them. As a matter of fact, we know that scars remain only from deep material wounds; all the lighter bruises, erasures or cuts disappear in a short time. But apparently a more formidable argument is brought forward when it is asserted that an injury to the body affecting the brain, destroys the memory. We at once admit that persons suffering from ill-health are at times subject to a loss of memory. The loss may occur suddenly, by paralysis, or by exhaustion of the vital powers of the system. But what does this prove? That mind is matter?—By no means. But simply that mind, the human mind, can only operate in our present state of existence through matter—that is, brain matter—in a certain state of vitality. A larger degree of vitality is required for some mental operations than for others. Retrospection is one of these; and with it we may add Application and Construction in their various degrees. We may sometimes use our hands, when we cannot walk; so we may use some mental powers in a feeble way, when we cannot use others. Inquisition, in all its

branches, demands vigorous vitality. Those who have heavy mental work must take care that the brain is well nourished by suitable blood.

The mind is often engaged in prospecting or forecasting the future. The youth often indulges in bright anticipations of the future in store for him. The aged frequently cast their eyes back on the past, and sit musing on the glories that surround the setting sun; but sometimes, looking beyond this earth, their vision is directed skyward, as knowing that their night is far spent, and the dawn of an eternal day is at hand. Prospection may be the offspring of hope or desire, but it may also be the result of a sense of duty, and in either case it is easily distinguishable from that which gives rise to it. In prospection or foresight the mind makes inquisition amid all its stores for what will cast light on the darkness of the future. When the future is that of place, inquisition is made for all information pertaining to that place; when it is that of condition, search is made for all causes operating towards the desired or feared result. The voyager looks forward from day to day to the place where he is to land. If he has been there before, his past conceptions of the place are reviewed, and he already brings before his mind the main features of the harbour, wharf, and city towards which he is moving. If he has friends there anxiously awaiting him, and to whom he is much attached, he will all the more frequently search the stored conceptions of the past, that he may already dwell in thought where he so much desires to be in bodily presence. If he has not been there before, he gathers up from all quarters what information he can concerning the place, searching the minds of others by his questions for the conceptions in which

he finds himself defective, and from all he can learn, frames, by the faculty of construction, an idea or mental vision of the place with all its surroundings. Sometimes the prospect is gloomy in the extreme. A storm is moving up in front of us, and we are moving down to it. Resources are diminishing and dangers are increasing. The mind is searched for past experience to resist the approaching evil, or to meet it with firmness, when it cannot discover a way of escape. The statesman is much engaged in prospection. He will forecast the natural results of a diminishing revenue in a curtailment of expenditure or an increase of debt; unless there has been a large excess in the past. Or he may calculate from a ratio of increase in resources how much he can safely expend throughout the year on works of public utility. Is not this a mere question in arithmetic?—Not exactly. He has many probabilities and uncertainties to take into account; and must trace from past experience of the operations of similar laws in similar circumstances the most probable results from the operation of his proposed tariff. He makes his estimate, and is applauded or condemned, at the close of the financial period, according as his power of inquisition, as foresight, has enabled him to see very accurately the future, or proved its defect in a lamentable shortcoming.

Happy is the man who, in the use of this faculty as a power of self-inspection, can see the lineaments of a renewed moral nature within him, and from the law of progress may see the perfection of the divine image, and his consequent admission into the select family of which the great God-man is the head—who, after a careful exploration of the road on which he has been

journeying, may safely conclude that its termination is the heavenly Jerusalem—and who, in the natural decay of the physical frame which assures an early dissolution, discovers in himself from the indwelling of the Holy Spirit the germ of immortality, and justly anticipates the development of that germ in a glorious eternity.

CHAPTER IX.

8.—EXHIBITION.

BRANCH FORMS:

PRESENTATION—PARABOLIC AND SYMBOLIC REPRESENTATION.

THE human intellect possesses the important faculty of holding forth, presenting, and illustrating its conceptions, by means of language, direct and simple, by illustrations or material pictures, and by symbols. To this power we give the name of

EXHIBITION.—It might appear to some that in this action the mind is exercising no particular faculty, but simply the general power of communication with the external world by material organs, or that, if any power is exercised, it is only that of construction, which has already been considered. On closer reflection, it will be seen that the mind can not only invest an idea in plain language; it can also adorn and illustrate it, as if holding it out in a picture; it can go still further off, and select symbols as exponents or exhibitions which have no formal resemblance to the objects which they represent; and it can employ what has been constructed and arranged in holding it forth to the admiration or detestation of men, and in pressing it upon their attention. We have placed this power thus far in the rear, because by it the highest conceptions of the soul are displayed; it employs all the preceding attributes, and

is, in a manner, the mouth or tongue of the soul. By it the loftiest adorations and supplications are laid before the throne of the Eternal, and by it, alas! the lowest scurrilities and vilest blasphemies exhibit the depths of corruption into which the human spirit can fall. Construction is its favourite assistant, but may not be confounded with it. To the power that can hold out a conception, turn it over and over that it may be seen in every light; bring all the light of heaven and earth to illuminate it; place side by side objects of comparison; spread it out to its utmost bounds; adorn it with all conceivable attractions, and press its reception with all the persuasive force of the soul, we must assign a place distinct from the faculty of construction, even in its most complicated form.

The mind seeks to convey its thoughts and feelings by sounds. Many of the inferior animals express their instincts and feelings in a similar way. But man shows his superiority by framing a language which may be constantly used as the exponent of his conceptions. Words or sounds are exponents of distinct ideas. Modifications of these sounds are modifications of the ideas. The combination of the one is the combination of the other. Sounds are also heard expressive of joy, as laughter; and of pain or sorrow, as wailing or moaning. Lower animals have also their groaning under pain, and their muttering under pleasure. Man advances a step when he frames a written language, using signs as exponents of sounds. Sounds, though often powerful and full of thought, are transitory and fleeting; signs, with all their modifications and combinations, are permanent or enduring.

When the mind, in exhibiting a thought or expressing

a sentiment, has failed in producing the impression desired, it has recourse to other terms, and if they fail to be apprehended by the hearer, the conception or idea is reconstructed, or the subject presented from another aspect, and suitable terms adopted for the new conception. When the conception is unusual, and the terms of the language defective or scanty, the mind may burst beyond the limits of ordinary use, and coin new terms, or endeavour to supplement by gestures the defect of sounds.

If the idea is not sufficiently presented by the use of plain direct terms, illustrations are called in to aid the exhibition. And in this the speaker borrows from objects of nature with which he is most familiar. The hunter will speak of one as swift as a moose, as slippery as an eel, as shy as a weasel, or as savage as a wolf. When the North American Indian would illustrate the grasping covetousness of the pale-faced European, under the guise of friendship, he said: "When the pale-faced stranger came, he saw Indian seated on a log, and came to him and said, 'Brother Indian, let me sit beside you.' The Indian moved over, and gave him a seat. After a little, he again said, 'Brother Indian, move over a little more.' The Indian gave him more room. The request was soon repeated, until at last the Indian had no room to sit upon the log, having moved from one end to the other. Not satisfied, the pale-faced insisted on giving up the whole log, which the Indian refusing to do, the fight began." The Almighty, in communicating his thoughts to his creatures, often adopted the same method. He sent Jeremiah to the house of a potter that he might see him at work, and when there he told him that with the same ease as the

potter made or unmade an earthen vessel, so could He make or unmake any kingdom or nation. And when he would give the same prophet a clear conception of the two classes existing at the time in the nation of Israel, he set before him two baskets of figs—the one the very best, the other the very worst—the latter only fit to be thrown away.

Another mode of exhibition is the parabolic. This is not a simple illustration of a detached truth, but a continuous narrative of what is true in nature, and may have occurred in fact; and designed to convey a lesson which would be less forcibly expressed in plain and direct language. The parable of the ewe lamb, as used by Nathan against David, exhibited more keenly the greed and unfeeling cruelty of the king than any plain terms. Under cover of the narrative he was able also to finish without violent interruption, as might have been the case had he proceeded to charge the king directly with the crimes. Our Saviour adopted a similar method with much of his teaching. Attention was secured by a simple narrative; the impression produced had a connected and permanent character—the lesson would either be gathered at the close or remain for future study; and the incidents of the narrative, as often as they occurred in actual life before the hearer, would attach themselves to or call up the lessons associated at first with them. It furnished truths with hooks like seeds, that they might stick wherever they touched, and morals with pictures that might be photographed upon the soul.

In advance of the parabolic is the symbolic. In prophecy this form of exhibition holds a high place. In the visions of Ezekiel, Daniel, and John, the Divine

Being presents the most prominent events in symbols. Ezekiel saw a vision of wheels within wheels moving rapidly, but under complete control, illustrating the providences of God which are complicated, rapid, but under perfect control. Daniel saw wild beasts as the winged leopard of the West, representing the swiftness and ferocity of the Macedonian conqueror. John, among many symbols, saw two women, one clothed with the sun and having the moon under her feet, representing the true Church, the other arrayed in purple and scarlet, and seated upon a scarlet-coloured beast, and with a golden cup in her hand, representing, as all who have eyes may see, the false and apostate Church which has had its seat in Rome. Man readily takes up this mode of communicating ideas. Among all nations, from the rudest to the most civilized, symbols of authority or subjection, of office or rank, of sale or compact, have been in use from the earliest times. In this faculty may we see the origin of the hieroglyphic writings.

To the public speaker exhibition is of the first importance, and ought to be cultivated with great assiduity. The orator, the statesman, the lawyer, and the preacher depend largely upon their power of presenting, clothing, illustrating, and urging their conceptions or convictions. They distinguish and distribute, construct and deduce; but yet they must hold forth, adorn, and press their sentiments. See the specimens of oratory which have come down to us from ancient times. In some the power lies in the arguments; in others in the illustrations; and in others in the vehement persuasions. In the best there is a blending of the three, expressed in the choicest language. The good is painted in its brightest colours, the evil in its

worst. What is fitted to move the passions, as stimulating to action, is seized with energy, and plied with ardour. Modern orators copy the natural and the logical. Some excel in declamation, others in invective; some in pictorial illustration, others in pathos; some in richness of diction, others in force of reasoning. Each has his own style, his own peculiarity, and natural spring of power. Speech has vast influence, but few public speakers take pains to make themselves effective. The statesman trusts to his facts and figures, the lawyer to his distinctions and legal knowledge, and the preacher to his general acquaintance with doctrine and the critical knowledge of the text in question. This common defect demands a remedy.

It is in adoration and prayer that this faculty is called to display its noblest efforts. The endeavour to comprehend that wondrous Being whom man would adore, his position of authority, the splendour of His throne and attendants, and the perfection and glory of his character tends to enlarge the mind to its utmost capacity, and furnishes the materials for the loftiest conceptions of praise. Then is heard from the elevated spirit of man, the outburst, "Hallelujah! the Lord God omnipotent reigneth! Salvation and glory, and honour and power, and might and dominion be to Him who sits upon the throne." When the highest thoughts have been expressed the soul is conscious of its inability to comprehend the Self-existent; and bending low as it approaches the Omnipresent can only exclaim, with covered face, "Holy, holy, holy, Eternal Jehovah, incomprehensible One, from thee I am, by thee I live, to thee I come—before thee I bow—thine I am, and shall be for ever." And where shall pleadings be heard, and

the soul exhibit all its depths of feeling if not at the throne of mercy, when unending wrath is deprecated and unending glory sought. There, in truth, the great battle of life is fought and won; the conqueror receiving a diadem outweighing in value all the crowns ever worn on mortal brows.

CHAPTER X.

9.—RETENTION.

BRANCH FORMS:

CAPACITY—GRASP.

We close the survey of the intellectual department of the human spirit by assigning the last place to the faculty of

Retention.—The mind possesses in an enlarged form the power of retention. It is endowed with an indefinite capacity for information and thought. Who can fathom all its depths, or search into its hidden caverns, or ransack all its secreted stores of past experience or acquired information? We cannot say that a solitary thought, or the most evanescent vision with which it has had even a casual connection, has totally and absolutely parted company with it for ever. The good that may be lost for ever can be remembered still; and the evil from which we have been mercifully saved, can or may be remembered for ever. In the one case, the retrospection will only add to the misery, while in the other it will add to the felicity.

We have used the term capacity at the head of this Department as possessed of an active signification, as involving the idea of capability, and not mere passive reception to which Sir W. Hamilton would arbitrarily restrict it. The mind has what appears to be a vast passive receptivity; but being instinct with life, it exer-

cises the power of grasping, moulding, exhibiting, and retaining what comes within its reach. It is not a dead hollow, into which you may pour what streams you like, and from which you may dip at your pleasure. It may refuse to receive, and very certainly it often refuses to let go. It has the power of Retention, as well as of Apprehension. The unity of the spirit involves the blending and co-operation of its powers in a greater or less degree, according to the demand made upon its resources. Hence it may be often very difficult sharply to define the limits of nearly related powers. The colours of the rainbow blend into each other. Man cannot say that his vision is sufficiently sharp to detect the very last line of the one colour, and the very first of the other. And it may be impossible for any human intellect so keenly to distinguish the movements of the mind, as to say, "This is the last movement of one power, and this the first movement of another." Faculties may rise into action almost simultaneously. Retention is seldom alone. Application and spectation are its common attendants. When controversy arises, and the man must hold fast in resistance to opposition, Distinction is often called into exercise to justify the refusal of concession demanded. The mind naturally applies itself to that which it will retain. And it as naturally keeps looking at what it is afraid of losing. Yet both application and spectation are easily distinguishable from retention. We may apply our minds to an object, and yet consent to let it go; we may yield the point in dispute while perfectly conscious of what we are doing. And we may look at a subject, and instead of desiring to retain it, we may order its instant removal.

This power may be seen in operation in the very noblest and in the very basest of characters. Our Saviour, when tempted by the adversary, held fast to his faith in God his Father, and to the principle of implicit obedience to His commands. And the adversary kept steadily in view his own design, the continued subjection of our race to his authority and influence, while ostensibly seeking to promote the comfort, honour, and public acceptance of the Saviour. And many of the followers of the Prince of light and the prince of darkness have shewn respectively similar displays of retention in lofty firmness of purpose in the path of integrity and honour, or consummate duplicity in the crooked path of deceit and cunning. When we have the truth ; when we are in the right, the high command of heaven is " Hold fast ! " But too often, through the blindness of the understanding, we cleave to error and reject the truth ; and through the love of sin or gain, we continue the path of dishonour and of misery. This is the perversion of a noble faculty to the loss and, it may be, the ruin of the man.

Take some specimen illustrations from various departments of human operations. The errand boy is sent forth with an express message, which he is charged to repeat word for word. By the way he may meet various attractions, such as boys at games, fruits in the stalls, pictures in shop windows ; but faithful to his trust, he keeps firm hold of the words of the message, strengthening his grasp by frequent repetition. The injunction, " Keep in mind what was told you," is obeyed by an actual *holding in mind* till the time of delivery. Or, see the same power at work in one of the highest grades of society. A skilled diplomatist is sent as an ambassador

to a foreign Court, with special private instructions, in addition to his public and ostensible duty. He is charged to watch the movements and influence of another party at the same Court. Alive to his business, he watches while he does not seem to watch, and listens while he is apparently absorbed in something else. He makes errands on mere pretences, and affects indifference while keenly sensitive. All this while he keeps prominently before him the subject which most concerns his master, and searches into every cause that seems to bear upon it. Or see a case of long-studied crime. Belthasar Girard was hired to assassinate the Prince of Orange. For seven long years it remained the chief aim of his life. He watched and waited for the opportunity on which his heart was set. He first studied to disarm suspicion, then to prepare his instruments, then to secure a position, and lastly to provide for his escape. He is long in the receipt of favours from the hands of the very man whom he has vowed to kill; yet he never seems to hesitate in his purpose, never to lose sight of his object for which, as a pretended persecuted Calvinist, he has come to the Court of the great and much-feared Protestant. He accomplished his object, but he perished most miserably, being unable to escape.

Pertinacity often degenerates into obstinacy. The bulwarks raised for defence become enclosures, beyond which some defenders decline to look. When conscience has a share in the dispute concession is not easily obtained. In the early Church a keen contest arose about the retention or omission of one small letter of the Greek alphabet. The advocates of our Lord's divinity were not satisfied with the term ὁμοιουσιον (*homoiousion*)

"of like nature" with the Father, but insisted on ὁμοούσιον (*homoousion*) "of the same nature," as alone expressive of the scriptural doctrine. To the retention of the *iota* the one party bent their energies, while the others were immovably resolved on its exclusion. In such contests the Will comes prominently into view. It is in exercise in the steady use of all the intellectual faculties; but with Retention it is in close alliance. When the dispute loses much of its intellectual character and degenerates into obstinacy, this intellectual power gives place to the domineering Will. Thus Luther maintained his opinion on the phrase: "*Hoc est meum corpus*," by sheer strength of will, and not by intellectual power. He could not be said to reason fairly on the question; but having taken hold of an idea he refused to let it go, however absurd it might appear. Thus, a great leader of opinion, a noble-hearted man, was left to himself to show how fallible are the ablest and best of human guides.

Such is the varied and wonderful intellectual capacity of the human spirit, as it appears to our examination. Beginning with the simplest acquisition of knowledge, we have closed with the resolute retention of it. In all conscious operations, mental and physical, the will is present with more or less efficiency. Through it, as an executive agency, the spirit, this marvellous unity in diversity and complexity, employs and sustains the intellectual faculties in every voluntary exercise. Through all the diversity of powers, the unity is apparent. At one moment a single faculty may appear to be alone exercised; in the next, two or three others are conjoined with it, modifying or controlling its influence; after which, the whole soul may be found absorbed in

one object; then, again relaxing its grasp as if wearied by the effort, and falling back into a state of quiescence.

We have seen Apprehension with its branches, simple Perception, elaborate Conception, and extended Comprehension; Application and its branches, Attention and Penetration; Distinction, with its forms of Division and Abstraction; Distribution, with its branches, Appropriation, Classification, and Symmetrization; Construction, in the forms of Architecture, Composition, Imagination, and Syllogization; Deduction, in its branches of practical Sagacity and elaborate Ratiocination; Inquisition, in its wide range of vision, in its branch forms of Introspection, or Consciousness and Examination—Retrospection, commonly called Memory or Recollection, with Association of ideas, and Search —and Prospection; Exhibition, in its forms of direct Presentation, Parabolic and Symbolic Representation; and Retention, in its extensive Capacity and resolute Grasp. With these varied powers as organs the spirit touches, handles, separates, constructs, extracts, exhibits, hears, sees and holds.

We have seen what may well engage our thoughts and elicit our admiration. Greater wonders lie before us.

DEPARTMENT II.

EMOTIONAL SUSCEPTIBILITY.

CHAPTER XI.

THE EMOTIONAL NATURE.

FEELING is inseparable from life. The one is an accompaniment of the other. Where there is no feeling, life is either partially suspended or totally extinct. It pervades every department of living existence, from the feeblest vegetable to the great spirit who fills immensity.

What is life ? We have neither found, nor can frame, an adequate definition of it. But we may describe the essential manifestion of creature life. It is an organised material existence or endowed spirit, with the power of appropriating by feeling, instinct or intelligence, within the sphere of its location or motion, what is necessary to its existence, defence, development or perpetuation in entire subservience to the design of the Creator. It is an existence with power of individual development by its own action with the means placed within its reach by its author. The lowest form of life subject to our apprehension is vegetable life ; the highest is pure spiritual intelligence of noblest attributes ? From the lowest to the highest sensibility, instinct, feeling, or emotion is plainly cognizable. We may therefore conclude that feeling, in some form, is co-extensive with life. In the vegetable, it

may appear in the sudden shrinking from touch of the sensitive plant, or the quivering, colour-changing, and apparent bleeding of the wild swamp turnip under the knife; while in the richly-endowed spirit it may assume the form of emotions of highest moral excellence, exhibiting the very bloom of existence in services the most gladdening to the performer, and the most acceptable to the receiver; or it may well up and overflow in the outgoings of burning animosity or bitterest sorrow, displaying the extreme wretchedness of existence in violent collision with the salutary moral laws of the universe.

Our business at present lies not with plant sensitiveness, or animal instinct, but with the emotions of which the human spirit is the subject. But, as man has an animal as well as a spiritual existence, a body having wants and desires peculiar to itself, and a spirit totally distinct from that body in its necessities, emotions, and developments, it is neither possible nor proper in investigating the latter, to overlook the influence and bearing of the former. Much has been and continues to be written on the mysterious connection of soul and body. Some of the latest speculations, as those of Professor Bain, would represent the two as a "*double-faced unity*." This comes in direct collision with the separate existence of the spirit as the conscious and responsible being, of which the body is at present the constant and necessary vehicle. The body is not the man; nor is the spirit the complete human being. But the spirit is the man, the conscious intelligence, and its presence in the body is essential to the animal life of that body. It can and does live without the body, but the body cannot live without it. When physiological theories, founded on

partial and obscure data, come into direct hostility with the experience of all ages, the testimony of scripture, and we will add the convictions of common sense, it is wisdom to call in question the proposed theory, and to regard the data as insufficient to bear the conclusion. It is not uncommon with such writers, Professor Bain included, to present bold speculations as undoubted truths, which, when examined, are found to rest on a very partial and defective experience. An atom of truth is seized and dwelt upon, and made the basis of a lofty superstructure, while a mass of matter beside it, that would lead to a very different conclusion, is overlooked.

Man lives apart from his body. When the material frame is reduced to dust, he still lives—to think, to feel, and to act. While this doctrine is outside *our present* experience, it is too much to say that it is contrary to experience, or that it is beyond all experience. If spirits who have never been endowed with bodies exist, why may not human spirits exist with all the endowments of spiritual life when relieved of their bodies? And if spirits foreign to the human race, have been known to enter bodies and control the action of those bodies, why may not spirits more congenial occupy and employ those bodies? There is, therefore, nothing contrary to reason or analogy in the existence of human spirits, as intelligent and responsible beings, separate from the bodies in which they once dwelt. If we bow to the testimony of scripture, the case is settled. The great advocate of christianity among the gentile nations, spoke of an absence from the body which would be a presence with his Lord; and of a vision which he had in which he might have been in the body or out of the body. Theories which controvert the plainest teachings of the inspired word, must be false.

Nature never contradicts the voice of the Creator speaking in revelation. Man misreads the book of nature, or misunderstands the voice of inspiration.

While maintaining the existence of the human spirit as a conscious and intelligent individuality separate from the human body, we are not slow to admit the closest vital union at present subsisting between them. They act and re-act upon each other. The body has life, animal life; but the presence of the spirit is necessary to the maintenance of that life. The consideration of the material structure, organs, wants, sensations, or feelings of the body, belongs to physiology; and while that science presses close upon the margin, it does not enter the domain of psychology. These are sister sciences. They should not be confounded, nor should they be separated. They should be studied in succession—first physiology, and then psychology. The study of the one to the exclusion of the other, can only result in one-sided conclusions. The perfect comprehension of either, we do not hesitate to affirm, transcends human capacity. An approximation to a satisfactory understanding of both, is all that can be made. In importance, beyond question, as bearing on a future and eternal existence, psychology excels physiology. But as the preservation and health of the body vitally affects the capacity and power of the spirit, a due attention is wisely bestowed upon it; which attention is the result of some adequate knowledge of physiology however attained.

To the animal life of the body belong certain sensations or feelings, pleasant or unpleasant, as of heat and cold; certain tastes, agreeable or disagreeable, as sweet or bitter; certain appetites, as hunger and thirst, painful, but necessary to the preservation of life; and the power-

ful social feeling designed for the continuance of the race. Through all these bodily feelings, the mind is often influenced to action; sometimes it is violently agitated; occasionally, the spirit is wholly absorbed by the pleasure or the pain, or the craving want produced by the bodily sensation. On this interesting and attractive border territory, we may not now enter, but the course of our survey of the emotional nature will constantly lead us to notice the uprising or subduing of emotion through bodily sensations or feelings, arising within or received from without.

The spiritual life possesses a susceptibility of feeling or emotion of wide range and great power. It is seldom wholly at rest or entirely devoid of emotion in some form, either day or night. Even in sleep the soul is sometimes so agitated that words of anger are heard escaping from the lips, or the person awakes in a fright. How varied are these emotions! At one time it is a gentle breeze imparting a fresh glow to all, and then it is a fierce tornado from which all escape as from impending ruin. At one time there is but a ripple on the surface with which an infant's hand may play, and then it is the wild agitation of the lake among the mountains, on which the tempest has come suddenly down, which tests to the utmost the skill of the voyager. One is hard to move, as it is to light wood saturated with salt water with a match; another explodes like gunpowder the moment a spark reaches him. One is like some secluded land-locked bay seldom disturbed by storms; another is like the New Zealand seas, seldom at rest from prevailing winds up and down the coasts. With one the emotion is noisy and fierce while it lasts, like a conflagration of shavings, but it is soon over;

with another it is like a coalpit on fire, which burns for years unseen, and whose existence is occasionally felt by a sudden explosion from no apparent cause, or by the unexpected subsiding of the earth, where you calculated upon a firm foundation. Sometimes it is highly beneficial, reviving the spirits and contributing to the restoration of health, as the effect of good news; and again it is very injurious, depressing the spirits or animal vigour and impairing the health, as the effect of bad news. Within certain limits its influence is decidedly good, affording a needed stimulus; beyond these it may be paralyzing, and in certain circumstances the shock may be so great, in other words, the emotion so powerful as to sever the connecting link between soul and body in instantaneous death.

Emotions are produced both by external impressions and by internal reflections, or by a combination of both. You see a vivid flash of lightning and hear a loud peal of thunder, and involuntarily a slight fear possesses you; you are a passenger on board a vessel on a dangerous coast, a storm has arisen, you heard with feelings of alarm the whistling winds and rushing waters, but a shock that has staggered you fills you with terror as you instantly realise that the vessel has struck on a rock. You meet a man that has done you some grievous injury in endeavouring to destroy your character, and you are filled with indignation; or you meet a very dear friend, to whom you are under special obligations, and the emotions of gratitude and joy combine to make the meeting to you most agreeable. You see a wretched drunkard lying in his stupor, and feelings of pity and of sorrow stir within you; or the funeral of an only parent, attended by tender orphans, passes you, and you are

moved by sincere sympathy. In a crowd you may receive a box on the ear from some malicious one, which fills you with wrath; in private you may receive a kiss from one very near and dear, which awakens the very different emotion of love.

And when there is no disturbing sight or sound or touch from without, and the mind turns in upon itself, and looks back to examine past impressions and doings, you may readily detect the workings of emotion. You may see the man that has been apprehended for some crime, and placed in temporary ward before trial, agitated with fear from the accusations of conscience for the deed known to himself, and which he has reason to believe will soon be proved against him. If you have done wrong, you may, on reflection alone, feel the burning emotion of shame, which may be followed by sorrow, attended with the silent trickling down of tears. You may have observed a man sitting in silence, and a smile passes over his countenance, followed in a few moments by a burst of laughter. He has alighted on some happy moments of the past, and with the discovery he has revived their attendant emotions. You have done something which you know to be unquestionably superior to the performances of others; reflecting on this, ere you are aware, that unprofitable and dangerous emotion of pride arises within you. You think on one occupying the place and receiving the attentions which you believe rightly belong to you, and that uncomfortable feeling of jealousy begins to burn. Or you are suffering under severe affliction, grief has weighed you down, when, reflecting on the goodness and mercy of God and his gracious purposes towards all his people, that all things shall work together for their good, the

invigorating feeling of hope rises into power; your soul is anew girded with strength, and the gloom of sorrow disappears.

The emotions enter so largely into the activities of human life that a detailed and orderly treatment of them will be acceptable to general readers. They have been differently classified by metaphysicians. Dugald Steward, treating them as Affections, has divided them into Benevolent and Malevolent. Dr. McCosh, viewing them in connection with the Divine government, has arranged them in the following order : — 1. Instigative ; 2. Adhesive ; 3. Remunerative ; 4. Responsive to joy ; 5. Aesthetic admiration—with the opposites of each of the five classes. Others taking a wider range, have arranged them thus :—1. Feelings of Liberty and Restraint; 2. Wonder; 3. Terror; 4. Tender affections ; 5. Emotions of self-complacency, Love of approbation, &c. ; 6. Sentiment of Power ; 7. Irascibility ; 8. Emotions of action, including the interest of Pursuit or Plot ; 9. Emotions of intellect, Love of Knowledge, Consistency, and Inconsistency ; 10. Fine art emotions or Taste ; 11. The Moral Sense (Cham. Encyclo., vol. 4). The first we must reject as clearly defective ; the second, as vague and unsatisfactory ; the third, as confused, and devoid of all natural order. The very simple and natural arrangement which we would suggest and adopt, is that of: —1. The Agreeable ; 2. The Disagreeable ; and 3. The Indefinite Emotions. The first are attended with pleasure, in a greater or less degree ; the second occasion pain or unhappiness in some measure, less or more ; the third may be attended with either pleasure or pain, or with neither in any marked or special manner. Under the first — the Agreeable Emotions — we would class

Gratitude, Hope, Love, Joy, and Pride. Under the second, or Disagreeable, we would place Shame, Hatred, Envy, Jealousy, Anger, Grief, Fear, and Depression. And under the third, or Indefinite, we would range Sympathy, Wonder, Zeal, and Desire.

DIVISION I.

AGREEABLE EMOTIONS.

CHAPTER XII.

1.—GRATITUDE.

The term Gratitude is employed in our language to express both a passing emotion and a habit of mind. Thus, we may say with equal propriety, "The man, on receiving the gift, exhibited the most profound gratitude"; and, "The man was characterised by a frame of habitual gratitude for his many mercies." The temporary emotion of which we speak is the uprising of a warm feeling of kindness and obligation, or indebtedness towards an individual or body of persons from whom a person has received in act, or by report, some special favour or favours. The favour may assume almost every conceivable form. It may be the simple recognition by a look of kindness by a superior or a friend; it may be the pronouncing of a word; it may be the noble and manly defence of character in trying circumstances; it may be the bestowment of relief when one was very destitute; it may be a rescue from what would be a sudden and awful death; and it may be the conferring of a gift which will enrich the soul to all eternity. In each case, the look, the word the act is regarded as properly a favour, that is, as

something gratuitous or something exceeding in value or overlapping any word or act which may have called it forth. It is regarded as proceeding from kindness, and as such it evokes kindness. It is regarded as wholly or in part undeserved, and therefore it evokes a feeling of obligation or indebtedness. Should the conviction arise that the defence of character arose from selfish motives, and not from heartfelt sympathy; or that the valuable gift now presented was simply the payment of a debt long due, no gratitude swells the bosom. The payment of a debt may in some instances evoke a measure of gratitude. If the payment was made when it could not be recovered by law, being out of date ; if before the time specified by engagement, which might be regarded as something in addition to the actual debt; if without solicitation, frankly, fully, and cheerfully, and at a time when a person was really in want of money ; or if when long considered as lost, and for years forgotten : in such circumstances a kindly feeling arises within the man covering the lower reaches of gratitude towards the honest and honourable debtor. The emotion is not confined to the actual reception of a favour ; it is awakened by the report of such a thing being intended, or of a kindly work performed at a distance. Nor is it restricted to the facts of a case. The report may be incorrect, yet believed to be true this proper feeling arises in the soul. The feeling may be often misdirected, the real benefactor being overlooked, and another receiving the thanks to which in truth he is not entitled. As a natural feeling, it is universally displayed by the young as well as the aged ; the sovereign, as well as the beggar ; the savage, as well as the civilized—a string of beads calling forth

the same emotion from the one, that the public thanks of a great nation will do from the other. So becoming is this emotion considered by civilized society, that he who does not show it in proper circumstances, is stamped as guilty of a high social misdemeanor. Ingratitude is indicative of something more than the mere absence of feeling; it reveals a nature in which the nobler attributes of humanity have been repressed and the meaner developed; it is a marked social and spiritual defect.

If we inquire into the design of our Creator in implanting a susceptibility of this emotion in our nature, we may discover that it was intended in the first place to awaken towards Himself, as "the Father of lights, from whom cometh down every good and every perfect gift," a feeling of kindness and a sense of obligation which would lead to some sincere endeavours to make an appropriate return; and in the second place, to produce a feeling of goodwill between man and man, and to establish a process of mutual assistance. It was of great importance to the happiness of the race that friendly feelings should exist among men, and that generous deeds should be acknowledged and rewarded in some way, not dependent on the material ability of the receiver of favours. Genuine favours proceed from kindly feeling. The receiver of the favours may be very poor, but he may, by sincere gratitude, return the very feelings which found exercise in generosity; and this gratitude may be so appreciated that the giver finds himself more than repaid; for it is more blessed to give than to receive. Further, this emotion involves such a sense of obligation that nature often prompts a man to say, "I cannot forget your kindness; I must do some-

thing to repay your generosity:" and being sincere, he looks around him for what may be within his resources, or what may be attainable by art or effort or influence, and in due time makes a tangible return; which mutual kindliness is highly serviceable to the interests of humanity. While it is improper in ordinary circumstances to repress the outgoing of gratitude in word or deed, as tending to impair the power of this natural emotion, it is proper to check any extravagance in either, by directing attention to Him who is the fountain of all our mercies, and to whom the chief thanks are due.

The inferior animals are sometimes the objects of similar feelings. We not only praise the watch-dog who has seized the midnight thief as he attempted to enter the house, and who, wounded and bleeding, retained his hold of the burglar till the inmates of the dwelling were aroused, but we are moved with feelings of glowing kindness towards him, which is the essence of gratitude. With still warmer feelings are we stirred when the faithful Newfoundlander has brought safely to shore the child who had fallen into a rapid stream, beyond all reach of human help. It is with no ordinary emotion that the rider claps the neck of his noble steed from which he has just dismounted, who seeing the danger of his rider, put forth, when requested, his utmost powers of swiftness, and bore his master in advance of murderous pursuers, for many miles, till he reached a place of safety. The extension of such feelings to the lower animals was doubtless designed to aid in the appreciation of such gifts to man, and in securing for them suitable treatment from their masters. And these animals, when kindly treated, have shown an

approach to gratitude. Cool and dress the rankling wound of a suffering animal, and he will show that he has understood your kindness. Remove the oppressive yoke, and take off the heavy load long borne, and set food before the famishing animal, and expressive movements will prove the double satisfaction of your humane treatment.

Illustrations of this powerful emotion abound among men. Let us select but two—the one in which God is the object of gratitude; the other in which man is the object; in the one case the subject of the emotion being an individual, and in the other a nation. The first is the gratitude of David, the King of Israel, towards Jehovah, the Divine benefactor. Nathan, the prophet, had been sent by God with a special message to the king. That message not only recounted past gracious dealings of God in behalf of David, but, referring to the future, promised the establishment of his throne and kingdom for ever in the persons of his descendants. David was deeply moved by the whole message, and retiring to his place of devotion, he poured forth the breathings of a grateful heart in the following living words:—"Who am I, O Lord God? and what is my house, that thou hast brought me hitherto? And this was yet a small thing in thy sight, O Lord God; but thou hast also spoken of thy servant's house for a great while to come. And is this the manner of man, O Lord God? And what can David say more unto thee? for thou, Lord God, knowest thy servant." At a loss how to express his thanks, he begins to extol and praise, as follows:—"Wherefore thou art great, O Lord God, for there is none like thee, neither is there any God beside thee." (II. Sam., vii., 18-29.)

The second is the gratitude of the British nation to their late renowned and victorious general the Duke

of Wellington. At the beginning of the present century, Britain was hard pressed by her foes. Her great rival France aspired to be mistress of the world. The sons of Britain were fired, as in former generations, to do noble deeds on sea and land. Warriors were not wanting, and God raised up many great men to command her armies and her navies. Among all the land warriors of the time Wellington stands pre-eminent, and the nation was not slow in recognising his great services. His victories in India, at the outset of his career, brought him a knighthood and the thanks of king and parliament. For his services at Copenhagen, in A.D. 1807, the House of Commons passed a vote of thanks. The Commons again thanked him for a signal victory in Portugal in 1808. Then followed severe encounters and several hard battles, in which Wellington displayed great skill which the nation acknowledged by the thanks of parliament, the title Viscount Wellington, and a pension of £2000. In due time the French were driven from Spain, the dukedom was bestowed, and a further grant of £400,000 from a grateful Government. Nor was it money thrown away. Had the French been able to secure the great resources of Spain and Portugal on their side, it is not difficult to see that Britain must eventually succumb under the exhausting draft on her men and means. On Wellington's arrival home, he received for the twelfth time the thanks of parliament, and was welcomed with greatest enthusiasm. The crowning victory of Waterloo had still to come. For this statues were raised in his honor, a mansion erected, and an estate purchased for him, and a further present of £200,000. These were the expressions of Britain's gratitude to her most illustrious military chieftain.

CHAPTER XIII.

2.—HOPE.

The human soul, in a healthy state, has a large measure of elasticity. When suddenly confronted with dangers, or subjected to severe pain, or burdened with an unlooked-for load, it rises to meet the pressure, and strives to sustain itself under the weight. This inward uprising is not of itself Hope, but is an essential element in it. A man led out to be shot by military execution, may brace himself up to meet his doom by what appears to be stolid indifference, or pride, or by both in conjunction with other considerations, in none of which may hope find a place. But when in connection with this elastic, sustaining, uprising of soul, there is an impression, more or less strong, of coming relief from the danger, pain, or burden, the emotion of hope is found. Hope, then, is a compound feeling. It has two arms. With the one it upholds the soul under its trial; with the other it grasps the impression or conviction of coming relief. It is generally regarded as the expectation of, or looking for, some coming good. But it is far more than this. While looking for a future good, either by the passing away of present evil, or by the positive bringing of relief from an outward source, it sustains the soul with all its might, and merits the distinctive appellation of the *sustaining* emotion.

Hope is the offspring of want, conjoined with the apprehension of possible desired relief. Hence, when

there is absolutely no want, there can be no hope. If we can conceive a region of such felicity that every want is supplied, of such security that no danger can be apprehended, and of such stability that no diminution of enjoyment can ever happen, this benign helper will not fold a wing on that happy land. Such are the mansions of the glorified as revealed to us in the inspired pages. The domain of hope lies on this side that brilliant world. In like manner, where there is no apprehension of possible desired relief, there is no hope. There may be an apprehension of possible relief from acute suffering, for example, but no desire for it—medical aid is spurned, the sufferer desires to die, hope is not suffered to plant a foot within the limits of earth, although want is felt, and possible relief apprehended. Again we readily grasp an apprehension of desired relief conjoined with the sad conviction that it is not possible. How often do we hear it remarked concerning a dying one, that all hope is abandoned. The relief is desired, but it is beyond the possibility of human skill. Could we conceive a world where wants are many and pressing—where relief is apprehended in the abundant supplies of others differently situated, but where the conviction is irresistibly borne home that relief is not possible, there hope cannot cast the gleam of her benign countenance for a moment, and the absence of her sustaining arm is felt to the utmost extremity. Such a place is that benighted region, which is denuded for ever, by a just sentence, of the favour of the Almighty. Hope, then, belongs to an intermediate state. It is not required in perfect bliss; it can have no place in perfect misery. It is an emotion of the human soul called into exercise by the necessities of its earthly existence. How

long and how widely has its soothing and sustaining influence been felt? Who can enumerate its efforts? To detail them would be to write the whole mental history of our struggling race. By its aid, the farmer toils in cultivating the soil; the miner digs into the bowels of the earth, in search of precious metal; the fisherman tugs at the oar amidst the stormy waves of a rock-bound shore; the soldier keeps his head erect, and struggles on in the fiercest contest on the field of battle; the weary and belated traveller holds on his way, in search of food and shelter; and the shipwrecked mariner clings day and night to the floating wreck till a friendly sail pass by. It proffers its tender consolations to the sons of affliction, when they are far removed from human aid. The Greenlander, separated from his home by a sudden movement of the ice over which he has been roaming, and overtaken by a violent snow-storm, is not abandoned. Hope visits him; and as if by a magic hand, reveals to him a clear sky, the wind reversed driving him shorewards, and his dear home again within sight. The castaway, the sole survivor of a crew, is not forsaken because he is but one. Every day hope bids imagination paint before his vision a ship bearing down upon his dismantled and helpless bark; and though often sickened by deferred hope, the vision is at length realized, and he is saved. When the disobedient prophet found a sudden stop put to his intended voyage by his occupation of the cavity of a great sea monster, abandoned by man whose power to save proved fruitless, and apparently forsaken by God whose anger he had provoked, hope descended after him into the depths of the sea, and holding up his head, bade him look once more towards the mercy seat. And in

cases, alas ! too common, when the curtain of life is about to drop, and the scenes of earth for ever to disappear, the glare of Time's fascinations being removed by the approaching twilight, deeds of darkness and pollution rise up to view, followed by a train of appropriate tormentors; the soul of man sinks as if into a great fissure of the earth, and looking up it sees an inundation of divine wrath trembling on the very verge of the chasm; with redoubled energy and speed, this timely helper rushes to the rescue, and strives with one hand to stay the descending flood, while with the other it points to a throne of grace where the darkest and vilest deeds are freely forgiven to the truly penitent. If successful, its mission is fulfilled, and the soul wings its flight beyond the realms of hope; if unsuccessful, and the downward pressure defies its utmost efforts, it perishes with the sufferer.

The sustaining power of hope, its right arm, is exercised according to circumstances. Where there is great suffering or want, its utmost strength may be tested; where there is no suffering, and but little sense of want, the sustaining arm may be greatly relaxed. A man has had a limb crushed by machinery, at a considerable distance from surgical aid. Assistance is sent for with all despatch, but in the meantime he lies in great agony. supporting himself as best he can with the hope that when the crushed portion is removed, the pain will be lessened and his life may be spared. In this case the strength of the soul oscillates between soothing suggestions, fitted to uphold, and longing expectations grasping for relief. Or a woman has been left with a helpless family, while the husband and father has gone abroad in search of employment. The scanty store that

remained when the husband left is soon exhausted, and now abject want oppresses. Letters are written to the absent one, and most eagerly are replies looked for. But they come not. Mail after mail arrives but no letter; no remittance for the sorrow-stricken mother and her famishing little ones. Hope is now hard pressed. It cannot rest within the house, nor can it leave it; it comes and goes incessantly, till mercy brings relief, or all perish together.

Or take a case in which the right arm is relaxed, and the left is mainly exercised in direct expectation. A farmer, of ample means, has sown a great breadth of land with some special crop, for which he has convinced himself there will be a large demand. While this crop is growing he is in weekly, if not daily, expectation in regard to it. In the meantime, beyond the exercise of patience, he is suffering no want, for his wealth is great, and personally he is under no distress. It is true he has some sense of want, for he would like to add thousands to thousands; but that desire cannot be supposed, in any ordinary circumstances, to demand the sustenance which would be claimed by pressing poverty. But it is to the needy, and not to the full, that hope reveals her graces. She passes by the doors of the wealthy to bestow her smiles on the poor. Benign hope! Stainless daughter of Heaven! how many weeping eyes of suffering humanity hast thou wiped dry! how many drooping heads has thy strong arm upheld! how many throbbing hearts has thy gentle hand stilled, while sweetest, softest consolations fell upon the ear of the bereaved and desolate!

> Auspicious Hope! in thy sweet garden grow
> Wreaths for each toil, a charm for every woe;

Won by their sweets, in Nature's languid hour,
The way-worn pilgrim seeks the summer bower.
There, as the wild bee murmurs on the wing,
What peaceful dreams thy handmaid spirits bring!
What viewless forms the Æolian organ play,
And sweep the furrowed lines of anxious thought away.
Angel of life, thy glittering wings explore
Earth's loneliest bounds, and Ocean's wildest shore.
Lo! to the wintry winds the pilot yields
His bark, careering o'er unfathomed fields;
Now on Atlantic waves he rides afar,
Where Andes, giant of the western star,
With meteor standard, to the winds unfurled,
Looks from his throne of clouds o'er half the world.
Hope! When I mourn with sympathising mind
The wrongs of fate, the woes of human kind,
Thy blissful omens bid my spirit see
The boundless fields of rapture yet to be;
I watch the wheels of Nature's mazy plan,
And learn the future by the past of man.

CAMPBELL.

CHAPTER XIV.

3.—LOVE.

Of all the emotions of the human soul, none is entitled to occupy a higher place than Love. Its blissful and beneficent nature has ever secured for it a prominent place. The man who is habitually swayed by it cannot be unhappy; nor can he cease to contribute to the happiness of others. What is love? It is the soul in a state of emotion, fastening with delight on some object in which it perceives some special excellence. Here, as ever, the intellectual power is the avenue to man's emotional nature. Something is perceived or imagined to possess some special good or excellence, and the soul fastens on it with delight. If nothing good or desirable is perceived or imagined, this emotion cannot be evoked. If what is witnessed or apprehended is vile or offensive, the soul loathes it; and instead of fastening on it with delight, turns away from it with disgust. If the object is in reality worthless, it must assume some attractive part, and appear to the soul to possess some excellence before it can be loved. The excellence may be material or physical, or it may be moral, or a blending of both. When we look upon an object of surpassing physical beauty, there is not only a feeling of delight awakened, but also a reluctance to part from it, a cleaving to it, a desire to be associated with it. This is love. When we meet with a man of moral excellence,

amiable, sincere, pure, disinterested, benevolent, we are pleasingly impressed with his character; we are disposed to repose confidence in him; his disposition, at once affectionate and noble, captivates us, and we part from him with expressions of regret, and with the sincere desire that we may very soon again enjoy his society. This also is love. It sometimes happens that physical and moral beauty meets in one person. Then the object is the loved of many. More frequently, however, moral excellence is exhibited without the material attractions which have a charm for most, and physical beauty is unattended with those spiritual graces which are the ornaments of the human soul. Hence, what has attractions for one has none for another; the man ardently loved by some is as ardently hated by others. The cast of countenance which awakens this pleasing emotion in one, produces no such feeling in another intimately associated with him; and the moral features which make a man to be prized by one class of citizens, render him the object of intense dislike to another class. But wherever love exists it is the offspring of some good, real or supposed, and the fruit like the root, is goodness, real or supposed, towards all who are the objects of it.

Like all other emotions, love varies in duration and degree. It may spring up, grow, and perish in an hour; or, kindling in early life, it may continue for many years to diffuse its genial glow over all the anxieties of the domestic circle. It may be so feeble that the first breath of slander will extinguish it; or so vigorous and vital that blasts of opposition only make it burn more powerfully, while it utterly defies all the waters of calumny to drown it. It has been distinguished by

terms descriptive of the subjects which cherish it, and of the objects on which it rests, as divine, human, conjugal, parental, filial—and as spiritual, carnal, patriotic, domestic, selfish.

If love springs from the perception of some special excellence in an object, how can a man love his enemies in whom he sees so much that is utterly offensive and repugnant? And how can the most holy God love a sinful world in which not one wholly righteous can be found? Is not our definition of love incorrect? May it not be a wellspring of kindness in the human soul which can pour forth its beneficent waters by a mere act of the will, irrespective altogether of the moral state or conduct of the recipient of our favours? We say, No! Love is one thing. Kindness is another. Love is almost invariably attended by kindness—it is generally an immediate fruit; but kindness is distinguishable from love, and may spring from another root, such as pity. Our business at present is with the natural emotion of love, that joyous, quickening feeling which fastens our heart on an object and makes us cleave to it with fond regard, and not with the moral duties of scripture as connected with a certain heart exercise. But as the soul's path to immortality lies along the high-way of heaven-revealed morality, we must notice this apparent difficulty, Let it be remembered, at the outset, that we are not required to love, that is, as we now understand the term, to fasten with fond delight on any creature without regard to his moral state. We are not required to love a rational creature simply as a rational creature; for example, a fallen spirit. There is an enemy which we cannot love, which we dare not love in any sense. There must be also a

wide distinction in our regard between the moral and the immoral. It cannot be supposed that our hearts should cleave equally to the vilest criminal and to the purest christian. We must distinguish not only in the degree, but also in the quality, of our regard between these two classes. The virtuous must never be confounded with the vicious, and the same regard extended to both. If we are, then, to love our enemies, that is if our hearts are to rest with delight on those who have done us the greatest injuries; it can only be, according to the nature given us by our Creator, by our completely hiding from view the evil deeds performed against us; the malignant disposition displayed towards us, and by our steadily fixing our attention on some former good deeds of the present enemy, or on some redeeming feature of his character, or by persuading ourselves that it was wholly by mistake that he injured us, and going a step further, by assuring ourselves that despite all appearances, he bore us only good will; in other words, by stripping him wholly of the character of an enemy and by presenting him to our minds in the amiable character of a friend. To most intelligent minds this will appear at once an impossibility, and further, it may not be a proper thing to try to persuade ourselves that we see a saint in one who is notoriously a vile criminal. Could or should the holy JESUS press to his bosom the base traitor Judas as he did the beloved John? No; his very soul abhorred the man. Hence, if our definition of the natural emotion is correct, the term "love," as used in certain commands of scripture, requires particular explanation to avoid gross misconceptions. But is it not said that God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son; and what excellence could he perceive in this fallen

world to call forth his love? May not love spring up, at least in the divine mind, without the perception of any excellence, and even towards the positively sinful? We answer these questions thus: There was nothing in this fallen world to call forth this love of which we speak; nor in our opinion can this love, that is love properly so called, spring up in any mind without the perception of some excellence. It is certain that God distinguishes between the good and the bad, between the precious and the vile, in the outgoing of his regards. He says, "Jacob have I loved and Esau have I hated," —of one, "I have loved thee with an everlasting love," and of others, "I will show you no favour." The passage so often quoted regarding the love of the Father to the world may be understood in two ways. No one who understands the Scriptures will question the statement that the term "world" is often used in a restricted sense, meaning a portion of the world or its inhabitants. It was said, for example, that the whole world has gone after Christ, when we know that many of its inhabitants had never heard of him; it was also written by an apostle that the whole world lieth in wickedness, whereas it is clear that the Christian portion of its inhabitants were not. If we limit the world loved by the Father to the elect portion of it, we have only to regard that portion as seen clothed in Immanuel's righteousness, and reflecting the divine image to understand how their beauty would call forth the genuine love of the Father. Seen as restored and glorified they are loved,—the Divine Being enfolds them, delights in them, and rejoices over them—with a love not only the most refined and genuine, but with a power and excellence exceeding all creature conceptions. By the other

interpretation we take the term world to mean mankind in general, and we solve the difficulty by affixing the true meaning to the term, which has been translated "loved." Much misconception has arisen from using the term "love" to express various states of mind. The word "love" is made to express, in our language, what the Greeks conveyed by three distinct terms—εραω, φιλεω and αγαπάω, — meaning respectively, I am passionately fond of,—I have an affection for,—and I feel kindly towards. The first expresses strong attachment as between the sexes; the second has a wider range, and means affection in general, as between relatives and friends; the third has a still wider range, embracing simple regard or benevolence, the tenderest human affection, and the loftiest divine esteem between the persons of the Godhead. The first of these terms is not used in the New Testament—the other two frequently. The third is the term used in the passages —"Love your enemies," "God so loved the world." Taking, then, the term αγαπάω, as used in the oldest classical writers, and in a sense borne out by the same word in the Hebrew (*agabh*), as used to express the professed esteem or regard of the Jews for Ezekiel, we adopt as the true translation of the word in the above phrases, the meaning—"show kindness to," or "treat kindly;" thus: "show kindness to your enemies," "God so kindly treated the world." This interpretation detaches the feeling of kindness from the emotion of love, properly so called, as the result of the perception of some special excellence, and leaves it to be the product of a kindred emotion, compassion, or pity, arising from a perception of relationship, want, or distress. We may therefore dispense with the old division of divine love into the love

of benevolence and the love of complacency. The love of complacency is the true, genuine love ; for there is no love without complacency. The love of benevolence is simply benevolence ; and that benevolence is the product, it may be, of love itself, or of compassion, or of a high sense of honour and justice.

An emotion so interesting, influential, and powerful, has ever been a fruitful field for poets and novelists of every grade, and in its higher developments has been a theme of admiration to theologians. A few brief illustrations in distinct manifestations will meet our present requirements. We treat not of love in the abstract, but of love as rising within and influencing the human soul. Hence of divine love we do not speak; that lofty subject would elevate and ennoble any spirit that could fairly enter upon its contemplation. We limit ourselves to the outgoings of the human soul in love to things earthly and heavenly. That love which has mainly and naturally exercised the hearts of the sons and daughters of Adam in all ages, and to which the term has been chiefly devoted, is the attachment of the sexes. Its importance can scarcely be over-estimated, as in it are centred the vital interests of the race and the domestic happiness of its countless families. In this case natural instinct gives immense power and permanence to the perception of any excellence in person, mind or disposition. And beyond any intellectual apprehension of adaptation of mind or person, where the attachment is of the model type, the highest and purest mutual affection, there is an indescribable something, a coalescing of spirit with spirit, the spiritual affinities of the one meeting their counterpart in the other, as if the blending of both were necessary to one perfect humanity. The emotion

awakened by the meeting of such intelligences when neither reason nor conscience may repress is not merely powerful, it is absorbing at least for a time ; and when rightly regulated, and fed by the numberless acts of domestic kindness, will continue to glow till the lamp of life expires. Associated with this as pertaining to the domestic circle is parental, filial, and fraternal love.

Beyond the limits of relationship is the love of friends. Friends of the same sex are often known to love more warmly than brothers, more fondly than sisters. Between some an ardent attachment is formed on the first acquaintance ; between others the most extended acquaintance leaves only a confirmed repugnance. History affords some beautiful illustrations of the strength of this emotional bond. The love of Jonathan and David will ever remain most memorable. But how much remains untold and unwritten, of what was done and endured on sea and land, in peace and war, in plenty and famine, by those united in the bonds of friendship's purest love.

At times the human soul is deeply moved by an attachment to what is called its native land. Let that land be invaded by the foe and laid waste, a thrill of emotion passes over the man as if a near relation had been wounded and laid low by some ruffian. Various feelings contend within him; but among them love of country holds a high place. He will prove his love ; his means are freely offered in defence ; and he is prepared to risk his life on the field of battle for the safety of the land which he calls his own. Let him reflect. What is this land to him more than other lands ? They may be fairer, brighter, richer than this ; why not rise and remove and leave to the foe what he claims ? Nay; his feelings clothe the hills and the valleys, the rocks and the shores

of the land of his birth with animation, and he feels that to desert his country would be to desert his *mother* in the hour of need. Let ignoble spirits desert her, he will not. And when in times of peace a sense of duty or necessity may require him to remove his home to another, and it may be distant land, he takes his last glimpse of his native land with a feeling of sadness, as if parting from a friend near and dear to him. It is true that when sorrows and injustice have occasioned the removal, the attachment is greatly lessened; but, surviving all injustice and cruelty, a tie binds the soul to that land, as distinguished from its temporary occupants, which binds it to no other spot on earth.

But the highest exercise of this noblest emotion is what may be termed Christian love. Its subject is the genuine Christian, the truly regenerated man. Its object is the divine Being—Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. It springs from an apprehension of the transcendent perfections of God, and his marvellous works of grace. It overflows on the first realization of the divine love to the individual, and it is constantly fed by a consideration of numberless present mercies, and the anticipation of the greatest blessings in the future. We love him because he first loved us. This love is shed abroad or diffused over the soul by the Holy Ghost. While then it is the action of the human soul, it is the action of the soul in a regenerated and not in a fallen state. The searcher of hearts could say of some who professed to be the people of God,—"I know you that ye have not the love of God in you." If they were in spiritual darkness it could not be otherwise. If love springs from a perception of excellence, there can be love only where excellence has been perceived. But the unrenewed mind being in

darkness cannot perceive the divine excellence, therefore it cannot love God. We cannot love what we do not know. God only can reveal himself; therefore all who are without his divine illumination remain in ignorance of him, and without love to him. To see him in his grace is to love him; to love him is to enjoy life; and to live in that love is to bask in the sunshine of immortality.

CHAPTER XV.

4.—JOY.

This emotion is peculiarly *the* agreeable emotion. It is so simple and so readily understood that the attempt to define it is merely the substitution of terms of similar import. It is the soul pleasingly, delightsomely excited to a greater or less degree, and for a longer or shorter time. The Creator, the happiest of beings, has made his animate creation susceptible of happiness. The occupants of air, earth, and sea, in their frolicsome gambols, confirm this statement. To man has been given an emotional nature, so susceptible of what is agreeable that the joy that is brought to it or evoked within it is seized, deepened, diffused and prolonged. It can be even recalled again and again after the lapse of years, and spread anew its cheering and refreshing influence over the soul. All are not alike. Some are favoured by a temperament, an emotional nature, so buoyant, so joyous, that it casts a sunshine over the most sterile waste, and lights up every gloom. While others dwell so much in the shade that all nature wears a sombre hue, a smile comes only by constraint, and an outburst of joyous laughter is so rare as to be deemed a grave impropriety. The one is susceptible of the faintest gleam of delight; the other can only be moved by the most powerful sunbeam. No age is exempt from the healthful influence of this feeling. The infant resting on his mother's lap

rejoices in her love ; the old man stooping to the grave recalls with brightened visage and quickened pulse the joys of the past, or rejoices in the speedy prospect of an immortality of glory. The school boy finds his pleasure in his success over rivals, or more generally in the free exercise of his limbs in the play-grounds. The gay, in their prime of life, find in fashionable amusements their well-spring of pleasure ; the successful speculation makes the cup of the merchant overflow ; and the crowning victory at the hustings is the jubilation of the politician. It would be endless to enumerate all the occasions of joy. As creatures of sense we are delighted by whatever pleasingly impresses us from without. The hungry man, after long fasting, rejoices to sit down to some favourite dish ; its very odour delights him in anticipation. The lover of music is charmed by some exquisite melody. Its thrilling notes meet a vital response in his spirit. He is transported by its animating utterances, and feels as if he could never weary in listening to its marvellous combinations of Nature's sweetest sounds. To some sensitive natures a work of great skill, or a picturesque scenery, brings not merely a pleasing feeling, but positive joy. Their rapture finds vent in exclamations of surprise and delight. With what joy will some listen to a marvellous tale. Even science can present in the solution of her difficult problems not simply absorbing interest, but exquisite pleasure. In the history of our fleeting generation each season brings its joys to many. Some rejoice in the blooming spring, others in the golden harvest ; some in the ripe stores of autumn, and others in the quiet rest of winter. To most a marriage day is one of supreme felicity. It is natural that it should be so. What joy fills the breasts of the little ones on the

day when the father has returned home from a distant voyage! And older hearts share in that joy. When the lost child has been found, when the tedious lawsuit has been won on which all the comforts of home depended, and when the deadly disease has been mastered which had fastened on an only son, the spirit rebounds from the pressure of anxiety under which it laboured into an ecstasy of joy. But a purer stream of joy flows from a higher source. If the beauties and melodies, the pleasures and gains of earth fill the soul with gladsome emotions, much more may the glory and riches of heaven fill it with rapture. This is a joy with which a stranger cannot intermeddle. The line of communication with heaven can be broken by no mortal hand. Spiritual joy flows from a sense of the divine favour. Let the Most High lift on man the light of his countenance, and the human soul is filled with bliss. In the language of the prophet, the ransomed of the Lord return to Zion, their heavenly city, with songs and everlasting joy upon their heads, because as the poet of Israel informs us, they walk in the light of his countenance. If ever joy is pure it is when it flows direct from the fountain head. Wherever the light of the divine favour rests, a communication is established for the time, between the human soul so favoured and the great and everlasting fountain of joy which enlivens and gladdens the universe, and the result is, nothing more can be desired, the soul is absolutely satisfied.

External indications promptly follow the internal feelings. This joyful emotion is revealed by smiling, whistling, singing, laughing, clapping the hands, and dancing. Let pleasant thoughts pass through the mind of things past, present or future, and a smile plays round the eyes

and lips; and as the emotion swells it is diffused over the countenance, clothing it with brightness. The same may occur during the hours of sleep. The soul is occupied with visions of beauty or pleasure, and the hidden joy comes to the surface in the face. It may even burst in laughter. The errand boy in his leisure trip, and the cowherd in his evening stroll, vent their exuberant feelings in whistling. Even the mechanic enlivens the workshop when things are moving swimmingly along by warbling out some pleasant ditty. When the emotion is fuller and deeper, it finds expression in song. The housemaid, the solitary rider, the group of sailors on the lonely deep, and the social evening party, at once express and confirm their joyous animation by some familiar air or some fashionable song. Religion, too, as the foster-parent of all true happiness, appropriately seizes this animating exercise and expresses some of her noblest thoughts in sacred melodies. The Christian, moved by heavenly love and filled with holy joy, pours forth his admiration of divine truth, his gratitude for mercies, his supplications for grace, and his adorations of his glorious Redeemer and God in the sweetest music of the human voice. And if the ethereal bodies of the glorified are capable of vocal utterance—and why may they not?—what must be the song that shall be the exponent of the joys of their triumph. Earth never heard such melody since the morning stars sang together and all the sons of God shouted for joy.

A common expression of joy is laughter. This is a discharge of inarticulate sounds from the throat, preceded by a sudden action of the diaphragm and lungs, and attended by a quick movement of the muscles of the mouth and of the face generally. When the laughter is

excessive, the action of the diaphragm is so violent that the person stoops and instinctively puts his hands to his sides to support himself; when he is, in common parlance, splitting his sides with laughter! In laughter there is generally something more than simple delight. An idea of something singular, odd, extravagant or grotesque is often blended with the joy. When the Syrian couple were informed by the Almighty that, although so aged, the long-expected son should be born to them, their joy found expression in a burst of laughter, although the future mother naturally desired to conceal this outcome of the emotion. Hence the assumption of something unnatural or odd in voice, manner, or dress, by those who wish to produce a laugh. By means of the laugh a pleasing and, in a measure, beneficial excitement is diffused over the physical frame. This is probably its natural design. When the joy is combined with a high state of excitement it is often expressed by clapping the hands. In this manner an audience in a public assembly at times proclaims its delight with the remarks of the speaker. Thus, also, spectators manifest their joy at the successful termination of some grand exploit. But the most forcible exponent of joy is dancing. When men leap for joy they are almost frantic with delight. This is very rare. Children often leap and dance for joy. Fashionable dancing has more excitement than pure delight. It is not beneficial to health or morals. Children may dance. It becomes them. Adults of sober thought will leave to voluptuaries and savages the exciting formalities of the public dance. The purest joy is tasted in the sanctuary, and not in the ball-room or theatre.

CHAPTER XVI.

5.—PRIDE.

This emotion properly occupies the confines of the agreeable. It is within the agreeable, for it is pleasing to human nature to think highly of itself. But it is so near to the disagreeable that the continual indulgence of it never fails to call up emotions the very reverse of pleasant. What is pride? Pride, properly so called, is the inflation of the soul with undue self-esteem, and is generally attended with disregard for, or contempt of, others. In its simple and original form the emotion is the elation of the soul on the conception of some excellence, personal or relative, which feeling is naturally agreeable. But, like other emotions in process of development, it alters its character so materially that what was commendable becomes uncommendable; and what was lawful becomes unlawful. In common language we hear it said of such a man, that the sect, the party, or the nation is proud of him. We cannot banish from our minds the impropriety of the use of a term that may convey to the mind of the hearers ideas the reverse of those intended. The term properly embodies the idea of something vain and arrogant, neither commendable nor moral. Whereas the speakers simply intend to say that they are joyfully elated by their connection with such a man. In this there is no feeling of arrogance, and no contempt for others. It is the emotion in its earlier and legitimate

development. The soul may be elated without being inflated. How many of our errors are traceable to the improper use of language! To elated properly belongs the simple idea of elevation, while to inflated belongs the idea of vanity. It would be well, perhaps, if the term elated could take the place of proud in all cases where arrogance and contempt have no place. A mother may be elated by the accomplishments of her daughter, or a father by the attainments of his son, that is, elevated and gladdened in spirit, without either being in any sense haughty or filled with contempt or disregard for others. A man who has gained an important victory after a severe contest may be elated, while his experience and good sense keep him from being inflated. The scholar who is publicly declared the winner of a great prize cannot restrain a certain gladsome rising of spirit; it would be a degradation of him to say that he was proud in the sense of supercilious, or moved with disregard for the unsuccessful competitors. When states or provinces have been engaged in friendly contests in the arts, it is no unusual thing for those belonging to the winning side to exclaim—We are proud of our country. The truth is, they are elated or raised in spirit, not merely gladdened; but not necessarily either bombastic or contemptuous. It is well when we can limit offensive terms to offensive meanings; as it is never desirable to make the same symbol express both what is commendable and what is contemptible.

Leaving the lower development of this emotion, we advance into the region of pride, properly so-called; we leave the elated and enter upon the inflated. Here reason loses proper restraint and the man becomes giddy, vain, and insolent. The emotion becomes the

controlling power, instead of being what nature designs an emotion to be, an impelling power. It is interesting to notice how the ancients expressed this feeling. It is generally dressed in a garb descriptive of some particular or prominent manifestation. The oldest moral writings extant—those of the Shemitic family—express pride by such terms as *gaah* or *gobah*, both meaning loftiness or haughtiness—*zadon*, swelling, inflation, arrogance—and *rahab*, violence, insolence. The Greeks expressed the same by *uperephania*, showing over others, making one's self conspicuous—and by *ubristes*, insolent bearing, violence, corresponding to the *rahab* of the Hebrews. The Latins used the terms *superbia*, meaning loftiness, haughtiness, as bearing one's self above others, and *supercilium*, literally the eyebrow, but meaning also stern arrogance, as if by knitting the eyebrows; a disdainful supercilious feeling. Our own term *pride* is from the Anglo-Saxon, *pryta*, meaning ornament, as if the outward adornment was an index of the inward feeling of superiority. As this feeling generally attended the possession of a handsome personal appearance, or special external adornment, the emotion laid claim to the term which generally displayed its presence and its power. It is natural to describe men by the dress which they habitually wear; but it is necessary to distinguish between the man and his dress, as the dress must in course of time undergo a change, and the most disreputable may be found wearing the dress of the most respectable. This emotion, then, as apprehended in its matured development by all ages and races, embodies the feelings of superiority, haughtiness, inflation, arrogance, and insolence.

Accepting the definition of pride as the inflation of

the soul with undue self-esteem, we may ask, for the sake of illustration, what occasions this undue self-esteem. Self-respect, self-love, or self-esteem is a proper feeling, and is very valuable as a principle of action; but when either becomes undue it proves injurious. This undue self-esteem is occasioned by an extravagant or unwise conception of superiority. A conception of superiority may be perfectly legitimate; it is of the undue or unwise that we now speak. Few things have more power to produce this extravagant conception of superiority than rank. Rank, that is high social position, is superiority. So far, the conception is just. But while there is superiority in some things, there is equality in many things common to humanity, and there may be inferiority in some things to some of inferior rank. Hence, if the things in which the man is on a level with other men are overlooked, and he suffers his mind to dwell only on those in which he is superior, the result will be undue self-esteem. Wealth is generally associated with rank. When united, the proofs of superiority over the masses of humanity, in possessions, houses, equipage, attendance, and enjoyments are so many and so manifest, that it is by an habitual and studied effort, approaching to a habit, that the mind is kept from that haughtiness which is characteristic of pride. This noblest triumph over self is attained by the habitual contemplation of personal infirmities, the many essentials held in common with all men, and the temporary nature of all these social distinctions so prized by many. Wealth sometimes precedes rank, and when possessed by the uneducated is seldom unattended by insolent bearing. The man is not only elevated, he is inflated by an

extravagant conceit of his own superiority. He will abuse his fellow men who are in his service as if they were inferior animals. Personal beauty commonly leads to undue self-esteem. Though generally exhibited by the weaker sex it is not confined to them. Men were proud of their personal attractions before Absalom, and women before Cleopatra. A secondary class of superior mental endowments conduces to the same feeling. The highest endowments are ever associated with humility. It is only an inferior grade of a higher order that produces or incites that undue self-esteem which results in haughtiness towards men of mean intellect, or contempt for them.

When animated by this feeling people often make strange spectacles of themselves. They are what the Greeks called, the "tetuphomenoi"—the stupified; their heads filled with smoke or vanity, and so regulated that the emotion breaks out in attitude, looks, airs, speech, and manners. They stand back from those conceived to be their inferiors, and raising themselves to their full height, a fit exponent of the inflated mind, they will not deign to look towards the ground, or, it may be, to answer a civil question. Or they may so far notice the objects of contempt as to fix a look of scorn upon them as if they would say by their looks, "how can you presume to approach us!" On such occasions the emotion of anger is frequently blended with that of pride, a feeling of indignation being evoked for some conceived insult. A lofty head does not always indicate a proud feeling. Some walk erect from choice and habit, and yet carry with them a very benign and gentle spirit. While others walk with bowed head both from hypocrisy and habit, and yet carry a most inflammable spirit, their pride being aroused on

the slightest appearance of disregard for their presence. The tossing of the head and the look of disdain most surely betrays its parentage. In the one word, *manners*, pride exhibits itself as in a looking glass. The dress, the movements, the attitudes, the service, the formalities, the attendance, all bespeak the ruling passion. Rivals must not be allowed to outshine them in any external display. Money must be freely lavished in dresses, carriages, furniture, and entertainments. Family pride does not speak in the muttering tones of a timorous servant, but in the commanding words of an absolute master. And should the rivals meet, and the well-fed feeling give the reins to the tongue, we may understand that the speech would not be the most complimentary. What fires of speech have raged from sparks dropped from the tongue of pride. Undue self-esteem has dropped a challenge; an equally proud spirit has taken it up; the contest extends to families; it is assumed by parties; it inflames cabinets, and is decided at length by hundreds of thousands of soldiers amidst the dust, smoke, fire, and carnage of the field of battle. In days of yore, eight hundred years before Christ, Amaziah, King of Judah, carried by storm the stronghold of Edom, and slaughtered his foes. Inflated by the conceit of his own ability, he challenged the King of Israel to fight. He got a mortifying answer in the shape of a humiliating advice. His pride did not suffer him to pass over the insult; the result was a battle and his utter discomfiture; Jerusalem was taken, its walls broken down, and the city pillaged. In our own day Louis Napoleon, Emperor of the French, conquered the Austrians, and drove them out of Lombardy, beginning in the old track of his uncle. There is more love to France than to Italy in all this. Having

humbled Austria, he must bring Prussia to her knees, to make France, as of old, the head of the continent. Pride sends the challenge, proclaims war on the merest pretext, and patriotism answers with ardour, by rushing her armies to meet the invading foe. Swift destruction treads on the heels of pride; France is prostrate in the dust; her emperor a captive; her capital in the hands of her hated rival; her territory lessened, and her treasuries emptied. And how often without a rival has pride wrought the degradation, if not the destruction, of an individual! The haughty autocrat of old Babylon descends from the most powerful throne on earth to feed with the beasts of the field, as a punishment for his pride. The powerful prime minister of the succeeding empire worries himself because a poor despised Jew will not join with others in ministering to his already inflated self-esteem. How sensitive must be that pride which demanded not the death of the offender only, but the death of the whole race to which he belonged, as the just expiation of the wound inflicted. But the Ruler of heaven and earth threw the weight of his influence into the opposite scale; and the despised rose to honour, while the proud despiser was overwhelmed with disgrace.

The morality of the human spirit is affected by this emotion. Why does God everywhere express his abhorrence of it?—Because it dishonours him; retards, if it does not prevent, the improvement of the soul, and inflicts untold miseries on others. In a measure it dethrones God, and deifies self; renders the man blind to his faults and wants; occasions his rejection of help as a matter of grace, when it cannot be received in any other way; and induces him to disregard and wound the feelings of others, both by speech and action.

DIVISION II.

DISAGREEABLE EMOTIONS.

CHAPTER XVII.

6.—1. SHAME.

MAN is no stranger to disagreeable emotions. He has in himself all the elements of trouble; and he lives in a world where these elements are constantly liable to disturbing influences. Much within is unsatisfactory, and much without is unpleasant and provoking. Hence he is often agitated and impelled by feelings the reverse of agreeable. On one day he is moved to envy at the prosperity, wealth, and splendour of a neighbour; on another he is fired with indignation at what he conceives to be his dishonesty and greed. The efforts of a rival kindle his jealousy; his success evokes his hatred. The imprudent act of to-day clothes him with shame; to-morrow his soul is flooded with grief on account of it. An accusing conscience distracts him with fear; and an accumulation of miseries overwhelms him with despair. His path through life is beset with thorns; and happy is he who, by vigilance, can diminish the number of his wounds. A brief elucidation of the chief disagreeable emotions may add to our conceptions of the soul's vast susceptibility of feeling. We begin with,—

Shame.—This emotion is a feeling of uneasiness, heat, and depression, occasioned by an unpleasant or unexpected exposure. The symptoms of the emotion vary largely in degree. The uneasiness may be a momentary tremor or positive restlessness. The heat may be an unseen passing glow, or the clothing of the face and neck with a crimson hue from the rushing of blood to the head. And the depression may be represented by the simple drooping for a moment of the eyelids, or by that sinking of spirit expressed by the wish to sink into the earth out of sight. In one of its stages the emotion assumes the form of modesty; in another that of bashfulness; it advances to the matured form of shame; and this, in its height, occasioning an obstruction of the ordinary exercise of the intellectual powers, is spoken of as a confusion of face. As the face is the general mirror of the soul, shame can with difficulty be restrained from exhibiting its presence by suffused features.

It has just been said that this feeling is occasioned by an unpleasant or unexpected exposure. This exposure may be to one's own self as well as to others. A man may be clothed with shame for his conduct in private when no mortal eye is on him. The soul has the power of looking back on the words, thoughts, and deeds of the past, and of bringing these out to the light for exposure and reflection, and for comparison with some received standard of propriety. If the man is not hardened by long continued impropriety of conduct, the exposure to himself of some grave misconduct will not fail to awaken the uneasiness, the depression and the heat of shame. He may have been that day in the witness-box, testifying on oath. Anxious to secure a

verdict to the side which he had espoused, he gave a colouring to some facts which the circumstances could not warrant, and so created a false impression on the listeners. Now in retirement he recalls his expressions; and they come not alone, they are attended by a feeling which betrays itself in a heated countenance. Or he may have spent the afternoon with some jovial friends, and partook more freely than he ought of the intoxicating glass. The heat of alcohol has passed off in some measure, but it is followed by another heat which does not elevate but depress, and makes the man unwilling to look his fellow mortal in the face. Or in his haste to be rich, he has added to the charge for an article to a liberal customer who he knew would not call in question the price; and now, on reflection on the gains of the day he is uneasy at this transaction, and could wish that the additional charge were again in the pocket of his liberal customer; and were the man suddenly to appear before him, the depression of shame would appear by a reluctance to look him full in the face. Or, reversing the picture in trade, a man may be ashamed of the foolish transaction by which he has lost a large sum of money. He has been fairly over-reached. He has bought for a large sum what is really worth but very little, as he now discovers. He cannot reverse the bargain. And the more closely he looks into the whole affair, the more does he see that he has parted with that money which had often comforted him against the thoughts of want. He is uneasy, heated, depressed; he is heartily ashamed of his folly. We pass by the gross misdemeanors, such as forgery, lewdness, and violence; the brazen face alone can remain unchanged on the exposure of such deeds to the eye of the soul, even in the absence of every fellow mortal.

When modesty is exhibited, the exposure has not been wholly agreeable. Internal nature in some part shows its uneasiness and disagreement. Yet a proper degree of modesty is becoming in all, but especially in women. The want of it would be a marked defect. To woman has been given for wise ends a keener susceptibility to this emotion. Her modest retirement is her attraction; her sensitive yielding, her strength; and her shrinking from observation, her elevation to notice; while the opposite display creates an immediate repulsion in the breast of every right-minded person. Modesty and humility are twin graces; and they are never far removed from high moral worth. See the maiden go forward to receive a prize for distinguished progress in learning, before a large number of spectators. Her cheeks and brow betoken a feeling most appropriate for the occasion. See the intelligent and clear-headed lad on the same arena, called up to demonstrate a difficult problem in Euclid on the black-board. Tremulous with emotion, indicating the uneasiness of a sensitive nature at the general exposure, he proceeds, chalk in hand, from stage to stage till the successful termination is greeted with loud applause. Few have been able, in addressing a public audience for the first time, in circumstances which admit of no retreat and when high expectations have been raised, to conceal the working of this feeling. Ample preparations may have been made, and there may be no lack of moral courage, but if there is not a depression of spirit there is at least an uneasiness combined with heat, the result of no mere excitement or timidity, but of that disconcerting influence which this emotion wields. So the inexperienced preacher generally feels when, exposed to the gaze of many, he rises up in the pulpit for the first

time to address a curious audience. Not less does the aspirant to legislative honors feel when he invites the attention of the assembled representatives of his country to listen to his maiden speech. False notions about the ease and coolness by which these performances might be gone through are easily dispelled by the experiment.

In bashfulness the element of depression is specially developed. The drooping of the head, so natural to a bashful person, indicates the sinking of the spirit. The soul of the individual is oppressed and consequently depressed by a sense of the superiority, the greatness or the grandeur of the assembly to which he is introduced. This subjection of the spirit is often attended by a partial stupidity, which renders the person awkward in his movements, and strips him of the ease and gracefulness so essential to polite demeanour. Bashfulness is an excess, and so far it is weakness—but it is readily borne by less sensitive minds whose sympathy it evokes; while the opposite extreme, impudence, naturally and properly excites disgust and indignation.

When full-blown shame is displayed by an exposure to others, the heat of this emotion becomes conspicuous. The person has run counter to the fashions of the day, disregarded the habits of society, violated the laws of the land, or transgressed the laws of God. A detection in or conviction of the fault is attended with the uneasiness and heat of this feeling. The emotion of pride often gives weight to the exposure, and increases the feelings of shame. A lady has the courage to appear in a dress quite out of date; but on meeting several of her own sex attired in the very height of the

prevailing fashion, she cannot suppress the flush that mantles her countenance. A man who was once possessed of great wealth, and had employed many men in his service, is constrained by what is called the turn of the wheel of fortune to descend to the position of the day labourer. While working with pick and shovel in the garb of the quarryman, he is accosted by those who knew and associated with him in the days of his splendour. The remembrance of the past, the contrast between his appearance and theirs, the pride of family not yet extinct, the undesired and unexpected exposure of his present poverty and degradation, bring restlessness to his nerves and perspiration to his brow, and if he were to express the wish of his heart, it would be, that they were a hundred miles away. Better thoughts might assure him that honest labour is no disgrace; but feelings often rush beyond the restraints of sober judgment. The cashier of a bank had a high reputation for integrity, honour, and all the graces of a sober-minded gentleman. In an evil hour he resolved to appropriate for private ends the notes entrusted to his keeping. Years pass on, and he wears the appearance of a diffident and humble man. At length the truth comes out; an examination of accounts proves a defalcation somewhere; to the amazement of all it is traced home to the cashier. Judge of his emotions when confronted by those whose duty it is to lay bare the guilt. The face is clothed with something more than diffidence; and humility, however genuine, gives place to a depression of spirits which claims the paternity of burning shame. Or the contrast may be between profession and practice in matters of religion. The professor of religion may be unexpectedly found

consorting with the lewd, with Sabbath-breakers, or with the riotous, by the officer of justice, the apprehender of offenders, who knows his position in the church of the most Holy. Not yet hardened by crime, he would fain hide his face from the gaze of the policeman; but called by name he must answer, and apprehended by authority he must go. Now he is abashed; but the confusion of shame awaits him in the trial of offenders.

Defeat and disappointment frequently occasion an exposure which culminates in shame. The man who entered battle with a high head and boastful language, returns defeated with crest fallen and lips sealed in silence. The unsuccessful competitor who boasted of his election before the contest, returns ashamed to his house on the declaration day. The servant who persuaded his master to join in a speculation, by strong assertions of great gain, is ashamed to look him in the face when the actual results prove the enterprise to be a ruinous loss. Most common is this emotion in children and servants, when summoned into the presence of parents and masters, after gross misconduct. How often should shame cover us when we approach our heavenly Father, our supreme Master!

This emotion is designed by our Creator to preserve the decencies and promote the refinements of social life; to conserve a due subordination to authority; and to restrain from improprieties and sin. It may however be subdued. A continued disregard of moral right, and specially of personal purity, will produce a callousness which will go far to rob the soul of this power of exercising a wholesome restraint on what tends to disgrace and ruin it.

CHAPTER XVIII.

7.—II. HATRED.

This emotion is a movement of the soul, more or less intense, to effect a separation between itself and something seen to be inferior, worthless or vile. It is experienced in various grades, from the mildest dislike to the strongest abhorrence. Yet in all the characteristic effort for separation is prominent; as that of fastening on or cleaving to is prominent in the opposite emotion of love. In the primary effort the soul seems to aim at the removal of the object disliked; in a secondary, the removal of itself from what is hated; and when the detestation is strong a simultaneous effort to force the loathed object away and hurry itself from it. In every case the thought, object or person, is perceived to be at least inferior, it may be worthless, or possibly vile or disreputable. This perception or conception, whether true or false, gives rise to the emotion. The soul very properly rises to effect a separation from what it conceives to be mean or corrupt. That is, the soul's action may be natural and thus appropriate, although the judgment which has given birth to it may be sadly astray. In ignorance man is often found hating what he should love, and loving what he should hate; but in both cases there is a natural cause.

The human soul is familiar with this emotion. It is a frequent and sometimes a friendly visitor. The

upright man often finds within himself that which demands the calling forth of this feeling. A passing object or thought calls up a train of reflections, in which are blended thoughts unjust, envious, or it may be unwise. Against these his soul must rise in strong dislike for their immediate expulsion. If this may not be done by direct effort, the offensive thoughts are covered from sight by attention being directed to something more agreeable and becoming. The immoral are also often dissatisfied with their own thoughts, and seek to rid themselves of their presence. The remembrance of evil deeds comes up more frequently than they wish, and with it the sting of conscience. Fears of retribution and a day of vengeance follow in close company. All this is distressing; and a marked antipathy to these disagreeable intruders is shown by a decided effort to remove or stifle them. In this case the emotion is misdirected. It should be launched against the evil deeds, and not against their timely condemnation, by a friendly voice giving warning of a possible future vengeance.

In the conduct of others there is often much to call forth not simply dislike, but abhorrence. We dislike the grasping covetousness which will never afford an advantage to a neighbour; and the double dealing of false friends who are like a limb out of joint, an attempt to lean on them resulting in a painful fall. We hate the hypocrisy which makes a profession of religion the stepping-stone to the attainment of some worldly object; and the actions of the vile slanderer who labours to strip us of all usefulness and respectability. We detest the villainy of the man that robs a poor widow of all her worldly goods, when entrusted with their management;

and the treachery of a Joab that could stab a rival while professing friendship; or a Judas that could sell his master for money, and then point him out to the arresting foe by a kiss. We abhor the infernal inhumanity of the Popish Inquisition; and the barbarous cruelty of the Chinese who slaughter captive rebels as if they were cattle. And we loathe the vileness of those who degrade themselves beneath the beasts in yielding to their insatiable lusts; and not less the infamous gain of those who grow rich by pandering to the corrupt propensities of human nature.

But if there is a commendable, there is also a condemnable hatred. There is a world that loves iniquity and hates righteousness. They detest warning, counsel, and instruction. They hate the light because their deeds are evil, and cannot bear its disclosures. By such all virtuous strictness is disliked; attention to the duties of religion is despised; and piety is treated with contempt. Through the perversion of their judgments, influenced largely by their positive choice of evil, sometimes as good, and their habits, they regard what is superior as inferior, what is most precious as worthless, and what is holy and desirable as vile and detestable, and hence the channels in which this powerful emotion finds an outlet. To regulate the feeling aright, we must rectify the judgment.

If evil deeds evoke hatred, it should not surprise us if the doctrines which are supposed to produce them should elicit the same feeling. Hence religious opinions have sometimes been regarded with extreme abhorrence. With no other feelings can we read of the dogmas of Moloch, the Carthaginian Baal, and the Druids in their prescription of human victims, infants and adults,

as sacrifices to propitiate their deity. In the same way we detest the infamous prostitution demanded of the votaries of Astarte; the shastras of India that could sanction infanticide; and the Thug superstition that could presume to sanctify murder. And would our souls be in the right mood if we read with anything short of abhorrence the regulations in respect to the torture unto death of so-called heretics by the most terrible engine of oppression which the earth ever heard of—the Inquisition? The preaching of the gospel of salvation by Jesus Christ inflamed the rulers of the Jews with hatred against the apostles. How thoroughly the Pharisees detested the teachings of Jesus of Nazareth! How abominable at one time to the soul of Saul of Tarsus was the doctrine of salvation by the cross! How the Sanhedrim loathed the speech of Stephen when they gnashed their teeth at him! In this case, as often happens, anger, after following closely on the heels of hatred, outstripped it and took the lead. That doctrine is generally hated which interferes with the pleasures or the profits of men. The silversmiths of Ephesus regarded with abhorrence the doctrines taught by Paul, as they sapped the foundation of their trade. The priests of Rome, in the palmy days of Romanism, could not tolerate the teachings of Wickliffe and of Huss, as they interfered largely with their sensual indulgences. And wherever antagonistic tenets are set forth in public controversy, as Protestant and Roman Catholic, Calvinistic and Arminian, the keen and vehement supporters on each side treat with loathing the assertions made by their opponents. Some, to mark their abhorrence of what they do not like to hear, remove their souls from impressions by putting their hands to their ears, or in a more

demonstrative manner, by abruptly rising and leaving the place. In so doing they may be acting rightly, for no man should listen to blasphemy or vile discourse who can remove beyond hearing; or wrongly, if what is spoken is the truth, which is profitable to them, although contrary to preconceived opinions.

Persons are, perhaps, the objects of antipathy as frequently as thoughts, deeds, and doctrines. It is difficult for man to look upon the person who has done him much harm in a very base manner with any other feelings than those of strong dislike. There is a legitimate hatred of wrong-doers. The most Holy "abhors the bloody and deceitful man;" he "hates all workers of iniquity." The Saviour loathed the lukewarm professors of Laodicea. It is just to conclude that those who are habitually under his influence will entertain similar feelings towards the same characters. Hence we read of the righteous that he "hates them that regard lying vanities;" and "hates with perfect hatred," detests or abhors, "those who rise up against God." There have been men of such infamy, such monsters of cruelty, as Caligula, Nero, and others that might be named, that no upright man could look upon them without utter loathing. Their wickedness makes them objects of abhorrence. As fellow-creatures they may be pitied; but as wicked, vile men they are properly hated. An idea is afloat in this age that a Christian should show no dislike or hatred to the vilest enemy he has—that all his evil doings and sayings should be ignored, and that he should be treated as if his conduct was commendable. This, we maintain, is a pernicious doctrine, if it could be reduced to practice, which must rarely be the case. We are ever to do

good to our enemies—to return good for evil—blessing for cursing—but never to confound good and evil, or place the both on a level, or be indifferent to either. Vile men should be despised in the eyes of the righteous, that they may be ashamed and cease to do evil. Mischief-makers should not be treated, even by Christians, as peace-makers. There should ever be a separation of the precious from the vile, and a treatment of both according to character; and with the reformation of the evil steadily in view while that is possible. There is a stage of guilt and degradation beyond which we are to mark our abhorrence, by having no fellowship whatever. Christians should distinguish between sin and the sinner; and the man should only be the object of dislike as an evil-doer, and that in proportion to his knowledge of the evil which he was doing and the guilt pertaining to the crimes or offences of which he was the author.

High moral principle is necessary to regulate aright the outgoing of this emotion. In this the righteous man appears to advantage. His character and principles constrain him to put a bridle on this feeling; and while heartily condemning what is sinful, and hating even the presence of the vile, he is careful to benefit and not to injure those whom he must hate. On the other hand, persons not ruled by high moral principle allow their animosity, ill-will, and malice, the offspring of hate, to have full play, to the lasting injury of those they dislike. By their tongues they seek to ruin their reputation and business; and sometimes their abhorrence finds vent in personal violence. What duels, family and tribal feuds, and national contests have sprung from unreasonable hatred! So prominent has this

emotion been, that we are spoken of as a race as "hateful and hating one another"! When the deed is revenge for injury done, there is some excuse; but often deadly hostility is shown when no evil deed can be named to call for such treatment. The question, "Why? what evil hath he done?" can only be truly answered by, "We loathe him, and wish him out of the way." And if we philosophically inquire how this deep loathing arises, we find that the person is presented to the soul as dressed in the garb of the vilest criminal—an impostor, a blasphemer, a traitor, or even a foul murderer. So the Romish inquisitors dressed their victims with paintings of dèvils to evoke the hatred of the populace as they were led to execution. And in our own day the heathen, to arouse the people to hate, persecute and murder the christians in their country, circulated the lying report that they were devourers of the children committed to their care. When people are at war hatred is the prevailing feeling. The very name of the individual antagonist is hated; every person belonging to the family at feud with another is gazed on with abhorrence by the contending parties; and when one nation is in open warfare with another, the feeling of hostility is extended to the individuals of both nations all over the world, and they cannot meet without mutual dislike, if not an open quarrel. Alas! the history of our race has hitherto been a history of warfare, and that warfare draws its life-blood from hatred. Till sin disappears, hatred cannot, and in one important sense should not, disappear. In a sinless world hatred is dead.

CHAPTER XIX.

8.—III. ENVY.

This is a feeling of poignant uneasiness in the human soul at seeing another more honoured, prosperous, or successful than itself. It is not a mere dissatisfaction with the honour, prosperity, or success of another. That may be on very proper grounds; an injustice may be shown; the person so favoured may be wholly unworthy. But when envy arises, there is a comparison between the object of envy and itself. In that comparison the soul finds itself in an inferior position. Its pride or undue self-esteem is wounded. It is uneasy, sometimes painfully uneasy, at seeing another in that high position, receiving those honours, adorned with that beauty, enjoying that wealth, or crowned with that glory which *it* has not, but would have.

This emotion is more frequently experienced among those who have some things in common, as among the members of the same family, the students of the same seminary, the members of the same military corps, and persons of the same profession, legal, medical, and clerical. There is a pride in the human heart that will not willingly see itself overlooked or outstripped. And there is a selfishness there also that would appropriate to itself all or many of the best things. Envy leans on the two arms of pride on the one side, and desire, in the

form of covetousness, on the other, They both prop up and nurture envy, saying to the soul, "Why should you be inferior—this excellence should be yours?" Some mark of favour is shown by a parent to one child over others; a prize is won, or the first place reached after keen competition in a seminary; a member of a military corps is promoted, contrary to the expectations of some who had carved out that honour for themselves; this lawyer or physician, or clergyman, is the favourite of the multitude, and is gathering golden honours, although some one can scarcely see why so many should run after him, or applaud his talent, or skill, or address; and this disagreeable feeling crops up in looks or language, despite, it may be, efforts to keep it down or conceal it, with the suppressed reflections, "Why should I be less esteemed, and why should not this wealth be mine—I am wronged; there is injustice somewhere?" A sense of injustice is at the root of envy. We do not say that there is injustice, but that the soul persuades itself that a wrong is done, and that it in some sense is a sufferer. Hence the painful uneasiness. It suffers. At the lowest consideration, it is thought, the person should not have stepped up to that position; he did a wrong to others who were better fitted for or more entitled to that place; and all who helped him up or put him in that office, were guilty of injustice in not selecting some one else, not excluding the complainer, and helping him to the coveted honour. Under the impression that the object of envy has done him a wrong, the envier strongly dislikes him, and can scarcely say a good word about him; and those who helped him up to honour come in for a full share of the displeasure, if not positive hatred. Nor does the dislike stop short with humanity; it is even directed

against the sovereign Disposer of all things for not having equally favoured the envious one.

Envy is not limited to those who have a community of interests. It is felt by those who are far removed from each other. The servant-maid may envy her mistress for the ease, the wealth, and splendour which she sees her possess ; and yet, unknown to that servant, the mistress may envy her for her liberty, her youth, and her beauty. The street-sweeper, looking upon the rich driving past in their decorated carriages, rolling in wealth and surfeited with luxury, may be pained with uneasiness at the contrast between his position and theirs, and feel that but for the partiality shown by some one, that position of honour and enjoyment might be his.

A wise observer of human nature asks,—"Who can stand before envy?" The reason is obvious. Envy is keenly persevering and ruthlessly destructive. Like other emotions of the soul, it moves not alone. It secures the aid of others. On the sight of some one in favour or prosperity it cries out to the soul,—"You are wronged, and this one is the occasion of it." Pride joins in and exclaims,—"Yes, bring him down from his height." Covetousness follows, and says with emphasis, —"Seize what he possesses, and make it your own." Hatred comes to the front and looks at him with swelling malignity, and roars out, — "Defame him, destroy him." And if necessity calls for it, Anger will lend a helping hand before Envy be allowed to fail in her design. Commanding such powerful aid, no wonder if men have fallen before its bitter and protracted animosity. The history of the favoured race of Israel affords some striking illustrations of this emotion. There is no nation and no community in which illustrations

do not abound; but those of Israel have a permanency in sacred history which hands them down to all ages, and proclaims them to the wide world. In the first family Cain envied Abel because the latter was blessed with marks of the divine favour. Pride and hatred gave their ready assistance till passion seized the control of the man, and murder was the result of envy, fed by pride and hatred. Laban looks with envious eyes on Jacob's ever-increasing stock, notwithstanding all efforts to stop that increase, and at length his dissatisfaction and uneasiness will not suffer him to look his son-in-law fair in the face. Joseph's brethren mark the fondness of their father for him; and as one gift after another shows a special esteem not extended to them, they look on the father's favourite with envy. Hatred joins hand in hand with envy, and they are prepared on a fitting opportunity to put him out of the way. That opportunity is given through the kindness of the parent and the fidelity of the son, and the brother is sold into slavery; and a lie that would rend the father's heart is devised to prevent all search for the favourite son. The position of honour and authority occupied by Moses and Aaron in the wilderness, make them the objects of envy to their brethren of the same tribe, and to some of the tribe of the first-born Reuben. A formidable rebellion is the result; and this is only quashed by a terrible display of divine vengeance, in the sudden destruction of the chief conspirators. The injudicious praise of the daughters of Israel evokes the envy of Saul, the king, and the youthful hero David must become a fugitive for seven long years to escape the ire of the envious monarch. Ephraim is the crown of the glory of Israel, for on him rests the chief blessing which per-

tained to Joseph ; but to Judah pertains the sovereignty and the temple ; hence Ephraim envies Judah the possession of these honours ; and Judah in return vexes Ephraim in retaliation for every display of resentment. The high position and great honour bestowed on Daniel could not escape the notice of the court of Darius. They ask themselves, " Why should this Jew hold the highest place under our monarchy, as under the Babylonian ? Must he ever be chief, no matter who conquers ? Is there no Median or Persian fit to fill this post ? Must we serve under this man whom our nation has conquered ?" These are the outgoings of envy, but they have a show of justice and reason about them. They may all be answered ; but the rejoinder will come back,—to the victors belong both the spoils and the honours. Nursing this sense of injustice, envy pierces their souls, and they lay wait to find fault with him. He reads their purpose, and is on his guard. All his public business is so carefully, wisely, and punctually discharged that they can find no loophole by which to shoot an arrow at him. His strict religious habits give them a hold on him. The snare is laid for the king, and he falls into it, for he it is who has continued this Daniel in such high honour. The enemy has triumphed over the upright, as he is often allowed to do, but not over God. The den of lions is indeed entered ; but the condemned leaves it as unharmed as he entered it. And now the autocrat takes vengeance for the snare cast over him ; and the envious are devoured by the choice of their own passion.

A higher and holier than Daniel is before us in the same history. The Messiah has come. His doctrines and manner of life disappoint the rulers of the Jews. He is not the Christ for whom they looked, and they

will have none of him. Yet his powers of working miracles, his benevolence, his blameless life and profound wisdom create a deep impression wherever he goes. At times the populace are moved to enthusiasm in his favour. Should the people yield to his doctrines, these rulers, priests, scribes, pharisees, must sink into contempt, for this Teacher never ceases to expose them to the reprobation of the whole land. Why should he supplant them?—this untutored prophet of Galilee!—this ignoble man of no reputation for birth or learning! Why should he carry all before him by giving out that he is the Son of David? His power and popularity incite their envy. They must put him out of the way. When the crowds shout before and behind him on his march—"Hosanna to the Son of David"—they are roused to action. He is soon after seized and brought before a Roman Governor, as if he were an enemy to Cæsar, who had upheld Cæsar's rightful authority, and as if they were friends of Cæsar, who hated the very shadow of his authority. No; let the truth be told. They are moved by envy. They would have his powers but cannot reach them—they would have his deep sagacity, but it is beyond their grasp—they would have his great influence with the people, but they cannot secure it. Had he no power, no influence, they would be content to despise him and leave him alone. But he has what they have not—the power to command support where he likes, and an influence with the masses of the people which can bear down all opposition. They are overshadowed by such greatness and popular influence. He must disappear. Who can stand before the envy of the highest authority in any land? He must give

place, for envy is cruel and inexorable. Pilate yields to their clamour, prompted by hatred, begotten of envy. Immanuel dies the victim of envy.

Unlike other emotions which in their development may become immoral and sinful, this emotion from its feeblest current to its highest restlessness is improper and immoral. We speak not of ordinary dissatisfaction at ill-gotten wealth or honours. That is not envy. But we speak of the hateful uneasiness laden with pain at the sight of the superiority of another in any desirable possession, obtained in the common evolutions of life. Such a feeling strikes at the sovereignty of God. It seems to say "the providence of God is wrong." Its thought is "that honour, wealth, pleasure, beauty, is not rightly bestowed; I should have had it, injustice is done to me; or I am at least as much entitled to receive it as this person." This is wrong. If a person has obtained his goods fairly, or won his position honourably, we have no right to envy him, he has done us no wrong; and we, in envying him, hate him, and are tempted to disparage and defame him. If the person has beauty or talent, or wealth or rank by birth, it is the direct gift of God, and shall we find fault with God? May he not bestow his own on whom he pleases? And will we be in pain and cherish ill-will because God has chosen to bestow his favours on some one else, and not on us? He has done us no wrong, as we were unworthy of the least of his mercies. If wealth or position has come in the occurrences of life, this also is from God, as promotion comes not from east or west, that is by mere chance; but God puts down one and sets up another, through the agency both of bad and good men. Let us suppress the first rising of envy, and be content with our portion and

position, as measured and marked out from time to time by the unerring hand of God. We may also ponder with profit the lines of the poet :—

> "Honour and fame from no condition rise,
> Act well thy part, there all the honour lies."

CHAPTER XX.

9.—IV. JEALOUSY.

Closely related to the preceding is Jealousy. This emotion is a burning feeling kindled within the soul by an apprehension or suspicion of wrong sustained, or about to be sustained, by our rights, or the rights of one we make our own, in the regard or affections of one esteemed or loved, being tampered with or destroyed. It is allied to envy, inasmuch as both spring from an apprehension of one being out of place to our injury in some form, and are both attended with feelings of keen dislike, — amounting at times to an inability to think or speak favourably—respecting the person seen or suspected of occupying this improper position. Such was the conception of the relationship of these two emotions by the ancients that one term was made by some of them to express both feelings. For example, the Hebrews employed *qineah*, and the Greeks ζηλός, *zelos*, for envy and jealousy alike; although the Greeks used also another term φθόνος, *phthonos*, for envy. Yet the two emotions are quite distinct. You may envy a man of whom you are not jealous. You may envy him for his personal appearance, great talent, wealth, grandeur, and respect, but you are not jealous of him, for you have no apprehension that he is tampering with your dearest rights, or secretly undermining your position. And you may be jealous of a

man whom you do not envy. You may be jealous of him because of his suspicious or unbecoming appearance, language, or conduct, but you do not envy him; you would not exchange places with him; on the contrary, you disregard his position as having no attractions for you, and you detest his conduct as mean in the extreme. In envy two persons only are generally concerned, the object and the subject of envy. But in jealousy three persons are frequently concerned, the object concerning whom you are jealous, the immediate occasioner of the jealousy, and yourself. And sometimes there may be a fourth; that is, there may be a twofold subject, a duplicate of it, the one the agent, the friend, the servant of the other; and the feeling may burn in one or both at the same time.

Suspicion is not jealousy, though closely related to it. You may be suspicious of a man's words or conduct, as not being what is professed; but you are not jealous of him as seeking to rob you of what you prize very highly. Yet you are seldom jealous without being suspicious at the same time of almost everything about him who is the occasion of the jealousy. Suspicion is often related to jealousy, as cause and effect. You suspect, that is, you imagine or conceive without proof, that a man has been, in your absence, worming his way into the esteem of one you highly regard, to your injury or exclusion, and the feeling of jealousy is kindled and cannot long be concealed. It is a fire which must have some outlet. But jealousy often rests on stronger grounds than mere suspicion. The subject of the emotion may have ocular demonstration of the attempt to do him wrong in his tenderest and most sacred feelings, or to defeat some project which lies very near his heart.

The heat and force of jealousy are in proportion to the interest felt in the person or thing, of or over which a man is jealous. The emotion is evoked when in possession of the object prized, and when there is rivalry for the possession of what has not yet been appropriated. The careful and correct use of prepositions in connection with this feeling is important. We are said to be jealous of, for, over, and on account of persons. The object or person who is prized or loved is the proper object *of* jealousy, and the person who is the immediate occasioner of this feeling, whose conduct gives rise to it, is the one *on account of* whom you are jealous. In common language, however, the *of* is used both for the object of the emotion and for the immediate occasioner of it, but not with sufficient accuracy. If a man said,—"I am jealous of that woman," most persons would imagine that she was the object of jealousy, and was consequently prized, but he might mean by that same expression that he was jealous *on account of* her, having nothing but dislike towards her, and fearing her presence in his house as destructive to his domestic peace, by instilling false notions into those he loved. Hence the propriety of avoiding ambiguity by the use of appropriate prepositions.

Can anything inanimate be the object of jealousy? Yes, frequently. We may be jealous of or over our reputation, trade, or the interests and honour of our country. Yet generally we are jealous of and on account of persons. But it must be noted that the object and subject of jealousy are so closely connected that the subject claims a property in, or oneness with, or closest relation to the object of jealousy, whether it be an inanimate object or a person, so that the injury

dreaded or done to the object comes home to the heart of the subject and kindles the emotion. An event, such as the discovery of a letter, without any clue to the knowledge of the agent or writer, is often the occasion of jealousy. The deed is there, and tells its own tale ; but the doer, who by this deed has made us jealous is unknown. You may say that the event has occasioned your jealousy, or that you are jealous on account of some unknown agent or writer. It amounts to the same. The actor speaks through his deed, and the writer by his letter, either for himself or another.

A man is jealous of his reputation. To a proper extent he ought to be. Men in public positions depend largely upon their acceptability with their fellow-men. Few can safely disregard the persistent attempts of enemies to destroy a man's character. He who is exposed to such injuries should be jealous. He may not close the mouths of foolish talkers or of slanderers, and he cannot stop the press when under the control of men of no moral principle, but he ought sometimes at least to answer a fool according to his folly, and sometimes to claim his rights of protection as a citizen. This emotion is fitted to stimulate him to his duty in protecting his good name when most unjustly assailed. While he ought not to notice every dog that barks, but hold on his way in the path of honour and integrity, he may err to his own injury and the injury of those near to him by too great indifference to the defamation of an abusive press, seen and read by the general public.

A man is jealous over a business which he has made his own. By some chemical discovery or mechanical invention he has started a fair trade, which will soon enrich him if left to himself exclusively. But he learns

that others are actively exploring the ground where he discovered his treasure, and their efforts arouse his jealousy. His patent will be jealously guarded. The public will be cautioned against all counterfeits of the genuine article. He will be particularly careful not to give any valuable information to a suspected inquirer. And every rumour that reaches him of a near approach to his own discovery or invention will furnish fresh fuel to keep the emotion aglow.

The departments of civil governments, when the ruling party have been overthrown by a general election, are generally the scenes where this emotion burns in many faces. Many applicants press their claims to office. They inquire who are seeking the same situation. From that moment the rivals are eyed with jealousy. Except among the nobler spirits, there is no wish to meet, or recognise, or speak to each other. Diplomatic circles are not free from the same evil feeling. When two contending nations are seeking the alliance of a third, the agents of both meet on common ground, and every art and argument is seized by each to influence to his side the arbiter in the contests. Every symptom that the opponent is making a deep impression evokes the jealousy of his antagonist, and he strives by a fresh counteractive to neutralize the work of his opponents.

Sometimes a zealous and faithful servant may be said to be jealous for his master, that is, for his honour and his rights. So Elijah, the prophet, speaking of himself, says, "I have been very jealous for the Lord God of Hosts." He had identified himself with his master's cause—his very soul was wrapped up in it; whatever touched Jehovah's honour touched his heart. That honour had been basely trampled in the dust. Israel,

who had been married to the Lord by a holy covenant, had recently given her homage and confidence to Baal, a small remnant alone remaining faithful. The servant who had made his master's honour his own, had his jealousy kindled into a flame on witnessing the daily proofs of Israel's infidelity to her great Redeemer-Husband. The language is both appropriate and deeply impressive. In similar terms, Paul says of the Corinthian church, "I am jealous over you with godly jealousy." He had felt as Elijah felt—had made Christ's honour his own; and every movement on the part of the Corinthian church that indicated alienation from Christ, to whom she was pledged, seemed to him like the unfaithful dealing of a betrothed virgin. After an engagement has taken place, both parties are naturally jealous of any conduct that looks towards a breach of promise. And if the engagement has been made on the part of the future husband, by proxy—by a friend warmly attached and anxious to be faithful—his friend will be jealous over the party espoused, as if he was a principal in the case.

In conjugal relationships this emotion engages most frequent attention. A husband becomes jealous of his wife for her extravagant efforts to please other men, and her readiness to receive undue attention from them. And a wife becomes jealous of her husband for his familiarity with other women, and his desire to please and honour them while she is, or imagines that she is, slighted. And when this fire is fully kindled, it has the heat of "coals of juniper." It devours soothing and conciliatory arguments as the flame consumes the stubble. Next to it in strength is the jealousy of rivals, male or female, in seeking to secure this important relationship. So violent has been this feeling that the death of the antagonist

has not only been desired, but actually sought, and even attempted both by poison and violence. This, however, is rare; but the fire burns fiercely as often as the occasion brings up the form of the rival.

In respect to morality, this emotion, unlike envy, may be allowable, beneficial or honourable. God is jealous; that is, he has a burning regard for his own honour, and will not suffer his rights in the affections and confidence of his people to be tampered with with impunity. Within certain limits the exercise of this emotion in a man's own behalf is beneficial; in behalf of other men it is often commendable; and when evoked from a pure regard for the glory of God, it is in the highest degree honourable.

CHAPTER XXI.

10.—v. ANGER.

This is the uprising of the soul, often swift and sharp, against the doer or supposed doer of some injury or wrong. It is one of the strongest, as it is the fiercest, of the emotions of the human spirit. Like others, it exhibits various degrees. You may behold it in the sudden flush that finds expression in the harsh word or fierce look, and in the wild fury that spurns all restraint. Its different forms or degrees have their peculiar designations; as, in addition to the common term, there are resentment, indignation, wrath, rage, and fury. In no age, rank, or class, is it inoperative. The child changes colour because its toy is wrenched from its grasp; the monarch fumes because some servant has dared to frustrate his purpose; the savage hurls his stone or launches his spear against the man who has upbraided him; while the more cultivated mortal allows his tongue or his pen to be the vehicle of his keen displeasure. Disappointments, disobedience, personal injuries, base injustice, and cruel wrongs, are the chief provocatives of this emotion. The immigrant who finds poverty where he expected wealth; idleness where he expected ample remunerative labour; a chill, miserable climate, where he expected perpetual summer, vents his reproaches, if not his imprecations, on the heads of the agents who were instrumental in inducing him to leave

comfort at home for wretchedness abroad. So Israel of old "chode" with Moses when pressed with the wants of the wilderness; and at a later day, when indisposed to fight for the possession of Canaan, proposed "to stone" the men who would advise a bold advance upon the promised territory. When the disappointment is traced to deception in the withholding of support in a grave juncture; to negligence in the payment of money most urgently needed; to treachery, in the refusal of testimony in a most important case, although repeatedly promised and fully relied upon,—the emotion finds utterance in the expressions of deepest indignation. The disappointment felt by the prophet sent to Nineveh because that city was not overthrown, according to his prediction, was so great that it evoked the bitter reply, "I do well to be angry, even unto death."

Disobedience does not always call forth displeasure. A man may smile in finding that his orders have not been carried out. It may have been most prudent to disobey. But in other circumstances anger breaks out violently when the discovery is made that important orders on which many valuable lives depend have been wilfully neglected. When expedition, skill, and courage, are demanded under the eye of an officer, blundering and timidity are too often visited by expressions that show the force of the displeasure. In the family circle, and in the common school, persistent disobedience in things requiring care and attention, will properly awaken anger though it ever should be held under restraint. A refusal to comply with the unreasonable request of a haughty eastern despot, evoked a feeling which demanded the removal of the Persian queen from her high position. The babes at Bethlehem felt the weight of Herod's wrath

because the wise men dared to disregard his command to point out the home where the infant Messiah lay.

When a man is smarting under personal injuries, anger quickly springs up. If smitten, he is very apt to smite in return, under the promptings of this fierce emotion, irrespective of the injurious consequences to himself as well as to the aggressor. If meanly and unworthily treated by those on whom he had strong claims for brotherly regard, this feeling may take the form of resentment. Dislike is blended with anger. Displeasure is cherished. The fire smoulders within him; a passing word may open a rent for the fanning breeze; and the grudges of years of antipathy may burst forth to startle the unexpecting beholder. If vilified, or even justly exposed for villainy, through the public press, he may boil with resentment against the writer, and the horsewhip or the revolver may prove the strength of the emotion. This is the spring of quarrels which have sprinkled the earth with human blood.

Sometimes a nation rises up in its wrath against the oppression of its rulers. There is a revolution. A sense of intolerable injustice evokes indignation against those who are charged with robbing and betraying their country. Woe unto the rulers who are exposed to the rage of an excited and unreflecting populace. The ungovernable passions of a mob will wreak ruin on every object of its animosity. One man is often the object of public indignation. He has showed great pusilanimity on the field of battle—or he has concluded a most dishonourable peace — or he has enriched himself at the public expense—or he has by gross mismanagement brought the country to the verge of ruin; let the country ring with his evil doings, and impre-

cations are heaped upon his name, and his very safety is endangered on any highway from the wrath that he has evoked.

Some of the fiercest demonstrations of anger have occurred when a man or his family have been subjected to cruel wrongs. Let an enemy enter a home to drag off into slavery or wretchedness a member of the household; what may we not expect from the guardian of that home, if tongue can speak or hand can move? When Jacob was pursued and overtaken by his father-in-law, as if he had been a thief, and all his property ransacked in vain for stolen goods, he gave utterance to his wrath against Laban in words that marked the intensity of his resentment. When his sons, Simeon and Levi, had a wrong to avenge for the seduction of their sister, they allowed their anger to burst into a flame of outrageous vehemence and ferocity, destroying the innocent with the guilty, and plundering and enslaving the defenceless. For a similar offence Absalom stamped himself with the guilt of a fratricide. In all ages, and among all classes, cruel wrongs inflicted on members of a family have kindled fires of wrath which have smouldered for years awaiting a day of vengeance.

Inferior animals, and sometimes inanimate objects, come in for a share of the outgoings of this emotion. The carter will sternly whip the horse that provokes him by constantly backing instead of going forward; The dog that delights to bite may look out for vengeance from him whom he has wounded. Balaam's ass suffers a severe beating through fierce anger, provoked by a bruised leg. Too often, indeed, these dumb animals suffer shameful treatment from man when anger has reached its height in ungovernable fury. Sometimes

we hear curses heaped upon the stone or root that has tripped a man of uncontrolled tongue, to his sore injury. And the child may be seen beating with violent feelings the thistle that has just pierced his hand or his foot.

Symptoms of this, as of other emotions, constantly appear in the inferior creation. We hear it in the growling and savage barking of the watchdog; we see it in the violent kicking of the horse; in the butting of the ram; and in the pawing and rushing of the bull. Sea and air are not free from similar exhibitions of animal rage. Anger was designed by our Creator to deepen the conception and confirm the abhorrence of wrong-doing, to stay the further progress of evil, and to prevent, by awakening fear, its future recurrence! Therefore, though often terribly destructive when unrestrained, it is sometimes beneficial. Anger is at times strength. A man without it is a weakling. In its reasonable development it is not sinful. An inspired penman writes: "Be ye angry and sin not." To see gross violence or injustice perpetrated, and iniquity flaunting itself unblushingly without displeasure, reaching to anger or wrath, is indicative of moral weakness; it is culpable indifference to the existence of sin, if not a sympathy with it. The man who broke the tables of stone on which the God of the universe had written his own law was not blamed for so doing. The deed was the outgoing of a righteous indignation at the sight of the most provoking idolatry.

In its best manifestations in the human spirit this emotion is but a feeble representation of an attribute of the deity. "God is angry with the wicked every day." Yet he is "slow to anger," indicating the restraint placed upon the indignation justly evoked. The

inspired volume gives great prominence to this divine attribute. If it break forth upon his foes, the results are indescribably terrible. "Who can stand before his indignation? and who can abide in the fierceness of his anger?—his fury is poured out like fire." "It burns to the lowest hell, and none can quench it." It seems an essential excellence in the moral governor of the universe, whatever notions of it the guilty may prefer to entertain.

Anger in man must be temporary and controlled. As a moral fire, it is a good servant but a bad master. "Let not the sun go down upon your wrath." Only in the breasts of fools can it find a permanent abode. It will consume the man in whom it is allowed to dwell. And if through want of proper restraint it oversteps the bounds of reason and develops into fury, the consequences must be injurious, and may be mournfully destructive.

CHAPTER XXII.

11.—VI. GRIEF.

VERY different from the preceding is the emotion of Grief. Instead of rising, shaking off indifference, assuming a hostile attitude, or throwing itself with force or violence against one conceived to have done, or to be doing wrong, as in anger, the soul under this emotion is depressed, sinks, is dissolved; and in extremities is poured out to utter exhaustion. Hence these two emotions cannot co-exist in the soul, as the one rouses and the other depresses it. They may succeed each other by turns with great rapidity, but they cannot co-operate. Such is true of other emotions. Joy and grief cannot co-exist. But it is sometimes amusing to see how rapidly they may follow each other. A child may be seen crying, and, before he has wiped his eyes, burst into laughter; and again, as in a moment, the joy may give place to a fresh burst of sorrow. On the other hand, shame and grief may co-exist, as they both depress the soul; and as a matter of fact, they are often seen co-operating. In the same way hatred and anger may conjointly possess the soul, as they both elevate it, and may nourish each other to extreme violence. They do not, however, necessarily co-operate; nor do shame and grief; as each of the four may singly possess the soul.

With the emotion of grief our race has, alas! the closest experience. We begin life with crying, and we

often end it with sighing and tears. Our path through life is ever sprinkled with drops of sadness, and often drenched with showers of sorrows. It finds expression in the sigh of the lonely, in the silent weeping of the very sad, in the crying of the bereaved, and in the groaning of the distressed; and manifests its depth and power in the wringing of the hands; in the prostration of the body as naturally exhibiting the sinking of the spirit; in fainting; in dethroning of reason; and in bursting of the heart in death. It may pass over us as the softly-stealing evening breeze, bending gently the heads of the ripening grain, extracting the sigh as it passes; or it may fall upon us as the tempest that prostrates the lofty and strongly-rooted tree, crushing the spirit for a lifetime by one blow. As joy prompts to speech, so grief tends to silence, except when its excess leads to broken utterances. Dumbness, or disinclination to utter a word sometimes attends extreme grief, arising from some great and unexpected calamity.

Grief is produced by the conception, sight, or experience of what is disheartening, painful, distressing, or overwhelming.

The lesser manifestations of this emotion are most frequently exhibited by those who are in the decline of life, or who have passed from sunshine into shade, from company into solitude, from wealth to poverty, or from health and pleasure into feebleness and suffering. The aged often look back and contemplate with sadness that may start a tear, the companions, scenes, and enjoyments of former years, now gone never to return. Persons who have enjoyed the smiles of this world, who have dwelt for years in its sunshine, who rolled in wealth, and spent days and nights in feasting and pleasure with

congenial spirits, cannot be transported into solitude, stripped of comforts, embarrassed with poverty, and exposed to neglect and suffering without frequent depressing reflections that things are no more what they once were. And when a man has lost his health and sees little prospect of recovering it, sadness will force itself upon him, and thoughts will arise of that distressing issue dreaded by most, and of the consequences that may attend it to those near to him, which, if alone, may find an outgoing in tears.

Exhibitions of deeper sorrow are witnessed in persons under sharp conviction of folly or sin, and in separation of friends who have little hope of meeting again. When sin appears in its true character, apart from its consequences, the human spirit can scarcely refrain from deploring its folly. It has returned evil for good; it has offended the most benevolent of beings; it has resisted the most friendly efforts for its welfare; it has despised the richest gifts; it has spent the most valuable treasures on trifles; it has yielded itself a slave to the meanest drudgery, and it has preferred the friendship of a malicious enemy to the favour of the most gracious God, no wonder if the soul sinks in the dust of self-abasement and weeps for its base misconduct. A sudden fall into sin may be followed by a quick and sharp outburst of grief. Such was Peter's grief for denying his Master. He went out from the hall, when the look of his Master reminded him both of what had been foretold and of what had now taken place, to pour out the sorrow of his heart in a profusion of tears. How common are the expressions of grief on the departure of friends. If the distance to be gone over is great, the dangers many, the separation long, and it

may be final, apart from the ordinary vicissitudes of life, sadness will claim its place in the heart, and it may not be possible for the sternest wholly to suppress it. In the streams of emigration now flowing from many shores to many quarters of the globe, such demonstrations of sorrow are of daily occurrence. At times the separation is heart-melting, if not heart-rending; as when a man is compelled to part from his family on the eve of execution. See John Rodgers, Walter Raleigh, Charles Stuart, or Louis Bourbon—all with human hearts, irrespective of rank, leave their families to meet their doom at the hands of their fellow-men. Who could blame the outgoing of excessive grief on such occasions? Bereavements by death, and severe losses by worldly calamities produce the most frequent displays of extreme sorrow. How often can we trace the footsteps of death in the symptoms of sorrow that occupy and surround a dwelling, where the wife laments the husband of her youth, the mother deplores the loss of her only child, and the father the untimely death of a favourite son. The sacred records have rendered for ever memorable the poignant grief of David the King for his favourite but rebellious son Absalom. How intensely bitter the cry,—"Would God I had died for thee, O Absalom, my son, my son!" Jacob refused to be comforted when deprived of his beloved Joseph, and said,—"I will go down into the grave to my son mourning." David's military band, when bereaved by a company of robbers of their wives and children, wept till they had no more power to weep. How general was the grief throughout our empire, a few years ago, when the Indian mutiny left scores of men,

women, and children, to the tortures of brutal Sepoys. Men have been seen to weep when the labours of many years have been swept away in a night by flame or flood. The stout-hearted Esau wept most bitterly when told by his father that the birth-right blessing was lost to him. Some are more susceptible of grief than others. They are either naturally more tender-hearted, or they have cultivated the finer and gentler feelings of our nature, and are more liable to feel what is fitted to give pain or occasion distress. Such may lament losses which scarcely disturb a stronger mind; or they may display a laudable and noble grief from their clearer perceptions and finer susceptibilities, of which an uncultivated and hard heart is wholly incapable. The grief of our Saviour for blinded Jerusalem, and the sorrow of Paul for his impenitent countrymen, illustrate this gentler and nobler nature as distinguished from mere softness of heart.

When grief becomes extreme, it sometimes assumes the form of anguish, and is attended with clenching and twisting of the hands, and with wailing. A person may be seen in that state when beholding the last agonies of a dear relative, the sole stay and support of a house. At other times, the load of sorrow compels the person to sit on the ground or floor, and throw the head forward, as if unable to maintain an erect position. So Job sat for seven days in silence, bowed down with a weight of woe that seldom or never rested on mortal head before. Hence the grief of true repentance is represented by "sitting in sackcloth and ashes." Where the emotion is even more intense, there is a complete prostration. When He who became our substitute carried our sorrows, the weight of woe laid upon him wrung out the cry, "My soul is

exceeding sorrowful, even unto death," and so oppressed him that he "fell on his face," and implored relief. Well might the poet exclaim:—

"O never, never cans't thou know
What then for thee the Saviour bore,
The pangs of that mysterious woe
That wrung his soul at every pore;
The weight that pressed upon his brow—
The fever of his bosom's core."

Under the doubly-distressing intelligence received by the disconsolate and unfortunate King of Israel in the house of the witch of Endor, the once mighty warrior threw himself prostrate on the ground, and could only be roused by an effort to attempt the now hopeless task before him. Sudden and awful bereavements have broken down the spirit for the rest of life, leaving the mortal a mere wreck of humanity. And heavier still—seizing the brain, it has dethroned reason; and paralyzing the nervous system, it has dissolved the body in death. Then "cord," and "bowl," and "pitcher," and "wheel," lie a mass of ruins, through the too great strain put upon the silver bond uniting head and heart. Grief appertains to a state in which the disagreeable or painful is either conceived or experienced. Many of the sorrows of humanity are caused by physical suffering. The weakness, wants, wounds, and pains of the body tell directly and powerfully upon the mind, and weigh it down in sadness or deep distress. As diseases and wants are universal, and injuries and pains most frequent everywhere, grief is universal and permanent on earth. It is so as the necessary accompaniment of sin. Sin is opposition to the will of Him who is essentially and unchangeably happy. As this opposition is universal on earth, so its necessary consequence, grief, is universal.

In the entire absence of all that can wound either mind or body, this emotion ceases to appear. Transplant the soul to a sinless state, and grief is unknown.

In our present state the operation of this emotion is in measure beneficial. While in excess it paralyzes or destroys both mind and body; within limits it humbles, and in a manner purifies and protects the soul. The man who grieves or mourns for a wound, self-inflicted through carelessness, or received from another, will naturally take more care, and that in proportion to the depth and intensity of his grief, to avoid, in the future, what occasioned the wound, than the man who experienced no such grief. Thus it deepens conviction of danger, and puts man upon his guard against injury. In like manner the grief arising from losses and bereavements may make us doubly careful to shun all that tends to a repetition of these evils. In moral questions the beneficial interposition of grief is almost indispensable to improvement. Hence the aphorism from the mouth of wisdom, "Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted;" and the exhortation as preliminary to reformation, "Be afflicted, and mourn and weep." It clothes the soul with humility as the first step to a true perception of its conduct and position; it softens it to receive deep impressions of its guilt and danger; and it leaves an open door for abhorrence of sin and folly to come in and take full possession. Insensibility to guilt, in other words, an absence of regret or grief before God for sins inseparable from human conduct, argues a hardened depravity which endangers the soul. Let us comport ourselves as becomes our position till freed from the cause of grief, we reach a land where "sorrow and sighing" are unknown.

CHAPTER XXIII.

12.—VII. FEAR.

This emotion is the soul in a state of uneasiness and distress, from the conviction that trouble or danger is at hand or about to overtake it. We experience it in various degrees, from the uneasiness that excites us to unusual vigilance to the terror that demands from us the utmost effort to escape from impending woe. The emotion shows its presence in the flushed or pallid countenance, in the startled eyes, in trembling limbs, in the creeping sensation over the head that sets the hair erect, in the knocking together of the knees, and in the stiffened and paralyzed attitude. It is also at times accompanied by shrieks or screams, especially among women or children. The evils dreaded are of all sorts, physical, mental, moral, and spiritual; real and imaginary.

Physical and spiritual evils are mainly dreaded by man. He is startled by fear when he sees the deadly weapon pointed at him, when he sees the lightning flash full in his face, when he sees the devouring element of fire surrounding him by rushing into his only avenue of escape, when he sees the flood of waters rising round and his craft sinking in the depths, and when he sees the instruments of death prepared for his execution. He grows pale when conviction of guilt is borne home upon him in the presence of the public, dreading the

reproof, shame, and punishment that must quickly follow. And long before the public have discovered his guilt conscience has done its work, threatening him every day with exposure of his lying, dishonesty, fraud, or forgery, till he stands in dread of every policeman whom he meets. When the foul crime of murder has been committed, fear becomes a daily, if not a nightly, companion. The slain appears in thought continually, and he cannot bribe him away, or force him away, or coax him not to trouble him any more. The suspicion is ever arising that some one has discovered his guilt, and that his arrest may be daily looked for. He is often literally frightened with his own shadow. At times under the impression that he hears some one approaching his hiding place, you might hear the beating of his heart. Let sickness of a deadly nature seize a man, and despite his efforts to keep up a countenance, fearfulness of death comes over him, because he has caught a sight of the king of terrors standing near. Few can look upon death with unshaken nerve. Let the plague break out, and alarm seizes the multitude, business is neglected, houses are closed, the market is empty, and families make haste to escape from the infected region. Fear is the spur that goads them on without rest to some spot far removed from danger. Let the earthquake throw down a few houses, and rend open the hills or valleys, and terror takes hold on man. He looks up and down and around and cries for help. His knees tremble under him, and his face grows pallid. The one desire for preservation from uncertain and irresistible woe absorbs everything. Nothing is cared for but safety. If we would see this emotion riding on the whirlwind let us look upon a large

army, seized with a panic, rushing from the field of battle. Obstruct their retreat with streams and rocks and fallen trees, and line their only outlet with a merciless foe, whose weapons make terrible havoc, increasing at every step the obstacles to be surmounted in the way of escape, and you may then see the madness, wrestling, desperation, and grim death that attend the movements of this emotion grown frantic.

Invisible evils are not less the objects of dread. Man cannot shake off the supernatural. He believes and feels that there are invisible beings above him who may do him much harm. He has ever stood in awe of them. He has lacerated himself and even sacrificed his life to please them in subjection to his fears. His superstition has given birth to his fears, and is itself the offspring of guilt and ignorance. Man has been much more under dread of the devil than under fear of God. Satan succeeded, under various forms of idolatry, in binding the human race in abject subjection to himself. Love he never pretended to inspire. He ruled by terror. And to appease his wrath, poor mortal man, under the impulse of fear, sacrificed hecatombs of human victims. When calamities came by flood, or fire, or war, men trembled because they supposed that he was angry, and under the direction of his priests submitted to the greatest humiliation and sacrifice.

The fear of the one true God was limited to those to whom he was revealed. Moses trembled on hearing his voice on Sinai, David when he experienced his wrath in a destructive plague, Isaiah when he saw his glory, Daniel when he came near and spoke to him, Job when he beheld his holiness, and Saul of Tarsus when he saw and heard the glorified Immanuel. The

emotion of fear occasioned by beholding the glory of Jehovah, or hearing his voice, is very distinct from that religious habit called the fear of the Lord. The first may be and will be experienced by those who are the enemies of God, as on the day of judgment, when awful terror shall seize the whole company of the condemned from the display of his majesty as a God of vengeance ; the latter is of the very essence of piety. This latter fear is an habitual respect and reverence for his presence, character, and authority, though unseen, and springs from a perception of his excellencies and claims, and the natural emotion of fear of incurring his displeasure by disregarding his holy will.

The inferior animals are very susceptible of this feeling. Their Creator has implanted the fear of man within them. How fearful the hare, the fox, or the deer of the approach of man as a hunter! The waterfowl often molested will not allow the sportsman to come near before they have fled to a safer retreat. Even the fishes of the sea start on the first glimpse of his approach. Animals that move in flocks or herds, as sheep and buffaloes, may be seized with panics under the power of which they destroy themselves in great numbers.

Fear may be ranked among the most useful emotions. Designed by our Maker to aid in securing the safety of man from coming evil, it often effectually subserves its purpose. It aids in preserving from physical suffering, from social degradation, from pecuniary loss, from moral corruption, and from spiritual woe. See the miner hurry away from the expected blast, and just in time to escape a shower of stones. See the mariner rush under shelter, and hold fast, when the tremendous billow is about to

strike his tempest-tossed vessel, and not too soon, as the wave would have swept him overboard as a feather. And see a fugitive family in the woods, hurrying from the forest on fire; every moment the flames are approaching; their roaring is heard; the wild beasts are rushing past them; every sight and sound betokens danger, and quickens to fever heat this powerful emotion, which now commands every energy of the being. Fear of exposure, as fraudulent or dishonest, deters from making a false entry or uttering a misstatement. The emotion comes to the help of the judgment, and lays an arrest on the hand and on the lip. The embarrassments of poverty rise up before the mind of the squanderer as his funds are becoming low, and fear puts a break on the wheels to prevent the train from plunging into the bog of distress. When evil habits are getting the upper hand, and clearly leading the soul into the den of sensuality, it sometimes, by a favouring providence, gets a sight of the interior, either by the entrance or escape of some prisoner, when it starts back with horror, and asks, "Whither am I going?" The vision remains, for fear keeps the eyes open; and now the words of the wise man are fulfilled, "In vain is the net spread in the sight of any bird;" he will not willingly go forward; he must be dragged as the most reluctant of prisoners into his cell; fear all the while holding him back; or perchance he bursts away from his fetters, and refuses to stay for a moment in the midst of dangers so alarming.

In a marked manner is the beneficial working of this emotion seen when men are deterred from exposing themselves to the vengeance of the Almighty as a just God. Truly the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom. A sight of his majesty may well evoke fear in

the hardest heart, and so arrest the most daring transgressor. If fear is ever to move the human soul, it cannot have a more becoming field than when the threatening wrath of Jehovah crosses the sinner's path. Let it now lay its arresting power to stop a further approach to the unquenchable fire; and let it clothe the feet with wings in their speed to a place of safety. When it arrests, the evil is supposed to be in front; and when it quickens the pace, the evil is supposed to be pursuing from behind. In the sinner's case, dangers seem to surround him, all refuge fails him, and perplexity, as when one is lost, seizes him. "What must I do to be saved?" is wrung from the depths of his soul, as fear takes full possession. Happy is he who is then enabled to perceive one narrow avenue open to a mercy seat; and with a speed and earnestness equal to the emergency, presses his way thither, and casts himself down before it.

There is a species of fear which partakes of the nature of a disease. It is called groundless, as there is no visible object or definite conception to call it forth. But it is not groundless. It has a material origin in the stomach, and more directly in the brain. Food remains undigested; the brain is, as a consequence, clouded and oppressed; and nature is telling her complaint in broken murmurs at the ear of judgment. The dimness of the perception is aided by the quicker sensibilities of the soul. The warning is given; let it not be unheeded. Take care of the mind by taking care of the brain; and take care of the brain by taking care of the stomach. Thus fear, by her uneasiness and distress, may lay a timely arrest on the loss of bodily and mental vigour.

CHAPTER XXIV.

13.—VIII. DEPRESSION.

THE last of the emotions which we have classified as "Disagreeable," is Depression. The condition so commonly referred to by the expression, "depression of spirits" cannot be overlooked by the psychologist. If regarded as an emotion, its claim to the class of the "Disagreeable" will not be questioned. It may be asked,—Is it an emotion? The question may be answered by defining what an emotion is. Is it simply the soul in a state or condition of feeling? If so, beyond a doubt depression is an emotion, for it is a very clearly marked condition of feeling. The soul is in a state of very impressive feeling. But if an emotion is defined as the soul in a state of motive feeling, that is, of feeling moving or inciting to action, as distinguished from what might be considered as a mere passive state of feeling, depression may still claim a place among the emotions. Like other emotions of this class, as shame, grief, and fear, in certain stages its direct influence is repression of action; yet it has a motive influence proper to itself, operating in a double manner, retarding or terminating actions now felt to be unwise or hopeless, and directly moulding the features of the countenance, giving tone to the utterance of the voice, and shaping the sentences of the p n.

Few emotions are more common than this in its lesser stages of development. It pervades all classes, and appears in every department of labour. It betrays its power in the countenance of the boy who has lost a game of marbles, and of the general who has been defeated with an army of one hundred thousand men. After assuming the simple form of discouragement, it passes successively into dejection, depression, despondency, and despair.

Its progress may be illustrated. An only son has returned from a voyage for his health no better than when he left home. This information produced *discouragement* in the fondly-loving parent's heart. A few days after his return he is seized with a fresh attack of disease. By this the parent is cast down, he is in truth *dejected.* The remedies resorted to have not been successful in raising him up, and *depression* of spirits becomes clearly marked on the countenance of the anxious parent. The truth cannot longer be concealed, the disease is making rapid progress, and the son is sinking. Painful *despondency* weighs down the parent's heart. Every device that might ward off the cold hand of death from the sufferer is tried —but all in vain ; insensibility supervenes on entire prostration, and now the gloom of *despair* settles down on all the attendants and crushes the spirit of the agonized father to the earth. Or take an illustration of another class of recent occurrence. A vessel sailing from Newcastle to New Zealand with coal foundered in Foveaux Straits. Head winds greatly retarded the ship during most of the voyage, by which the captain and crew were doubtless discouraged. On reaching the West Cape of the South Island, one of the most stormy

regions on the face of the globe, they were met by a heavy south-east gale which dejected all on board. The gale continued to increase in violence with its usual accompaniment a raging sea, and the vessel, the Hydra, sprang a leak. Depression was then felt by every soul in the tempest-tossed bark. The pumps were set agoing, but the water came in faster than it could be put out. Despondency began to prevail. But the skilful captain and hardworking crew connect an engine with their pumps, and they are barely able to keep the water in check. The strain is unusual for the engine, and should it break down all hope of saving the ship is gone. A few hours' pressure breaks the machinery, and now despondency gives way to despair of keeping their vessel afloat. They cannot save the ship. They betake themselves to the boats and are picked up by a passing vessel. In both these cases the climax of despair is relative not absolute. The father despairs of saving his son and ceases to try any further means; the captain and crew despair of keeping their ship afloat and cease all further effort in that direction. But neither the one nor the other resign themselves to utter inaction; other duties must engage the father's attention; and the possibility of saving their own lives prompts the captain and crew to immediate and appropriate action, which through the favouring providence of God proved successful.

The operation of each grade of the emotion may be separately traced. Discouragement generally follows a want of success in any engagement or occupation. The hunter will not go and come day after day empty-handed without feeling discouraged. And so with the miner and the fisher. If the precious metal cannot be reached

after shafts have been sunk in various quarters, and if no fish can be seen after repeated efforts, this emotion begins to assert its place, and lay a restraint upon a further expenditure of time and means on what appears unprofitable and vain. When the failure is on an extensive scale and after indulging high expectations, dejection will show its presence in countenance and act. The farmer has had an extensive area sown ; the grain has made its appearance in a most promising state ; favourable weather has advanced it almost to maturity ; but now the turn of fortune comes ; the rain descends in torrents for days, the rivers rise and overflow, and the vast fields of grain, once so promising, are deluged and destroyed, and all hope of a remunerative harvest is swept away. Can that farmer walk over these mud-besmeared and water-wasted fields without a stock of grain erect, and not feel dejected from his heavy disappointment ? Repeated failures on an extensive scale, attended with loss of reputation, will produce depression. We know what repeated failures in mercantile transactions have produced on sensitive minds. Hardened dishonesty can alone withstand the depression. Honourable men have borne the traces of this mental burden for the rest of their days. When the losses have been such as come home to the heart of a nation ; when one defeat after another has been suffered on the field of battle ; when the slaughter has been heart-rending ; when the circumstances indicate to the eye of the public cowardice or want of capacity on the part of the general so often and so disastrously beaten ; when the crowning act of the foe is to capture the unfortunate leader and the remains of his army—what must be the feelings of that general, surrounded by a few dejected fellow-

captives, when the condemnation and reproaches of tens of thousands of his countrymen, now prostrate under the feet of the conqueror, reach him in his retreat? What were the feelings of Napoleon the First on returning to Paris after the battle of Waterloo? And what emotion held supreme sway over the spirit of Napoleon the Third when a captive in Germany after the battle of Sedan? May it not be said that discouragement, dejection, depression stamped the spirit and countenance alike of uncle and nephew. We rejoice in the humiliation of no fellow-mortal, except so far as that humiliation is a victory of enlightenment, liberty, or righteousness. On the distinguished men to whom we have referred we are not called upon to pronounce judgment; their known mental state, after the signal defeats which were conclusive as to their fate, has simply furnished us with an appropriate illustration of deep depression.

Severe and repeated bereavements sometimes lead to this state. In such circumstances the emotion is generally blended with grief. They are distinct but kindred emotions. Depression with grief may exist in the soul of the captain who has been defeated with the loss of many brave men. Grief without depression of soul may touch the heart of the victorious captain because he has lost some highly-prized officers. The victory precludes depression; but the loss of brave men familiarly known afflicts with grief. We do not say that the soul is elated at the moment of grief. It cannot be, for grief inevitably weighs down. But at the time of victory the soul is elated; and the subsequent thoughts of loss or sights of pain check that elation, and bring down the feelings; but the assurance of

victory acts now as an equipoise and prevents the soul from sinking. Hence the natural influence of grief is felt ; and yet the soul upborne by victory is prevented from coming within the domain of this emotion. It will be readily admitted that depression may often exist without grief distinctively so called. It is often, however, the result of excessive grief. If sorrow is protracted the spirit assumes a downward bent, as a branch of a tree to which a weight has been attached for some time, it will not return at once to its upright position but may retain perpetually the bent of its burden ; so the spirit is said to be broken, meaning by such an expression, greatly depressed. If not relieved within a limited time the emotion passes into a *state* properly so called, and the person becomes melancholy. Against this habit or state the human spirit struggles manfully. The good Creator has endowed it with a large measure of buoyancy or elasticity which enables it after a time to emerge out of deep waters and to resume with wonted spirit its old toil.

To despondency we assign an advanced grade of this emotion. This will be readily admitted. Men may be discouraged and yet not despond. They may be even dejected or depressed, and yet not reach the stage of despondency. But add to the depressed mind the burden of several failures to ameliorate the condition, and feelings of despondency will force themselves upon the soul. Struggle as it may, it will in most cases begin to despond. Despondency is not despair. In despair hope has ceased to operate on a limited or unlimited sphere. In despondency hope still keeps a foothold, and is reluctant to lose it. Many ways may appear blocked up, but it conceives that one still

remains open and affords a way of escape could it only be found. Take the case of a man suffering from illness. He may be discouraged or even depressed by it, but he does not at once despond, unless the disease is of a peculiar character, or some presentiment of death has taken possession of him. It is when a variety of means have been tried, one after another, with fair intervals between to give time for the examination of results, that despondency puts in an appearance in countenance and speech. In this mood the soul is very unsettled. At one time it is on the very verge of despair, and again hope has mounted the throne, and cast a gleam of cheerfulness over the face. The case of the patriarch Job affords a striking illustration. He was at first simply dejected by sore bereavements. But personal affliction brought him into a state of depression; and this continuing without prospect of recovery, he falls at times into deep despondency,—he wishes that he had not been born, he complains bitterly, and expresses a desire to die rather than drag out such a miserable existence; yet these are his worst moods; he does not relinquish his hope in God, but declares that though He should slay him he would not abandon his trust in Him. Hence despair is not allowed to take possession, though fits of despondency bring him to its very doors, and extract expressions which may be pardoned but not justified.

The last stage of depression is despair. The soul can sink no lower. This feeling may be limited or absolute. When limited it respects some person for whom while hope remained efforts were made, but when despair received possession of the soul it stopped all further trouble, or some particular line of operation

on which it terminates all effort. Thus a man despairing of finding his way through the woods after several fruitless attempts, because night has come down upon him, ceases all further search, and lies down to wait for the dawn. Or a man despairing of reforming a profligate son from his vicious habits, may, after much heartbreaking for the failures of every conceivable means of reclaiming him, give up the task as wholly vain. When despair is absolute, the man either surrenders himself to his fate without a struggle, or throws himself away. A man may die like Cæsar. After bravely defending himself while there was hope, he may cover his face with his mantle and meet his doom. Those who have no means of escape from a sinking ship may calmly await the moment when she takes the fatal plunge, if all fear of death has been swallowed up. But generally distress is so great that cries are heard, as from a man surrounded by flames or drowning, such as despair alone can wring out. Men sometimes throw themselves away under the influence of this emotion. We speak not of cases of disordered brain where disease has been at work, but of that crushing depression of spirits which forces hope out of every resting-place in the soul, and drives the soul to seek refuge from its burden in the arms of death. Such are ever to be pitied. As we would rescue our fellow-man from a material burden which was crushing his frame, so should we strive to relieve the poor burdened spirit of man from a feeling which was crushing him as the boa constrictor the harmless buffalo. Let us avoid what would cause this depression. Let us cultivate a cheerful and hopeful spirit. And to gain reason and conscience to our side, let us avoid such moral evils as blast all

hope of the divine favour. Doing what is right; seeking to benefit man and to glorify God in all our ways; let us bear up under all trials and discouragements, preparing and looking for a better world where the human spirit shall never renew its acquaintance with disagreeable emotions.

DIVISION III.

INDEFINITE EMOTIONS.

CHAPTER XXV.

14.—1. SYMPATHY.

By Indefinite Emotions we understand those which cannot be definitely classified with either the Agreeable or Disagreeable. They are few in number. Some of these have a marked tendency to pass into the Agreeable or Disagreeable; as the soul strongly moved readily assumes a palpable element of pleasure or pain. But their individuality or separate existence may be distinctly traced anterior to the assumption of the pleasurable or painful element. Others, as Wonder and Zeal, may be so absorbing or self-contained as scarcely to suffer any other emotion of the soul to impinge upon them during their current existence. If prolonged, however, some other emotion will generally arise, blend its influence with the preceding, and modify its power; it may be, rise to paramount authority and extinguish the existence of the former by wholly supplanting it.

Sympathy.—We have given this emotion the first place among the Indefinite. It is entitled to it as peculiarly indefinite. It bears a general character; to-day linked with joy; to-morrow blended with sorrow;

and the third day rising in the amazement of the wondering without an element of either joy or sorrow. Under a partial investigation it may appear as if one of the agreeable or disagreeable emotions with a new name. But it is clearly distinguishable from the simply pleasurable or painful in more ways than one. It is always a feeling *with* some other animate being, rational or irrational; whereas a simple agreeable or disagreeable emotion may arise from a personal sensation or a consideration of the individual's own state without the smallest reference to another. But its claim to a classification distinct from the two preceding general divisions will be conceded when we consider that it rises with emotions or blends with feelings, that have as yet no sensible element of pleasure or pain; as the soul standing in a state of expectant wonder, or putting forth its ardour without thought or sense of the pleasing or the displeasing. Thus the soul may be thrown into great excitement, in other words, be moved with very strong general sympathy, as in a crowded enthusiastic meeting, without any well-defined emotion preponderating; the man being simply under the influence of an indefinite sympathetic zeal. Hence sympathy is pre-eminently indefinite, as the most general of all the emotions, being the susceptibility of the soul to assume or imitate almost every emotion under which another sentient being is seen or thought to move.

There is one species of sympathy which properly belongs to physiology. It is that in which one part of the body being affected, another part is felt to be similarly affected by reason of some nervous connection with it. The brain and stomach are known in this sense to sympathise very strongly with each other. A heated

head will immediately affect the digestive process in operation in the stomach. On the other hand, a warm draught taken into the stomach will almost immediately be felt on the brain. It is said that an ulcer on the brain will produce vomiting. A blow on the head by a fall certainly may. A very cold drink will at times produce an acute pain over the eyebrow; distension of the stomach will produce heart-burn; and indigestion will occasion a pain beneath the breast bone. To these many additional illustrations might be added.

Another species of sympathy belongs both to physiology and psychology. Ordinary illustrations of this kind are seen in sympathetic yawning, laughing, and fits. The marked nervous action in these cases brings the phenomena properly under the cognizance of the physiologist. While the emotion to which the soul has been subject, in the production of the nervous action calls for the investigation of the psychologist. It is very common to see the yawning of one person in a circle followed by a general yawning, at short intervals, all round. How is this? The yawning of all except the first, seems to be, partially at least, involuntary. One has apparently relieved his lungs by a prolonged expiration, and the act has suggested to those who have seen the wide-extended mouth, or heard the familiar sound attending yawning, the propriety of a similar act of relief. The act occurs during dullness, drowsiness, or fatigue. It is an effort of nature to relieve itself, and its repetition by others present is due to the involuntary sympathetic susceptibility of the soul. Something similar occurs under the influence of excessive laughter. It is well known that if two or three children of a group begin to laugh persistently, others will join them in the exer-

cise—unless restrained by strong considerations opposed to the conception of anything laughable—until the whole company are convulsed. And of these there may be some who, if interrogated, will reply that they are unable to say at what they are laughing. In simple truth, they laugh because others laugh. But the psychologist, anxious to penetrate beneath the surface, presses his investigation. And what is the result? He can only extract from nature the repeated response — "I sympathise—I sympathise in feeling, and my nervous system responds to the demand of my emotion." In some homely phrases there is true philosophy. The expression "laughing is catching," is one of these; for a listener who is not a spectator may actually "catch" the emotion, and join in the laughter, although a partition separates the parties. By some this may be attributed to suggestion. Doubtless the intellect is often, in such cases, in active exercise; but laughter is the result of emotion, and this emotion is known to occur without any conscious mental exercise to produce it. Still we may not exclude all intellectual exercise, for emotion itself is the fruit of sensation or conception, recognised or unrecognised; and swift intellectual apprehensions of some sort must precede these outbursts of jubilation. The sight of one falling in a fit has been known to produce a similar effect in others. For example, a woman falling in an hysterical fit, in a crowded and excited meeting, has similarly affected several others. The emotion of one has been caught by others. In each case the emotion has been preceded more or less rapidly by intellectual apprehensions of some sort. The sensation has led to the apprehension, the apprehension to the emotion, and the emotion to the prostration; but in the

immediate antecedent to the fit, the soul showed its striking susceptibility to catch the feeling by which others are impelled; in other words, to sympathise.

The sympathy which properly belongs to psychology is the prompt assumption of the feeling which is seen or conceived to move others whether attended or not by nervous action or energetic effort. Illustrations crowd upon us. Sorrow is to us, as a race, most familiar. We enter a room, in which is a coffin containing the mortal remains of one dear to those in the house. The coffin is about to be closed, and the relatives gather round to take a last look. Tears flow profusely. You are no relation of the deceased, but your heart is subdued and saddened by the sight; you sympathise, and may feel your own eyes suffused with tears, without any wish on your part. If we open the wondrous historical book from which we have so often drawn our illustrations, we gather some touching cases. A princess was walking on the margin of the famous old Nile, when her eye was arrested by the sight of a cradle of bulrushes floating on the edge of the river. It was brought to her, and she opened it, and saw a babe of wondrous beauty. The strange sight startled the infant, and he wept. His tears penetrated the heart of the lady—the sorrow of his infant breast awoke a sympathy in her womanly nature, and he was saved. He who possessed a perfect humanity was once surrounded by a group of mourners. The bereaved wept, and their friends wept. Could he remain unmoved?—Impossible. He groaned in spirit, and forthwith the tears of sympathy rolled down his cheeks. The foresight of coming woe had the same effect upon his benevolent nature. He saw the streets of Jerusalem strewn with the slain, he beheld the wretched remnant reduced to the greatest straits of

poverty, disease, and woe; the sight might melt a heart of iron. He saw it as present, and the sympathy of grief caused him to weep over the doomed city.

So with joy. The joy of the bridegroom is proverbial. But his joy is shared by another. The friend of the bridegroom rejoiceth because of the bridegroom's voice; the unselfish, true-hearted friend glows with delight because another is delighted. The parables of the lost sheep, lost money, and lost son exhibit the joy of recovery, as extended to many beyond the immediate owners. When, a short time ago, the heir apparent to the throne of our empire was raised up from the gates of death, the heart of the mother—the widowed queen—was made glad. But she was not alone in her joy. Her happiness struck a sympathetic chord in many hearts in her empire, and addresses of congratulation poured in from all quarters. What are congratulations for successes, honours, victories, and deliverances, when sincere and without respect to any personal advantages, but the outgoings of joyful sympathy? Humanity is not alone in its sympathies. The triumphs of the church on earth evoke the loudest jubilations in the heavenly mansions. The rejoicings here are caught up, and re-echoed over the wide plains of the celestial paradise. The events themselves, as distinguished from the persons specially interested, might occasion great joy; but the two families are one in Christ, and the triumph of the one is the rejoicing of the other.

In fear the power of sympathy is most marked. A few timorous minds will make the hearts of many to fear. Hence the judicious order given of old before going into battle, requiring every faint-hearted man to leave the ranks and return home, lest his timidity should

infect others. The flight of a few disheartens many, and suggests the propriety of a retreat. When a panic takes possession of a portion of an army, the emotion of terror may spread with amazing rapidity, and irresistibly control those who know no reason for their fear or flight. Imagination has taken the place of accurate perception. They have suddenly conceived some terrible impending woe, and the emotion of fear becomes overpowering. The emotion exhibited in its fruits in some has, by this law of sympathy, evoked a similar feeling in others with corresponding results. Similar effects are seen from an alarm of fire, or earthquake, or the giving way of a portion of a building in a crowded house. The emotion, naturally produced in the minds of all who understand the alarm, is increased much by the exhibition of the same feeling in many others. It must be so, as some are seen to quake from fear who have not heard the alarm, and are unable to say from what cause the terror has arisen. They have seen others trembling, and the emotion of dread has taken possession of them.

See a crowd assembling from various parts of a city because of some unlooked for event. A criminal may have been arrested and is striving to escape; a carriage may have been overturned and its occupants thrown out and injured; or a man may have fallen down in the street and lies apparently dead. The result is the same whatever may have been the nature of the event. A crowd assembles with wonderful rapidity. One leaves his store, another drops his tools, a third and fourth run from their houses, and it may be nine-tenths do not know what has occurred till they reach the spot. They have seen others making haste to a certain spot; they

have observed that from all quarters that place is the point of convergence. It is enough; they must run and see what is the matter. The emotion of wonder evoked in one or two has spread in all directions and seized on the crowd, although when assembled the greater part, like the mob at Ephesus, know not why they have come together.

We speak of the sympathy of numbers. What is it? It is the emotional glow diffused from spirit to spirit and re-acting on its various sources. The feeling has spread from soul to soul, until it has become a common possession, and its combined power increases the emotion in each individual beyond what it would have experienced from the originating cause if detached from the multitude. The united flame from many branches causes each to burn more fiercely, and kindles some that would not burn without this general flame. In this way many rush into battle, swarm up the ascent to the fort, and leap into the midst of destruction, their courage being kept aglow from the fire of a diffused and reacting emotion rather than from any individual considerations of duty. Some are more susceptible than others; they are heroes; they will lead others into the fight; and a body of them will perform prodigies of valour. On the same principle we explain the interest felt by a speaker and by the audience in a crowded assembly. Many have risen to distinction in the world by the display of abilities drawn out by the multitude, who, by a variety of circumstances, have been induced to come and hear. The speaker is aroused by the sight of so many waiting upon him; if he has ability it must now come to the surface; anything at all fitted to impress moves some in the audience, specially if pre-

disposed to receive a favourable impression ; these being moved, by this law of sympathy, affect others ; the interest proves infectious ; the audience is in a state of impressible expectancy ; a sentence, even a word, moves them, for the speaker is, as some would express it, *en rapport* with his hearers ; they act and react on each other until speaking becomes a pleasure and hearing a delight.

The operation of this emotion is not limited to the human species. It is extended to the brute creation by man ; and it is shown by the inferior creation towards man. We sympathise in the alarm felt by the mother-bird in her endeavours to gather her scattered brood under cover from the hovering hawk about to pounce down upon them. We share in the sadness of the cat going mournfully round in search of her kittens that have been stealthily carried off and drowned. We are pained with the dog whose sides have been laid bare by the paws of the kangaroo. And we are gladdened by the frolicsome gambols of the lambs on the grassy lawn. And on the other hand, the noble horse is known to sympathise with the zeal of his master in the chase. He understands his task, and in his ardour equals, if not outstrips, his rider. The faithful dog pines and moans when he sees his master in trouble, will instinctively seek his relief, and when dead will howl over his grave.

This susceptibility of feeling indicates a designed adaptation to society. Sympathy naturally developes the emotion in the original subject of it, increasing the anger, hatred, fear, and sorrow, as well as the gratitude, love, joy, and hope. But sometimes sympathy, with suffering, is seen to diminish the grief—not as a direct result of

blending sorrow with sorrow, but from attendant considerations of comfort, aid, and support, under the present distress. Sympathy should be cultivated within certain limits. "Rejoice with them that rejoice, and weep with them that weep." A contrary disposition is the exponent of selfishness. But all emotions require to be under restraint. Excess is weakness, often loss, and sometimes death. A due development of emotional sympathy reveals a thoughtful mind and a well-regulated heart. And a wise selection of the objects of sympathy reveals an enlightened conscience and a noble nature.

CHAPTER XXVI.

15.—II. WONDER.

This is a feeling of surprise, astonishment, or amazement in seeing, hearing, or imagining anything unusual, strange, startling, or extraordinary. Under its influence the soul lifts itself to a state of vigilant expectation, or holds itself in anxious suspense, as if to watch or guard against the next movement or change. The wonder may subside or pass away, on the object apprehended or conceived or the sound heard losing its strangeness, and becoming recognised as natural or ordinary; or it may pass into another emotion, as that of joy on the apprehension of something conceived to be desirable, or that of terror, on the discovery of something truly alarming. Phenomena of providence, monstrosities of nature, curiosities of art, singular and strange personal appearances and sounds, all excite wonder in some of its stages. The eclipse of sun or moon, total or partial, is seldom witnessed without the emotion of wonder. In times of ignorance the emotion speedily passed into terror; but now it rests in wonder or amazement. When comets appear night after night in the sky, with their long trailing appendage, curiosity is evoked while men gaze with astonishment. The brilliant flickerings and nimble dancings of the electric lights which constitute the auroras of the poles often attract attention, specially when brightly coloured, and never fail to call forth this

emotion in some form. The astronomer, whose business it is to survey the glories of the heavens, must often be subject to this feeling, if favoured with a glass of unusual power.

Nature presents to us some unusual sights from time to time. They are designated "monsters," whatever may be the size. The giant and the dwarf are alike wonders. An unusual development, as a double head on one neck, six fingers or toes instead of the ordinary number, five feet instead of four, belongs to the same class. The surprise is felt to be greater when the characteristics of two natures are seen blended in one. Inanimate marvels are not less attractive. The seven wonders of the world, viz., the pyramids, the Artemisian mausoleum, the Ephesian temple of Diana, the hanging gardens of Babylon, the colossus at Rhodes, the statue of Jupiter Olympius, and the pharos of Alexandria, in days of old, aroused this emotion in no common manner. And what traveller can gaze for the first time on the first of these on the plains of Egypt, without standing almost bewildered in amazement. Colossal structures of modern art may claim a place beside some at least of these. Who can look upon the Great Eastern steamship, in all her magnificence, grandeur, and extent, for the first time, without wonder? And who can pass through or under the great iron tubular bridge across the river St. Lawrence—nearly two miles in width, raised on granite piers sixty-eight feet above the water, and sunk in a stream twenty-five feet deep, and in a current running five miles an hour—without a similar feeling strongly developed? What is surprisingly beautiful or exquisitely finished calls forth astonishment, mingled with delight or approbation.

How often is this emotion excited in the heart of the traveller or explorer! Who could traverse the wilds of Africa with Livingstone, or Baker, or Speke; who could explore the most remote regions with Humboldt or Hooker; who could penetrate the frozen regions of the north with Ross or Parry, with Hall or Kane, without often dwelling in amazement at unwonted sights? The wanderer in the valleys of California comes upon a gigantic forest. Far above his head, towering up to three hundred feet, with a girth of thirty, sixty, or ninety feet, stands before him the "Wellingtonia." Is he not surprised? He looks up, he walks round, he takes his stand at various points of observation, and everywhere one emotion overpowers all others. He beholds a tree that has grown for three, it may be, four thousand years.

The Canadian visitor steps out of a railway carriage at the suspension bridge of the Niagara River. A deep rumbling sound fills his ears. His mind is held in suspense. He pursues his way west from the station for less than a mile, the roar of waters growing louder as he advances, when the world-renowned falls burst upon his entranced vision. His wonder has not yet risen to its height. He looked, it may be, for waters rushing from above him, but he sees a mighty river falling from beside him into a deep cavity or gorge. Let him descend the zigzag path, and take his stand in front of the falls, and there let him feast his eyes on one of the grandest sights on our planet, and dull indeed must be his nature if his soul does not respond to the loud call of nature and rise to wonder, and then to adoration of Him who caused this stream to flow with such stupendous force and grandeur. But we need not travel from home. Seasons seldom pass without this emotion in some form assuming

temporary possession of the soul. A stranger is ushered into our room. There is something unusual in his appearance. A retrospective glance on the stored-up impressions of past years discovers something very like the man who now stands before us. This emotion comes now into full play, but rises with increasing power from the moment that the singularity struck us, and aids the intellect in its explorations by quickening its energy. At length the wonder passes into the higher grade of astonishment, when we are able to name as an old and dear friend of former years the unexpected visitor who has called upon us. We break out with such expressions of wonder as — "I am surprised to see you here," or "Is it you?"—as if some lingering doubt remained; "How came *you* here?"

Or lying awake in the silence of the night, a sound breaks on our ear as if of human moaning. The soul is hushed in suspense to hear with all acuteness. The moaning is repeated; this emotion now takes full possession. Some one is suffering. Is the sound within the house, or is it from the street? Careful listening determines its locality to be the street. Who is it? Some homeless wanderer—some outcast victim of sin and shame? We cannot rest—the emotion will not suffer sleep; we must rise, and see who the sufferer is; he may be a man of worth, who has been seized and robbed and wounded, and now is ready to expire from want of human aid and sympathy. The search is made, and we are in time to afford much needed relief to an unfortunate but innocent fellow creature.

Excited by the constructive faculty of the intellect, in the form of imagination, the soul may gaze with amazement on its own creation, or listen with breathless

suspense for sounds which have no existence beyond the conceptions of the brain. In this way many of the spiritualists of the present day are the victims of their own delusion. They see and hear, as they conceive, the forms of beings, and the reports of their doings or movements, whereas the reality closely investigated shows that the whole transaction of sights and sounds is within their own brain. They have trifled with that wondrous but mysterious constitution of nerve and spirit with which we are endowed, and have disarranged the action of the one to the detriment of the other, and must pay the penalty of their folly in the annoying and dangerous troubles of a disordered brain. Have we not passed in boyhood the place said to be haunted, the old forsaken house where some crime had been committed, or the graveyard, the sleeping place of the dead, with the emotion of wonder rising at every creation of the intellect, and the emotion of fear rising as quickly beside it, until clearer vision and the power of will dissolved the fancy and sent both emotions back to rest; or until fear overpowering wonder, bore us off with quickened pace beyond the reach of the supposed danger, when a long expiration indicated the soul relief to which we had attained.

The watchman who paces the streets during the midnight hours, and the look-out on the bow of the ship at sea in a much frequented region, have this faculty of the soul often called into exercise. The unusual sight or sound arrests the attention of the one, and the light or sail attracts the steady notice of the other, and in most cases the intellectual exercise is followed by some development of the emotion of wonder, it may be the extreme of amazement.

This faculty is easily excited and easily sustained, as it can co-exist with and derive nourishment from other emotions as love, joy, fear, and sorrow. How do the masses of the populace rush to shows, exhibitions, menageries, circuses, and theatres? Something new, strange, extraordinary is to be seen or heard. The report excites the emotion, and there is an almost insatiable craving to have it gratified. Nor is it easily satisfied; the promise of new sights will keep up the feeling, until the muscles of the frame, and the nerves of eyes and ears succumb with fatigue. On this faculty novelists trade very largely. To it they are indebted in no small measure for their popularity and wealth. The emotion is so easily excited, and so easily sustained, that men, and specially women, pore over books that feed this faculty. It becomes as a result unduly developed—the soul craves for the excitement, as the body for the stimulant of alcohol after it has for some time been addicted to its use, and what is not fitted to arouse it is slighted as uninteresting, no matter how valuable and important the information may be. Who has not marked the interest with which a group of children will listen to the wonderful tale. If it is cut short, how disappointed they feel; the request of all is —go on, tell us more about it. Sailors and soldiers that can relate the marvellous will not want for listeners; and the more singular the event the deeper the attention; every disturbing sound being promptly suppressed that no syllable of the story may be lost.

The design of this emotion is readily discernible. It is intended to arrest and sustain the attention to what is fitted to interest and instruct; to fasten the sight on what is beautiful, magnificent, or glorious; and to

demand the notice of what may call for the most prompt and vigorous measures to render assistance or escape from danger. It is perverted when it is given over to the slavery of the silly and the ridiculous—or suffered to be chiefly occupied with vain, unprofitable, or immoral shows. It is seen in the noblest and highest exercise when securing attention to the many wonders of creation, providence, and grace. It served a high purpose when it arrested the attention of mortals to the miracles of Immanuel on earth, and it will find its loftiest development in heaven, in evoking the adorations of those who behold the ineffable glories of the uncreated God.

CHAPTER XXVII.

16.—III. ZEAL.

The derivation of this term reveals the essential element of the emotion. It is taken from *zelus*, the Latin for zeal. The Latin is but the borrowed Greek ζηλος, which in early days conveyed the idea of jealousy—as Hesiod Op. 193; Septuagint Num. xxv. 11, and Cant. viii. 6; but in later times expressed the clearly distinct idea of Zeal; Arist. Rhet. ii. 11, &c. In the New Testament the Greek term *zelos* is used to convey both ideas, as in Rom. x. 2, it is correctly translated *zeal*, and in 2 Cor. xi. 2, it is no less correctly translated *jealousy*. In one case at least, in our opinion, the word would have been better translated "jealousy" than "zeal," as in the well-known passage, "The zeal of thine house hath eaten me up," (John ii., 17 v.) being a quotation from Psalm lxix. 9—as the idea involves something more than mere ardour in the cause of God, and corresponds to the feeling of the great prophet who, in his complaint to Jehovah, says,—"I have been very jealous for the Lord God of Hosts." In jealousy there is a keen sense of wrong done or thought to be done to the person having this emotion, or to one whose cause he makes his own. And this was the case with Christ. It was jealousy for the honour of God, inflamed by the profanation of his house by traffickers in merchandise, that consumed him with its burning heat. The Greek

noun ζηλος is from the verb ζεω, to "boil," and is akin to the Hebrew *zidh* or *zudh*, which is the same in signification, and corresponds to our own old English word "seethe,"—each of the three terms—zidh or zudh, zeo, and seethe—being onomatopoetic, and having a common origin. The idea of fervour, ardour, glowing heat, pervades each term, and this feeling is an essential element in both zeal and jealousy. But with the heat there is a distinguishing element. Heat characterizes several emotions, as anger, shame, jealousy, as well as zeal. But unlike jealousy there is necessarily no sense of wrong done or contemplated, and unlike shame, there may be no sense of guilt, and unlike anger there may be no sense of opposition to a supposed offender. Distinguished from all these, zeal stands out as the soul aroused and heated to action by the conception of an object deserving and demanding the utmost effort for its attainment. It is the act-inspiring, the deed-demanding emotion. It rests not without action; it feeds upon it, flaming like the torch as it moves forward; it dies without it. Springing from deep conceptions, or firm graspings, — we do not say from profound apprehensions at all times, —of the importance of ideas to be promulgated and of exertions to be put forth, the soul is set aflame for action; in other words, the soul under the influence of powerful conceptions, pointing to action as the path of duty, becomes all aglow; its ardour arouses its intellectual and physical powers, and the energy of the whole man is placed at the service of the will. Action in some direction must follow. The mind will work if the body cannot; and both will be spent under the demands of this powerful influence. Action is the ordinary result

of all emotion. It may be but the dropping of the eyelids from shame; or it may be the frantic rush to save life from the promptings of terror. One emotion often aids or conjoins its action with another. One is the principal for the time, the other is the assistant. See the ordinary motions of the body. When a person walks the muscles of his legs are mainly exercised, but many muscles of other portions of the body co-operate. If he stand still and exercise his arms, the muscles that had co-operated with the lower limbs in walking may now co-operate with the upper limbs in working. So it is with the soul. An agreeable or disagreeable emotion, as love or hatred, in the execution of its appropriate action, may secure to its aid this powerful emotion of zeal by directing the consideration of the mind to the vast importance of accomplishing the object aimed at. On the other hand, the soul heated to action by this emotion, may be aided and sustained in its efforts by other emotions, both agreeable and disagreeable, as hope and anger; or it may be checked and retarded by purely disagreeable emotions, as grief and depression, rising and clinging, as it were, to its skirts, and refusing to be cast off.

Let us see this emotion in action. Many of the noblest achievements accomplished on earth were performed under its impulse. See the ancient racer at the Olympic games. The honour of his country inspires him. The sight of the vast crowd excites him. The fame of the victor kindles the glow of ardour within him. The prize is the object of ambition—the goal is the point of attainment. He is restive for the signal to start. In an instant he bounds forward regardless of every object on either side, and intent on one thing with

all the energy which the mind in flame of excitement can furnish. That one thing is for the moment of pre-eminent importance, and it has secured by this fiery motive power all the physical capacity of the man. If he can, he must be victor by being first at the goal. Or see the modern boatman at the regatta. Weeks or months have been spent in training by the use of the oar in a chosen boat, and over a chosen course. But now the hour has arrived when the signal for starting shall be made. He has been anxious to keep cool, and reserve strength by calming the nervous system till the moment had come, but now that it has come, the draughts of the furnace are thrown open, every power that can excite has free scope, every thought that can kindle or sustain ardour is not simply welcomed but sought, and the power directed by skill, is kept up to the highest pitch of capacity by a burning zeal to be first in the race, and not to suffer a defeat. In this case sympathy adds her influence, and makes the crew in each boat a unit in respect to feeling and aim.

Military enterprises offer a fine field for the display of this emotion. A man of known energy and activity is entrusted with the raising of an army to repel the invasion of his native land. All the powers of mind and body are brought out into full play. Five-sixths of every twenty-four hours he is at work delivering arousing addresses, writing orders and despatches, riding from place to place to superintend defensive operations, and to secure the due collection of supplies. The army has to be raised, armed, fed, and skilfully handled, till it can meet the foe and feel the way to victory. In common language, he is the soul of the army and the defense of his country. And feeling the responsibility, and nerved

with patriotic ardour, he is the embodiment of zeal. Flaming as a torch, he kindles all inflammable spirits wherever he goes. The most sluggish feel his power, and must wake up or move out of the way. He is the Vercingetorix or Arminius, the Wallace or the Washington of his day.

The claims of suffering humanity have sometimes been responded to by a benevolent ardour beyond all praise. When the cry of the Waldenses, bleeding under the exterminating sword of the hired minions of the papacy, rose to heaven, many noble spirits were touched with a sympathy that kindled the flame of zeal, and so were moved to step in and ward off the stroke of death from the helpless. When the Protestant Church of Hungary, after centuries of dire persecution, was about to be annihilated, her appeal to the Protestant states of Europe against her powerful oppressor, met with a zealous response from many christian hearts. Remonstrances poured in upon the bigoted council that directed or permitted these cruel measures; and some noble men stood forth conspicuously in their zeal in pressing the claims of justice and humanity till the tyrant was compelled to relax his grasp on his victim. Exhausted, but breathing still, the church rose from the dust, when one of her most resolute antagonists, confounded by the sight, exclaimed, "Either God or the devil must be in favour of the Protestants, for when we are about to extinguish them, some deliverer rises up to save them.

The propagation or defence of religious opinions has afforded the world many notable illustrations of this emotion. We may select two or three examples. Saul of Tarsus, brought up in Jerusalem, the head quarters of the Jewish religion, at the feet of Gamaliel, a renowned

doctor of the law, of a susceptible, ardent, and enterprising nature, embraced with vigour and tenacity of purpose, at the age of manhood, the dogmas of the Pharisees which had been instilled into him from childhood. He found a rising sect dealing fatal blows against the denomination to which he belonged, and whose cause he had espoused with all his heart. He springs forward as a defender. His ardent nature carries him to the front, and to the spot where the foe is most powerful. From being a defender, he becomes a persecutor, an exterminator. His zeal for the utter annihilation of Christianity was such that he describes himself as "exceedingly mad against" the professors of it. He will suffer no opposition to the cause which he has espoused, and in his fiery zeal he would pursue the scattered fragments of the opposition to the ends of the earth. The man is changed. His eyes are opened. He approves with all his mind and soul what once he hated and despised. And now he must propagate what he believes to be the very truth of God. Not only are his judgment and conscience won over to the new doctrine, but he has received a commission from heaven to spread the truth. The fire of heaven falls on an inflammable nature. His ardent temperament glows under the quickening touch of the celestial fire, and he must traverse sea and land to spread the name and fame of Jesus. Tumults, scourgings, imprisonments check not his ardour. Out of prison to-day, he preaches the gospel to-morrow. Penury and want, cold and nakedness, hunger and thirst, stay not his progress; he will preach the gospel to every creature under heaven if he can. It is enough to say that he has the soul of a seraph in a tabernacle of clay.

Take another illustration. It is the reformer Farel.

Born in Dauphinè in 1489, he is brought up a Romanist. The nature of the man is such that what he is, he is with all his heart. In early life he shows extravagant zeal for the doctrines which he has been taught. But the scriptures come in his way; he studies them; embraces the reformed faith; and throws his whole soul into its propagation. He begins his public career as a reformer at Basle, in 1524, by sustaining thirty theses against the Church of Rome. He meets the moderate trimmer of those days, Erasmus, and his fiery spirit cannot brook his ways, and he calls him "Balaam." Fierce disputes arise, and the Reformer has to flee. But all the neighbouring towns are aroused by the thunders of his vehement eloquence. He lets none sleep under him. Image worship everywhere is denounced with startling violence. His friends remonstrate at what they conceive his intemperate zeal. But his labours are successful. God owns his zealous servant, and many embrace the saving truth of the gospel. He enters Geneva, and is compelled to flee because of his zeal; he re-enters, and is again compelled to withdraw. Next year he goes back, and now he triumphs — the city embraces the faith of the gospel. Four years after, the severity of his discipline is too hard for human nature, and again he is forced out of Geneva. But he goes abroad a flaming light, and he is found in France fighting bravely for his master. At one time he is found pleading with the princes of Germany for the poor slaughtered Waldenses; and a short time after, up in the mountains of Jura, pleading with the rude inhabitants to believe the love of God to man in the gift of his Son. And now over seventy years of age, he is seen in his native Dauphinè preaching with all the fire of youth

against Popery. He is seized, and thrown into prison. He is liberated, but it is the prelude to a better liberation from a body worn out by incessant toil. The burning light passed from earth into congenial company, among the shining lights around the throne of the Eternal.

It would be easy to multiply examples from modern advocates both of truth and error; but the past are sufficient. In every truly noble character the susceptibility is not wanting. Its presence indicates a depth of feeling which is itself an element of power; and it is generally the offspring of deep and strong convictions without which men are not prepared to withstand persistent opposition and attain to eminence. How important that this soul power be wisely directed! There is a zeal which is not according to true knowledge. Knowledge or information, however false, may call up the latent powers of the soul. The regulating power of the man is not in his emotional nature. His emotions may indeed rise to control him; but then they rise beyond their legitimate sphere. It is the part of the emotions to supply a motive power of vast utility. It is the part of the intellect to give information regarding the exercise of this power. And it is the part of conscience, in concert with an enlightened deduction, to indicate when and how far this motive power is to be exercised. As the soul is aflame for action, good or bad, when under the influence of this emotion, too great care cannot be taken to see that it is the offspring of true wisdom. The man who is endowed with this susceptibility in large measure, and has it regulated by an enlightened mind, will not fail to leave his impress broad and deep upon his generation.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

17.—IV. DESIRE.

The last of the emotions in our enumeration is Desire. We have assigned it this place, not because it is the last in development, for it prompts the infant to stretch out the hand to receive the proffered gift, as well as the man of four-score to utter his prayer to the Unseen; nor because it is the last to yield to the impulses which excite the emotional nature, for the passing of a gay butterfly as well as the occupation of the brightest post of earthly honour may awaken it, but because it is often found in closest contiguity with that executive or volitive faculty, which in the order that we conceive to be the most natural and appropriate, will next claim our attention. The optative emotion and the volitive faculty have an acquired, if not a natural affinity, though they are quite distinct as will be proved in the department on the Executive power. The movement of the one is generally responded to by the exercise of the other. It is true that emotions of all kinds lead to an exhibition of volitive or executive power in some form, and some of them to instant and resolute determinations; but this emotion seems to claim the right of sitting at the elbow of the will and a ready attention to its promptings. Hence the choice of the position assigned.

This emotion is notably distinguishable from the bodily appetites. The state of the body may enforce

mental rest, or stimulate to mental action, and the mind may produce precisely the same effects upon the body, enforcing rest or arousing to action. When bodily appetites, such as hunger or thirst, crave supply the mind is aroused to seek after the means of gratification, and much ingenuity is sometimes displayed to stop the unpleasant craving. And when the mind has discovered something that it would be most desirable to possess, it may urge the body to protracted and excessive toil that it may reach it. Our present business is with the soul movement impelling to action both mental and bodily, and not with the bodily appetite which may occasion mental, emotional, and physical action.

What is Desire? It is the rising of the soul to, and its going out after, something perceived or conceived to be pleasing or profitable for a possession. It may exist in the form of the faintest passing wish, or in the form of a strong and incessant longing. The sight of a book may awaken a desire to possess it; a second thought may dispel the feeling. Riding past a farm or estate may occasion a wish to purchase it, and the feeling may take such strong hold that the earnings of half a lifetime will be handed over for its legal title. Its power to enslave has too often been experienced. Reaching after and prompting the soul to possess whatever is seen to be of value it may be named the Acquisitive emotion. In the ordinary routine of every day it may rise and fall scores of times, according as objects of interest are presented or sought after. But when any object not immediately obtainable awakens a strong and settled desire, the emotion may become a habit of the soul, and rise to its throne as its paramount power. Then confirmed desire may assume the form of ambition, or covetousness, or

godliness, according to the object which has called it forth. Sustained emotion passes into habit, as fear into timidity; hope into courage; wonder into curiosity; joy into cheerfulness; shame into modesty; and desire of property into covetousness, all which will receive attention in a subsequent department. In the case of this last emotion the habit acquired takes its name and character from the form in which the emotion is developed. The object of supreme interest to one may be a matter of utter indifference to another, and yet both may be at the same time under a marked display of desire. How important that only worthy objects should be suffered to arouse this dormant power which, when once fully occupied in pursuit, is not easily diverted from its purpose, but may sometimes make shipwreck of the whole man rather than come short of the object of supreme desire!

Of the three marked developments mentioned above, we may give some illustrations.

A desire to excel, to acquire honour or fame, or obtain power, is early seen in some natures. They are aspiring or ambitious. They see a position before them of honour or power, it may be vacant or at present possessed by others, and a desire is kindled to secure that post of distinction. In the school-boy, it may be the head of the class, the first on the roll of fame; in the lawyer, a seat on the Bench; in the politician, the premiership; and in the subordinate in the army, the rank of marshal or commander-in-chief. How much is made subservient to this dominant desire! Every stepping-stone to each height is eagerly sought, and every acquirement needed to reach each step, ardently desired. Guided by intelligence, the end is sought as wisdom would direct. If

guided by folly, the end may indeed be reached; but the possession will be painful—it may be disastrous. Honour obtained by dishonour is worthless. Authority secured by infamy is disgrace.

How have students who were rivals in fame toiled for the coveted prize. Books are explored; all the powers of mind are bent to the mastering of the subject; rest is despised; the midnight hour finds both intent on study; pleasure, and even society, are for the time forsaken—one subject alone absorbs all thought, and desire bears up the drooping energies to seize the prize. See political lawyers contending for the highest place on the Bench. How many things are sacrificed that even one step towards the point of ambition may be gained. Excuses will be framed for the greatest inconsistencies. Pledges thought by others to be absolute will be proved to be conditional if circumstances require that they should be abandoned. Envy will often add her bitterness to the contest. Antipathies will rise, and personal criminations follow as a consequence. As either approaches the goal, the struggle may become intensely, if not dangerously violent. Thus ambition impels. In the desire for promotion, the subordinate officer is often seen craving for action, longing to be sent to the post of danger, volunteering in the most hazardous enterprises, and seeking notoriety by the most dauntless courage. His life is altogether a secondary consideration. Fame and position are the masters of his energies by evoking this now dominant emotion. Through what fields of blood have not ambitious warrior-monarchs waded, that they might stand alone on the earth, in the summit of glory, without a rival! They gave the reins to an insatiable desire, and, like the fiery steed without due

control, it carried them over the precipice into hopeless ruin. See Cæsar, fallen in the senate house, pierced by many wounds inflicted through envy and malice, because carried by ambition to the perilous height of sole and supreme authority. See Napoleon Bonaparte, chained as a dangerous animal on a far distant and solitary rock in the ocean. What placed him there? It may be said, His victorious enemies; but it may also be said, His restless and unscrupulous ambition. He desired to be the supreme dictator of Europe: in that position the crowns of Asia would be at his feet; then even America would be unable to disregard his pleasure; and thus he would be the chief man on earth—the civil head of the whole human family. Here was the acmè of ambition for a military leader, whose armies had borne down opposition on many battle fields of Europe, and which claimed to be regarded as invincible. One sea-girt isle remained unsubdued, and her warrior chiefs on sea and land proved too strong for him. The strong man failed. He who had the range of Europe was confined to a small isle; and he who was for years surrounded by hundreds of thousands, in all the pomp of human glory, died alone, and in obscurity. Let ambition be restrained; desire is not designed to rule, but to serve; it is force, but not authority.

In civilized lands where trade is general, the desire to acquire wealth early becomes a habit. The bent of the soul is in many individuals to add pound to pound, house to house, and acre to acre. It is when some apparent advantage, some special opportunity comes within the range of the experienced eye, that the emotion rises with power even above the wonted bent, and sets the man astir, if it does not produce positive uneasiness,

till he has put forth his skilled endeavour to acquire this new attraction. Some payable bank stock has come into the market, he must make haste to secure it lest another come in before him. By an unlooked for circumstance a neighbouring house of great value is set up for sale. To him it has special attractions. If possible he must compass the purchase of it at a bargain. For this his best ingenuity is called into exercise. The emotion calls for mental application as well as personal effort, and the will responds to the call, and places the powers of the man at the service of this imperious feeling. Desire grows with possession. To speak philosophically, the motion expands with exercise; its capacity is enlarged by successful effort. And now possessed of great wealth, insignificant purchases are overlooked; where a few pounds were reluctantly paid away, thousands are handed over without emotion; a large estate, with all its attendant grandeur, is coveted, and now that it is within his reach, scores of thousands of pounds are not withheld that the enlarged emotion may be gratified.

In some, desire for acquisition takes a peculiar turn. Some object or animal awakens a wish to possess it. Obtained, another of somewhat different form or colour produces a similar desire. The second is followed by a third, until the man is said, in common language, to have a fancy for such things. One has a taste for handsome pictures, and every new one must be purchased, if possible. Another has a fancy for birds, and the curiosities of his aviary are his daily study, and this emotion is ever at his service, should any novelty come under his eye. A third has a fondness for antiquarian treasure. Every fossil or coin, ancient spear head or battle

axe, flint or stone implement brought to his notice, produces a wonderful desire to add it to the already encumbered storehouse, unless a similar specimen has been already secured. His spirit roams through the cities and fields, and along the highways and shores of bygone ages, and their remains from nature, art, and literature, are eagerly prized. The brick, with its mysterious inscription, is more valued than its weight in gold. The emotion of wonder, at its first inspection, is instantly followed by the emotion of desire for its possession, or the both by turns occupy the soul.

So absorbing and controlling is the habit produced by the indulgence of this emotion that it is declared by the highest morality to be idolatry. What sacrifices have been offered at the shrine of mammon! Who can count the lives cast away and the souls destroyed to appease this idol! See Naboth stoned to death, that Ahab may go in and possess his vineyard. See the traitor Judas sell his divine master into the hands of his deadly foes, for thirty pieces of silver. What dishonesties, forgeries, thefts, false swearing, assaults, murders have all sprung from the desire to seize the property possessed by another! How many wars, resulting in the slaughter of hundreds of thousands, may be traced to the desire of one nation to seize the property of another! Is there not truth in the statement that the love of money, that is, the desire for money, is a root of all kinds of evil? Unless restrained from excess, it makes the man a perfect slave; it wears out both soul and body, often not suffering the poor slave to take the nourishment and rest demanded by exhausted nature. How foolish this excessive desire for this world's goods! We brought nothing into this world, and it is certain that we shall leave it without being able to carry anything with us.

There is a development and cultivation of this emotion which is not only legitimate, but highly honourable and beneficial. This may be said of the acquisition of property within a certain limit. But as the moral surpasses the material, and the eternal the temporal, the desire for the one is to be preferred to the desire for the other. Coveting is both forbidden and commanded in the holy scriptures. We are to suffer no inordinate desire for what belongs to another to dwell within us; but we may cherish an earnest longing for what is in the gift of our great Creator, the possession of which by us will injure none. We may trace the working of this emotion in spiritual things in a variety of ways. Knowledge is wealth, and spiritual knowledge is an inestimable treasure. It is eternal life. Man may well set his heart upon its possession. If life here is precious, much more is eternal life. The wise shall shine as the brightness of the firmament for ever. For the wisdom that can secure this elevation, man may well toil and strive with all the energy of his nature. One that was learned above many counted all but loss for the excellency of the knowledge of Christ. When a desire for spiritual knowledge takes possession of a man, the feeling deserves to be cherished, as it may lead into the marvellous light of the gospel. Some of the first movements of a regenerated soul are longings for light, thirstings for knowledge. When men have been accustomed to the public services of the house of God on the Sabbath-day, and have enjoyed them as their necessary food, a removal to a place where no such privileges are enjoyed, occasions a craving after these ordinances as often as the Sabbath comes round, which no stranger to these feelings can fully understand. Then a truly spiritual man may be heard saying, "My soul longeth, yea, even fainteth, for

the courts of the Lord." As the votary of pleasure sighs for his old companions and enjoyments, when far removed from them in a distant land, so does the man accustomed to the holy services of God's sanctuary pant for a return of these favours when deprived of them. When the shortcomings and infirmities of fallen humanity are brought home to the heart of the sincere christian, there arises within him a desire for holiness, a longing for entire conformity to the image of God, and a strong wish to eradicate every root of bitterness, and close every fountain of iniquity. Then appears the επιποθησις—*ardent longing*—(2 Cor., v. 2), of Paul, which would separate the soul from every taint of corruption. And having tasted of the stream, there is a craving for the fountain. The soul longs for God, the felt presence of God, the unveiled manifestation of the glory of God. "I pray thee shew me thy glory," is the expression of this desire. More than the watcher longs for the morning does this partially illumined soul crave for the dawning of the eternal day. His wish shall be granted. The hour hastens when on his waiting spirit the sun of righteousness shall rise in all his ineffable glory, flooding his soul with eternal light. Desire rests everlastingly satisfied in God alone.

DEPARTMENT III.

THE EXECUTIVE POWER.

CHAPTER XXIX.

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.

We have now reached a Department in Psychology the full understanding of which is attended with no little difficulty. On this field the most powerful intellects of many centuries have waged war with keenest blades. If those who have ventured on its exploration have differed so widely in regard to its location, extent and bearings, we may conclude that some peculiar obscurity overshadows it, or that a subtle intricacy marks its pathways. It is interesting to follow some of these explorers until they lose themselves, and you can, on retracing your steps to a well-known highway, feel a degree of complacency that the mistake rests with another and not with you. It is no less interesting to mark the keen contest between two who have entered the field from different quarters, and viewing the point of contact from opposite aspects, mutually insist on being exclusively right. Yet we owe much to every diligent, patient, and faithful investigator who has preceded us. Even the mistakes and failures have not been fruitless. Like the explorers who have searched for a pass through a range

of mountains, or through a long chain of coral reefs, and have returned to tell us that no openings can be discovered in certain directions, they save from fruitless toil and limit the field left open for exertion. But many have been successful. They have passed through the forest with all its jungles, and have left us the result of their observations. As would be expected, what has been noticed by one has been overlooked by another. Hence it is unsafe to trust any one exclusively. The whole truth may be reached, so far as comprehensible, by a careful comparison of the results recorded by the most sharp-sighted and patient noologists, with a personal examination of the whole field. When this has been done who can presume that he has left nothing for a subsequent explorer to bring to light? May he not fear that as he has detected the errors of those who have preceded him, some who come after him may have to call attention to the proofs of his defective vision. But with all the difficulties attending the investigation of mind, the science of psychology must advance in the hands of skilful noologists. The progress of natural science, in all its departments, is the result of patient research and the laborious collection of facts in detail, so would we hope that some acceptable approximation to an enumeration of the prominent distinguishable phenomena or faculties of mind, with their necessary elucidation, will yet be attained and a solid foundation laïd for further progress. But while the corner stones of the foundation are in dispute the building cannot progress.

In our survey of the human spirit we recognise four prominent manifestations or capacities, viz., intellectual capacity, emotional susceptibility, an executive faculty,

and a normal authority. If these were generally admitted as occupying the prominent position assigned to them, a correct enumeration of the manifestations of the two former, and an exhibition of the place, power, and prerogative of the two latter might at length be attained. But writers on mental science have long disagreed in respect to the place to be assigned to the two latter faculties or powers. Less trouble was felt in dealing with the intellectual faculties and emotional nature. They were patent to the consciousness of the most ordinary intellect. But the nature of the will and the conscience lay in the back ground, and it was often impossible to take their rise and form and bearings with anything like accuracy. Here lay the difficulty. The mind is one and yet multiform, under a constitution that admits of incessant change. At one time the whole man may seem absorbed in one intellectual power, such as application; at another, an emotion chains up under its power every other faculty; again the will sits as enthroned and seems to give orders to all others; and yet over it a voice is heard saying, *this* must be done, and *that* left undone, and the whole soul is subservient. But not singly only, but together, do these faculties generally work. Two or three intellectual powers, or two or three emotions, with a consenting will, may combine on any object. Is it a matter of surprise that men should hesitate to distinguish as permanent forms what seem to be the ever-varying phases of an unquestionable unity?

Hence men of profound thought, of a past generation, preferred to represent the will, not as a separate, prominent faculty or power, but as the mind itself in a state of volition. And one, at least, of the most distinguished

men of the present day, while giving special prominence to the power of will, would speak of it as a "generic term," as embracing "a class of mental affections," which he would call "the Optative states of mind."

We are not disposed to endorse these opinions. The faculty of will is clearly distinguishable from the mind or spirit as a part is distinguishable from the whole. We know that when we will or determine we exercise a power very different from that of deduction or judgment; and when we are influenced by grief or anger we are in a state, or are swayed by a power equally distinct from will or judgment; and when we are impelled by conscience, intellect, feeling and will can be separately recognised as acquiescing or co-operating. If, therefore, we are to have an enumeration of our mental powers,—and for the knowledge of ourselves and for the due training and development of these powers it is most important, if not absolutely necessary,—it is right that those which have a common affinity should be grouped together, and distinct and separate powers existing singly or alone, should have their due place assigned to them.

It is easy on such a subject to propound a theory, and if a man is possessed of penetration and ingenuity he will find ample materials, in a question of such intricacy, with which to build up specious arguments. And if there is a thirst for notoriety, it is well known that the broaching of novel and still more of startling opinions is sure to secure that notoriety, from the host of opponents that shall rise to refute these opinions. But our object is truth. We wish to get at the facts of the case without respect to the opinions of others, or the honour or dishonour attending the investigation.

The question asked is,—Is the will myself, or is it only a part of myself? And another,—If a part of myself only, what power has it? Does it rule itself, or is it ruled? Is it self-determined, or is it determined by things without, including the other mental states or powers? And again, if determined, as a part of the mind, by influences external to itself,—What part does it act in morality? How is our freedom, and consequently our responsibility, affected by it occupying this position? These questions show how far the subject reaches, determining our eternal destiny.

Who can answer these questions?—The great Spirit who gave us our being. Is it presumptuous to ask his aid in the study of his works? Let it not be thought so. Our being has no mystery to him. His light can dispel our darkness. And his blessing will rest upon the patient and diligent explorer, who with reverence studies the wonders of mind or matter, and who is prepared to give him the glory of every new discovery. Man in the pride of his intellect has too often disowned God. Few things are more fitted to make men proud than the consciousness of superior intellect. And as God is ever far from the proud, such men reveal the distance by a studious ignoring of his presence or aid as something beneath the dignity of learned men. How far removed in conviction and feeling from those bright spirits who wait upon the Almighty, who are not confined to tenements of clay nor limited to a petty planet as their field of observation, but have the range of the universe as their theatre of exploration! It is not given to any one man to make all needed, still less all possible, discovery in the domains of mind or matter, as it was not given to any one inspired man to reveal all the

mind of God, nor all the truth in any one department of theology. And inspired writers, whose place was posterior to that of others, did not overlook the revelation made by those who preceded them, but guided by the revealing Spirit, made use of it and built up on it, developing the germs of the past and adding fresh discoveries.

It is not ours to follow, in this investigation, the labours of inspired men, but it is ours to make what use we can of the researches of distinguished men who have preceded us, some of whom, alas! were alienated in heart and life from God, pushing our way farther on from the way-marks which they have left standing, even when they went astray; seeing more clearly, if we can, the true course through the labyrinth, mapping out the marvellous convolutions of the everchanging human spirit, and so far advancing the science as to facilitate, in some measure at least, the labours of those who come after.

We start from a clearly-defined position. We regard the Executive Power, the Will, as a distinct power of the human spirit, so that what may be predicated of the spirit or the man at one time, may not at the same time be predicated of the will, and that what may be affirmed of the will may not at the same time be affirmed of the mind or spirit as a whole. This distinction touches the very vitals of morality. It cannot be too carefully, or too accurately drawn. Nor should we forget the admitted difficulty of exploring the recesses of the human soul. Our Maker asks the question,—"Who can know it?" And he answers it by saying,—"I, the Lord, search the heart." One difficulty arises in the endeavour to trace an emotion or state of mind,

such as desire or coveting, when it passes from the harmless into the sinful, to mark its existence first as a simple movement in the spirit, occasioned by an external sensation, and then to follow it slowly or rapidly overspreading the soul, silencing or subduing the conscience, and securing the power of the will. Where does the morality begin? Is there morality in a state of mind as a settled inclination or habit? Is there morality in a passing emotion? Is the consent of the will necessary, that is, must the executive power of the soul go with the emotion or suggestion before it comes within the domain of morality? These questions must be answered. They meet us at every turn in life. The great Teacher has told us that desire may reach such a stage, as when it secures the consent of the will, although the actual deed is not performed, that it becomes a transgression of the law of God. Although it is difficult to know the heart, that is the soul or spirit, we are commanded to search it, to discover what is wrong and what is wanting, and to keep it with all diligence, for out of it are the issues of life.

No material illustration can adequately express or set forth the immaterial and indivisible. We have to explain a unity in multiplicity. What we may illustrate by a square and speak of as having foundations and corner stones, another may illustrate by a circle, with its ever-expanding and contracting circumference, but both are inadequate. It would require the combination of many material and animate objects, external to man, to represent the marvellous spirit the glory of this lower creation, and for that combination the Creator alone is equal. But for passing states, emotions, or commotions, many illustrations may be found in external nature. Calm

patience may be compared to the unruffled sea reposing at rest in the glory of a summer evening. Restless activity to the ever-expanding and contracting movements of the sea-jelly when floating under the heat of the tropical sun. Violent passions to the shooting out and up of the fiery flame when fed by some powerful combustible. But when we seek for illustrations of intellect and will, as in distinction and determination, we can only discover, external to man, imperfect approaches to either in the instincts of the lower creation. We may observe the ox distinguishing among the herbs placed before him for food, refusing to eat the one, and readily devouring the other. And we may see the horse chafing under the restraint of a too limited and scanty pasture, ranging round the fence until he has discovered some bars lower than others, when he determines to hazard a leap and escape from confinement. But in neither is there a judgment or deduction from premises, but simply the instinct or impulse of animal nature. To man belongs the dignity, if he choose to assume it, of acting from rational arguments and selected emotions, and of regulating his conduct by a prescribed rule. When we would apprehend man with all his variety of faculties, we must fix our thoughts on all the outgoings and incomings of his spirit, and by the most patient and minute investigation of every phenomenon, attain to true distinctions and correct generalizations. In this manner would we prosecute our inquiries into the manifestations of will as exhibited in the human soul under a great variety of circumstances.

CHAPTER XXX.

NOTICE OF OPINIONS ON THE NATURE OF THE WILL.

DESCARTES—LOCKE—LEIBNITZ—EDWARDS—REID—M'COSH—HODGE.

It is interesting to notice what men of thought who have given attention to this subject have written as the result of their reflections. As it is useless to multiply quotations, a few only will be introduced. The selection is made from writers of the present and two preceding centuries. The acknowledged ability of the few whose opinions are laid before the reader is generally the main ground for the choice displayed. It is proper to state that the same writers do not always adhere to any one definition given, but variously express the same idea, or what they wish to be regarded as substantially the same idea. At times also they, or some of them, are liable to the charge of either inaccuracy or inconsistency. The difficulty of adhering to precisely the same definition, under the various shades of thought, will be admitted by all who have studied this subject. These remarks are made lest it should be said that other definitions differently expressed may be found in the same writers. We begin with the distinguished thinker who started from the axiom,—"*Cogito, ergo sum.*"

Descartes (Born, A.D. 1596).—"The power of will consists in this, that we are able to do or not to do the same thing."

This concise definition expresses not only a mental power but the freedom of that power. The idea conveyed is that there is a power in the mind to choose or reject anything proposed for its acceptance or performance. It is not sufficiently explicit, for if you substitute the word "mind" for "will" the same thing might be affirmed; and if you substitute "freedom" for "power" the same thing might also be affirmed. As it now stands, its correctness may be called in question, as applicable to the will only in certain conditions. May not a man possessed of will be able to do, and not be able to leave undone the same thing; as a man enslaved to a vicious habit, his power of resistance is so far impaired that the presentation of the temptation is constantly, if not invariably, followed by the indulgence; and on the other hand a man may be so habituated to the service of God that he is able to do, but not to leave undone, in all ordinary circumstances, that service. In both cases there is no force or constraint. The man acts freely, that is, of his own accord, the will yielding to the prevailing bent of the mind. If it be said that under sufficiently strong persuasions the evil habit might be resisted and the deed left undone, and that powerful temptations might in like manner prevail to set aside the service of God, which had been the life of the righteous man, we grant it. But then the definition must be understood as representing the faculty in its primitive state, its natural and normal condition, liable to impulses of opposite kinds, and unsustained by any power extrinsic to itself. Of Adam, in his innocence

and under trial, it might be said, that his power of will was such that he was able to do, or not to do the same thing.

Locke (Born, A.D. 1632).—A volition or an act of the will is,—"An act of the mind knowingly exerting that dominion it takes itself to have over any part of the man by employing it in or withholding it from any particular action."

Stripped of its verbiage, this means that a volition, or act of the will, is the mind knowingly controlling a part of itself in any particular way. It is not quite satisfactory. First in respect to the knowledge of the act of the will. We often take notice of the acts of our will, and often compel others to take notice of our volitions. But are we always conscious of each particular volition? Does the mind never will without inspecting the mental operations? Consciousness is that power by which we can inspect ourselves, and observe what is going on in the mind, as the natural eye can inspect the body; but with this difference, that while a part of the body, the back and head, are mainly excluded from vision, the whole soul may be inspected by itself. The question is, is it necessary to a volition that the mind takes notice of it at all times?—that the reflex act involved in inspection or consciousness should invariably accompany every act of volition? We think not. We think that volitions often take place without this reflection. A man rises and acts from a mere impulse of feeling; or from an impression made on his mind from a passing object, as an individual passing his window. No time is taken to examine, or look at, or reflect on the mental process by which the mind has controlled the body in any particular way. If by "knowingly" Mr. Locke

simply means that intelligence accompanys the volition, that as the mind is one, its display of power is attended with mental vision, as all mental acts of intelligent beings are, we may agree with him. We do not mean that man always sees or understands what he is doing, and therefore willing to do, but that the intelligence of the individual, however faint or however powerful, is not detached from the acts of the will. But this is distinct from the act of consciousness in respect to each particular volition; which in our judgment is very frequently absent from volitions. It is right to think what we are doing; but it is also well for us when prompt action is needed, that we can will without looking at the process by which we will.

The definition is explanatory of a particular state of the mind rather than of a faculty of the mind. It is true that a faculty is just the mind in a particular state, but it is not by any means the whole mind. Hence that may be a true description of a faculty which is a very defective description of the mind, and that may be a true description of the mind in a particular state which may not be a satisfactory definition of the faculty to which that state refers. We would be disposed to reverse somewhat the definition, and say that in volition a particular faculty of the mind is controlling the whole man, rather than the mind controlling any particular part of the man. Both may be true; the question is simply which is the more accurate or appropriate. By the will in volition I can employ and control a particular intellectual power, say attention; in this case one part of the mind controls another; it is better therefore to define the will as a faculty than to speak of it as the "mind knowingly exerting dominion," inasmuch as the exertion may be

confined, in great measure, to one part of the mind, while another part, the feelings, as in the case of a father punishing a beloved child, may be consciously in opposition.

Again, it is not necessary to a volition that the mind be in such a state that it may do or not do any particular action. A volition may be simply positive. The reasons for action may be so entirely on one side that there is no hesitancy in respect to any particular course, as a man perceiving but one door of escape from imminent danger. Nor is volition the product of the mind only when balanced as on a pivot, so that it may with equal ease turn to the right as to the left. It is rarely in such a condition, and yet it is constantly putting forth volitions. The weights in each scale of the balance are seldom equal, and the determination of the will is in favour of the heavier. The mind or the man may be said to hold the balance, not the will; and when the intellect has declared where the preponderance lies, the executive faculty of the mind, the will, rises into play and exhibits itself by a volition or determination, according to what was felt or perceived to be the superior weight of evidence on either side.

Leibnitz (Born, A.D. 1646).—"When we exercise a volition we always follow the collection of all inclinations, alike on the part of effective reasons as of feelings, which thing very often happens without any express judgment of the intellect."—Opera. I. 156.

Although this extract from the writings of the great scholar is rather a description or declaration of the antecedents of volitions than a definition of a volition, yet it implies what a volition is. It is an effect; the act of the will, or the mind in a state of determination; and is

occasioned by inclinations or influences in the form of reasons or feelings, or both, more or less numerous, operating on the mind and bringing it to this state that it resolves, wills, or determines. We have nothing definite here in respect to a distinct faculty or power. What is said may be affirmed of the mind, but as the action of the mind in this state is distinguished from other operations of the mind which preceded this volition, it may without impropriety be understood as referring to the commanding influence of an executive faculty. He very truly adds that the will often operates without any express judgment of the intellect. Not that it works apart from the intellect, but it waits not for an express judgment of the intellect in every particular act. It would be unutterably tedious to us if we could not move or resolve on any act, mental or bodily, until the judgment had formally pronounced upon it. We may indeed defer action till this takes place, till we are satisfied of the propriety of our proceeding in this particular way, and it is well that we have this power; but we can also move so swiftly in our determinations that it is impossible to trace any antecedent judicial process. In such cases the will follows instantly an immediate apprehension or decision of the intellect.

Edwards (Born, A.D. 1703).—"The faculty of the will is that faculty or power or principle of mind by which it is capable of choosing; an act of the will is the same as an act of choosing or choice." And this word choosing he defines as involving "refusing, approving, liking, embracing, determining, directing, commanding, inclining, a being pleased or displeased with."

To these definitions we make two exceptions. First, in the term selected to express the act of the will. In

choosing, in the ordinary sense of the word, there is something more than the exercise of will. An intellectual faculty is prominently in exercise. The power of distinction is at work, doubtless under the concurrence of will, but the work of choosing, so far as it involves the idea of marking distinctions which is essential to choice, if it is *choice* and not a picking up at random, is an intellectual as distinguished from an executive operation. If we are to distinguish faculties we must keep distinct what are clearly distinguishable. All intellectual operations are carried on with the concurrence or under the direction of the will. But if an intellectual faculty, such as apprehension, is chiefly engaged, we speak of the operation as intellectual, and with propriety, although we take no notice of the concurring or directing will. In choice, the work of the will is to fix on the object distinguished by the intellect as superior or most appropriate. Hence choice is the effect of a compound cause, intellect and will, the latter following the former; and the term choice may not properly be applied to the distinguishing of the intellect, for that alone is not choice. Nor to the fixing upon of the will, after the distinction made by the intellect, for that alone is not choice. To choose is to make choice of, and implies a selection; for if there is but one object presented to us, there is in common language "no choice." Hence the term selected by president Edwards to represent the normal act of the will is not sufficiently explicit, and is also too limited. We often will, or exercise a volition, when one single thing is before the mind. We rise up or sit down; we take or decline to take a book presented for our acceptance. No alternative was before the mind, no selection was offered, at the time the volition took place. How then

could there be a choice? Every effort must be made to secure appropriate terms, otherwise it is impossible to make progress in a branch of learning so difficult as this. If it is said that we chose rather to rise than to retain our seat, or to retain our seat rather than rise—and that we chose to accept or decline the book rather than the opposite—we have only to reply that in numberless instances the mind will not look for an alternative, nor does it wait till it is suggested, but decides immediately. It will not do to fall back upon what is implied as possible in a mental process. We seek to describe mind as we find it, and when we have at our service explicit terms they ought to be adopted. Second, we take exception against including in the idea of volition such terms as "inclining, liking, or disliking." When a man is simply inclining towards a thing, there may as yet be no volition. He may stand before a counter and examine an article of goods placed before him for purchase, he may be inclined to purchase because of its colour or texture, but the question of price may debar the will from the act of volition which would make the purchase. There is an inclination to purchase, but no determination or volition. A person may be found often "liking" or "disliking" under the influence of an emotion of love or hatred. The will may be concurring, but it would be improper to represent a display of an emotion as the expression of a volition. If this were allowed every intellectual and emotional exercise of the mind might be defined a volition. The clear and penetrating intellect of Edwards was directed to the overthrow of a doctrine concerning the condition of the will. He proved to his own satisfaction, and to that of many others, that the will does not subsist in a state of contingency, but is ever swayed by

the strongest motive—that it is not self-determined, but is determined by something within or without the mind, but external to itself. He dealt with psychology only so far as it trenched upon his particular business, and hence his comparative neglect of accurate definitions at the outset. His work on the Will displays great acumen, and is an elaborate array of arguments; but discards the graces of style, the author being intent on the demolition of the position of his antagonists and the maintenance of a doctrine involving important theological issues. On the point assumed it may be pronounced unanswerable, if we interpret his "necessity" by "moral certainty," which is the real meaning allowed to it.

Reid (Born, A.D. 1710).—"The determination of the mind to do or not to do something which we conceive to be in our power."

This is sufficiently brief and explicit, and may be accepted as correct. The limitation of the last clause might be called in question. Do we never determine without conceiving that the act is within our power? Certainly we determine to do many things which are not within our power, both mental and bodily—but do we always conceive them to be within our power when we will them? Are we conscious, at the time of willing, that the thing which we purpose doing is within our power? May we not will under the impetuosity of feeling without any conception of ability? We hear persons say,—"I never thought what I was doing," but the meaning is that they did not consider or reflect on what they were doing. We cannot detach intelligence from volition, but we may detach the exercise of certain important intellectual faculties, such as distinction or deduction from volition. Can we detach the conception

of power from volition? Left to ourselves we ordinarily determine to do what we conceive to be within our power, otherwise we would be exercising volitions fruitlessly—but we may be persuaded to attempt, and so far to determine, what our judgment tells us is clearly beyond our power. A man may say to another,—"Lift the end of that anchor." In reply he may answer,—"I am sure I cannot." Under persuasion he may make the attempt, saying, "I know I cannot." It may be said that what he wills is to make the attempt, but not to lift the end of the anchor; in other words, he wills to do what he conceives to be within his power. This is true, although he may actually lift the anchor's end in the attempt, and so do what he did not actually will to do, from a conviction that it was not in his power.

We are disposed to accept Reid's definition as correct, though we may not express our idea of the action of will in precisely the same words. When we will there is certainly some apprehension or conception of power in us, however faint, to do what we determine, even should it go no farther than an attempt. If there is a conception present that we have absolutely no power, we refuse to make any movement. Even in this there is a volition, but it is a volition in confirmation of the definition, which is also a determination not to do what we conceive not to be in our power. Yet we must not forget that we acquire habits of volition that seem to take for granted that we have the needed mental or physical strength, without waiting for any formal conception of the power needed for the particular act. We will to move in any particular way, and instantly we move. In the absence of any overflow of animal spirits or fulness of muscular energy prompting to action, we have an abiding impres-

sion, which is a certain conception, of more or less power for the performance, or at least attempt at performance, of the act which is the object of the volition.

It may be proper to notice the opinions of one or two living authors. We cannot say that the progress of this science is invariably onward. The results, as proceeding at all times from the reading more or less thoroughly and accurately of the operations of the mind, must depend on the penetration, patience, and general ability of the individual author. Powerful and independent thought, however disarranged and improperly applied, can scarcely be said to be lost. Real thought is treasure. It is the part of the wise to apply the treasures of the past and present to use.

M'Cosh speaks of the will as follows:—"The essence of will is choice, or the opposite of choice, rejection. It takes various forms, and may have degrees of intensity; if the object be present, it is adoption or consent, and if the object be absent, it is wish or desire, and when it leads to action it is volition, but under all its forms it is characterized by active selection or rejection." Again: "We think that it is high time that writers on mental science should be prepared to admit that there is a separate class of mental affections, which we may call by the generic term Will, or as we would prefer, the Optative States of the mind. These are very numerous, and differ from each other in degree and in certain minor qualities, but they all agree in this that they contain choice or rejection. In this class we include not only volition, or the determination to act, but preference, adoption, if the object be present, and wish, desire, if it be absent."—Div. Gor., 4th Ed., p. 267.

We cannot adopt this interpretation of Will. We

have already commented on Edwards's definition of will as choice. We cannot help thinking that what we conceive to be the inaccurate definition given by the great name of Edwards has led to vast misconception. We have already shown that choice is a compound effect, that the exercise of the intellect prepares the way for the exercise of the will, and that this latter exercise, detached from the former, is not choice but simply determination. We are not prepared to admit the variety of forms of the will above submitted. It has degrees of intensity as all may admit, and is exercised on an infinite variety of objects, but its outgoing is one, determination. M'Cosh admits that whatever forms it may assume, when it leads to action it is volition. What do we know of any faculty but by its action; if its action is always volition we can only describe it as the faculty whose invariable and essential action is volition. The assertion that under all its forms it is characterized by active selection or rejection is opposed, we might say, to universal consciousness. We constantly exercise our wills where there is but one object presented to our view; we do not wish to conjure up an alternative; we decide at once to accept or reject. It will not do to say that that very action implies a preference, a doing this, rather than not doing it; but in definitions we look for explicit terms when they are at hand, and reject terms that can only be true by an implied construction—and which implied conception is not present to the mind of the one exercising will in the greatest variety of circumstances. The term choice ought to be discarded as doubly indefinite, as not expressive of a simple exercise of the will, according to the true meaning of the word, and as only applicable

in this imperfect way to a comparatively small number of volitions.

This author, in the second extract given, speaks of the will as a separate *class of mental affections*, which may receive the generic name Will, but which he prefers to call the *Optative States* of the mind. In this way he would make the will multiform like the intellectual capacity and the emotional susceptibility. But this is against nature as revealed in consciousness. Executive power is one, not many, in the individual soul. It may have a thousand objects on which to operate, but the power is one. In intelligence we feel the necessity for various sources of light; in emotional susceptibility we admire the wisdom displayed in the various fountains of power, but the directing energy of that power must be one, while the soul is one and indivisible. When we ask for an enumeration of these states of the will we are told that "they all agree in this that they contain choice or rejection." In his view it is not only determination, but preference and wish also. Preference is choice, and wish is desire, and both have been already disposed of. An illustration is given in proof that desire is a state of the Will. A dear friend is very ill, and we naturally wish, and that most earnestly, for his recovery. In this wish or desire M'Cosh thinks that there is more than emotion. What can be stronger than the longing desire in our breast, while we wait beside the bed of the sufferer, for his recovery? But what is this longing desire? Is it not feeling—strong feeling?—a feeling so strong that the will is at its service to do anything in its power to save the life threatened. But the feeling is distinguishable from the will, which promptly shows itself in accepting any new remedy proposed. The

explanation of the case is simply this: The will is generally concurring in all intellectual and emotional operations. In some cases the emotion absorbs the whole energy of the soul, as a man under the power of terror, when the will actively operates in carrying the man away from the scene of danger. In the case referred to desire for restoration has taken possession of the soul—every faculty seems subservient to it; it is emotion, but emotion in paramount influence, with the will ready for action when any work mental or bodily is demanded by it. Notwithstanding these apparent misconceptions and defective or inaccurate definitions, the author, in a note, expresses his pleasure in finding eminent men "representing the will as an *unresolvable* and independent potency."

We close this section with the opinion of a living author of great celebrity for intellectual power, Dr. Hodge, of America. He says:—"The will is that faculty by which we determine to do something which we conceive to be in our power." And again:—"It is altogether better to confine the word to this its proper meaning, and not make it include all the forms of feeling involving approbation or delight."—Theol. vol. II. 403; II. 297.

This definition is almost identical with that given by Dr. Reid. We approve of it as correct, with the simple explanation given before, that we may not always have a formal conception of power in each particular volition, but certain volitions, apparently spontaneous, spring from an abiding habit of mind, in which habit may be found an indefinite impression of power.

It is with profound respect that we have offered our independent observations on the conclusions of men

justly renowned throughout the world for their high intellectual ability. We have limited our observations mainly to the nature of the will. It will be necessary next to consider the state of the will in the act of volition or at the time of determination, whether moved *ab intra* or *ab extra*, whether in a state of indifference, moral certainty, or absolute necessity. On this arena intellectual gladiatorship has displayed its sharpest weapons.

CHAPTER XXXI.

EXAMINATION OF THEORIES ON THE CONDITION OF THE WILL IN THE ACT OF DETERMINATION.

The first question that now meets us is,—How is the will determined? Is it determined by influences or feelings or powers *within itself* alone, that is *ab intra?* Or is it determined by influences or motives *external to itself* as a separate mental power, though it may be internal to the mind, that is, *ab extra?* The answer to this question depends much on our psychological view of the will. If we view it simply as the mind in a particular state, and therefore embracing all the faculties of intellect and feeling displayed in other states, we may claim for it a self-determining power, for we are merely claiming a self-determining power of the mind. With this all but fatalists and pantheists might agree. Or if we view the will, as Dr. M'Cosh, in the work already referred to, is disposed to do, as "a faculty of a most peculiar kind, a faculty constrained by nothing out of itself, but following its own free and independent laws," and at the same time make this faculty to include a class of mental affections," to be "called optative states of the mind," which are said to be "very numerous,' we might almost be disposed to admit that the will is determined *ab intra*. But these views of the will are most unsatisfactory. If we are to classify our mental powers, none has a higher claim to a distinct place

than the will. In speaking of the will, then, we must not speak of the mind as a whole, or there is an end to all right conceptions on this question. Nor can we accept the theory that the will is a "class of mental states," following their own or "its own free and independent laws," for the will as manifested in determination its true and natural outgoing is one, and is clearly distinguishable from every intellectual or emotional state. If the will had a class, a numerous class of mental states, all governed by its own free and independent laws, would it not be a mind within a mind, or be in itself the soul of man, with the intellect and emotions as mere appendages, instead of being what they are essential parts of the one spiritual being? So far does this writer carry the power and authority of the will, that he says: "So far as the true is preferred to the false, or the right to the wrong, or the pleasurable to the right, it is by the exercise not of the reason, or the conscience, or the sensibility, but of the will." It is clear that he is attributing to the will what belongs to the mind as a whole, or at least to other faculties besides the will; for in the cases referred to, both reason and conscience are in exercise as well as the will, not certainly to the exclusion of the will, but as certainly to inclusion of the reason, and generally of the sensibility, and frequently of the conscience. Following out his theory, he is brought to state: "We hold the will to be a general potency or attribute of mind"—p. 269; in plain terms, mind possessed of power. Any attempt to maintain the theory as definitely propounded, would lead to endless complications, and hence the reasoner falls back on the "general potency," which nullifies the idea of a distinct faculty. How true it is, that when

we are on the right track in dealing with mind every thing harmonises, but if on the wrong course we are confronted by walls or thickets at every turn.

We adhere to the idea that the will is a distinct and powerful faculty of the human soul, and not a mere general potency, spread over all states and emotions, and shared alike by all. Holding this, we ask what are its endowments? Has its eyes of its own by which to guide its course? Has it feelings of its own to impart power to its separate determinations? These would make it a mind of itself. It has not these separate intellectual and emotional states. The mind has them; they are not needed in duplicate; in the mind and in the will; and they can influence the will; and the will by means of one or more of them can influence others. Stripping the will of intellectual and emotional endowments, what do we attribute to it?—*Power*; power to fix upon, to determine, to adhere to, to control. If power, and not reason or feeling, be attributed to the will, we have already indicated our opinion that the will is not self-determined, or determined *ab intra*. The power exercised by will is often the offspring of intelligence and feeling, and hence if they are not within the will, they must be without. But has the will the power of moving at any time of its own accord, that is, of determining without any motion or influence from without? Activity belongs to the mind as a whole, and therefore in a measure to every part of it; a spirit is self-acting; it is not a piece of inert matter, requiring to be acted upon before it moves; but the particular determinations of the mind, exercised by its faculty the will, are the results of influences external to the will, but within the mind. These influences may be

sensations from external nature, convictions of the judgment, emotions, or dictates of conscience. When any one, or several of these combined, acquire paramount possession of the soul, they acquire the governing power, the executive is at their disposal. While we say that the mind is self-acting, we cannot say with M'Cosh that "the will is self-acting, and has its power or law in itself." For this would make the will, the man, the intelligent responsible being, which it is not, for it is not endowed with separate intelligence, nor with the deep springs of action in feeling; but the man is the aggregate of intellect, emotion, will, and conscience; and we may say that responsibility belongs to man because he is endowed with each of the four, and because he is at liberty to exercise his faculties.

If we say that the will is determined by influences external to itself, do we not land in fatalism? Are not all volitions bound by an unalterable necessity? By no means. The man is free to adopt the reasons or influences that determine the will or to reject them. As a matter of fact he often does reject influences, in the form of strong reasons, which in the opinion of others, should have swayed him. They had a certain weight with him, but other influences had a stronger; and the stronger prevailed to a determination in their favour. We sometimes say that a man is very obstinate, that he will not listen to reason. But what are the facts? He has his own notions of the path of duty, and he refuses to let go his hold of them, or to suffer them to be overcome by opposing ones; and he keeps them before his mind as the rule of duty, and the will determines accordingly. In fact, if it did not, the whole mental constitution would be incapable of attaining

what is called character. If man had no control over what influences his will, he would then be a mere machine. But he has control over his will, and over his conduct as the outgoing of the will, by having control over what influences or determines the will. But is not this the will determining the will? Not exactly. The will, guided by reason or conscience, and stimulated by feeling, may, as the exponent of the whole man, fix upon the motives or the grounds which should influence the will in any contemplated action. It is not the will determining the will, but the whole man determining the will, either in particular acts whose antecedents are fully examined, or by the formation of character which gives a general bent to the will, or an ordinary certainty in respect to its volitions. The man is free in performing particular acts, and in the formation of character, and therefore responsible. Fatalism, or physical necessity, can only exist when all freedom has ceased; but freedom is not taken away while the man has the power to choose what influences and determines his own conduct. Men know that they exercise this power; therefore they know that they are free, and not bound by any fatalism or physical necessity.

Some writers in their recoil from everything approaching to necessity have maintained the idea of contingency in the will at the formation of a volition or determination. By such the condition of the will is described as one of indifference. They maintain that they have the power of determining against the strongest motives; that at any time the volition might have been the very opposite of what it was, the motives or influences remaining precisely the same. They go so far as to hold that the

will is independent of reason, of feeling, and even of God. Cousin says: "The will is mine, and I dispose of it absolutely within the limits of the spiritual world." Reid says: "If in any voluntary action, the determination of his will be the necessary consequence of something involuntary in the state of his mind, or of something in the external circumstances of the agent, he is not free." These statements have a show of reason; let us examine them. If Cousin means that the will is his, as an attribute of the mind is his, he is right; but if he means that he can dispose of it without respect to God or man, the external world, or his own internal mental state or moral character, he is mistaken; for both God and man may influence his will, through his intellect or conscience; and his own internal state, mental or moral, and the external circumstances in which he is placed are ever influencing and sometimes swaying his will. In the very nature of things he cannot be independent of himself, though he may be independent of a part of himself if that part be a non-essential. There is no "I," separate from the will which can dispose of it; but the will in company with other faculties may dispose of itself and these other faculties; in other words, the man may dispose of himself. Reid's statement amounts to this: That a man is not free if his determination in any voluntary act be the necessary consequence of something involuntary in the state of his mind, or of something in his external circumstances. We are not quite prepared to admit this. A habit may have such a hold of a man that it may be a striking characteristic; he may hate it, and would fain rid himself of it; it may be said to be something involuntary in the state of his mind; and a determina-

tion to which he has come may be the result, the necessary consequence of this habit or state of mind, and yet the man is free; that is, he is a free agent, though in common language he may be said to be a slave to his evil habit. We confidently ask, is not general experience in favour of this opinion? We know that man is free, and yet we know that he often acts from acquired evil habits which he professes to hate, and which we may believe he does hate. And in respect to the second clause, are not many determinations the necessary consequences of the external circumstances of the man? A person goes among the vile; the temptations to evil are before him; he does not resist these temptations, he joins in evil. His volition to do as he has done may be said to be the necessary consequence of his external circumstances. What he did was done freely by yielding to temptation. He chose to go into temptation and he yielded to its power, and he was free in both cases. But may there not lurk something in the term necessary which has been overlooked? We take the phrase used in the ordinary acceptation, as equivalent to natural sequence. A necessity that precludes or overbears all freedom of choice we disown, as making a man a mere machine. But a natural sequence, which may become from established habit an invariable sequence, we regard as in perfect consistency with highest freedom.

We therefore reject the idea that the will immediately anterior to the act of determination was in a state of independence or indifference, capable of deciding against the strongest motives, equally as for them as if suspended on a pivot, with power to neutralise all influences that might hang as weights on either side. In

point of fact, this is not true. The will is not, and cannot be, independent of the influences that surround it and ever operate upon it. It must be guided by something. And who is to guide it but the man who is endowed with it? And how can he guide it but by motives such as reasons? If it is independent of all the reasons which man can bring to bear upon it, then it is a power within a power, an agent within an agent, a man within a man—which is absurd. If not independent, it is not indifferent, but is moved by ideas, reasons, feelings, and is constantly taking sides with one party or another, obeying the prevailing bias of the mind in its ideas or passions. If the will should be always indifferent, how could character be formed? There could be no steadiness, for the man that was truthful, honest, and pure to-day, might be the very opposite to-morrow. This cannot be true, for it is contrary to universal experience. It would make a man care no more for the good than the bad, for the true than the false, as he must be in a position to determine as readily for the one as the other. The saints in heaven, who must be regarded as most free, must be as ready to do evil as to do good; and the devils in hell to do good as to do evil. Such a theory of contingency, of the will in a permanent state of contingency, is a phantom of the brain.

Nor is the will capable of deciding against the strongest motives equally as for them. This is conceived to be necessary for its complete independence. It is not correct. The will yields to the strongest influences, whatever these may be, and come from what quarter they may. This is the constitution given to it by the Creator. It is the best possible. In vain do we ply man with arguments, if he is able at any moment to cast them

to the winds, without supplying their place by still stronger. The determining power in man is placed at the disposal of the strongest causes, reasons, motives, or influences. The strongest may not be the best; they may in the estimation of sound judgment be the very worst; but they are the strongest in the man's mental constitution. The strongest influence controlling the will may be a long-cherished habit, and against it reason is almost powerless. Sometimes one idea may secure the will to its side contrary to the natural feelings of the man, and contrary to what was a long-cherished expectation. This idea has risen for the time to paramount influence, and the power of will goes over to it, as its right. As in a constitutional assembly of representatives, a few ideas skilfully handled and pressed on men may sway their votes contrary to what was expected of them, and thus a majority of votes may be obtained, and by them is secured the executive authority in a country. This is admitted to be right — it is the exponent of freedom.

The will may sometimes be as on a pivot; the arguments on one side are so nicely balanced by those on another, that the man is in suspense as to what he should do. He may refuse to decide in the circumstances, but even that is a concession to strength, to uncertainty as stronger for the time than certainty. When a small preponderance is felt in one scale, the will goes over to that, and the greater the increase of weight on one side over the other, the greater the force of will on that side. We are persuaded that this is the natural process of the human soul, and that it is the wisest and best possible arrangement for man's liberty and progress.

Hence we conclude that the will in the act of determination is swayed or controlled, not by its own inherent choice or pleasure, as if endowed with intellect or feeling, nor by any mental states or affections that have been imagined to belong to it, and to be subservient to its laws as a separate department of mind—but by influences or motives external to the will itself, but internal to the mind, which influences or motives may have their origin or strength in impressions from without, in convictions of the judgment, in the rising of the emotions or in the settled bent of the disposition an acquired habit of the soul constituting what we call character. It is not determined by any law or physical necessity which would destroy man's freedom, nor does it exist in a state of indifference, equipoise, or independence, having the power at the same moment to yield to or set aside the strongest motives at the time of each volition or determination; but its true position is between these two extremes, a capacity or readiness to be influenced, determined, controlled by what is within the mind at the time of a temporary or permanent nature, so that it is an expression for the time of the state of the man, the determination of his will revealing to himself and to others his character, judgment, and feeling.

CHAPTER XXXII.

FREEDOM AND ABILITY.

It will be impossible to apprehend aright the nature and operations of the will without a clear apprehension of the proper meanings belonging to the terms, *freedom* and *ability*. A proper explanation of these terms will throw light upon the power and condition of this great central faculty of the mind. In the past the confusion of ideas arising from the inappropriate use of one or other has been most embarrassing to the progress of thought, and has contributed to prolong the controversies of which the will has been the subject. It is high time that this confusion should cease. The terms are not interchangeable. There may be freedom where there is not ability, and there may be ability where there is not freedom. Let us illustrate. A man may be free to swim across a river to which he has come in his journey, but he has not the ability, and he dare not venture, having never learned the art of swimming. Or, in matters of mind, a man may be free to study the most abstruse questions of astronomy or of theology, but he may not have the ability, the intellectual acumen and the power of application necessary to apprehend these difficult matters. Or, in the domain of morals, a man may be free to throw off some long-indulged evil habit, that is, there is no restraint laid upon him to retain it; nay more, the solicitations of his friends and his own

judgment may be in favour of its abandonment, and yet he is painfully conscious that he has not the ability. There is freedom, but not ability.

Again, there may be ability and not freedom. The captured slave may be able to swim ashore from the vessel which has run down and broken his canoe, but he has not the freedom ; he is seized and bound hand and foot, and hoisted on the deck of the slaver. Or a man may have the ability of mind to investigate the most important doctrinal questions, but he may not be free to do this, having given, of his own choice, his time and abilities to other matters ; or, having vowed to abstain, in obedience to the demand of his superiors, from the consideration or study of such subjects. It may be said that there is a freedom in this very bondage. There was a freedom in the voluntary placing of himself in circumstances that preclude the study of doctrinal questions, or in the placing of himself in subjection to religious superiors ; but a man cannot be free and bound at the same time, and in respect to the same thing. The vow of obedience taken by a Jesuit places his faculties, all his mental abilities, and therefore his will, at the disposal of his superior. He retains an ability both physical and mental, but he has disposed of his freedom. He has placed himself very much as a machine in the hands of his superior. But as freedom is the power of choice or the ability of determining according to our pleasure, in disposing of freedom has he not disposed of ability?— He has disposed of ability, but it is controlling ability ; while he also retains ability, but it is a subservient ability. The Jesuit holds his powers in subjection to his will, but he has placed that will in subjection to a superior will. He has ability, but he is a slave. Again,

in the region of morals, a man may have the ability to do many things which he has not the freedom to do, which he is not free to do, which he has not the will to do. He is able to forgive a debt, he is able to sustain a benevolent cause presented to his notice, or he is able to forego revenge, but he does not choose to do so. He is able, but he is not willing. Can we say that he has not the freedom ? Are we not accustomed to say that he is free to do so, *if he please ?* He has freedom, and he has not freedom. He has freedom so far as respects external constraint ; no one prevents him from acting in the manner proposed, but the will is not free to do this or that particular act because strong convictions of an opposite character or tendency fetter its action, and so far the action of the agent, as the determination of the will is the expression of the man. The greed of money may interpose a barrier in the way of forgiving the debt ; the spirit of covetousness may long have regulated the man ; the will is subservient for the time to this ruling desire ; the will is in a measure enslaved by it, and so far the man is in bondage to it. He is free to forgive the debt if he please, but he does not please to do so ; on the contrary, his pleasure lies in the opposite direction. His pleasure is his preference, and that preference accords with his ruling passion. But is there not a contradiction in saying that a man has an ability to do a certain thing, and yet that he is restrained from doing it, that he can do, and that he cannot do the same thing ?—Not exactly, for a man may have a natural ability to do something which certain accidentals or circumstances may prevent him from doing, may deprive of the freedom of doing. The man before referred to may have the natural ability to swim ashore, but the accidental restraints take away his

freedom. So the man who is a creditor is in a sense the possessor of the amount claimed as debt—it is his; he has the sole power to dispose of it, that is his ability; but the accidentals of the man, his present strong love of money, ties up the hands of the man in respect to generous acts—he is not free to wipe out this debt so long as these strong cords are round his heart. For a similar reason he is not free to sustain a benevolent cause claiming his support. He has vast wealth, he has the ability to dispose of it, but a restraint is on him when the proposal is made that a portion of it should be given for a certain object. The love of money may operate in this case as in the last, but there may be also an antipathy to the cause asking support. These two feelings may in this case conjoin their forces and fasten down the will in opposition to the request presented. Loosen these cords by argument or appeal; remove the dislike, and persuade to benevolence, and you may set the man free to act according to your wishes. In the meantime he is guided and restrained by views and feelings with which you may have no sympathy, but which are at present the ruling powers in the soul, and ruling they restrain from action in this particular way proposed. There is a general ability, but a particular bondage. When a question of revenge comes up there is often a conflict of passions. Pride, hatred, and anger cry out for retaliation, benevolence and fear withstand the demand. The man has the ability to take revenge in inflicting physical injury or financial loss, or injury to character. Will he do so? This depends upon his state of mind; and the state of mind on the prevailing power of certain emotions. If the fear of God or man, and a feeling of

compassion or benevolence surmount the wild and turbulent emotions clamorous for retaliation, they will lay a restraint upon the restive spirit, and when the arm would be uplifted to strike it is held back, when the lips would speak reproachful words they are sealed up, and when a stroke of his pen would inflict financial ruin on one who has done much injury, it is restrained. He has the ability to take revenge but not the will. He is free, and he is not free. He is free as a responsible agent; but not free by his own choice to do this particular action. With conscious ability, and in the exercise of highest freedom, he has tied up his own energies from going forth in a certain way, deemed unworthy of his position as a man or a christian. There is ability without freedom. The freedom of the will is the freedom of the agent; but the freedom of the agent is not always the freedom of the will, if by the freedom of the will you understand a liberty to do or not to do the same thing at the same time; in other words, to determine for or against any particular thing with equal ease at the same time. Every responsible being is a free agent, that is, he is at liberty to determine according to his views, feelings or character, to what is within himself and belongs to himself. He determines for himself and of himself; he is therefore free. But that determining faculty, the will, while the man is a free agent, in the sense explained, may be found invariably and most certainly determined in one particular direction from the established character of the agent. This may be called restraint, or bondage, but it is the restraint of freedom. The term bondage is not the most appropriate, for the man acts freely. It is perhaps better to express that condition as a fixedness of will according to a confirmed disposition of soul.

On examining the history of man throughout his whole revealed course, we find the will in three distinct conditions. It first expressed the condition of an upright, holy soul, inclined only to good. As man, when first created, had no evil principle or disposition, the will was steadily exercised in a right direction, that is in accordance with the mind of God. It had received, however, no permanent bias, as man had not yet an acquired character, the result of prolonged exercise in any particular way. An opportunity was afforded him of securing that character which would give a fixedness to the will in a right direction; in plain terms, which would confirm him in holiness. He failed in the hour of trial. The falsehood suggested was believed; that belief led to a determination to do what was forbidden. The deed was attended with the guilt and pollution of sin, which completely altered the creature's condition before God, and as a consequence his internal spiritual state. That being altered, the will reflected the change most accurately. Man then entered on the second stage of his history.

Partially obscured in intellect, blunted in conscience, and deadened in noblest emotions, the soul moreover presented a positive alienation from all that was just and pure and good. Sin, as a moral disease, had infected it, and it now became filled with enmity against God. The will expressed what that nature approved and felt. It was habitually turned away from God and the things of God. As the piece of iron placed in the compass may draw the needle from the point to which the magnetic current would lead it, and completely reverse the course from which it was a conductor; so sin, taking possession of the human soul, deadened and destroyed its heaven-ward tendency, and shaped its course hell-ward. The needle

acts freely, and yet the iron remaining in one position, its action is not only partially swayed but regulated by it; there is a fixedness in its movements, it is determined in one direction and not in two or three. So sin remaining in the soul, in the heart the seat of the affections and the source of power, draws in its own direction, according to its own natural bias all the energies of the man, which direction is revealed by the will. It is said by inspiration that, viewing man according to the general bent of his disposition, "Every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil, and that continually." That evil heart ever bent on sin in some form pointed the will in a direction most congenial to itself.

We are not to suppose, however, that the will is never swayed to the right or left of this point to which it habitually looks. It is often swayed by light in the understanding to direct the energies of the man in a path more becoming a rational being. Sometimes high and noble thoughts of honour, of benevolence, of patriotism, acquire a firm hold of the mind, and counteract the selfishness and depravity engendered by sin, and swing the will round as if halfway back to its old and honourable position. Sometimes feelings of regret for conduct condemned by conscience sets the soul in opposition to the attractions of sin, weaken greatly for the time its power, and enable the recollections of former days, or the present admonitions of friends, to acquire an influence of which the will is an index, in an avowed determination to throw off for ever the yoke of sin, and to lead a new life. Under present impulses the will has gone more than half back. The man may seem changed. And for the time externally he is. Like

Ahab, the equally foolish and wicked king of Israel, he may humble himself and walk softly under the terror produced by the prophecy of the coming vengeance of the Almighty. Or like the Ninevites, the man may bemoan his folly and wickedness, and turn for the time from all his wicked ways, and strive to do what he conceives to be right. Then the will will be found oscillating between the pressure of the convictions of duty strengthened by sorrow and fear, and the pressure of temptation aided it may be by evil spirits or false friends. Sometimes the common operations of the Holy Spirit which are ever counteracting the evil dispositions of men, and preserving our world from being wholly inundated by crime and corruption, overcome the power of sin for a time so far as to lead to a great reformation of conduct, and to an apparent delight in the things of God. The mind is enlightened by the word of God, and receives it with joy. The man proclaims his renunciation of all sin. He will hereafter only serve God. Sin however is not removed. The guilt of unpardoned sin remains, and with it its essentially degrading influence. The will for the time responds to the power of light in the understanding, and to the dictates of conscience, and turns the face of the man heavenward. What is now wanted? Remove the perverting iron that has reversed the true course of the magnetised needle. Take away the guilt of sin, and remove the curse attending that guilt, by pardoning the sinner, and magnetise the soul afresh with heavenly influence.

In the regenerated state the will is habitually, but not invariably, inclined heavenward. In the scriptures it is said that he that is "born of God doth not

commit sin; for his seed remaineth in him; and he cannot sin, because he is born of God." But it is also said by the same scriptures, by one who delighted in the law of God after the inner man: "I know that in me, that is in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing—for to will is present with me, but how to perform that which is good, I find not. For the good that I would, I do not, but the evil which I would not, that I do. I find then a law that when I would do good, evil is present with me." Both these passages teach the same doctrine; but the one goes farther than the other. The one testifies to the divine principle implanted in regeneration, which has reversed the past tendencies of the soul, and given them, and with them the will, an habitual upward and heavenward tendency. The other testifies to the same change by saying, "I will and I would do good," but reveals also the powerful and sometimes prevalent evil still existing in the soul, interfering with the doing of good, and sometimes securing the consent of the will. These are opposing principles in the believer's soul. The flesh wars against the spirit. The spirit has the victory, but not invariably. The flesh, or carnal mind, has deep-rooted power in the fallen soul; and while grace produces desires for holiness, expressed by "I would," or "I wish," or even secures the actual determination of the will to do good, the man is constrained to admit an opposition to these desires re-asserting a place in his soul, and a deadness and incapacity to perform the good for which a positive volition has been secured. In every deed the will has a part, whether the deed be good or bad. But the deed may be in conformity with or against the general character of the man. When sin is committed by the

believer, his will is concerned in it, and he is guilty, although it is against the general tendency of his soul, and as a consequence against or contrary to the general bent of his will. The work of sanctification is generally a progressive work; sin is undermined, weakened and destroyed; and holiness is established, strengthened, and made permanent; and in proportion to the progress of sanctification will be the steady inclination of the will to all that is divine and heavenly.

In the glorified state the will has attained to a fixedness which will be perpetual. It is the result of an enduring character. Its condition differs somewhat from the state of the will when man was in innocence, but untried. It was then only inclined to good, it could not be otherwise, as reflecting the image of a soul in which no vein of perversity existed; but it is now in a state of glory the index of a character acquired by grace and confirmed by the sentence of the supreme and eternal Judge. The soul is now perfectly holy, and as such the will must be perfectly disposed to good without any restriction or check; and as that perfect holiness is unalterable and eternal, the will must be unalterably and eternally disposed in one direction, to obedience to the will of the Supreme, to holiness his pleasure, and to such acts of worship as will demonstrate the entire agreement of the creature with the Creator, their wills being one.

If it be said that this fixedness of will is inconsistent with freedom, it may be asserted that God is not free. For what will is more fixed than His not to do evil. He cannot lie. He cannot do injustice. His will or determinations reveal his character, and as that character is unalterably holy, he being unchangeable, it follows that

his will will never be disposed to evil in any form, that it will everlastingly tend or point in the same direction. And yet God is most free. Freedom consists in liberty to act according to our pleasure. This pleasure may be the outgoing of temporary convictions or feelings of a permanent character. In the one case it may point in various directions according to influences; in the other it will point steadily, it may be everlastingly, in one direction. But in both cases there is freedom, and in the latter the highest type of it, for the pleasure is uniform and uninterrupted.

Ability is easily distinguishable from liberty. Adam had ability of mind to meet the suggestions of the tempter by other and stronger considerations. He could have reflected on the veracity and goodness of God, and keeping his mind fixed on these preserved his will in conformity to the will of God. In our fallen state the ability of man is very much impaired. He can easily do wrong, but with difficulty can he do good. The understanding that might influence the will aright is often in darkness, the good emotions are with difficulty aroused for "the heart is hard;" and even after intellect, emotions and conscience have moved the will to determine aright, the strength to perform what is good is wanting. The soul sinks under the burden; it cannot climb the steep, it cannot mount up with wings; it is like a man enfeebled with disease; it is like a bird with a broken wing. In an unconverted state, it may do many things commendable and proper, but it cannot serve God, and so cannot please him, for the will is habitually disposed to evil in some form, generally the service of self to the exclusion of God or his glory. When renewed by the Holy Ghost, it possesses power according to the grace

received, according to the light in the understanding, the quickening and elevation of the affections or emotions, and the vitality and power of conscience. This transformation is the work of the indwelling Spirit; he restores the power of these faculties that had been impaired by sin; and he also works in the soul of the believer both to will and to do, that is making the soul willing in the ordinary and natural way, and then enabling the soul to carry into execution its own determinations. In the absence of that power, the regenerated soul is often painfully conscious that he has not the ability to perform what he would. He cannot by a mere volition remove sin, guilt, pollution, weakness, sorrow. Means must be used; and yet he finds an inability to use the means in the way prescribed. Who can restore the lost ability? God alone can. "O Israel, thou hast destroyed thyself, but in me is thy help found." Raised from spiritual death, and the pit of corruption, and trained by grace for glory, the soul finds itself endowed with strength for every duty.

In the faintest exercise of liberty some ability, mental or physical, is displayed; and in the highest form of freedom all the ability of the creature is fully developed. Thus liberty and ability which had been co-ordinate and equal in man while innocent, were found dissevered, antagonistic and unequal, when the soul, diseased by sin, was visited with light and grace; but become reunited in equal perfection in a state of glory.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

DEFINITIONS AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

Before proceeding to define our English word "*Will*," and to illustrate its various meanings, it may be profitable to notice how the earliest writers expressed the idea of a volition or determination, what terms were used to express "desire" or "wish" as distinguished from settled purpose, the state of mind in each case, as well as the act of the mind. The oldest writings extant are the books of Moses. With them are associated the productions of other sacred writers of great antiquity. While not dealing specially with psychology the scope of their writings led them frequently to enter the domain of moral science, and to express the different shades of feeling and purpose, both divine and human. With these writings in Hebrew and Chaldee, the Septuagint translation may be compared, as fitted to throw light on the specific meanings of these terms as viewed by those who understood and spoke the Greek language which is pre-eminently adapted for intellectual distinctions. The books of the New Testament present almost every shade of wish or desire, and also of purpose or determination; and may also claim our attention, as the ideas of the sacred Scriptures have largely moulded our language at the period of its most rapid development. It will be seen how far the Septuagint selection of terms influenced the writers of the Greek New Testament. Our object is not

to follow the English translation where it has chosen to insert the word "will" either as verb or noun, but to cull a few passages where the original writer has the idea of a fixed purpose or determination in his mind, as a matter settled or decided, which he wishes to convey to the reader; where he has the idea of a mere desire or wish; where he has an idea of the state of mind, as willingness or voluntariness; and where he has to relate the deed or act of the mind, and to note how and in what circumstances these ideas are represented in words.

The Hebrew scriptures contain at least three verbs which express decision, purpose, determination of mind, as *Abhah*, *Chaphetz*, *and* Yagatz. Each has it peculiar shade of meaning, and two of them, *Abhah* and *Chaphetz*, are sometimes used to express a state of mind in which desire is prominent with concurrent will, but all express or have been used to express, a settled purpose of mind. We will notice some passages as illustrative of the meaning of these terms.

In Genesis xxiv. 5, the verb *Abhah* is used in the following sentence:—"Peradventure the woman will not be willing to follow me." Here there is something more than disinclination to come with a stranger. The meaning is—"But if the woman will *determine* not to come with me," as pointing to a purpose or resolution of mind. In Deuter. ii. 30, the same verb occurs as follows: "But Sihon, king of Heshbon, would not let us pass by him." Here is a very positive *determination*. The Israelites wished to pass through this king's territory in peace, and proffered a request to that effect. They met with a stern refusal, backed up with an array of military force to prevent the passage. In the 10th chap., 10th v., Moses expressed by the same verb the

decision of Jehovah not to destroy the people in answer to the request of his servant. An instance of settled determination expressed by the same verb occurs in chapter 25, 7 v. A man refuses to marry his brother's widow. That refusal is reported to the elders of the tribe by the widow. In doing so, she uses this term, which must imply in the circumstances a positive decision. In Isaiah xxx. 9, the word is used to convey the determination of a settled habit of mind, in these words: "This is a rebellious people, lying children, children that *will* not hear the word of the Lord." The word *Abhah* descends through two or three intermediate languages into our own, and appears in avarice and its connections. From the Hebrew it passes into the Greek, αυω, and thence into the Latin *aveo*, whence "avarus," and our English *avarice*. It originally means to breathe or blow after, and expresses strong desire so frequently the origin of volitions. Its derivation would intimate that it might express a state of mind in which emotion was paramount.

The word *Chaphetz* is used to express both desire and determination. In that very ancient book, the book of Job, it occurs in chapter xxxiii. 32 v.: "I desire to justify thee." *Chaphatzti tzadheqcha*. Here beyond question it expresses a wish or desire; any supposed determination could only be conditional. At the same time the will is not excluded from acquiescing in that desire.

But in Deuter. xxv. 8, it expresses the determination of the will: "The elders of his city shall call him and speak unto him, and if he stand to it, and say, I like not to take her," *lo chaphatzti l'qachtah*. Here, beyond question, is a fixed determination. It amounts to this: "I have made up my mind not to take her."

In 1 Sam. ii. 25, the same verb occurs in a passage which conveys the idea of a settled purpose. "Notwithstanding, they hearkened not unto the voice of their father, because the Lord would slay them." It was no mere wish or pleasure of the Almighty to destroy these worthless sons of Eli, but it was his purpose or determination to punish them for their revolting wickedness that they might be a warning to others, and therefore he left them to their own perverse disposition, that in the exercise of their own wills, as free agents, they might go on to their pre-determined destruction. This passage opens up an intricate question, but we cannot turn aside here to discuss it.

In Isaiah liii. 10, we find this word in a sentence which, in our opinion, has not been wisely rendered in our translation. The words in English are: "Yet it pleased the Lord to bruise him," *va Y'hovah chaphetz dacco.* "But the Lord purposed to bruise him," or more freely, "Yet it was Jehovah's determination to bruise him." In this way we eliminate all mere desire or pleasure in such a sorrowful transaction. We know that the Almighty does not afflict willingly even the children of men; that he has no pleasure in the death of the wicked, and could have no pleasure, in the common sense of that term, in the death of his Son; but it was his purpose or determination, formed before the advent of his Son, that he should be bruised as the substitute for sinners. The word here, then, conveys the idea of an unalterable determination. *Chaphetz*, after passing through Etruscan and Greek, re-appears in the Latin "gavisus," the participle of "gaudeo," from which we have our own "gaudy" and its connections. Originally denoting taking pleasure in, or delighting in, it came to mean the

act of the will as the result of feelings in which the soul was absorbed.

The third term, *yagatz*, unlike the preceding, has not its origin in feelings of desire or delight, but its employment to express determination is the result of an intellectual exercise. It frequently means to consult or advise, and from that follows the determination to act as the result of deliberation and forethought.

In 2 Chron. xxv. 16, *yagatz* occurs to denote a divine purpose. Thus the prophet says: "I know that God hath determined to destroy thee because thou hast done this." It was not that the Almighty would take counsel to destroy the vain-glorious king, but that he had already determined upon it to punish him for his absurd stupidity and perversity in serving the gods of Edom, which had proved their incompetence to protect the very people whom he himself had overthrown. The word here clearly represents a firm decision.

In Isaiah xiv. 24, and xix. 17, the same term is found denoting the settled purpose or determination. In the one case God has purposed to destroy Assyria, and in the other Egypt. The divine mind has formed a positive determination in respect to both countries which he will execute. An instance of the determination of human minds after consultation may be given. In 2 Chron. xxx. 23, it is said: "And the whole assembly took counsel to keep other seven days, and they kept other seven days with gladness." The word is *vayuvagtzu*. It is not simply that they took counsel, for no determination of any special nature might follow, but that they determined on or after consultation to continue the religious services. Hence the translation might be improved by the substitution of the word "determined"

or "resolved," instead of the words "took counsel;" for they certainly did more than take counsel on the matter; but no other word is used to express that further process; hence this term must be understood as conveying the mental decision or resolution arrived at.

In the Chaldee, such terms as *chathac*, *charatz*, were used to convey the ideas of decision or determination, their primary meanings being "to cut off," "to separate," as matters on which a *conclusion* had been attained.

There were three nouns also used by the Hebrews to express pleasure, will, determination. When it was something agreeable to the mind on which a decision had been reached, the term selected was generally *ritzon*, expressing both the *will* of God, as in Psal. xl. 8, cxliii. 10; and the *will* of man, as in Levit. i. 3, and xix. 5. When it was the outgoing of feeling, or a purpose the result of enflamed passions, the common word for soul, *nephesh*, was employed as in Gen. xxiii. 8, where it corresponds with our word "mind," and in Psal. xxvii. 12, where the word "passion" is nearer the force of the original. When the volition was a deliberate judgment, the term *mishphat* was used. It was in a measure a judicial decision. For a state of mind, represented as acquiescing and voluntary, corresponding to the English word "*willing*," the ordinary word was *nadhabh*. In such passages as the following, 1 Chron. xxix. 9, Psal. cx. 3, Judges v. 2, and Nehem. xi. 2, this word is found in some of its forms. Its original idea is doubtful. It may be impulse; hence inward impulse or spontaneity.

It is not without object that these different terms are submitted to the consideration of the thoughtful reader.

How did the Greeks represent in their language the ideas found in the writings of a race that preceded them in literature? For each of the three Hebrew verbs, *Abhah*, *Chaphetz*, and *Yagatz* the Septuagint translators have used βουλομαι *(Boulomai)* as in Gen. xxiv. 5 and Isai. xxx. 2, for *abhah*; Isai. liii. 10, Deut. xxv. 8, and 1 Sam. ii. 25, for *chaphetz*; and 2 Chron. xxv. 16, Isai. xiv. 24 and xix. 7, for *yagatz*. Another term very frequently used by them, as equivalent to the two first of these Hebrew verbs, is θελω *(thelo)*. This verb is given as the interpretation of *abhah*, in three places at least, as in Deut. ii. 30; x. 10; xxv. 7; and for *chaphetz* in Prov. xxi. 1, and Job xxxiii. 32.

For the noun *ritzon* there was a double interpretation. When it was understood to mean a voluntary willingness, or a will the result of spontaneous feeling δεκτος (*dektos*) was the chosen substitute, but when it meant the will as the result of judgment, θελημα (*thelema*) expressed their ideas. For *nephesh* the natural substitute was found in ψυχη (*psuche*) and for *mishphat* κριμα (*krima*). For *nadhabh* they found an equivalent in εκουσιος (*ekousios*) "voluntary."

From an examination of the circumstances in which βουλομαι and θελω are used, it will be found that where there is wish or desire manifestly implied, θελω is used in preference to βουλομαι, and that where counsel is implied as the antecedent to determination, βουλομαι is adopted. This is contrary to the opinion of some lexicographers, who would make βουλομαι to express wish rather than θελω. To βουλομαι beyond question belongs "determination," the result of deliberation. The very noun βουλη counsel might settle that. But to θελω belongs both wish and will, mere desire or pleasure and settled

determination. *Βουλομαι* or *βολομαι* is from the Semitic *bol* the mind or heart—in Syriac *bol*, and in Arabic *bal* both the same in meaning. Hence *βουλομαι* would originally mean to apply the mind or "to mind," and hence to counsel, purpose, determine.

In the New Testament *θελω* has the widest range. It may mean *wish*, *please*, *desire*, or *determine*. In Matt. viii. 3, "I will (*θελω*), be thou clean,"—may be either I please or I determine, according to the idea attached to the preceding sentence. "If you are pleased to do so, you can make me clean—I am pleased to do so," &c. "Or if you determine, you can make me clean—I determine," &c. In the same way, Matt. xx. 15, *pleasure* or determination. But in Mark xiv. 7, "When ye will ye may help the poor," pleasure or disposition is preferable to determination. In Mark xv. 12, where Pilate asks what should be done with Jesus, *θελω* must mean desire or pleasure rather than purpose. He wished to please the Jews, and asked what was their desire. So in all those cases of applications for cure when the Saviour asks the sufferers what they *will*—the meaning is not what do you purpose or determine, but what is your *desire* or wish. But *θελω* means positive determination also, as in the following passages, Matt. xxi. 29. The young man says to his father when requested to go to work in the vineyard—"I will not," *ου θελω*:—John v., 40, "Ye will not come unto me that ye might have life;" Rom. vii. 18, "To will is present with me, but how to perform I find not;" Phil. ii. 13, "Both to will (*θελω*) and to do." In these cases the action of the determining power of the human soul is prominent.

We may now notice the use of *βουλομαι* by the same writers. In Acts xv. 37, we find Barnabas

reported as determined to take his nephew John Mark on his second missionary tour. That act of mind is expressed by βουλομαι. That it was no mere wish, but a very fixed determination, all capable of understanding the passage know. In Act xviii. 15, Gallio determines to be no judge in religious matters. Here the "*I will not*" of our translation is ου βουλομαι in in Greek. It was not a mere wish of the judge, but a very firm determination as he soon showed. In like manner the determinations of God are expressed by this term—1 Cor. xii. 11 ; Matt. xi. 27, with 2 Peter iii. 9. as distinguished from 1 Tim. ii. 4, where θελω is used as expressive of desire or pleasure. The "all" of 2 Peter iii. 9 is to be interpreted with the "long-suffering to usward," as pointing to all the objects of his grace. Also, in Heb. vi. 17, where the "willing" of our translation is from βουλομαι as conveying a very settled determination which calls forth not only a promise but an oath. From these passages may be gathered the true meaning of these terms ; and they are sufficient to modify at least the distinctions of some lexicographers.

The term in use for the power or faculty of will is θελημα (*thelema*). It is spoken of the human and divine will. In 1 Cor. xvi. 12. The will of Appollos was very firm against acceding to the request of Paul. And in Ephe. i. 11, we have the phrase βουλην θεληματος as expressive of the deliberate determination of the divine will.

With this notice of the mode of expressing the different shades of feeling or thought with relation to purpose or determination contained in the most valuable series of writings extant, and which deal more with the soul of man than any other, we pass at once to our own English word "*Will.*" The verb *to will* is from the Anglo-Saxon

Willan,and connected in the root origin with the Gothic *Viljan*, the German *Wollen*, the Latin *Velle*, the Greek βουλομαι or βολομαι, which is from an old root *Bolo*, the Syriac *Bol*, the Arabic *Bal*, and the ancient Chaldee *Bol*. The last three are one in signification, and mean "mind" or "heart." The ancient Assyrian who exhibited the vigor of his *Bol* in the first of widespread empires on earth, has his counterpart in the English, whose energetic *Will* has spread out the widest of modern empires over sea and land. The noun "will" is defined by Webster thus: "The power of choosing; the faculty or endowment of the soul, by which it is capable of choosing; the faculty of preferring or selecting one of two or more objects;" in simple words, "the power or faculty of choice." In support of this, extracts are given from Stewart, Reid, and Hooker, none of which, except the last, and that indirectly, bears out his definition. It would seem that Edwards' definition of will so widely spread in America has misled the otherwise acute and able lexicographer; unless he conceives that use and wont rather than psychological distinctions should guide. It is patent that choice is not a simple act of the will—but an act of the will led by an intellectual exercise with which it never ceases to be identified, and which intellectual exercise is the leading or chief power in the act, the will or determining faculty concurring not directing. The second definition includes "volition" as the action of the power or faculty of will. To it we take no exception. The third is the same as volition, but in an authoritative form as a command. The fourth and fifth, as wish, and the thing wished for; both of which are now rarely used. The sixth and last, except the legal will, is power to control or determine, which

is marked rare or obsolete.—(Webster's Unabridged Lex. 1864). This last we would place first and chief, as really expressing what the human soul possesses as an executive faculty.

Admitting the irregularities and difficulties of the verb, we scarcely see the necessity of presenting it both as transitive and intransitive, when the same definitions are given to both. We accept the intransitive as correct. It means, as Webster says—1. To exercise an act of volition. 2. To be inclined or disposed to desire, and instead of "to choose" we insert "to wish." And 3, to decide, to determine, to decree. The 4th, to order or direct by testament, is peculiar, and apart from our present purpose.

The business of the psychologist differs from that of the lexicographer. It is the task of the latter to present to the public the various meanings attached to the words by society, learned or ordinary. It is the duty of the former, in his use of terms, to show what is the natural and correct expression of the mental feeling, conception, or volition. It may at once be seen that the first and third meanings of the verb "*to will*," given above, may be thrown into one; for what is a volition but a decision or determination in some form or for some object? and what is a decision or determination but a volition or exercise of the power of will respecting any particular subject or object. We have thus reduced the definitions to two—to decide or determine, by an act of volition, and to be inclined to, to desire, to wish. May they not be reduced to one? The act of the will is one, but we cannot always mould language to suit our wishes. It would be well in some respects if one word conveyed but one definite meaning; it should never convey con-

tradictory meanings; but in the expansion and variety of thought, terms are pressed into service to convey diversities of meanings. As a matter of fact, the English verb "to will" does convey at present these two very distinct meanings to desire or *wish*, and to *determine* or decide; and as long as the present translation of the English Bible is in use, or the phrases remain in which this verb occurs in it, so long will these two meanings hold their ground. It is not because they simply have a place in that book, for terms in it are now obsolete; but because they both occur in so many phrases, that they are likely to retain a permanent footing in the language. Yet we cannot hide from our minds the fact that our language is still undergoing changes, and that now, in common conversation "wish," "desire," or "pleasure," takes the place of the former "will." We now say, "if you wish," "if you please," or "if you desire," rather than "if you will." The term "will" is coming to be regarded as the proper expression for positive volition or determination, as distinguished from inclination or wish; and the day may come when it shall be dropped from the inspired volume in all those place where wish, desire, or pleasure, is the proper substitute, and retained only where distinct determination is involved. If we can find a term to express a distinct act of will, in which no special element of feeling or thought is naturally or necessarily involved, we ought to select that term, and adhere to it in systematic composition, to the exclusion of less definite terms. For this reason we exclude "wish" or "desire," from a correct definition of the act or the faculty of the will, because although the will is often concurrent with the desire, it is not always; and when it is, the emotion is paramount.

For the same reason, we reject choice as a proper definition, because the intellectual power of distinction is equally prominent with "will," in an effect which may be said to have a compound cause. The term which we prefer as definite, decisive, and free from any peculiar element of feeling or special intellectual faculty, is DETERMINATION. To *will* is to *determine*. The will is the faculty by which we determine. An act of the will is a determination. To define more fully :

The will is that faculty of the human spirit by which man determines to think, speak, or act on, or respecting any subject or object, in any manner, or at any time felt or judged right, proper, or necessary. It may be said that here either feeling or judgment is involved. We admit it ; but no special feeling nor any particular intellectual exercise in paramount or equally prominent influence. We do not pretend to separate feeling or intellect from the acts of the will. So far from that, we represent the will as influenced to action by both feeling and intellect. But in selecting a term to define "will," we wish to eliminate as far as we can emotional and intellectual action. We introduce the one or the other, only when we give *in extenso* the influencing cause of determination.

Is it necessary to illustrate will ? Behold the works of creation ! They are the offspring of divine determination. Behold the works of civilization ! They are the doings of the human will. Hear the myriad tongues of human intelligence ! They are the voices of will. See the multiform products of intellect and art ! They are the effects of will—steady, patient, persevering will.

When and how does our will first act ? The infant is seen exercising his will to move a limb that may be resting uneasily or suffering pain. Feeling prompts to

action. That action is preceded by volition! Again an overflow of muscular power operates in the same way. Being refreshed by nature's best food, there is a stimulus to action from the very fulness of the vesicular tissue. Here also feelings move to exercise. The will is concurrent. But let months roll on; an object of attractive colour meets the eye; action follows; the hand is stretched out to grasp it. Here there is something more than feeling. A conception or imagination of something desirable is formed in the mind, and the will has in this case obeyed the intellect. When time is no longer counted by months but years, the mind or intellect with the emotions, more and more directs the movements of the will, although animal appetites exercise their full power, chiefly at regular seasons. When intelligence has become a directing power in youth, conscience is felt exerting its influence, and thereafter through life makes its authority tell with decided force on many of the decisions of the will.

If intellect and conscience, as well as the emotional nature, have so much influence in controlling the will, how inadequate is that definition of "will" given in Chambers' Cyclopædia, vol. 10, where it is said: "Will is defined, *action prompted by feeling*." In following out this definition, which appears to be in keeping with the theories of Bain, as the reader is directed to his work on "The Emotions and the Will," three facts are said to concur in forming "the collective aptitudes of the will." The first is termed "*spontaneous activity*"; the second, "a tendency to abide in agreeable action and to abandon disagreeable action"; the third is "the operation of the retentive power of the mind in joining together by a permanent association movements and feelings that have existed together for some time." In plain terms, this

simply means that will is the product of feeling, and is in keeping with the strong materialistic tendencies of a certain school of modern philosophers. What is here said of the will would entirely agree with the doctrine that the soul is merely animated matter, prompted by animal life and sustained by acquired habits or habitudes. In the infant, doubtless, animal life is specially prominent, but not always so, for temper or passion is often seen to have a controlling influence over the will for a time, and a certain stubbornness is shewn which the soothing influence of the mother may not for a time overcome. Here clearly there is will, and will controlled by something outside of muscular feeling, viz., an emotional nature capable of pride, envy, and anger, even at that early stage of existence. Spontaneous activity does not belong to the will by itself, but belongs to animal life, and specially to the human soul. The seeming spontaneous activity of the body is merely the activity of the soul working through or by the body as its machine or instrument. The sensations of pleasure or pain do certainly influence the will, and properly. These feelings are intended to conserve what is useful or good, and to terminate what is felt to be injurious or destructive. We withdraw our hand suddenly from what is felt to pierce it, and we continue the hand after being cold on what is felt to be soft and warm. In both cases the will is engaged in conserving the body, its agent. Feeling, doubtless, is the main ingredient in directing the will in such cases, though intellect is not wholly excluded. But we can easily conceive the removal of the hand, as the result not simply of feeling, but chiefly of perception. The hand has touched a circular saw in rapid motion. There is no contact as yet with the teeth of the saw, but the touch of the cold steel has awakened the attention

of the mind, the eye is directed to the spot, when the imminent danger of the hand is instantly perceived, and with the velocity of lightning the order flies from the will to remove the hand. Mere feeling would not call for immediate removal, for no wound was yet given, but intelligence moved the will to instant action. The third "fact" amounts to this: that habit sways the will. This is true within a certain range; but what a vast array of operations, and many of these of the noblest and most important character, lie beyond the range of habit. A man is called suddenly to dare or die for his country, or for a fellow man in extreme danger. Is it mere feeling that leads him to the field of battle, or prompts him to spring to the rescue of the perishing? Is it pleasure or pain? or is it the power of retention in the mind, linking old associations together? We give to feeling its place, but we also allow to high and noble thoughts, to a perception of what is right, to a conviction of duty, the controlling power in directing the will in many such exertions. Emotion in such cases, as fear of death, might overbalance love of country or sympathy with the suffering; but convictions of duty, of what is becoming and right as a citizen and as a man, bear down fear and all opposing emotions, and direct the will in the effort or enterprise. Hence we regard Bain's account of the development, education, or "aptitudes" of will, as well as his definition of it, as radically defective. Man is not a mere animal, but in his true normal actions exhibits a will regulated by noblest conceptions of right and duty.

In the efforts of the aspiring student, we often see the power of will. He is endeavouring to translate a language foreign to him, or to grasp a mathematical problem.

Difficulties are not mastered by a mere wish. For consecutive hours he bends all his intellectual power to overcome the obscurity, to find his way through the obstructions that beset his path. What a relief when the obscurity has vanished, and a good and appropriate meaning has been obtained, or the problem is solved by the discovery of a high-way through the intellectual puzzle ! Here the intellect has first guided the will to the work to be done, and when that is determined upon, the will employs the intellect in the performance of the work. How resolute is that will when the work to be done is the deciphering of ancient inscriptions without a key ! How long have men toiled over mysteries, the will keeping them like slaves to their task, and itself the agent of entrenched convictions or aspirations ! In ponderous works of literature, such as elaborate commentories on extensive writings, we have the labours of a lifetime. There the will has directed the employment of the intellectual faculties, with a steadiness which has acquired the force of habit. The will, however, is but the exponent of the acquired mental character. Certain convictions, desires, or aspirations, as motives have secured a firm hold in the soul, and they control the will. To change the will, you must change their hold of the mind. Relax their grasp or displace them, and the will responds to the change. For example, the close application may be exhausting the strength of the body, for "much study is a weariness to the flesh," and the system may be craving for relief or a change by a feeling of weakness or pain in more than one place. Against this is the conviction of duty that the work must be done, or the desire to see it accomplished as a monument of intellect, or the aspiration for fame expected to

follow, may press for a continued application. The opposing forces may be for a time balanced, during which the work is suspended until one prevails, as seen in the resumption of the work or the abandonment of the study for a time.

In speech the will exhibits its highest power in courts of justice and halls of legislation. What efforts to make some things plain, and to mystify and conceal other things, are sometimes heard in courts of justice ! At times what lengthened speeches of accusation, defence, or judicial summary extending over days, until the ears are weary of hearing, and the tongue of moving. The will literally holds the tongue, so that the youthful admonition, " hold your tongue "—although not polite in modern conversation—is not far from the truth of nature. In criminal cases, or civil cases involving great issues, there is a holding that is a controlling of the tongue by the will in a very marked manner, often seen in the witness box. And with what pains will the advocate, highly talented and deeply interested in a case, set forth what he conceives to be the just view of the matter under consideration. On such occasions one might conceive, on gazing on the earnest pleader, and noticing the various turns of argument and illustration, that there was an " I " over the head of the will, supervising and directing it; but the simple truth is that it is the soul, in its power of introspection and retrospection, searching for stored up arguments and illustrations, while the will keeps up the steady stream of discourse.

When a constitutional debate occurs in Parliament on a question of some moment, powers of speech of an extraordinary character testify to the strength of will. Men speak for four, five, or six hours continuously,

when what are called the powers of nature begin to give signs of exhaustion. The intellect may seem wearied: but it is more likely that the material organs will show the first symptoms of exhaustion. In every effort, but particularly in such extreme effort, the will appears in the fore-front directing and sustaining the intellectual struggle through the organs of voice, and often of gesture or action.

Man is a worker. In the open field or in the workshop, on the sea or in the mine he is a son of toil; and everywhere the will is the exponent of his energy. But it is in stubborn contest with opposition that the tenacity of will is seen. Watch the steady struggle of the rowers contending against wind and tide in a heavy sea. The task seems hopeless. But they tug at the oars; they stick to the task; they strain every muscle; for the will is resolute that the shore shall be reached, and death avoided if human strength can accomplish it. See the furious battle for a position of importance in a vast engagement between armies. It may be taken and retaken, as was the key of the battle-field of Waterloo. Or it may be held without surrender for a moment with the most undaunted heroism, although its defenders have been reduced to one-fourth their numbers. There is an obstinacy of character which is but another name for a stiffness of will, which may or may not be serviceable to a man. If a man is right he should hold to it; but if wrong, his obstinacy renders his improvement doubly difficult. Men will sometimes cling to a project which is utterly hopeless. This is folly. It may be a crime. Tenacity of purpose is good, but let us be open to the convictions of sound reason or valid experience. The will of the autocrat has wrought much mischief—

but sometimes it has achieved great marvels. When men get entangled in their own meshes it requires some strong spirit represented by the will to cut the knot. There are evils now preying upon society, such as intemperance and war, which await some powerful will, when one year will accomplish what a century of negotiation and moral suasion will not do. There are moral evils afflicting this earth which await the advent of some strong wills, in other words of some strong spirits which will reorganize some church organizations and cast the leaven of corruption into the fire of universal condemnation. The will is but the collected and directed energy of the spirit finding expression in thought, speech, and action, and ought to be regulated by forethought, prudence, purity of feeling, and an enlightened conscience.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

RELATION OF THE WILL TO MORALITY.

What is morality? It is the relation of any thought, feeling, purpose, state, or act to a supposed or given law of rectitude. What relation does the human will bear to morality or to relation to law?—So extensive that morality extends so far and no farther than the domain of will in its passive concurrence or active direction. But is accountability co-extensive with morality?—No; for there may be morality that is, a character or act, beyond the domain of accountability. An insane man may perform many acts, and acquire a character by these acts, which having a direct relation to laws human and divine, are embraced by morality, and yet accountability is wanting, for the intellect is obstructed in its natural operations through a diseased or disordered brain. There is morality where there is operation of will in the indulgence of feeling, or in the formation of character, or in the performance of an act in conformity with or in opposition to a proper rule of rectitude. A deed may not have been intended by the doer, yet there is morality in the act, for the will is in it, and thus the man is in it, and there is a measure of responsibility connected with it according to the culpable ignorance or carelessness of the doer. Hence we are not prepared to accept the statement of Dr. Hodge that where there is no intention there is no morality.

He says: "If I kill a man, unless the act was intentional, *i.e.*, the result of a volition to kill or injure, there is no morality in the act."—(Theo., vol. 2, p. 304.) The deed has certainly a relation to law, and therefore comes within the range of morality. The will was in the act, though without that end or issue in view. Every deed must have a doer. If the man is not forced by his limbs being used by another, if he acts voluntarily the deed is his own. If his limbs or hands are employed by another, the deed is the act of the other who employed his limbs or hands. In the case supposed the act was the man's own, but it was not intended. Is there no morality in it because it was not intended? Suppose a man firing a rifle. He aims at a bird perched on a tree near a highway. Persons are passing along unnoticed by the man who carries the rifle. The ball misses the bird and shoots one of the passers by. He did not intend to shoot the fellow-mortal, but a bird; but is there no morality in the act? The killing of a man without being required by self-defence, or judicial process or war, or any way recognised as lawful by the laws of God or man, is a wrong or a crime. But does the want of intention exclude it from all the classes of acts ruled or controlled by law? We think not. The man is not a murderer, he has been guilty of the deed by accident. But he has done injury, great injury—what is in itself wrong, decidedly wrong, though unintentionally. There may be circumstances to aggravate the deed, not only in respect of the person killed, but from the carelessness and disregard of admonition exhibited by the doer. If the idea should go abroad that there is no morality in any act which a man does not intend, the consciences of many wrongdoers

would have a balm for their wounds. A thousand evil deeds are the result of carelessness, not one of which may be intended. Recently through what appears to be sheer carelessness a steamer ran into an emigrant vessel at anchor, occasioning a loss of 300 lives. Who could suppose the act of the man at the wheel of the steamer to be intentional—yet it was the occasion of the loss of so many valuable lives, and was in all probability the result of carelessness. Is there no morality—no transgression of law — in this wholesale slaughter, because not intended? Want of intention in respect to the actual result, implies want of knowledge of the result about to take place. The ignorance extenuates the guilt. If the ignorance is culpable, the guilt is greater, the extenuation less. If the result could not be foreseen, as in experimenting with machinery, and all known precautions had been used to avoid disaster, then the result, though the death of one or more men, is a pure accident so called, which may be deplored, but for which no special blame can be attached to any one. It is clear then that there are deeds which, not intended, are yet highly blameworthy and therefore within the range of morality, and it is equally clear that there are results of voluntary acts which, not intended, are pure accidents, to which guilt cannot be attached, however much they may be deplored, which are in the abstract within the range of morality, but beyond the range of culpability. Hence we distinguish not only between morality and accountability, but also between accountability and culpability. A man may be the doer of a moral act, that is an act of which in itself the moral laws of God and man take cognizance, but not be accountable for it, the man being insane; and a

perfectly sane man may be the doer of the same act, viewed by itself, for which he is accountable, but for which no culpability attaches to him, the deed being wholly unforeseen, a pure accident so called, and one which none deplores more than the unfortunate doer of it. Sins of ignorance are moral acts, not intended, but they are still sins for which God holds a man accountable, and to some extent culpable, according to the light attainable by the evil-doer. Saul of Tarsus, when putting to death the followers of Jesus, did not intend to dishonour the God of Israel or trample on all his laws, but he did so in his ignorance, and was justly held both accountable and culpable. His ignorance extenuated his guilt, but could not wholly remove it; there was morality of a very pronounced type in his cruel deeds, which were the manifestations of a very violent rebellion against God, which however was very far from his intention.

On the question under consideration Dr. M'Cosh says (Div. Gov., p. 309): "We regard the will as the seat of all virtue and vice;" and again, page 310: "We maintain, then, that there can be neither virtue nor vice where there is no exercise of the will. There is nothing for example meritorious"—(and we suppose the opposite)—"in the mere exercise of the intellectual faculties." Before commenting on these extracts, we wish to remark that it is often extremely difficult to avoid dropping some sentences on such intricate subjects to which no exception could be taken, and which may appear inconsistent with other sentences not far removed from them. M'Cosh is specially open to this remark. And when we are constrained to differ from him or others, we wish to do so with a sense of equal or greater liability to err. But it is by the detection of mistakes and the proved establish-

ment of truth that the science of mind can make advances which may be regarded as permanent. If we take the scope of several pages our views may not differ much from the author under consideration ; but there are emphatic sentences, like the above quoted, to which we cannot agree without modification and explanation. When it is said that the will is the *seat* of all virtue and vice, we suppose the meaning to be that all virtue and vice *rest there*, and *rise from there*. Such are the purposes of a seat. Now what is the essence of the will but power, force, in which resides neither virtue nor vice. True, that power is inseparable from intelligence and feeling in all accountable beings. But it is because the doings of the will are the outgoings of power, indissolubly united to intelligence, feeling, and conscience, that they are virtuous or the opposite. They are not so, simply as doings of the will, but as doings of a will conjoined with these qualities or faculties. Is it right then to say that the will is the *seat* of all virtue and vice? Is not the seat of virtue, or its opposite, *the soul*, with its attributes of responsibility ? So far from the will being the seat of virtue or vice, it is the exponent of an anterior or inner virtue or vice. It puts out in shape or form what it has received from the other faculties of the soul, and is therefore the manifestation of virtue or vice rather than its seat. The second extract shows that we are not misunderstanding our author. He says that there is nothing meritorious in the mere exercise of the intellectual faculties. Now we know that no faculty of the intellect can be brought to work or kept at work without the will. If the sentence has any meaning it must be that the employment of the intellect, that is with the will, without which there is no employment, has nothing

meritorious. To this we do not subscribe. Taking the ordinary sense of the word meritorious, as good, praiseworthy, is it not good, praiseworthy, or meritorious to employ the intellect in the study of the works or word of God? True, the will is in it, for the will is in every voluntary movement of mind or body, but the intellect is the chief worker, and so far as we can speak of "the mere exercise of the intellectual faculties," they are at work and no other. As an improvement of the mind and a storing of it with precious knowledge, is not that exercise praiseworthy, that is "meritorious." On the other hand, may not the intellect be employed in its "mere exercise" in perusing the most vicious publications, or plotting base stratagems, or indulging a foul imagination, and so debasing and degrading the soul? It may be asked, "Where is the seat of this perversion of intellect?" We answer by asking "Where is the seat of sin?"—Not certainly in mere power or force viewed abstractly, therefore not in the will by itself as a faculty of the soul. The seat of sin is the soul viewed as a whole, and specially, we apprehend, in its emotional susceptibility, operating on the one hand in the darkening and perversion of the intellect, and on the other in the darkening and perversion of conscience, the will being the true exponent as the working power of the three great functional departments. What this author has affirmed of the mere exercise of the intellect, he affirms in the same page of "mere emotion." Now, is there anything to be gained by affirming that mere emotion has neither virtue nor vice in it? Is there no virtue in love, as in supreme love to God? Is there no vice in hatred, as the hatred of everything good? There is virtue in the one, for it is the fulfilling of the law; and there is vice in the

other, for it is a transgression of the law. Yet both are emotions. But are they mere emotions? They certainly have in such stages a concurring will; but they are the leading power in the soul at the time; they influence the will in any movements of attachment to the object loved or in aversion to the objects hated. Thus far the emotional nature may be said to be the seat of virtue or vice, rather than the will. We admit at once that there is no morality or immorality attributable to any individual in which the will has not a part, but that part may be a concurrent part as well as a directing part. But the soul, as a whole, and not the mere will, is the seat of morality; and while it is such, its intellect may be at one time the prominent agent, at another time the emotional nature; and in both cases the will may be found concurring rather than leading. When purposes, resolutions, or determinations on any moral question are called for, the will appears in prominence as the exponent of intellect or feeling, or of both combined. The same is true when moral deeds are to be performed. The will is the executive faculty of the soul, the doing power, revealing by its determinations and its actings the moral nature of the soul, as that is exhibited through the views and feelings of the intellect and emotional nature. If this is correct, it must be improper to represent the will as the seat of all virtue and vice, when it is but the concurrent or actively prominent agent of an anterior or inner influence possessed of the true moral character.

Similarly inaccurate, we apprehend, is the definition of the will given in a work recently published in this city by a late acute and vigorous thinker. He says: "The power of volition is the power which makes the mind moral; or it is the moral power of the mind" (Quaiffe's

Intellectual Sciences, vol. 1, p. 49), modifying this definition on a subsequent page (53), he says: "The will is man's moral nature, taken in connection with the functional power of thought." The two sentences first quoted are not the same in meaning. The power which makes moral, and the moral power, can scarcely be said to be equivalent expressions. The power which makes the mind moral is not the will or the mere power of volition. It is essential to active morality; but there are other essentials which form the chief ingredients of a moral nature. We see will—powerful, obstinate will—in the brute creation, where there is no moral nature. Witness the obstinate horse which cannot be forced across the bridge, or the stubborn ox that will not draw in the yoke. The power which made the mind moral is the author of our being; but the powers which constitute a moral nature are intelligence, feeling, and conscience, attended with the power of displaying and directing each of these endowments or faculties, which power we call "Will." We cannot, therefore, accept the second sentence that the will is "the moral power of the mind." It exhibits by its volitions or actions the moral nature of the mind good or bad, but it is not in itself the moral power. It is power, but power displayed in mathematics or mechanics, where there is no element of morality, as well as in moral actions or volitions. Hence it is not accurate to define it as the moral power of the mind, as if morality rested in it, which is the idea of the author. Morality is displayed through it, and so far it may be called a moral power, as the instrumental cause, the active prominent agent, but the morality of the soul, and its adaptation to moral actions lie beyond the will, the former in the acquired

character, and the latter in the spiritual endowments formerly mentioned. In the quotation from page 53, the author unites with the will "the functional power of thought" to make up "man's moral nature." This is nearer what we apprehend as the truth, but defective in giving the first place to the will, and in associating with it only intelligence. Man's emotional nature has much to do with morality. His loves and his hates, his hopes and his fears go far to form character, and the character of an intelligent responsible being is the manifestation of his moral nature. Then his conscience occupies the chief place in his moral constitution, as approving or disapproving actions or thoughts regarded as having a relation to law. We must not, therefore, allow the will, because of its prominence in action, to conceal from our minds the nature beneath it, of which it is the active exponent. Thus the review of opinions in which authors seem to have misapprehended the true nature of the subject under consideration, affords an opportunity of bringing out, by way of contrast or distinction, what are conceived to be the true ideas of that subject.

The will, then, has a vital connection with morality, both *mediately* and *immediately*; that is, with acts called accidents, in which a voluntary agent was one of the operating causes in results not designed or contemplated, and in intellectual pursuits and emotional states in which it holds a concurring or subordinate part; and in determinations and actions in which summoning all the powers of the soul as subservient to itself, it displays immediately, prominently and directly, the moral nature of the man. It is not correctly called the seat of morality or of virtue and vice, for the soul, with the constitutional endowments of intelligence, feeling, and

conscience, with will, is that seat, but it is the chief exponent of the morality which is in man, by concurring with other faculties or in taking the lead of some or all of them.

Thus we have endeavoured to thread our way through the thicket, in which so many have been puzzled and bewildered. We have noticed the opinions of other writers on this important subject with feelings of respect, as explorers who have preceded us with less light, it may be, than we have had. We have examined theories of the will in respect to its determining power, whether that power rested in itself as a separate faculty, or in the faculties external to itself in the soul, and have been constrained to believe that the will is determined by the judgment, feelings, conscience, or character of the soul, and cannot be self-determined. We have seen that liberty belongs to the agent, the man, rather than to the will; that the will is swayed more or less strongly or steadily by the prevailing impressions and judgments, or by the settled habits of the man; and that his ability varies according to the condition of the man or the state of the soul, and is not to be confounded with the freedom or liberty of the man as expressed by his will. We have glanced at the shades of thought, feeling, and determination, as expressed in the oldest written records in the possession of man, as they bore on the action of will in the human soul, and have, in addition to many casual declarations of the meaning of will, given our own formal definition, attended with a few illustrations as exhibited in thought, speech, and action. And we have closed with a brief notice of a question of great importance, the relation of will to morality. We hope that the way in which this last question has been

handled may simplify the subject and strip it of much of its vagueness or ambiguity. The will in this matter is but the inner man showing himself; and his doings, which come under the cognizance of law, may be traced from the prominent agent to the impelling nature lying beneath which in part may at times show itself side by side with will in exercises both of intellect and feeling, and specially of conscience.

It is hoped that the unity and simplicity of these sentiments on this complicated subject may aid its comprehension, and contribute to a settlement of opinion on this important department of mental science.

DEPARTMENT IV.

THE NORMAL FACULTY.

CHAPTER XXXV.

SELF-REGULATION IN THE WORKS OF GOD

One of the most distinguishing features in the perfection of the works of God is their possession of self-regulating powers, where motion, change, and freedom are required. Where nature is inanimate the regulation is effected by the combination of the various powers and properties of different bodies. Where nature is animate the self-regulating capacity is the possession, as is meet, of each animate being. Yet in no case is one creature seen absolutely independent of all others. But the dependence is diminished as the creature rises in the scale of being from the inanimate to the highest grade of intelligence.

The co-operative mechanism of a clock or steam-engine is justly considered a triumph of human ingenuity. There is not only a neat and accurate adaptation of one part to another, and such an adjustment of parts that one may exercise a lever force, when set in motion, on another, but an application of power in such a way as to necessitate an even and regular exercise of force, while the power is restricted in measure and range within

carefully defined limits. Now if the first mentioned piece of mechanism were so constructed that while its force is being expended in its appropriate work, it also impelled a supplementary apparatus in the form, it may be, of an air pump, which husbanded a force sufficient, at the right moment, before the spring was exhausted, by the simple touch of a lever, to rewind the clock to repeat with perfect accuracy the work of the past, we would have a self-regulating machine which would continue to work till its pivots or cranks or levers wore out. This would be an approximation to the perfection of God's works in their self-regulating powers. But the inferiority of man's work would soon become apparent in the lack of self-restoring power. Man requires to repair his machinery from the results of tear and wear; and to retard that wear by preventing friction through repeated supplies of oil. Here the master spirit becomes apparent. The Fountain of skill has so constructed his works that they are self-restoring within the limits prescribed for their operations, their joints being steadily oiled, and their waste being replaced, so that they are both self-regulating and in their own sphere self-restoring. Let us glance at some of these arrangements.

It was necessary that this earth should be watered. Where shall the water be obtained, and how shall it be done, and how shall the supply be kept up? The ocean is the great reservoir, but it is salt, and who shall lift it up and spread it on the land, if fresh. How marvellous the divine arrangement. The earth shall be watered on a scale equal to its demands. Its dryness shall present its request. The ocean shall respond by its evaporation. The process shall take the moisture and leave the salt. The vapours shall seek the land from their very coolness

—the mountains shall arrest them—the condensed vapour shall descend in drops over hundreds of miles and refresh the parched land. Nothing is lost. What the earth does not need is sent back to the ocean, or raised again in vapour to the clouds. The land cries to the sea and sky, and is answered with rain; and the sea and sky cry for a return to the earth, and are answered by rushing rivers and steaming vapours. Thus the circle moves round in perfect harmony under natural laws.

It was necessary that the atmosphere of this earth should be kept in motion that its vital qualities might be preserved, and yet that this motion should be varied, and not be always in one direction; and also moderate, as violent motion would be the destruction of man, animals, and vegetation. How shall this varied motion within due control be permanently maintained? Cold and heat, gravitation, the action of the sun, electricity and the rotation of the earth on its axis, shall all blend their powers in harmony to keep up this health-giving circulation. No rectification from the creating hand seems needed. The arrangements were perfect when the work was begun. If the air has to be cooled, a cooling apparatus is under preparation, whilst the extraordinary heat is progressing. The heat is, in truth, preparing a cooler. If wind is needed to dry off damp vapours, cold and heat are both in store ready for the moment of action. The one will congeal into snow, the other dissipate into invisible mist; and both the one and other will be attended by wind. If the wind blows long from one quarter it is at the same time preparing agencies which shall reverse the current. If noxious gases are collecting which would destroy life, chemical substances are also forming and combining which will consume or

explode and dissipate these foul gases. Thus marvellously does change with order walk the surface of the earth, and mount the higher regions of the air.

It was necessary that this earth, as the abode of man, endowed with a material frame, should have a succession of light and darkness, that both should come and retire gradually, that they should be universal and permanent. How was this to be effected? Shall two great lights be kindled and extinguished, one on each side of the globe, every twenty-four hours? Not so; one luminary shall perform the task, and it shall not need to be even shaded, much less extinguished. The object to be illumined shall be set a whirling, on such a principle and with such a speed that its motion shall be incessant, and its rotation completed in the prescribed time. The illuminator shall be of sufficient size, and at a sufficient distance, to illumine thoroughly and perpetually the whole face of the earth turned towards it, and that only. Then the conditions are that the one body retain its fixed position and illumining power, and the other retain its distance and regular rotatory power. What are the facts? The sun is stationary so far as the system of which it is the centre is concerned. Its illumining power is kept up undiminished from age to age by, as we may suppose, an incessant consumption and precipitation of gases in its atmosphere. They rise and fall in endless circle. The gases of our globe, in all their changings, are indestructible. And the distance assigned to our earth is the exact position for which its gravity fits it, so that its centrifugal force is fairly balanced by the attraction of the sun, thereby securing to it its proper place, and with that its proper measure of light; and the original rotatory

velocity given to it remains undiminished, being incessantly sustained by the action of gravitation in the annual revolution round the central luminary. Here, then, is marvellous order, exact balancing of powers, and incessant self-regulation, by the combination of different forces and of different motions. Day succeeds night, and night succeeds day in perfect silence, with exact time, with even speed; and that not by by some invisible hand raising and depressing from day to day a celestial luminary, but by material orbs performing those offices, exerting those powers, and accomplishing those motions assigned them in creation by the great Architect.

When we touch the domain of life, we touch on mystery. Even vegetable life is inscrutable. We cannot measure it or weigh it as a current of magnetism or the sparks of electricity—we cannot produce it. A seed lies before us, apparently a dead mass. But if uninjured, life lies entombed in it. Place it where the chemical powers of heat, earth, and moisture may reach it, and that life awakes as from a sleep, and it strikes downward to receive a permanent supply of nourishment, and strikes upward to seek extension, development, and fructification. It is not simply force, for force once expended cannot renew itself. It is not an explosion as of gas, or a slower expansion, as of carbon. To describe it as force is simply to speak of its operation, leaving itself unknown. It is an inscrutable something with strong chemical instincts, by which it seeks nourishment, obtains strength, grows, often amazingly, although generally a fixture to the soil of earth, and reaches fructification by which its kind is perpetuated and spread abroad. Dig and delve and pry

as you may, there is something beyond that eludes your mental grasp. The protoplasm of the materialist will not solve the difficulty. There is carbonic acid and water and ammonia in the plant, but there is something more. An electric spark passing through hydrogen and oxygen gas may produce water ; but any amount of electricity passing through or dwelling in carbonic acid, water and ammonia in any quantities, will not produce a living plant. The life is not light, nor heat, nor electricity, however much any of these may be essential to the development of life. It is humbling to man to have to confess that there is a something ever before his eyes, the nature of which he cannot comprehend. He cannot put his finger on any one substance, and say, " that is vegetable life." He may say of this or that seed, a grain of wheat or a bean, "there is vegetable life in that speck of matter," but what that life, now inert, is which may so soon expand in so many ways and forms, and develop wondrous power and beauty, he may not say, for he cannot understand. The germ of multitudinous forms, of power, instinct, sensibilities, and beauty, to us invisible and inscrutable, is seen and known by the Creator. To us belong the phenomena, and here we may luxuriate at will.

Taking the plant as we find it, what manifestations of self-regulation can we discover? Its movements are regulated, that is, directed and controlled by itself to the growth, nourishment, preservation, beauty and fructification of the plant. That it may grow it will seek for food in earth, air, and water, and absorb it when found. It will pass by what is deleterious or unfit for its nourishment, or rejected by its instincts, and stretch out its roots to touch the coveted earth or moisture, or its branches to

reach the desired air or heat. It will lift up obstructions of stone or earth, it will split rocks, it will pierce through small cavities, it will climb lofty supports, or penetrate into great depths of soil to attain its appointed magnitude. It will spread its branches far and wide; it will multiply its branchlets, and sub-divide these into countless twigs and sprouts, and expand the last into innumerable leaves that the air, warmth, and moisture of heaven may contribute to the development and maturity sought. For preservation it will store up water in its roots; and when the time has come it will call up from its storehouses this water, in the form of sap, for further development, foliage and fructification. Its leaves will both shade and manure the roots. And when the plant seeks propagation how exquisite the arrangement and beauty often displayed. Where is the physical beauty that can excel the flowers of the field in the process of fructification? If the seed requires protection it may be found surrounded by a hard covering, and that by a fleshy substance or a tough matting, the one to nourish the soil, the other to protect from fracture by a fall from the tree. If it must spread it may be found furnished with wings of down to bear it far and wide over the fields. Is not the plant marvellously self-contained? Give it its appropriate soil and climate, and it wants no more. From its first display of life till it dies, it requires no mortal hand to touch it, all its processes are carried on without human aid, until we behold its matured utility in timber, fruit or flowers. The art of man may remove obstructions, or propagate combinations, but in either case nature does the work, man can only facilitate the operations. He can feed and strengthen and train, but in every particle of development he must wait on nature and be a silent

observer. And is not that work perfect after its kind? Who can detail its marvels? From the sprouting till the life disappears in the root or the fruit, the incessant, varied, and complicated operations, which we may call chemical, are carried on unaided by any animated existence, nature beneath, around and above furnishing the only material assistance required.

When we advance to the animal kingdom the evidences of self-regulation become more clearly defined. The animal is complete in itself in respect to all the purposes of being. These purposes are attained through its nourishment, preservation and the perpetuation of the species. It was created to display the glory of the Creator, and to contribute its quota to the general welfare of animate existence. When formed, it required nutriment, protection, and a continued existence in its progeny. Food is provided, but the animal must seek it. As vegetable life was stationary, each plant was granted its appropriate soil. But as animals have as a rule the powers of locomotion, they are allowed to roam in search for food. As food is not brought to them, have they the needed instinct to guide them to appropriate nutriment and to the avoiding of what is injurious though apparently similar to the most nutritious? They have an instinct vastly superior to any human direction or restraint. See the flocks of migratory birds moving over continents and isles at appropriate seasons in search of nourishment or for the rearing of their young! See the shoals of fish that move into shallow waters where food may be found for themselves or for their spawn when hatched! How they swarm into creeks, coves, bays and harbours in countless millions, all obeying the powerful instinct which the all-wise Creator implanted in them!

The greatest on land or in sea are guided in the same way. The whale resorts to its feeding ground where the food is found in greatest abundance at certain seasons—and the herds of buffaloes or elephants shift their quarters as the abundance or scarcity of grass or foliage may require. Nor are the insects less skilfully guided. See the ant, the wasp, or the bee. When the food is flesh or grass, or fruit, or drops of liquid, the teeth or the tongue, or the trunk, or the claws, as well as the internal organs, are provided for it. When the animal is to become stationary, as the oyster, it is guided by instinct to adhere to such a place as is fitted to afford it nourishment in the watery currents that flow around it. Preservation is needed as well as nourishment. This is not absolute, for many are designed to perish, but it is comparative, securing ordinary safety and a necessary term of life to the species as a whole. How are they preserved? Each has his element and his place of retreat. Wings are given to the bird to bear him away from the snare, the arrow, or the bullet; fins to the fish to launch with amazing rapidity through the watery element which is its home, and where swiftness is denied, bony protection in weapons of defence or offence, or where either is denied the instinct strongly exhibited to elude the pursuer by concealment. To the antelope or deer is given the long slender limb that speed may be its security. To the lion or the bear are given the teeth and the power of jaw, the claws and the weight of paw that the antagonist may be both smitten down and torn to pieces. The insect and the serpent are furnished with their irritating or their deadly poison that the intruder or the foe may stand in dread of them; and the sluggish crocodile is shielded by his coat of mail from the ordinary assault of the prowling

panther. But the age of all is limited. If they are not to perish or to be re-created, they must be propagated. No unnecessary expenditure of power or skill is seen in the divine operations. The species are perpetuated in their offspring. In general the species are in duplicate—the male and his female. In their season they pair, and co-operate in building their nests, preparing their spawning shoals, constructing their lairs, and where necessary rearing their young. In all this the most wonderful instinct is displayed. Truly they are self-regulated. One species does not guide or instruct another. Each selects its mate, chooses its own resting place, and watches over the young that need care with close solicitude. When the grade of animal is low, as the *Lamellibranchiata*, it may be hermaphrodite; but even then the progeny is multitudinous. When the parent animal cannot look after the young, and the consequent loss is great, provision is made to meet this in the vast numbers of ova produced. But these are not cast out except where provision is made in some measure for their nutriment in the early stages of life. The herring spawns on the sandy bottom in the shallow lagoon, and the salmon on the pebbly bed of a running stream, where the ova of both, when hatched, may receive needed sustenance. All the requirements of being, amidst the endless variety of animal life, are met by the instinct implanted in each, and the bounties of Providence strewn within the range of that instinct.

If inanimate matter endowed with various properties is found by combination moving in endless cycles from the narrowest limits to the limitless expanse of space apparently self-sustained and self-regulated; if vegetable life, endowed with tendencies pointing upwards to

animal instinct, is seen in countless varieties deriving sustenance from inanimate matter in all its forms, and regulating its whole being from the first sprouting till it droops and dies, having culminated in perfect fructification and development; if animal life, endowed with still higher powers, and sustaining its existence by vegetable life or the inferior forms of animated being, exhibits a marked self-regulation and control in the whole sphere prescribed by the Creator for its early growth or mature operation, under the steady guidance of a normally unerring instinct, which elicits the admiration while it transcends the comprehension of the superior creature, man;—what might we not expect the normal condition of that creature to be who was raised far above mere animal existence by an intellectual endowment which enabled him to explore, and in some measure to comprehend and admire, the whole creation brought within his vision or control, and whose spiritual aspirations carried him out to the boundless ages of eternity? Might we not conclude that not only would this creature be self-regulated, but that the principle of self-regulation would be developed in him in a decidedly superior form? If informed that this being was the highest on the globe which was made his abode, that all the powers of nature and all the animate existence in that world was placed under him and at his service, that over the whole face of the planet he stood visibly supreme without a rival, our conviction of his self-regulation would be strongly confirmed, as it would appear unreasonable to place one in authority, with extraordinary power at his disposal, and numberless sentient beings under his influence, who was unable to regulate or control himself. If farther instructed that

this honoured creature bore, in respect to his spiritual nature, a resemblance to the supreme Creator, endowed, in a necessarily restricted measure, with some of the attributes of that wondrous Being of whose order this universe is so striking a proof, all doubt of his possession of that essential quality of self-control and self-regulation would vanish, and we would expect to find in him a model of propriety in an orderly discharge of every duty pertaining to the honored sphere allotted him by his Creator. Independence of superior help and control, indifference to the pleasure of his Maker, or the assumption of claims inconsistent with his position as a creature or the rights of the supreme Ruler would not be looked for by any guided by sound reason. Absolute independence is the attribute of one Being alone, the self-existent God. Indifference to the will or pleasure of his Maker would at once indicate a radical disorder in man's spiritual nature, as interfering with and obstructing the grand purpose of his creation. The machinery must be deranged when the normal service could not be performed. And the assumption of unnatural claims would be proof of positive antagonism, apostacy, rebellion. This is not the place to inquire into man's actual condition. What it really is can be readily ascertained. It is sufficient for our present purpose to show that man's position in creation would unmistakably indicate a self-regulating power as part of an extensive and varied endowment perfectly qualifying him for the discharge of every duty imposed upon him by his Maker.

When we turn our investigations to man what do we find? When we ask him the question:—Hast thou been endowed with a self-regulating power by which thy whole moral conduct might be exercised aright? what

answer may we receive? The answer gathered from the voices of thousands scattered over scores of generations is:—We have been endowed with such a faculty, for a law has been written on our hearts to regulate our conduct by directing us in what is right and restraining us from what is wrong. This language is true, for it is the utterance of universal humanity. Intelligence and emotion are associated in creation with morality. There must be a law to regulate the exercise of the one and the other. Intellect must be directed to the study and the use of creation with the highest end in view; and emotion must be exercised on objects and in measure commensurate with the rank and purposes of being. We have no reason to believe that any intellectual being exists devoid of moral powers, that is, devoid of the moral faculty that takes cognizance of a supreme moral law, and seeks to subject the whole nature to that law. Created intelligence is subject to law. Morality is the domain of law. Therefore the agent and the expression of the supreme law must occupy the throne of the rational creature, the intellectual and emotional nature with their exponent, the will, being subject.

It will be seen, therefore, that we have reached a most important and most interesting department of psychology. We have to examine into the nature of this faculty which claims to give law to man, to distinguish its operations, to point out its authority, to explain its present irregular and defective movements, and to notice the means by which its original perfection of character and influence may be completely restored. In this, man will appear as the subject of a moral Governor of highest rectitude, but his conduct will disclose him a sinner woefully disorganised, shattered,

and corrupted; while he will be found in that peculiar position in which a choice for eternity must be made between distress that baffles all description, from the violent accusations of this very faculty, and complete restoration to pristine integrity by the acceptance of the proffered help of his gracious Creator.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

THE NATURE OF THE NORMAL FACULTY— REVIEW OF CLASSIFIED OPINIONS.

The thoughtful in every generation have recognised in the mental or spiritual constitution of man, the existence of a principle, power, or faculty declaring certain designs, actions, or utterances, to be wrong or right, to be improper or proper, to be condemnable or commendable. But in respect to the nature of this principle or faculty they have not been agreed. Some have regarded it as a distinctly divine element in the human soul. This has been the language of some of the ancients ; and expressions of modern thought describing it as " the voice of God in the human soul " might seem to endorse this ancient opinion. Others speak of it as the reason in its highest form, the intellect occupied in discerning the agreement or disagreement between moral acts and some acknowledged standard. Others view it as a feeling or sense, a display of the emotional nature under quickened apprehensions. A fourth class conceive this peculiar mental action to be an introversion of thought, the soul comparing its conduct with some law or standard of propriety ; and its declaration or voice to be a result of the judgment, and not the expression of any distinct faculty. And lastly by some modern writers it is taken to be a mere sentiment, the growth of some religious habit or the expression of some established public opinion.

From this variety of opinion it may be seen that the correct apprehension of the nature of this deciding power or would-be authority, is attended with some difficulty. It may also be inferred that there is something in the manifestations of this faculty to give rise to each shade of opinion enumerated. Thus it seems to point to some law known or unknown, and to speak with such authority, and even vehemence, that it is not surprising that it should be spoken of as the "voice of God" or the "mind of God" within a man. Then its claim to connection with the judgment may be readily apprehended, and its designation as "the right reason," may be justified. None may doubt that it wields the emotional nature with peculiar force, and hence its supposed origin in this department of our being. As the feeling of approbation or disapprobation is generally preceded by a deduction from an examination of some conduct or action, there is an apparent ground for the opinion that conscience or this moral faculty is a blending of two powers of our nature, the intellectual and the emotional. The introversion, examination, and comparison exhibited in the movements of this power, together with the etymology of the word "conscience," have induced the idea that the normal faculty is simply the mind in the exercise of introversion of thought, with reference to some supposed law. And that it should be regarded as "a growth," need not excite wonder, for conscience can be developed. It may be stunted and dwarfed by ignorance and repression; or it may expand and raise its head above all other powers, and be the overshadowing influence of the whole man. Yet we are far from supposing that it has no deeper root than local religious or public opinion.

Though we may not adopt any one of these opinions, yet we are prepared to admit that the manifestations and developments of this faculty warrant the belief that there is a real or seeming element of truth in each of them; and therefore before we proceed to state what we conceive to be the precise nature of the normal faculty, we will afford a short space for their brief examination.

SECTION I.

THE NORMAL FACULTY A DIVINE ELEMENT.

CICERO—SENECA—EPICTETUS—ANTONINUS.

First—That the normal faculty was "the mind of God," and "a part" or "fragment" of the divine essence.

This opinion was held by some of the most eminent ancient philosophers. Cicero (born 106 B.C.) writes: "*Hanc video sapientissimorum fuisse sententiam; legem esse æternum quiddam, quod universum mundum regeret. Ita principem legem illam et ultimam mentem dicebant, omnia ratione aut cogentis aut vetantis Dei.*" — *De Legibus, Lib.* 2. "I see that this was the opinion of the wisest: law is an external something which should rule the whole world. So they say that that chief law is the highest mind of God, impelling or forbidding all things by reason." And again, explicitly:—"*Lex vera atque princeps apta ad jubendum et ad vetandum ratio est recta summi Jovis.*" "The true and also chief law fitted to order and forbid is the right reason of the highest God."

Seneca (born about the beginning of our era) writes, in Epistle 66 : " *Una inducitur humanis virtutibus regula ; ratio recta simplexque ; nihil est divino divinius, cœlesti cœlestius. Ratio autem nihil aliud est quam in corpus humanum pars divini spiritus mersa.*" " One rule is imposed on human virtues, right and simple reason, than the divine there is nothing more divine ; than the heavenly, nothing more heavenly. But reason is nothing else than a part of the divine spirit incased in a human body." Again he says : " *Sacer intra nos spiritus sedet, malorum bonorumque nostrorum observator et custos.*" " A sacred spirit dwells within us, the observer and the recorder both of our bad and good actions." It is clear that by " reason " he means the "*recta ratio*," or " right reason," the faculty which imposes a moral law on conduct, as it professes to regulate human virtues.

Epictetus, a moral philosopher of some note (born about A.D. 50), speaking of the logos, or reason, as regulating conduct, says :—"Κατὰ τον λογον ουδὲ χειρων των θεων ουδὲ μικροτερος."—" As to reason, it is nothing less nor inferior to that of the gods." His meaning is that the human reason which regulates morals partakes of the same nature and is not inferior in its requirements to that of the gods.

Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, one of the noblest of the Roman emperors, and a Stoic philosopher (born A.D. 121), in the 5th book of his own life, speaking of the soul of man in relation to the supreme Being says, chap. 6 : "Αποσπασμα εαυτου ουτος δὲ εστιν εκαστου νους και λογος." —" The mind and reason of each is but a fragment of himself," that is of God.

Two things are plainly taught in these extracts that the ancients spoke of reason, "*ratio*" and "λογος" as exer-

cising a regulating power over the conduct, as a moral influence in the soul, and that the highest known, and therefore what we call the normal faculty—and that this principle, power, or faculty, was the "mind of God," "a part of the divine Spirit," "something equal in nature and duty to the same faculty in God," or "a fragment or shred of divinity itself." They were right in regarding the moral principle the ὀρθὸς λογος or *recta ratio* as the highest in man, and as representing the mind of God when under proper influence; but they erred in speaking of it or of the human soul as a part of the divine Spirit as equal to God, or as a fragment or emanation of Deity. The Creator must never be confounded with his creation, or the Governor with his subjects.

SECTION II.

THE NORMAL FACULTY—THE INTELLECT IN EXERCISE ON MORAL SUBJECTS.

CUDWORTH—CLARKE—PRICE—KANT.

Second,—That moral distinctions and judgments are the offspring of the intellect or reason only, and not of any distinct moral faculty. The advocates of this opinion include some very distinguished men. We can only notice a mere selection.

Ralph Cudworth (born A.D. 1617), one of the most distinguished, in a great literary age, for learning and intellectual vigour, held that the reason of man apprehended moral truths as it apprehended mathematical

truths, that the one came under its cognisance as the other, and were pronounced right or wrong, true or false, according to the nature of the subject presented for adjudication. He says, in his great work:—"The measure and rule of truth can be no foreign or extraneous thing without the mind, but must be native and domestic to it, or contained within the mind itself, and therefore can be nothing but its clear and distinct perception." In the immediate context he had in view fundamental truths of science, but as he advances he shows that he includes all truths, and speaks of "eternal moral truths" as apprehended by the intellect.

Samuel Clarke (born A.D. 1675), another eminent writer, attributes to the intellect the apprehension of moral truths, with the same propriety as problems in geometry. He lays the foundation of morality in the "fitness of things," and says that it belongs to the intellect to discover the fitness or unfitness of each particular deed to some required standard, and to pronounce accordingly. With him there must be some eternal standard of rectitude, by which all the conduct of men shall be measured and either condemned or approved. He holds with Cudworth that the standard of morality is not even the will of the Almighty, but the nature of the supreme Being, of which his will is the exponent. As the intellect perceives that the three-angles of any triangle are equal to the two right angles, or that two parallel straight lines extended can never meet, so it perceives the agreements or disagreements of all human conduct with the standard of morality which we may adopt.

Richard Price (born A.D. 1723), a writer of some note in his day, in his "Review of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals," states very distinctly what

he apprehends to be the faculty of the human soul which has to do with morals. He approved of Dr. Clarke's theory of the fitness of things, and endorsed his judgment of the normal faculty. He asks the question, What is the power within us that perceives the distinction between right and wrong? and answers, The Understanding.

Immanuel Kant (born A.D. 1724), one of the most acute and penetrating intellects of modern times, attributes to reason the distinction of right and wrong. Reason, he says, is exercised about three questions:— "What can I know? What ought I to do? and what may I hope?" To the first belongs science; to the second, morals; to the third, faith. Reason is exercised in all; but when occupied with the second question he would designate it, Practical reason. Practical reason, with him, points out the path of duty, obedience to moral laws; these laws are the result of experience; the end of all is the happiness of the creature; this is the *summum bonum*, the highest good, and what it is, is discovered by experience, and embodied in moral laws which have been discovered by reason, and are constantly apprehended by reason in order to practice.

On these opinions we offer the following remarks. We may agree with Cudworth in the conclusion that the "measure and rule" of things visible and tangible must be within us, for if our senses, in proper exercise, deceive us on what can we rely in respect to the external world; and if our intellectual faculties cannot apprehend the magnitude and relationship of things presented for their cognisance we have no other power on which to fall back. But we think that, as moral beings, it would be reasonable to suppose that we should have a moral

faculty. We are formed to do, to act, to obey as subjects as well as to know: we have abilities to know in order to do; but to do or act aright, that is to obey, we must have a rule—that rule must be either within or without us: if within us, we have been perfectly created for all the purposes of our being; if not within us, but wholly without us, there must be an external revelation of the will of our Maker, in some form, in nature without us, in providence or in grace, and abilities fitted to apprehend this external law most clearly and perfectly. It will be admitted that that being is more worthy of being called perfect who carries a law within him wherever he goes, to act as a regulator with promptness and vigour at all times, than one who had to search for a law without him amid the varied objects and experiences by which he is surrounded. We are warranted by analogy in searching for such a law, and if we find it we should hail the discovery as of a lost power in the spiritual world which accounts for the numerous perturbations which for ages have been the subjects of observation. It is easy to prove that the apprehensions of what we call the normal faculty are something very different from mere intellectual apprehensions. A man looks through the plan of a ship or a problem in geometry, and after a little investigation apprehends clearly the connection of the various parts, and the principles on which the construction is carried on. This is a simple intellectual apprehension. But the same man, on looking over his account-books, may discover an entry falsely made, in quantity or quality, or both. The apprehension in this case is very different: it is instantly attended with self-accusations, and all the excuses that may be gathered up to silence this feeling are for the time generally unavailing—a voice within

reiterates the charge of wrong and injustice done to a fellow-creature. It would be most unphilosophical to assert that the same faculties alone were occupied in both these cases. Cudworth, from time to time, speaks of conscience, but generally in connection with religion, and seems to attach to it the idea of religious conviction or principle—something that man has assumed or adopted for the regulation of his conduct.

We agree with Clarke that there is an eternal standard of rectitude—that some things are wrong and others right, not because man has declared them to be such, or proved them to be such in experience, but because God has declared them to be such both by nature, providence and revelation; and this declaration is not an arbitrary expression of his will in respect to some temporary arrangement forbidden or tolerated, which arrangement, whatever its nature, could not be wrong so far as he was concerned, but is the expression of his nature—the exponent of what he approves and of what he disapproves, of what he loves, and of what he hates. Beyond this we cannot go. We cannot ascend beyond the divine nature; we cannot overlook the infinite. There is reason in all his laws. We may not say that he binds himself by the laws framed for his creatures; but we may say that if they are an exponent of his own nature, he will not act in opposition to them. He who has forbidden a lie will not himself lie; he who forbids injustice will not act unjustly. How much beyond the laws which regulate our moral being he may go, we know not. There are moral creatures far above us to whom some of our laws cannot apply, for example, the fifth and seventh commandments. But there are laws of truth and justice and love which, we apprehend, hold sway in the whole

intelligent universe, which are binding upon all moral creatures, and which are founded on the nature of the self-existent and incomprehensible Jehovah. These essential laws of truth, justice, and benevolence are eternal as their origin, and therefore immutable. Morality with Clarke is a fitness to this standard of right. This we may accept. But the question is, what is the faculty that is occupied with declaring the fitness or unfitness of thoughts, words, and deeds with an assumed standard? Clarke says the fitness or unfitness is apprehended by the intellect as if it were a problem in geometry. Now, we will not deny that the intellect is exercised in comparing the conduct with an acknowledged rule of rectitude, but we cannot conceal from ourselves that over and above the perceived conformity or unconformity there is the pointed decision of a judge, the accusation and the threatening of an officer of justice, or if the deed is not committed, the earnest warning and the stern forbidding. Is this all mere intellectual apprehension, as of conformity or unconformity in lines and figures of a geometrical problem?—We may boldly say psychology disowns the conclusion.

What disposes of Clarke's opinion bears with equal force on the explicit declarations of Price, who adopts his theory.

Kant differs widely in many things from the above three, but agrees with them in this that he acknowledges nothing superior to reason in the spiritual constitution of man. He magnifies reason. But his explorations by its aid have proved how limited is the intellectual power of man, met on all sides by an impassable gulf; stopped in upward flight by the failure of the wings to carry him further; unable to sound the depths over

which he is sailing, by the utter inadequacy of the length of his line. Not only is the range of action all round limited, but within the limits over which it delights to roam and to explore, it is met by apparent contradictions, seeming antinomies, which it cannot reconcile, and over which it must breathe the confession—"These things are too deep for me; I cannot comprehend them." This is what might be expected from the low rank of man in the spiritual scale of beings, and from his present immature intellectual condition. He knows, and can know but in part. With Kant, science, duty, and religion are alike apprehended by reason. So far we may go with him. Reason is exercised in each, but not reason only. Science forms an appropriate field for reason or the intellectual powers, but even these are to be exercised under law. We must do all things to the glory of God. But duty requires something more than mere reason—a restraining and impelling power. And what is religion without faith? And is faith a form of reason? There is reason in all faith that God demands of us, but it is a reason in some cases which bids faith go forward, rest, and adore, where it can only stand and wait but cannot comprehend. Reason is a noble endowment of the human soul; it is the light of the soul, and rightly used, it will disclose a world of wonders, but we must not exalt it above measure. It is not the only endowment. Man has a fount of feeling of wondrous variety and power. And he has, as we affirm, a moral faculty accusing, condemning, theatening, when actions are done or resolved upon which are contrary to some acknowledged standard of rectitude. Is this singular perturbation of soul the result of reason only? Is it the offspring of intellect merely? It may be said that

intellect has previously apprehended a law, and that it has now discovered a want of conformity to that law, and that the perception of the disagreement has produced this perturbation or distress. It is clear, then, that the distress felt is something different from the intellectual apprehension, and is apparently a result, or at least a consequence of the intellectual apprehension. But when the distress assumes, as it often does, a specific form, and speaks out boldly as an accuser, and dictates as a master, and condemns as a judge, we are compelled to investigate this psychological fact, and ask is this a mere result of intellect? does intellect so accuse, condemn, and warn? That intellect is in exercise, that it has been and is employed we readily admit; but we regard it rather as the instrument of a higher power, as the officer of a court of justice rather than the judge on the bench. The intellect or reason is the mental eye by which the judge sees and discerns the case as brought under judicial notice, but the perception of the case is something distinct from the accusation of guilt and the sentence of condemnation. We may not confound the counsel with the judge. Hence we regard Kant's revelation of the mysteries of mind as decidedly defective. There is something higher than reason in the mental phenomena which pass under the common term "conscience." But may these phenomena not find their true place in the emotional nature of man? We shall see.

SECTION III.

THE NORMAL FACULTY REGARDED AS AN EMOTIONAL OPERATION.

HUME—SMITH—M'INTOSH—BROWN.

Third,—That the normal faculty, or conscience, is simply the emotional nature of man variously exercised.

David Hume (born A.D. 1711) writes :—" The final sentence which pronounces characters and actors amiable or odious, probably depends on some *internal sense or feeling* which nature has made universal in the whole species."

Adam Smith (born A.D. 1723) writes :—" It is altogether absurd and unintelligible to suppose that the first perceptions of right and wrong can be derived from reason. These first perceptions cannot be the object of reason, but of *immediate sense and feeling*."

Sir James M'Intosh (born A.D. 1765), in his Dissertation on Ethical Philosophy, when reviewing Butler, writes :—" The truth seems to be that the moral sentiments, in their mature state are *a class of feelings* which have no other object but the mental dispositions leading to voluntary actions, and the voluntary actions which flow from these dispositions."

And Dr. Thomas Brown (born A.D. 1778), in his 81st Lecture, writes :—" Moral obligation, virtue, vice, right, wrong, merit, demerit, and whatever other words may be synonymous with these, all denote their relations to *one simple feeling of the mind*—the distinctive sentiment of moral approbation or disapprobation which arises on

the contemplation of certain actions." Brown opposes the ideas of Hutcheson, in respect to a moral sense, and declares that "There is nothing analogous to sense or perception in the sentiment;" and adds that what Hutcheson "calls an idea is nothing more than *an emotion*, considered in relation to the act which excites it."

It will be seen how widely these four powerful thinkers differ from the preceding four. Hume says the sentence announcing an act moral or immoral springs from a feeling that is universal. Smith declares it absurd to suppose that a perception of right or wrong would have its origin in reason, and regards it as the immediate offspring of feeling. M'Intosh is of opinion that moral sentiments when matured are a class of feelings producing mental dispositions which lead to actions—an awkward way of stating that moral sentiment is feeling in one of its varieties. And Brown affirms the moral sentiment to be a feeling of approbation or disapprobation on the contemplation of certain actions. He is clear in his conviction that it is not an idea, but an emotion arising from the view of an act.

The preceding four were equally satisfied that it pertained to the intellect, or reason, to distinguish right from wrong, and that the moral sentiment was a declaration of the judgment in respect to the fitness or unfitness, agreement or disagreement, of any particular thought, design, or act, to some required standard of morality.

We are dealing now with those who trace the moral sentiment to mere feeling or emotion—in other words, that man's emotional nature gives rise to the sentiment of right and wrong, just as it produces fear or joy on

appropriate objects becoming the subjects of contemplation. It is impossible to reflect with any measure of ability on this intricate subject without perceiving that these writers have grasped at least a portion of the truth regarding the moral sentiment. But have they grasped the full truth? Can it be that emotions such as joy and fear, the two chiefly excited in this department, can account for the peculiar and powerful manifestations of what we call the normal faculty? We think not. There is not only the pleasing feeling diffused over the soul when something humane, noble, or generous has been done; but there are the prompt, poignant, startling accusations, the reiterated charges, the repeated authoritative judgments, the refusal to let the soul off, the enforcement of its presence at a tribunal where it is constrained to hear its sentence, and after it has been pronounced it is hung up before it, as if to prevent its being lost sight of. It can make itself heard and felt before a deed has been performed as well as after. There is often a debate carried on in the soul in respect to the propriety of a certain act. At times the emotions of joy and fear, instead of giving rise to this moral sentiment, may be in direct antagonism to it. The pleasure conceived to be associated with a certain deed may prompt to it, but the voice of conscience remonstrates and forbids on the ground of the impropriety and the injustice of such a proceeding. Fear may impel a man to leave a post of danger where he is the mark of the enemy, but a sense of right, of truth, of honour, this regulating faculty called conscience forbids it, and says,—You shall not retreat—rather die defending what you have solemnly vowed to maintain even at the sacrifice of life. We cannot overlook the tone of authority with which these

sentiments, these moral judgments, are delivered. We know that intellectual apprehensions may enrapture or enchain the whole soul, that emotions may become all-absorbing, but in no mental or spiritual movement in the human soul is the voice of command, or the tone of authority, so distinct and emphatic as in this moral operation. When evil or wrongdoing is proposed, suggested, or contemplated, it may stride across the path and boldly say,—You shall not do it! and on being disregarded, it may speak still louder, till the man is actually arrested in his course, and turns back. And when a foul deed has been accomplished, the demand of a master not of a servant is heard, the cry is, "Come hither, and see what thou hast done!" A refusal is met by force, the man is constrained to see in the light of the law what he has done, and as a criminal to hear his sentence. His feelings in both cases, in the preventing and punishing, are made to hold a subordinate place; law is paramount; the right and the wrong are kept before his eyes, irrespective of his feelings. We may not give the consequent the place of the antecedent. If the antecedent assumes the superior place, and acts without an invariable consequent, it demands the chief recognition. It is a master attended with an ordinary servant, but also one who shows his ability to act with or without his ordinary attendant. We may not give to an attendant the place of the leader. We do not lose sight of the fact that the emotion of approbation or disapprobation, said to be the moral sentiment, is admitted by these writers to be the consequence of the contemplation of certain acts, and is to be regarded in connection with these acts; but we affirm that mere feeling cannot account for the varied manifestations of

authority and power exercised in respect to what is considered duty; and that there is an attribute in the human soul that assumes the right to command and to judge, and that emotion ordinarily waits upon this faculty, as it waits upon certain intellectual apprehensions ; and further, that it may and does speak when no perceptible emotion follows to disturb the soul.

SECTION IV.

THE NORMAL FACULTY—AN INTROVERTION OF THOUGHT AND COMPARISON WITH A MORAL STANDARD.

PURITAN DIVINES—SIBBES—WARD—GOODWIN—CHARNOCK CLARKSON.

Fourth,—That the phenomena of conscience are explainable by the mind in the exercise of introvertion of thought, comparing its own conduct with a moral standard.

This is substantially the view held by many of the religious thinkers of the Puritan period. Among the Puritan preachers were men of profound thought. They were deeply read in scholastic learning, and they were profoundly acquainted with Scriptural ethics. In their writings they have left us the results of their explorations of the region of morality, both with the dim lights of Platonic philosophy and scholastic weapons, and the purer light and safer guides of inspired authorities. We do not say that they have been wholly successful, but they have at least helped to clear the way for future explorers—have accomplished what should merit

the gratitude of those who succeeded them—have anticipated some of the most important conclusions of moralists such as Butler, and lighted the path to fame of some who have not acknowledged their obligations. That they have not fully unravelled the intricacies of the normal faculty will not excite surprise, when we reflect on the diversities of opinion among the most distinguished philosophers of the subsequent generations on this subject. On the manifestations, operations, authority, influence and importance of conscience, they are full and detailed. It is in the psychological department—in the nature of the faculty—that we conceive that their chief defect will be found. We will select the definitions given by a few of these learned men, that the reader may judge of the accuracy of our observations.

Dr. Richard Sibbes (A.D. 1577-1635) writes, in his commentary on 2 Cor. 1 chap.:—"What is conscience *but the soul itself reflecting upon itself?* It is the property of the reasonable soul, and the excellency of it, that it can return upon itself. . . . . Conscience is called the spirit, the heart, the soul, because it is nothing but the soul reflecting and returning upon itself. It is called conscience—that is, one knowing joined with another—because conscience knows itself, and it knows what it knows. It is also called conscience because it knows with God. Therefore, it judgeth of its own acts because it can return upon itself."

Rev. Samuel Ward, B.D. (A.D. 1577-1639), writes, in his "Balm from Gilead," as to the nature of conscience:—"Some fools doubt whether there be in them such a thing, yea or no. Origen thought it a spirit or genius, associated to our souls, to guide and tutor them; but

this is like some of his other conceits. The schoolmen, somewhat acuter, thought it some an habit, some an act of the soul—the later divines, a faculty of the intellectual part. But the truth is, it is no such inmate, no such guest of the soul; but an inbred faculty of it—a noble and divine power, planted of God in the soul, working upon itself by reflection; or thus, *the soul of a man recoiling upon itself.*" In a note on the etymology of the word, he quotes the language of Bernard:—"*Cum alia scit animus, scientia dicitur, cum seipsum, conscientia*"—"when the soul knows other things, it is called knowledge; when it knows itself, it is called conscience." Farther on he reaches some conclusions to which we had come before falling in with his views, in which he says:—"Let us turn our sight to behold and wonder at the divine royalties and endowments of it, it being in man the principal part of God's image, and that by which man resembleth most the autarchy and self-sufficiency of God. This faculty makes him self-sufficient and independent of other creatures, like unto those self-moving engines which have their principle of motion within themselves." In the conclusion of the treatise from which these extracts are taken, there is one of the most powerful appeals to conscience which our language contains. It may not be improper to state that these views were given to the world before Cudworth was born, and sixty years before his great work, "The Intellectual System of the Universe," was published.

Thomas Goodwin, D.D. (A.D. 1600-1679), in his work on the Holy Ghost, enters at great length on the nature, condition, and operations of conscience. He writes: "Conscience is that only principle in a man under

whose cognisance comes all that hath the notion of what is morally good or evil, and which with one and the same eye, vieweth a rule or law forbidding evil, or commanding good; and together therewith do we take a glance of God, as the supreme judge giving that law, and backing it with threatening or promises of rewards. And thus the etymology of the name denotes, *conscientia*, *quasi cum alio sciens*, viz., with God, and from this knowledge of God, which it carries about with it, together with its being a rule or law, it is that that obligation, power, or force of it doth arise which binds a man, though no creature doth look on, to be a witness of his sin, and so he becomes "a law unto himself."

Rev. Stephen Charnock, B.D. (A.D. 1628-1680), in his treatise on "Practical Atheism," writes: "Conscience is nothing but an actuated or reflex knowledge of a superior, and an equitable law; a law impressed, and a power above it impressing it. Conscience is not the law giver, but the remembrancer to mind us of that law of nature imprinted upon our souls, and actuate the considerations of the duty and penalty, to apply the rule to our acts, and to pass judgment upon the matter of fact."

Similar sentiments might be given from others. One very learned author—Rev. David Clarkson, B.D. (A.D. 1621-1686)—speaks of it as the "freest faculty, and the most exempt from the control of any other authority," yet subject to God as his deputy or vicegerent. The vigorous and powerful intellect of this writer has more than once grasped the leading faculties of the human soul in a manner that places him as a mental analyst above many who have in subsequent times made it their study to investigate these subjects. His references to the mental phenomena occur when treating of other

subjects, and give us a glimpse of what we might have had if psychology had become a special subject of investigation. A Puritan preacher might then have held the place now filled by the distinguished Locke.

From the extracts given from the Puritans we cannot endorse the statement of Dr. McCosh, in his introduction to Charnock's works, when speaking of the Puritans. He says:—"They attempt no psychological analysis of this power [conscience]. They do not inquire whether it is an exercise of the reason on the one hand, or a sense, sentiment, or feeling, on the other. This was a question started in the next age by Samuel Clarke on the one side, and Shaftesbury and Francis Hutcheson on the other." It will be seen that some of them devoted very particular pains to explore its operations, and have attempted to define and explain its nature. Ward expressly rejects the idea of its intellectual origin subsequently maintained by Clarke. In their definitions they were altogether too much hampered by the etymology of the word "conscience," both in its Greek and Latin origin. The idea of conjunct knowledge, that is, a conjunct view of moral conduct and the law which should regulate it, is wholly inadequate to represent the normal faculty. These deep thinkers felt this; and in their illustrations of the power and operations of the faculty, they went far beyond their own definitions of the name. Had their various ideas been collected and systematised, and a definition of the nature of the power been framed from its proved offices and operations, we would have an induction from facts to which little addition might be made. While an introvertion of thought, a comparison of conduct with a law, is within the range of the intellectual faculties—and so far con-

science is, if limited to its etymological meaning—these writers as a rule speak of it as quite distinct from the intellect; as "a law," "a principle," "a faculty," occupying the highest place of authority in the soul. A recent author in this city, adhering to the etymology of the term, has defined conscience as: "The moral product of introversion of thought, it is not a *faculty*, as is commonly thought, but a *result*." And again more fully: "Conscience, then is an actual judgment passed by us on our own moral state, combined with the painful or pleasing feeling which thence results" (Quaiffe Intell. Scien., vol. I., pp. 63, 66). This definition we cannot accept. Conscience is much more than a judgment with its accompanying feeling of pleasure or pain. It does pass sentences which are attended with feeling, but it does much more. The intellect is competent for deduction, with its accompanying emotions, but it is not competent for the offices of accuser, witness, judge, ruler, executioner, all which come within the domain of this faculty. The Puritans, from their profound researches into man's moral nature, could not be tied down to their defective definition. They failed in not establishing a harmony between their discoveries and their definition. This in part is to be accounted for by the subject being generally handled as a collateral discussion in illustration of some superior purpose.

SECTION V.

THE NORMAL FACULTY—A GROWTH, A HABIT, THE RESULT OF EDUCATION AND PUBLIC OPINION.

PALEY—CHAMBERS' ENCYCLOPÆDIA.

Fifth.—That conscience is a *growth*, a habit of more or less strength, formed by education or public opinion.

Paley expresses this opinion when he says; "Upon the whole, it seems to me either that there exists no such instincts as compose what is called the moral sense, or that they are not now to be distinguished from prejudices or habits." This theory assumes various forms. The moral code is supposed to spring from utility, from what has been by experience proved to be of use to society; and with this are associated certain national and religious predilections or prejudices, having from custom the force of law. The conscience is a habit, the result of the training and development of two principles—self-preservation, or a regard for ourselves, and sympathy, or a regard for others. "The child is first taught obedience by penalties, and is made to associate pain with forbidden actions. This is the germ of conscience. Habits of avoiding what is prohibited under penalties are gradually formed, and the sense of authority and law is thereby acquired." Afterwards, as knowledge advances, what was the product of fear becomes the result of spontaneous approbation. Conscience thus follows, and does not precede the experience of human authority. (Chamb. Encyc., Art. Ethics.)

It is sufficient to say, in answer to Paley, that we find this normal power often in direct collision with habits. The man is pursuing a course altogether opposed to this moral monitor within, and the result of the contest sometimes is that the habits are successfully resisted and overcome. Prejudices are powerful mental habits, and they may be found giving a bias to conscience, both in the right and in the wrong, according to the training received; but conscience may be heard speaking over and above these prejudices on the exhibition of truth to the mind, and in a moment the prejudices of years may be cast to the winds, and the supremacy of conscience be openly displayed. It is not philosophical to confound things that are frequently antagonistic, and the result of education with a power that often reverses the life in opposition to that education. We appeal to ordinary experience. It may be said that the change is simply attributable to fresh light in the understanding. We admit the fresh light: by it the eyes of conscience have been opened; but a power may be felt pressing this fresh light on the attention of the soul, and refusing to let it pass from before the observation of the mind till the conduct has been conformed to it. Is there no clear distinction between the information lodged in the mind and the power that enforces attention to it, and that in opposition to strong inclinations to the contrary?

In reply to the modern advocates of this theory, as explained in the Encyclopædia, we may state that morality has a deeper foundation than utility: there is a right and a wrong, from which the useful and the useless spring. The one is enjoined and the other forbidden, not only because of natural results immediately flowing from them, but because of ulterior consequences

not now perceptible either by the individual actors or by the framers of the law. The law (we speak of the highest moral law) springs from the nature of the Being who has created us, and from our relationship to him. It is not right, then, to say that the law *is*, because it has proved useful; but that it has proved useful because it is right. We do not hang its existence upon its utility, but upon its fundamental rightness which we believe will result in utility in its widest sense, as embracing the glory of God, whatever may be its effect on a certain class of creatures. The national and religious predilections are embraced in the same principle, as they are regarded as belonging to the useful. But in respect to conscience as a growth : We cannot help regarding the conception as totally inadequate to the varied phenomena connected with this moral power. We admit a development, as we admit a development of all mental and bodily powers under training. But the faculty must exist in some form, even as a germ, before it can be developed. In the opinion of these writers, fear of punishment, as from the threatening of punishment to a child for disobedience, is the germ of conscience. This germ is afterwards strengthened and confirmed by authority and law. The normal faculty is doubtless affected by the remembrance of the penalty attached to the disregard of authority, but does it never speak when no human law has been transgressed ? Does it not often make the stoutest heart to tremble where no fear of mortal punishment can find place ? Felix trembled when the great preacher reasoned of righteousness, temperance and judgment to come. It was not that he feared the wrath of the Jewish populace, or the displeasure of his master, the Roman emperor, or that he was a slave to national

prejudices or superstitious notions; but it was because his evil deeds rose before him, and a voice within assured him that a judgment was awaiting him for these very deeds. Many are smitten by remorse for deeds which they know are beyond the ken of mortal observation or discovery. Can such feelings spring from either of the fountains of self-preservation or sympathy? The person may be dead on whom the injury was inflicted—the evil may never have been revealed to any mortal—yet the perpetrator, from no feeling of sympathy or self-preservation—for the sufferer is gone from human sight, and there is no mortal avenger—is distressed from time to time by keen accusations of gross misconduct in this very deed. And as for human law and authority, this power within often resists both, and compels the man to take his stand before the powers of earth, admit his disregard of their law, and his determination for the future to pursue the same course, and that contrary to the habits of much of his past life. See Peter the apostle before the Jewish Sanhedrim, and Luther before the Diet at Worms. Men have quailed under this power who had no parental training, and whose high position placed them in many respects above all human authority and law. This exhibition of the normal power in man is a bare presentation of some of its manifestations, and of certain influences which help to develop the faculty; but it does not touch its origin, and leaves unnoticed its greatest doings.

SECTION VI.

THE NORMAL FACULTY A REGULATING POWER—VARIOUSLY ENDOWED.

CHRYSOSTOM—HIEROCLES—BUTLER—M'COSH—WAYLAND—AUTHOR'S DEFINITION.

Sixth,—We shall now notice some views of this faculty, believed to be nearer the truth both of nature and of revelation.

Chrysostom (A.D. 347-407), in his 12th Oration, writes: "Εξ αρχης πλαττων ο θεος τον ανθρωπον νομον αυτω φυσικον εγκατεθηκε και τι ποτε εστι νομος φυσικος; το συνειδος ημιν διηρθωσε και αυτοδιδακτον εποιησε την γνωσιν των καλων και των ου τοιουτων."—"At the beginning, when God formed man, he placed in him a natural law,—and what, then, is that natural law? Self-knowledge has instructed us, and a natural genius has given us the knowledge of things that are right and of things that are not such."

And Hierocles, a moral philosopher of some celebrity about the middle of the fifth century, speaks of a mental power or faculty as showing us the divine laws—Ο λογισμος τους θειους νομους υποδεξαμενος—"The reason or discernment which makes manifest the divine laws." And again, the same writer says—λογω ὀρθω πειθεσθαι και θεω ταυτον εστι—"To obey right reason (conscience) is the same as obeying God"—quoted in *Goodwin.* It is more than probable that both these Greek writers united with the study of the Platonic philosophy the clearer moral philosophy of the Apostolic writings.

Coming down to modern times, we have the opinions of men who have made the moral nature of man a special study. Pre-eminent among these stands Butler, author of the "Analogy." His ideas of the nature of this faculty are not the most explicit, while his grasp of its operations and manifestations is profound and extensive. Without limiting himself to any particular term or definition, he says :—" It is manifest that a great part of common language and of common behaviour over the world is formed on the supposition of such a moral faculty, whether called conscience, moral reason, moral sense, or divine reason—whether considered as a sentiment of the understanding, or a perception of the heart, or *which seems the truth as including both*." In strict language, we speak of perceptions as appertaining to the understanding, and of feeling as belonging to the heart. Butler's definition is rather an explanation of the operation of the faculty, employing, as it does, both the intellectual and emotional nature of man to show its presence and power. Preceding writers teem with ideas as far advanced as these.

M'Cosh, in his " Method of the Moral Government of God," speaks of conscience as presenting *three* aspects. First, as proceeding upon and revealing a law; second, as pronouncing an authoritative judgment upon actions; and third, as possessing a class of emotions, or as a sentiment. After explaining each of these aspects he adds: —" The view now offered of conscience, from the way in which we have been obliged to state it, may seem a very complex one; in reality, it is very simple. *The conscience is the mind looking to a moral law, and pronouncing judgments giving rise to emotions.* We do not see how anything could be simpler" (p. 306). The sentence is

simple enough; but the definition is one which Ralph Cudworth, Samuel Clarke, or Richard Price could adopt. We might ask where is the moral law to which the mind looks? If it is only in the Scriptures, will we limit the faculty of conscience to those only who have the Scriptures? Is the conscience the mind looking to a law, and not a law written in the heart, requiring the obedience of the man? If the conscience is the moral nature of man, beating responsive to an invisible moral law pervading the universe of intelligence, is it not substantially a law within, rather than the mind looking to a law? The emotional nature does not always wait for judgments, but is often agitated by accusations and threatenings anterior to a formal comparison of actions with a moral law. On the three "aspects" we may remark that we accept the first as correct, but not exactly in his sense. The normal faculty does reveal a law, though obscurely, and proceeds upon it; but it is something more than an "eye," to which M'Cosh compares it. He says:—"Conscience is not the law itself—it is merely the organ which makes it known to us—the eye that looks to it." If we were to accept this, we could not stop short of Cudworth's theory: the moral nature would be resolved into the intellectual. But in truth the normal faculty reveals a law and proceeds upon it as responsive to the moral nature of God, though very imperfectly. The needle of the compass reveals a magnetic current, invisible to mortal eye, and proceeds upon it by following the variations of that current. The second "aspect" we approve without comment. The language of the third is not satisfactory. We do not think that conscience "possesses" this class of emotions. The emotions all belong to a separate department of

man's spiritual nature. They, in part, are moved by the voice and actions of conscience. While we may with propriety say that the human soul possesses classes of emotions, we can scarcely say that a simple department outside that emotional part possesses them. Following out the idea of this aspect, we might land in Hume's or Brown's theory. In respect to the "sentiment," we do not see that such a term is equivalent to "a class of emotions."

Wayland, in his work on the Elements of Moral Science, defines the normal faculty thus:—"By conscience, or the moral sense, is meant that faculty by which we discern the moral quality of actions, and by which we are capable of certain affections in respect to this quality"—chap. 2. Discernment of moral quality, and affection by that discernment, are the two things here attributed to the normal faculty, by which we are to understand its nature. We consider the definition defective. If you lay down a moral law, the intellect is capable of discerning the right or the wrong of any action compared with that law, and emotions are a natural result from certain intellectual apprehensions. The definition seems to lose sight of the instinctive, judicial, punitive, or remunerative character of the faculty. There is no redundancy in God's works. If the work done is simply intellectual and emotional, let us not multiply faculties for work which these departments can perform. We believe that there is a directive, authoritative, and judicial potency belonging to this faculty which places it over and beyond anything properly belonging to the intellect or emotions. It wields both; but it is distinct from and above both. The paralysis that has overtaken it, in consequence of the alienation

of the soul from the Creator, accounts in great measure for the conflicting opinions and confusion of ideas respecting it. Its detached operations, as the outlying portions of a building in partial ruins, are readily perceived; but its internal nature, like the interior structure of the edifice, is obscured by the accumulations of a moral catastrophe.

What, then, after this general review of the opinions of others, is the definition which we would offer? In the fewest words which we can select, we would define what is commonly called the conscience as—*the normal, self-regulating faculty in the soul of man responsive to the moral nature of God.* Or, more fully—A DIRECTING AND JUDICIAL FACULTY EXERCISING CONTROL OVER THE WHOLE MAN, IN SUBSERVIENCE TO THE MORAL NATURE OF THE CREATOR, WITH AND WITHOUT A REVEALED LAW. Its province is morality. It embraces every department of duty. Man has relationships with God and his fellow-creatures. It is reasonable to suppose that his nature would be furnished with a faculty directly occupied with relations which enter so largely into the welfare and happiness of man. He has that faculty. He would be manifestly imperfect in a high degree without it. It promptly recognises the right and the wrong, what ought to be done and what ought not to be done. It is distinct from, but not independent of, the intellectual department. All departments are vitally one, and mutually dependent, though some are superior and others inferior. The emotional nature depends largely for its action on the intellectual; in like manner the normal faculty is largely dependent on the same department. And hence its diverse decisions. If the understanding receives false guidance, or is perverted, the

normal faculty, accepting its information, may determine accordingly. As the emotional nature varies in its movements according to intellectual apprehensions, so may the moral. There is a right and a wrong—as God is right and all opposition to Him wrong. That right is in His nature: He cannot go against it, for He cannot do wrong. He cannot lie, do unjustly, or countenance iniquity. Therefore He is self-regulated in the highest possible perfection, and immutable in that perfection. He made man in His own image: therefore with a perfect nature, as far as that creature capacity would allow. That nature must be moral—that is, possess a respect to right as distinguished from wrong, that the duties inseparable from his relation to his Maker and his fellow-creatures might be discharged. That moral perfection, as well as the Divine image, implied a self-regulating faculty in the absence of, and as altogether superior to, a written law. Man's nature was set to beat in unison with the Divine; and the normal self-regulating faculty presiding over the whole spiritual machinery was what is called conscience.

The moral nature of man is admitted; but the existence of a separate or distinct normal faculty has been called in question. We have already met the different arguments that have been advanced against the existence of such a faculty, by ascribing the phenomena of conscience to intellect alone, to mere feeling, to education, to authority, and to habits. Other objections will be disposed of as we proceed. We are now to direct attention to inspired references to the power, authority, and operations of this normal faculty. Accepting the inspired oracles as the word of the living God, we expect to find man's moral nature truly delineated there—both

what it was, and what it is, and what it may become. He who made us can inform us in respect to all the faculties with which we are endowed. The outlines of a true psychology will be found in the heavenly oracles. As the works of nature reveal every branch of natural science, though in detached members scattered everywhere over sea and land, which have to be gathered up and arranged with protracted labour and patience, so may we find scattered through the communications that have come from heaven to earth, detailing man's moral history and relations, the elements of a reliable and enduring spiritual science. It may require time and the labours of many investigators, but we have unwavering faith in this result. The book of nature and the book of revelation have one author. As revelation came to aid man's disordered and debilitated moral nature in the performance of its duties, so may its light aid us in exploring those recesses of that nature in which human ingenuity has so often been perplexed.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

INSPIRED IDEAS OF A NORMAL FACULTY.

In the divine records of creation, man's creation is widely distinguished from that of every other animate existence on earth. He is created after consultation,—the Almighty saying: "Let us make man," and in the image of God, a distinction attached to no other visible creature—and by a double work the formation of his body from the dust of the earth, and the breathing of the Creator upon that body, imparting by his creating breath or spirit a spiritual and immortal inmate to the material frame. Our business lies not with the exquisite workmanship of this material frame, but with the spiritual offspring of the Almighty planted within that frame.

It is distinctly recorded: "So God created man in his own image—in the image of God created he him." As God is a spirit, the image of God which was bestowed on man, must refer exclusively to man's spiritual nature. Man as a spirit, a rational, moral, and immortal being, bore a miniature resemblance to his great spiritual Parent in respect to his communicable attributes. Did this resemblance consist in the essential attributes of man's spiritual nature, or in the moral rectitude which adorned man as first created, or in both?—In both. Man resembled God not only in the possession of certain spiritual faculties, but in the perfection, beauty, and holi-

ness of these faculties. By his disobedience and alienation from his Maker, he has lost the latter, while he still retains the former in their impaired state.

What are these unimpaired faculties? A mind, soul, will, and heart, in perfect adaptation to man's position and duties. The restored image is said by the apostle Paul (Eph. iv. 24 and Coll. iii. 10) to consist of knowledge, righteousness, and holiness. These terms bespeak the result of the new creation; they point to the effects of brightened vision, rectified conscience, and purified emotions. The soul is re-illumined to know God; through this light, the faculty, whose province is righteousness or moral rectitude, discriminates and regulates; and this habitual rectitude clothes the soul with a garment of holiness. The knowledge directs us to the enlightened intellect, the righteousness to the normal faculty restored to its authority and place, and the holiness to the emotional nature cleansed and ennobled by the truth. In each department the will, though unnoticed here, is the working potency carrying out the pleasure of the soul.

If the normal faculty holds the place and authority in the human soul which we have ascribed to it, it cannot remain unnoticed in the extended records of inspiration which deal so largely in the moral character and doings of men, both as fallen and as regenerated. Its operations are recognised throughout the Scriptures. In many cases its power is the prominent influence in the soul, when no spiritual faculty is named. In the Old Testament, and partially in the New, it is designated by a general term, "the heart." In the New Testament it receives a special designation "conscience", and acquires great prominence, as intended to regulate the

new man. Who can fail to mark its power as a judicial faculty, though unnamed, when Cain was accused of the murder of his brother, when Joseph's brethren had harsh treatment measured out to them in Egypt, when Saul was charged by Samuel with gross disobedience, when David was pointed to by the prophet Nathan as the perpetrator of the great outrage on human rights, when Peter was pierced by the look of his master whom he had just disowned, when Judas cast down the money which he had obtained by betraying the Lord, crying, "I have sinned," when Pilate strove to save Jesus from death, and when Felix trembled under the anticipations of a coming judgment.

Leaving out certain passages (such as Job xxxviii. 36) which may be called in question, and which it might be improper here to discuss, the general Hebrew term in which the workings of this faculty may be broadly traced, is "*lebh*," or fully, "*lebhabh*," of which the ordinary translation is "heart." We will notice a few instances in which the normal faculty is clearly referred to under this term:—

In Job xxvii. 6, we read:—"My heart shall not reproach me so long as I live." The meaning is plain —the original might be rendered:—"My conscience upbraids me for no day of my life." We know that it is not the emotional nature of man that accuses of wrong-doing; but something possessed of authority not pertaining to mere emotion.

In 2 Sam. xxiv. 5, it is written:—"And it came to pass afterward that David's heart smote him, because he had cut off Saul's skirt." On reflecting on the deed which he had committed, his conscience smote him for what he now judges to have been a mean and unworthy

action, beneath the dignity of a leader of the hosts of Israel. To some it may appear a very harmless affair, for which no conscience properly enlightened should disturb any man. To say the least, it was not honourable, and we may approve of David's tenderness of conscience as an element of true nobility, and, as employed in this instance, as in many others, in staying further and worse proceedings in the same direction. This rebuke of conscience aroused David to prevent his men from slaying Saul.

In 2 Sam. xxiv. 10, we have another display of the power and authority of this judicial faculty for an offence of a much graver character than the last. It is said:—"And David's heart smote him after that he had numbered the people." Precisely the same terms are used in the original as in the last. The meaning of the word translated "heart" can scarcely be misunderstood in such cases.

In 1 Kings viii. 38, we read:—"What prayer and supplication soever be made by any man, or by all thy people, Israel, *which shall know every man the plague of his own heart.*" The expression "plague of his own heart" (*nega lebhabho*), "smiting of his heart," that which reaches to and beats upon the heart, clearly indicates the repeated accusations of conscience, demanding as one knocking at a door, the attention of the man. For such an accused, self-condemned, and then penitent mortal the great King of Israel now offers an intercession.

In Eccles. vii. 22, it is written:—"For oftentimes also thine own heart knoweth that thou thyself likewise has cursed others." This appeal to self-knowledge in respect to right and wrong, is an appeal to conscience. The normal faculty, not the emotional nature, accuses or

excuses. It is not simply an appeal to memory. Memory, which is the soul looking back on its past doings, may be called into exercise; but the abiding conviction of having often cursed or wished ill to real or supposed enemies, at once brings into prominence that department of the soul which deals with moral questions.

Isai. xxxviii. 3, offers an example of the approving or peaceful conscience. There Hezekiah says: "Remember now, O Lord, I beseech thee, how I have walked before thee in truth and with a perfect heart. The original is *u-bh'lebh halem*, with a heart in a peaceful state, sound, whole, not disturbed, that is, in the language of the New Testament, "with a good conscience." This is the ordinary state of a righteous man. He makes it the aim of his life to have a conscience void of offence before God and man. Hezekiah refers to his upright conduct, and appeals to the searcher of hearts in respect to his internal feelings in matters of duty, declaring that his heart, his conscience or normal faculty, was at peace, did not accuse him of habitually or wilfully neglecting any duty. No reasonable doubt can be entertained respecting this as the correct interpretation.

We have another aspect of the operations of conscience in Jere. xx. 9. Jeremiah records: "Then I said, I will not make mention of him, nor speak any more in his name. But his word was in my heart as a burning fire shut up in my bones, and I was weary with forbearing, and I could not stay." Here is the impelling power of conscience. The prophet had met with violent opposition, and was greatly discouraged. Under temptation from the pelting scorn to which he was exposed, he hastily resolved to keep silence, to speak no more in the

name of the Lord, and let them take their own course, and reap their reward. But he soon found that there was power within him that demanded a hearing, and would not be put off. David had experienced the same in very similar circumstances (Psal. xxxix. 1-3). This impelling power he compares to a fire in his very bones. The expression is strong, and points vividly to the peculiar working of conscience; it was a fire burning, and yet shut up, as in his very bones, on which it seemed to be preying. He was called to the prophetic office in a trying time, and his quickened conscience, responding to the authority of God, would not suffer him to neglect his duty, notwithstanding the fierce persecution to which he was exposed.

These passages are sufficient from the Old Testament. They reveal a faculty reproving, condemning, accusing, approving, and impelling. Such a faculty cannot be confounded with mere feeling, or with simple intelligence. It claims an oversight of duty, and it wields an authority over the whole man. In every instance given, this faculty was expressed by the term *lebhabh*, or the shorter term *lebh*, which our present version renders "heart." As they have not given the same rendering to the term at all times, but have rendered it also "understanding" (Job xii. 3, &c.), thereby distinguishing the faculties of the human soul in the use of the same term, an equal discrimination might have given the word the meaning "conscience" in such cases as those presented above, to the manifest advantage of the English reader.

In a few instances the writers of the New Testament have given the equivalent of *lebh* in the English term καρδια (*kardia*), to represent this judicial faculty; but

generally a special and distinct term συνειδησις (*suneidesis*) is used. We shall first notice the former, and then group together the illustrations of the latter.

The conviction produced by the preaching of Peter on the day of Pentecost, is expressed thus: "Ακουσαντες δε κατενυγησαν τη καρδια" (Acts ii. 37). They were pierced in their heart; or having heard, they were smitten at the heart. The guilt of slaying the innocent son of God, their own Messiah, flashed upon their minds, and their consciences smote them as if a dagger had entered their hearts. It was not mere grief that pierced them; it was a sense of guilt—of great and overwhelming guilt. They were ready to despair, and cried out, "Men, brethren, what shall we do?" Here the presence and power of conscience are so marked as to require no further elucidation.

The same faculty as a condemning power is twice referred to in 1 John iii. 20, 21, in the use of the term καρδια: "For if our heart condemn us—καταγινωσκη ημων η καρδια—God is greater than our heart, and knoweth all things. Beloved, if our heart condemn us not"—the same phrase with the negative particle—"we have boldness before God." The meaning of καρδια in these verses can scarcely admit of a doubt. Man's emotional nature does not condemn, nor his intellectual nature attribute blame to him for his conduct. The term used for "condemn," etymologically means, "to know or note against," hence, to judge or condemn as guilty. The normal faculty notes against the soul certain proceedings not in accordance with the normal standard of rectitude, and thus bars it approach, because of guilt, to the holy God. Hence the importance of having a conscience void of offence—hearts appeased, to use the

apostle's language (verse 19), "if we would enjoy the countenance of the Almighty."

But the most important passage of Scripture bearing on this whole question, and one which serves as a connecting link between the two terms καρδια and συνειδησις is Rom. ii. 15, in which both the terms occur, the latter as explanatory of the former:—"Οιτινες ενδεικνυται το εργον του νομου γραπτον εν ταις καρδιαις αυτων συμμαρτυρουσης αυτων της συνειδησεως και μεταξυ αλληλων των λογισμων κατηγορουτων η και απολογουμενων," which our version renders:—"Which show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another." The English reader is left in doubt whether it is the work of the law that is written on the heart or the law itself that is written on the heart. But the original shows that it is "*the work*" that is engraven on the heart. It is in accordance with Scripture to speak of the law itself as written on the heart (see Heb. viii. 10); but such is not the exact expression here. Hence we may properly view the text as presented to us. It reveals then a law external to the hearts of men, which, however, has left its impress on these hearts. What is that law but the moral nature of God? The Creator has impressed on the heart or soul of man the law which regulates the natures of intelligent beings, and which is a transcript of His likeness. As the substance on which the law operated was not inert matter, but spirit, its effect was to impress or transfer its own guiding principles and powers to the living spirit on which it operated. Practically, then, the work of the law on the heart was the planting of a law in the soul of man. The work is said to be in the heart, as that term

hitherto was used to express the morally regulating principle in man, as well as his general emotional nature. But its immediate explanation by another term συνειδησις, "*conscience*," indicates in what sense it is to be understood, and calls attention to a particular endowment of the human soul which is the exponent of the work of an original moral law. How do we know that the law—the normal model on which the rational creation has been formed—has left its impress, its work, on man's soul? The conscience informs us: it bears witness. In this case the apostle intends to intimate that it is a conjoint witness. The "also" of our translation has no place in the original. But there is an idea implied that seems to justify it. The term συμμαρτυρουσης is not simply "bearing witness," but "bearing witness with" something else. What is that something else? It is either the law (not the work of the law) or their own acts—that is, the acts good and evil of the Gentiles. If we suppose the former, it is simply that the conscience and the law speak the same thing—the one beats in harmony with the other, and they both testify to the moral nature of God, and the eternal distinction between right and wrong, the Divine nature being immutable. If we take the latter, it will be that the conscience, or the normal faculty, testifies along with the conduct or acts of these Gentiles that there is a moral law pervading the universe. The conduct speaks to the world without; the conscience to the man within, and they unite in testifying to the existence of a law. We regard the latter interpretation as conveying the mind of the writer, though we do not conceal from ourselves that the one involves the other; for testifying with conduct is testifying with a law that regulates such conduct.

In the latter clause of the verse the Apostle explains the movements of conscience. It both accuses and excuses. The term λογισμων is not simply "thoughts," as cogitations or reflections, but judicial discernments. The και "and," does not mark something in addition to the testimony of conscience, but something as equivalent to the preceding, and corresponding to our terms "that is," "even," "whilst"—that is, something in addition, but the addition is the explanation of what precedes. The judgments involved an accusation of guilt or a justification of conduct. They were not all of one class, but sometimes favourable and sometimes condemnatory. The μεταξυ αλληλων, rendered "the meanwhile," is also translated "between themselves." The latter is the literal interpretation; the former the supposed meaning. The idea seems to be "one with another" intermingled, sometimes one thing sometimes another, decisions condemning and approving conduct coming in between one another. The whole verse may be rendered:—"Which show the work of the law engraven on their hearts, the conscience testifying with their conduct, the decisions condemnatory and apologetic, being intermingled one with another"—*according as actions good or bad followed each other.*

Leaving the exegeties of this important passage of Scripture, we have to notice that there is here inspired authority for the opinion that there is in the soul of man a faculty testifying in respect to the nature of his conduct, and to that faculty is given the specific name συνειδησις (*suneidesis*), which in English is rendered "conscience." Whence this term? The Greeks had three terms which express this faculty, συνεσις, συνειδος, and συνειδησις. The first, literally meaning a coming

together, is often used for the understanding; but that it also means the conscience the following extracts from Euripides will show. Eurip. Ores., 395, Menelaus asks:—"What thing do you suffer?" as we say, "what is the matter?" And adds:—"What disease destroys you?" Orestes answers:—"η συνεσις οτι συνοιδα δεινυ ειργασμενος"—"Conscience, for I am conscious that I have been doing dreadful things." The other two are from συνοιδα, the perfect for the present, there being no συνειδω in use. The noun συνειδησις appears in the Apocryphal Book of Wisdom, 17 ch. 11 v.:—Δειλον γαρ ιδιως πονηρια μαρτυρει καταδικαζομενη αει δε προσειληφε τα χαλεπα συνεχομενη τη συνειδησει—"For wickedness condemned of its own nature testifies that it is a fearful thing, and pressed by conscience has ever anticipated distresses." It is found in the New Testament some thirty times, being used by Luke, John, Peter, and Paul, the last employing the word in his Epistles not less than twenty-four times, and in seven different Epistles. From this bare enumeration it will appear that it has acquired a prominence in Christian ethics which will not suffer it to be overlooked, and which claims for it a full investigation. The genuineness of the clause in which the term occurs in the gospel of John (viii. 9) has been called in question, but apparently without sufficient cause. It is wanting in many MSS. But as the term must have been in frequent use at the time when John wrote his gospel, it is more likely to have been omitted by some than to have been inserted by others, and seems necessary to give a completeness to the passage. Luke in his history of the Acts uses it twice (Acts xxiii. 1, xxiv. 16) in reporting Paul's self-vindication. It occurs three times in the

first epistle of Peter (1 Peter ii. 19, iii. 16, iii. 21). It is in constant use in the writings of the apostle of the Gentiles. An examination of the passages will reveal some of the chief offices of this faculty, as well as the degrees of vitality and authority to which it may be subject.

Conscience appears as an *accusing* power, speaking of guilt and condemnation under the moral government of a holy God, in Hebrews ix. 9, 14; x. 2, 22. Sinners burdened with guilt under the accusations of conscience, are excluded from the presence, and incapacitated for the service of God. On the other hand, it is presented to us as an *approving*, peace-speaking faculty, in Acts xxiii. 1; Timothy i. 5, 19, 3, 9; Hebrews xiii, 18; 1 Peter iii. 16, 21. The Apostle represents the christian as seeking to secure at all times the approbation of an enlightened conscience as something of great value, of which no good man can be deprived, and asserts that such was the aim and the practice of himself and his fellow labourers.

Again, this normal faculty is exhibited as endowed with an *impelling* force, urging to duty—Rom. xiii. 5; 1 Peter ii. 19. And again as a *restraining* power—1 Cor. viii. 7-12. Christians are to yield submission to a lawful power from a sense of right, that is, in obedience to the regulating principle implanted in their constitution by their Creator; at the same time the very respect which they pay to their own consciences should induce them to respect the consciences of others (1 Cor. viii. 7-12). The conscience decides according to the light which it may have. To one person a deed may appear wrong, which to another appears harmless; hence a respect for the convictions of conscience is inculcated even when these convictions may be founded in ignorance.

It is spoken of as the *controlling* power in the upright man. Acts xxiv. 16; 1 Cor. x. 25-29; 2 Tim. i. 3. And again, as *attesting* to his integrity or sincerity, Rom. ix. 1; 2 Cor. i. 12, v. 11. The righteous man strives to live according to the mind of God, so far as he can ascertain it. In so doing, the power of conscience will be felt restraining him from evil, and thereby controlling his conduct; and in yielding obedience to its dictates he receives in return an attestation of approval.

Again, it is appealed to as a *judicial* authority capable of judging in matters of honesty and dishonesty, sincerity and craft, in 2 Cor. iv. 2; and lastly, it is spoken of as seared, deadened, *insensible*, or *defiled*, and so incompetent to occupy the judicial seat, as a judge whose discrimination had failed through intellectual infirmity. 1 Tim. iv. 2, and Titus i. 15.

Here we have a power accusing and approving, impelling and restraining, controlling and then attesting, judicial, and then by harsh usage and violence rendered insensible. With such varied proofs of special, direct, vigorous, and authoritative action, that system of psychology must appear radically defective which denies a high and distinct position to this faculty, or declines to investigate its peculiar and complicated phenomena. To some who claim to rank among philosophers, a reference to Scripture may seem out of place in such questions. When, we ask, have the sacred writers been proved mental imbeciles? When have their writings been judged devoid of profound thought by any capable of entering into their meaning? Is their neglect a proof of wisdom or of folly by men who pride themselves on mastering the most obscure fragments of the writings of ancient profane authors? Wherein is Plato superior to

Paul, or Aristotle to John? Who that has studied both will not declare that Plato and Aristotle, with their great and unquestioned intellectual power, are immeasurably surpassed on the field of high morality by the two mentioned writers of the New Testament? The time has gone by for that philosophy which would ignore the ethics of Paul and John; and above all of that great Light, God manifest in the flesh. While we recognise the great natural endowments of many of the sacred writers, and claim on this ground for their writings the profound investigation of the intellectual, we may not overlook the important truth that they were inspired by the Holy Ghost to reveal the true state of man's soul before God, the law which should regulate his life, the influence which alone can restore the power of obedience to that law, and the blessed consequences which attend a compliance with the divine will. In giving due prominence to the ideas of men so richly endowed by nature and grace, we are adopting a course which in the end must receive confirmation from the aggregate of human experience.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

ORIGINAL DESIGN AND AUTHORITY.

From the testimonies of Scripture above referred to, as well as from the lessons of human experience, we may safely conclude that the almighty Creator in endowing the soul of man with this faculty, designed to plant within him a regulative authority clothed with judicial powers. This regulative authority was practically legislative. It did not make the law, but it was the bearer and the expounder of the law. It was not an independent authority; but the chief official of the supreme legislative authority of the universe. Clearly, if we allow any distinction of place among the faculties of a spirit which is indivisible and a unit, this faculty is the head and chief of all, as no power within the soul can take precedence of the directive and judicial. Through it the all-ruling Spirit that fills immensity exercises his regulative and controlling influence over the human soul. Every door is open at his approach; he can touch the intellectual and emotional nature of man at his will, and does influence both; but this faculty is the established point of contact by which the created spirit is made to feel both the authority and the determinations of the almighty Ruler. Balanced at first, or set in perfect harmony with the nature of God, it became moreover his agent in preserving the soul in conformity to that nature. Acquiescence with its native impulses diffused a healthful

glow of delight over the whole soul, as the enjoyment of an exercise in which life luxuriates, but it marked the slightest deviation from the point of rectitude as a violence put upon it, as a jarring of the spiritual machinery by the dislocation of the main axis from its socket, and sent a feeling of distress and alarm through the whole spirit. God is present with all his intelligent creatures, but he does not destroy their free agency. He is more closely intimate with the innocent and upright, dwelling in them, but he does not supersede their natural faculties. When man was innocent God dwelt with him ; this faculty then held the soul for God as under his eye. To try man his Maker withdrew his special sustaining presence, leaving him to the free exercise of all his faculties, among which the normal was supreme. The pressure of a superior intellect, operating under the guise of friendship, overcame the resistance of this regulating power, and induced a transgression of the divine command. We are constrained to believe that our most benevolent Creator would not place man in a hopeless condition of temptation: and therefore that man either had in his own resources sufficient strength to resist the urgency of Satanic pressure, great as it was, or the power to evade the force of the temptation by keeping away from the place of danger, or had within call the divine assistance which is never denied to the upright in the path of duty. The fallen angel could not be permitted to *force* man to transgress the laws. The deed must be the voluntary decision of the soul. Man was free to give heed to arguments, or to turn away from them. An argument that hinted at disobedience should have been discarded without examination. Its full force should not be allowed to

come upon the soul. Hence the command of scripture—"Resist the devil and he will flee from you." Great as his power is, it is only when we enter into temptation—that is, when we entertain it—that its power can be felt in its overbearing influence, and through it the power of the adversary. The triumph of the Fall was not won in a moment. The man was not deceived. If he was tempted previously, the temptation was successfully resisted under the admonition of conscience. The woman was deceived by specious arguments, and her conscience was either overborne or her whole spirit was spell-bound as by a fascination—a power acquired over her by the tempter, by her voluntary entertainment of his evil suggestions. It required a double pressure to persuade man. The first reason given by his Maker for his condemnation is,—"Because thou hast listened to the voice of thy wife." He knew what he was doing, and the entreaty of his wife was aided by the pressure of the evil spirit: both secured what we must conceive was a reluctant consent. The disobedient pair had done violence to their whole spiritual nature specially to the normal faculty, which now accused, condemned, and scourged them as if it belonged to a power external to themselves and had no sympathy with them in their misery. This peculiarity of conscience must never be overlooked. It is not only the chief point of connection between the Creating and the created spirit, but it is a fort or stronghold in the intelligent creature which the supreme Ruler never surrenders, although his intercourse with it may be temporarily suspended. How far the movements and inflictions of conscience are due to the natural workings of this faculty, and how far they are attributable to the presence and power of the Almighty working through it, it is impossible for human

ingenuity to determine. If we attribute them wholly to human nature, we must endow this faculty with a sensitiveness, a power, and a vitality, altogether remarkable. It is more reasonable to suppose that the ever-present Being, who reads all our thoughts and motives, not unfrequently employs this faculty to present to the soul His view of the deed or design, and his judgment concerning it. In these cases there will be a vividness, a power, and a persistency in the impressions and movements wholly unusual.

Everywhere, and at all times, this faculty is a witness to the existence of a superior moral Ruler. As man is not self-created, he must have had a Maker greatly his superior. As work reveals the character of the worker, man's moral nature reveals a moral Creator. Man need not go beyond his nature to know that there is a God, an intelligent and good Being, and a moral Ruler to whom he is accountable, and to whose nature certain things are pleasing, and certain things highly displeasing; and as a result, certain things agreeable to the creature, and certain things painful in the extreme.

We may conclude that all rational creatures are endowed with this faculty, both as the organ or point of connection with God as their Ruler, and as a power for preserving, controlling, rewarding, or punishing them. We see a restraining moral power in the angels, when they durst not imitate a bad example, by railing in return for false aspersions. Jude 9, 2 Peter ii. 11. And we see the terrors of an accusing faculty in the outcry of the devils against our Saviour for a supposed premature torment. Matt. viii. 29.

The first work of the normal faculty in the rational creature, as he comes forth upright from the hands of the Creator, is to preserve the soul in harmony and

peace with God. This is accomplished by a double movement. Obedience to the Divine will is commended and rewarded with joy. And a warning voice on the appearance of evil as a temptation, to restrain the soul from touching it. As the warm and balmy breezes of spring diffuse a healthful glow through the human frame, so does the breath of an approving conscience warm and refresh the righteous soul. And as the eye closes on the approach of danger—real or apparent—threatening its safety, and the hand is instinctively withdrawn from what threatens to scorch it, so does this faculty warn and restrain on the appearance or approach of moral danger. But this preserving power is limited. It failed in the trial of our first parents, and it failed in the trial of a higher race of beings. This implies that rational creatures, so far as known to us, are created fallible. They acquire a permanent stability in rectitude when they have proved their fidelity to God by obedience and, it may be, by the resistance of evil. Though many have fallen, many have retained their high position of integrity. For aught we know, the vast majority have passed the trial with honour. The probability lies in favour of this conclusion, for the original inclination of all as created, every power of the soul, and specially the faculty of which we write, is in favour of obedience. The existence of evil has its origin in a mystery to us unfathomable; but the design of its limited sway is sufficiently intelligible in the manifestation of the glory, —that is, the various perfections of Jehovah.

When the responsible creature has passed over to the position of a sinner or a rebel against God, conscience assumes a new aspect. It suffers in common with all the faculties in an interruption of the vitalizing and

invigorating influence of the great Invisible, but it retains power sufficient when aroused to shake the soul with extreme distress. Its assumed independence of the soul is somewhat remarkable. It will approve, and it will condemn, as if it owed allegiance to some superior power, whose agent it was, and whose rights it would maintain. The inclinations of the soul being habitually evil, its chief exercise assumes the form of a varied antagonism to the designs and doings of most men. Here we may quote the words of Juvenal, Sat. 13, 2: "*Prima est haec ultio, quod, se judice, nemo nocens, absolvitur.*" "This is the first revenge that, the person himself being judge, no guilty one is absolved." This faculty within is the judge, not the whole soul; for within there may be varied efforts to find excuses, and to evade the force of the accusation. But conscience sets up before the soul the deed that has been done, and says, in a tone that can admit of no reply, You have done this deed, and you are *guilty*. We are far from saying that conscience is always right; but when it is right beyond dispute, it is hard to resist its authority. That it is sometimes wrong is a proof of the interruption of the Divine connection, and hence it cannot be regarded either as a safe guide at all times, or as a supreme authority in matters of right and wrong. What was practicable in the days of health is often found impossible in the days of sickness. What was accurately done under the supervision and immediate control of a master, will often be inaccurately done when the worker is deprived of that supervision and aid. Conscience, with God dwelling in the soul, was fully competent for every duty required from it; but conscience deprived of that presence gives frequent proof of its incapacity and weakness.

The capacities of this faculty show that it was endowed by the Creator under a clear perception of the requirements of a sinful state. It was fitted to serve Him and benefit the rational creature not only in a state of innocence and righteousness, but in a state of guilt and corruption. It does much more to preserve the authority of God, and prevent the overflowing of unrighteousness on this earth, than men are disposed to recognise. As the apprehension and conviction of offenders against the civil law of a country tends to deter men from the commission of crime, so the very general apprehension of *self* by this police force when evil has been committed, and the conviction which is the ordinary result, renders it most undesirable for the soul to transgress a second time in the same way, from the certainty of self punishment with increased severity. And as the civil force of a community sometimes comes upon the plotters of a scheme of wickedness before it has been carried into execution, as in the infamous gun-powder plot of A.D. 1605, so conscience lays its arrest upon an evil design by sternly denouncing the project, and threatening condign punishment should it be carried into practice. Man does not willingly listen to an accusation of guilt, either from a voice within or without. His self-esteem is wounded. It is an attempt to drag him down from a seat of honour, and to place him in the box of the criminal. He will resist such an attempt. Hence the task of the normal faculty in a sinful creature is generally unpleasant; and if it did not possess considerable power and authority, its accusations would be summarily put down. But it is prepared for opposition, and fitted to make good its position. If the deed has been done it cannot be denied to this internal accuser, however fre-

quently it may be denied to external accusers. Any attempt to palm off a deception on conscience is instantly torn into shreds—the man abandons the attempt and falls back on excuses of weakness, temptation, provocation, and such like; but the deed is not denied within, whatever may be said to those without. Having at times full control of the spirit, conscience brings up the past, spreads out the scene, details all the circumstances, and dwells on each stage of the proceeding, until the soul exclaims "I am guilty: O what shall I do?" The faculty takes for granted that the deed is wrong, that it is in contravention of law; and it is only when the surmise is entertained that no law has been transgressed that a search is made into the records of law. Here the whole information in the possession of the soul is brought into service. The man, well informed in laws human and divine, will have a test applied without delay, to confirm or rebut the charge of conscience. The man not possessed of this training, is tossed with perplexities, till past experience, human authority, or, above all, the innate power of this moral arbiter, decide the case. When the guilt is established, and the soul stands convicted at the bar of conscience the former accuser and witness-bringer mounts the tribunal as deputy-judge, and pronounces a coming judgment. The sinner is ever made to feel that he has to do with some mighty ruler and judge, external to himself, of whom this internal voice now gives notice, and whom it claims to represent. Conscience never professes to be the final judge; but it is ever calling attention to a future judgment, the nature of which it professes to indicate. By acting the part of a deputy-judge, and pronouncing beforehand the future decision, it may both cheer and

strengthen the soul of the just and benevolent, and sadden and depress the mind of the false and the cruel. It thus in part anticipates a future retribution. It so far rewards and punishes, by personal internal feelings, on which the life and happiness of men so much depend. Inflexible justice is in it; it seems to know no mercy. It will soothe, and comfort, and uphold by assuring the man of the favour of a supreme Being when he has done well; but it will be as resolutely adverse and punitive when evil has been done. Compassion for the sinner as a sufferer is ignored. It incessantly justifies the punishment when it is a due reward for iniquity. When quickened and brought into direct contact with the almighty Spirit, its power to repeat, and enforce the justice of, the sentence pronounced on the sinner defies resistance, and the soul sinks writhingly under its lashes. Hence, it is clear, that while it constitutes a part of man's spiritual being, it claims to belong to God more than to man—to be more God's servant than man's—and will take part for or against man, as man is for or against God. It will comfort man in extreme distress if suffering for God; but, so far from comforting him in similar trouble when suffering justly for his sins, it will add its whole weight to the scourge, and terribly augment the pain. In vain will poor man look to it for sympathy when paying the penalty of his crimes. God has so constituted man that he carries in himself a rewarder and a punisher greater than any creature can be to him, and inferior only to God himself.

If these statements correctly represent human experience it is plain that the original design of the Creator in bestowing such a faculty on man was that there should be in man at all times and in all conditions a witness to

the existence of God and of his moral government, with which witness, as a normal faculty, the supreme Ruler would hold intercourse at such times and to what extent He pleased ; that this faculty should to the innocent and obedient be a preserver and a rewarder, and that to the guilty and disobedient it should be, so far as their wickedness extended, an accuser, judge, and punisher, as anticipating but not superseding His own judicial proceedings and that during the period of forbearance allowed to the sinner it might exercise a powerful restraint on the prevalence of ungodliness ; but that when final judgment had overtaken the transgressor, it might enforce the justice of the Divine displeasure beyond the power of dispute.

The question here arises, what is the authority of conscience ? Is it supreme ? Ought it always to be obeyed ? It is not absolutely supreme, nor should it always be obeyed. It cannot make right wrong, nor wrong right. If man had retained his integrity it could claim universal obedience, for it would ever have spoken the voice of God, as God would have retained his closest vital connection with the soul of man. Or if in the spiritual fall it had remained upright, retaining in full its connection with God, and through that its light and power, it might still claim general and constant obedience ; but it has suffered by the fall ; the whole soul of man has been deprived of the gracious presence of its Maker ; and the normal faculty has frequently shown by its torpidity, weakness, or perversity, that it does not always represent the will of God. It has a delegated or official authority. When it speaks the mind of its Superior it carries His authority with it ; when it speaks the mind of another, as the folly and superstition of man, it carries no such

authority, and may without guilt, but not without inconvenience, be disregarded. It possesses power, and formidable power, even when not speaking the mind of God, as some officials, when going beyond or contravening the orders of their superior; and disobedience to them may occasion not a little trouble before the judgment of the superior can be heard. It is not enough to have conscience on our side. It may give us confidence, but not safety, as the peace which the perverts to a false religion profess to have. We must have the Lord of conscience with us also, or conscience enlightened and moved to speak the mind of God, when we shall have both safety and peace. Right is right, independent of any decision of conscience; and no urgency of conscience can make that which is in itself wrong, or opposed to the nature or mind of God, to be right. Hence we may call in question the decisions of this faculty. Man, as a fallen being, is far from being infallible; and the light that is in him, paradoxical as it may appear, may be proved to be great darkness. The greater the power of the normal faculty to soothe or alarm, the greater the care that should be taken to regulate it by the light of eternal truth. It comes then to this, that the regulator has to be regulated. It was set in brightness and beauty at first by the great Architect, in His exquisite spiritual mechanism of the human soul; but the deluge of sin has stained and corroded it, darkened its lustre, and impeded its action. Revelation has come to supply its defects. Since man has fallen the conscience-voice in man has not been uniform. Its decisions depend largely on the degree of light in the individual. Hence it can not be regarded as the universal standard of right or wrong in many details of duty. It has universal decisions which are the

voice both of nature and of God, and before which both civilized and savage are constrained to bow; but in the details of duty it lamentably fails. The infinite mercy of God has met our wants by writing on a visible page the full details of that law of which conscience was once an adequate exponent. As the present condition of the normal faculty is of great practical importance it will deserve a particular examination.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

PRESENT CONDITION OF THE NORMAL FACULTY.

To form a correct opinion of the Normal faculty, we must view it in several distinct moods or conditions. It will be impossible to exhibit every phase which it may assume; but we may illustrate certain states which have acquired a degree of permanency. The mountain torrent does not change its channel every day, but only under the influence of severe storms. In like manner the Normal faculty delights to move in acquired grooves. And as the trade-winds which blow steadily in one direction for months, so this power is often felt steadily directing the soul to one line of conduct which it has stamped with its approval. It is, however, very frequently in the back ground, allowing the other endowments of the soul apparently to manage affairs as they see fit. In a large ship with many officers, we may, in ordinary weather see little of the captain, for his subordinates are charged with the management of the routine work; but let a violent gale spring up, or the ship be brought into extreme danger, and the responsible head, if worthy of his position, will at once be seen and heard in every part of his command. So conscience, in the ordinary duties of every day life, may be much out of sight; but let questions of right or wrong, of truth or falsehood, of justice or injustice, be forced upon the attention of the man by high authority or impressive circumstances, then it comes forward to assert its claims

to obedience. It is not always, however, that the soul captain, like the ship captain, is sufficiently prompt to meet, or sufficiently strong to avert, the impending danger.

The operations of conscience are neither constant nor perfect. Yet we can recognise the value of even occasional and imperfect service. The man who has lost his legs may yet support himself by the diligent use of his hands. He who is too old and stiff to keep watch on the mast head, may yet do good service in steering the ship, or sounding the alarm to man the defences on the approach of the enemy. The guide who may not know the whole way through the forest, may conduct us to a half-way house, where another may be found. Let us appreciate the service that can be performed, while we carefully discover what is wanting. We have more reason to complain of error and of unfaithfulness than of simple defect. When the conscience, professing to be a watchman, falls asleep at its post and allows the enemy to enter, without sounding an alarm; when professing to be a guide it leads astray in the midst of danger; or when assuming to decide for the right, through ignorance and mental deception, it perverts right judgment; then we have occasion to question its claims, and condemn its misdoings. Hence it is of moment to apprehend with some degree of clearness the capacity or inefficiency, the rectitude or the perversity of the normal faculty, when summoned to follow its guidance. To facilitate this apprehension, we will notice some of the ordinary states or conditions in which conscience comes under our cognizance. These we enumerate as the Unenlighted, the Perverted, the Torpid, the Troubled, and the Quiescent.

1. The Unenlightened.—Light in the conscience attends light in the mind. If the intellect or mind is in darkness, so is the conscience. But the conscience is not dependent on the intellect for its action; for it may operate in the midst of great intellectual darkness. When the mind has light it belongs to the whole man; the conscience shares in the common benefit. The normal faculty works with and without what is properly regarded as mental and spiritual illumination, in the highest refinement, and in the grossest barbarism. In distinguishing the *Unenlightened* conscience, we see it working amongst the rudest tribes of heathendom, among enlightened or educated heathen, among those who enjoy the civilization of Christianity, and among those who have become the subjects of regenerating grace, but are yet in comparative ignorance. To these the term "unenlightened" is applicable in common, though in very different degrees.

If we closely examine the legislation and conduct of the most barbarous tribes of our race, we may discover the rude outlines of that law which was many centuries ago written by the finger of God on tables of stone, and handed to the Hebrew legislator. The first three Commandments refer to the acknowledgement, worship, and reverence of one supreme God. All the heathen have some supreme invisible deity of whom they stand in awe, whom they seek to worship to the best of their knowledge, whose name they reverence, and whose rights they carefully respect. The fourth Commandment requires the observance of a particular portion of time as sacred to the supreme Being. All the heathen have their appointed seasons for religious worship, which seasons are regulated by the heavenly orbs which rule the day and night. The other six Commandments

point to respect to parental and constituted authority, to the evil of destroying human life, to the maintenance of conjugal rights, to the claims of personal property, to the preservation of truth, and to the restraint of unjust desires to acquire what does not belong to us. Every one of these laws is in some respects acknowledged by the human normal faculty in the breast of the untutored savage. They may not have been able to give them a written form, but they often appeared in the public discussions held in their councils, their palavers, koreros, or corroborees. Respect was granted to their chiefs, the loss of life demanded retaliation, interference with marriage obligations produced revenge not easily appeased, theft was punishable in more ways than one, lying was condemned as dishonourable, and efforts to acquire by improper means what belonged to another received general reprobation. Whence these principles of rectitude? They are the fruits of conscience—the law written on the human heart. They are not the fruits of a mere intellectual examination of the fitness of things, or of what is due to the welfare of society; but they are the results of a moral regulative power common to all, and therefore acknowledged by all. Laws are useful; they have an efficacy when there is a power in every man's heart testifying to their justice and demanding obedience to them. In the absence of education the sentiments uttered in the general councils became the subjects of consideration in every private dwelling, and helped to train the youthful and inexperienced to a recognition of what was right in general public estimation.

When literature obtained a footing, the laws social, moral, religious, and national, would acquire a written

and visible form. With the increase of light, conscience could enforce its claims with more power. The information respecting duty being present to the mind, or presented in so many impressive forms, a departure from what was enjoined by law would the more easily be detected. The laws occupy a place in the history of all civilised nations of antiquity. Their domain is the domain of conscience. Had they been perfect, and the soul of man fully competent to apprehend them, no complaint could be made that the normal faculty wanted light for the path of duty. But they were not perfect, for they were in great part the product of unaided reason; and if they had been given by inspiration of God, the mind of man could not fully understand them without divine illumination. Hence conscience, greatly benefitted by written laws and mental culture, was still defective by want of perfect light. Inspiration changed the moral aspect of the earth. God again spoke to man. He gave him that knowledge of himself which was essential to right worship, and service; and he gave him that apprehension of man's rights which taught him to act justly and kindly to his fellow creature. Moses was inspired by God to frame laws for the regulation of a religious people. The prophets, raised up in the Hebrew nation, expounded and enforced these laws, and foretold an era when the laws of Jehovah would regulate the conduct of the whole human family. The advent of the Messiah, the God-man, was the dawning of a new day of greater light. The old law was not repealed, for it was founded on the principles of eternal right; but it was explained and enforced in a higher degree, requiring the careful regulation of the thoughts and of the desires by the strongest motives of God's love in the mission of his

Son, his own character, and the salvation involved in the possession of holiness. The complete revelation of the divine will has become a part of the literature of several nations, and their habits and laws have been largely influenced directly and indirectly by it. Its light has thus far reached the ordinary conscience. We do not forget that in some nations professing to be not only civilized, but christian, this perfect revelation has been put beyond the reach of the common people, and its general use forbidden by those who profess to enlighten the souls of men in the matter of salvation, a crime of deepest dye, an injury to man, and an unspeakable loss to society ; and that in lands where this Book, Heaven's standard of morality, suffers no restriction in its freest circulation, there are many who are grossly ignorant of its contents, having never read a page of it, nor heard its holy words explained ; but yet the morality of Christendom has been influenced to a greater or less extent by the possession of the heavenly oracles, and so far the moral faculty has shared in this supernatural light. The voice now heard from heaven has not contradicted the voice within that has spoken in all ages, and among all nations, but confirms, strengthens, and adds to that internal testimony. While the voice within spoke of law and justice, heaven's voice without repeats in clearer tones the same truths, but adds what conscience never could discover, the message of mercy, a discovery of free sovereign grace to guilty and perishing man. Is not this light sufficient ? What more can be wanting ? What are the facts ? Many share but dimly in this light, from neglecting to peruse the Bible for themselves. Others who do use it are unable fully to understand it, and say, with the eunuch of Ethiopia, " How can I understand it

without some one to explain it?" More light is needed. The light of human experience, and still more, the illumination of the Holy Ghost. He who studies most the sacred oracles will often repeat the prayer, "Open thou mine eyes that I may behold wondrous things out of thy law." The highest light which the conscience can receive is the illumination of the spirit of God. This is an endowment of unspeakable value. How earnestly should man pant after it! How eagerly should he prize it! What can equal wisdom! But what can rival this light? How shall we estimate its value? O, that the fountain of material light would pour his spiritual radiance into the souls of universal humanity! This light has been granted to many, but in different degrees. As the powers of eyesight differ in many, so in the powers of spiritual discernment. Many need more light who are the children of light. Hence this defective illumination leaves a partially unenlightened conscience. Such a condition is not desirable. It is found often extremely troublesome. The soul may be said to have more sensibility than knowledge. Conscience will see things wrong which others more enlightened justly consider to be right. Let it be trained, not forced. It is unwise to do violence to moral convictions. A tender conscience is often of great value. Give it full light, and obedience to its demands will be followed by peace flowing like a river.

2. The Perverted.—In this case a double injury is inflicted on the human soul. The intellect or understanding is deceived, so that it apprehends things in false relations, and is taught to call evil good, and good evil; and, influenced by this falsely-taught intellect, the

normal faculty impels to the doing of what is in itself wrong, and accuses and condemns when that wrong, supposed to be a duty, is not performed ; and restrains the man from what is in itself good, under the conviction that it is a moral wrong. The importance of correct moral instruction is at once apparent. The conscience may be so perverted by a wrong education that it may prompt to the doing of what the conscience of the untutored savage, left to the guidance of the voice of nature, would restrain him from doing. We may pervert a spiritual faculty, as we can pervert the natural action of a physical limb. The arm of the human body is made to hang down, but its muscular action may be so perverted by being held continuously up, that it may be impossible for it to resume its natural position without extreme pain.

A few illustrations may elucidate this condition. A man may be so taught by heathen priests or so trained by heathen parents that he may look upon a block of wood or stone with great reverence and awe, as the representative of an invisible and supreme power. A proposal to deface or maim that block would instantly call forth the strong resistance of conscience. The man would abhor the doing of such an act as a great crime, as a direct insult to the deity. We know that such an act in other circumstances, with the light that revelation casts on the worship of images, might be regarded as not only harmless but commendable as a significant proof of the entire abandonment of the sin of idolatry. The same heathen may have been so trained as to bring at stated times presents and offerings to the idol. Let something interfere with the customary visit and donation so that it has been neglected at the proper time,

how will conscience act? It will upbraid, accuse, and condemn for the neglect of an important duty in the judgment of the individual. But what is the truth? Conscience is upbraiding for not doing what is in reality a sin, however the man may tread the path of duty. Sin is unchangeable in its character. Duty is often changeable; but what is in itself wrong, being in opposition to the nature and revealed will of God, is eternally wrong in all places and under all circumstances. Our duty is not regulated by our light, but our culpability may be, when the darkness is not the result of our own personal action. Idolatry has its sacred days. Should an idolator yield to the temptation of wages, and work on a day set apart for the honour of the local deity, we can understand what internal trouble his own conscience may give him for this supposed profanation. He was setting up his personal interests before the honour of his god, and such a proceeding never passes uncondemned by a conscience possessed of sensibility. In all this we can see that the acknowledgment and worship and service of a supreme Being is the point to which conscience is aiming; its great mistake, its perversion is that it has come down with a darkened understanding from high and adequate conceptions of the great, invisible, and glorious Jehovah to the worship and service of the mere creation of the human imagination.

The perversion of the normal faculty in respect to the duties which man owes to his fellow-man is somewhat different. In the former case the being, character, and worship of God was misapprehended by the intellect, which led to the perversion of the regulating faculty. In this case man and his claims are well known, and hence the perversion of conscience does not arise from ignor-

ance, but from giving the supposed good to be obtained a preponderance over the evil demanded as the means for its attainment. The very depths of cunning are embraced in this principle. It is embodied in the well-known sentence recorded in Scripture:—"Let us do evil that good may come;" and in the modern phrase:—"The end justifies the means." The evil is admitted, and thereby conscience is allured to anticipate no wrong, and the good is magnified that it may fill the soul, overshadow the evil, and in a manner totally alter its character. If the evil still rises up, that is, if conscience still hesitates, the good to be reached is weighed with it before the eyes of the mind, and the preponderance of good is made to appear so marked as to constrain the conscience not only to consent, but it may be to give the man no rest till the good is reached even by such unjustifiable means. We know nothing more fitted to secure the commission of sin, nothing more fitted to subvert the moral nature of man. The author of this device is the devil. It is the acme of his sagacity in the seduction to moral turpitude. It succeeded with our first parents. It was the good to be attained—the equality with God—that overbalanced the sin involved in disobedience. The Pharisees taught the same principle in their perversion of the fifth Commandment. And the followers of Ignatius Loyola have interwoven this principle through a system of morals which completely upsets the morality enjoined by heaven. Take some illustrations of the systematic destruction of man's moral nature and of God's authority over him.

The law of God requires obedience to those who are in authority, whether parents, masters, or rulers, when that obedience is not contrary to the word of God. But

the morality to which we refer professes to absolve from that obedience, and enjoins disobedience, on the ground of the benefit that will follow to their church. In this way the authority of the church, or a section of the church, is placed above the word of God, and the conscience is trained to regard the voice of the church as authoritatively proclaiming the mind of God, when in reality it is not only superseding it but is directly antagonistic to it. In the same way the revolting crime of murder in the form of assassination is made to secure the support of conscience. This deed is so opposed to the natural influence and bias of conscience that it requires strong discipline to bring it into complete subjection to such gross immorality. For this end special pains are taken to show the good that must result to the church from the removal from the earth of such a man; and the benefit is so weighed with the sin that the latter is cast into the shade as utterly insignificant compared with the good results; it may be represented as but the loss of one soul compared with hundreds; until at last, like the deluded mortal that assassinated the Prince of Orange, the man cannot rest till the deed is performed or he perishes in the attempt. How sadly is this powerful faculty perverted when it may impel a man to do, as a good deed, what nature, reason, and revelation, with one voice, loudly condemn as a revolting crime. If we advance to the seventh command of the decalogue, we shall find that the Jesuit moralists are prepared to silence all accusations of conscience in respect to the breach of it, if certain circumstances are allowed. By a species of dexterous hair-splitting, for it does not deserve to be called reasoning, the inconve-

niences and difficulties, and disabilities arising from certain restraints are enumerated, and then the possibilities of greater sins than the one contemplated, resulting from a variety of imaginable consequences of not yielding to the tempting opportunity; the mind, naturally prone to sin, is trained to view the deed as it wishes to view it, as stripped of its deformity, and adorned as a real and allowable good; and advancing a step farther, it is led to regard the restraints that have been imposed by society as an unjust restriction, and therefore that the deed of licentiousness is but a resumption of right. Thus by a variety of pretences, and by progressive stages, the mind is taught to regard sin as no sin. The conscience will excuse the deed by the Jesuit maxim; the less of two evils has been chosen; and it will be no wonder if it reach the full length of the path of degradation by justifying sins condemned by this command, on the plea of natural right. If the difficulties of this command can be got over, it is comparatively easy to find excuses for the breach of the other three. What harm can it be to appropriate the property of a heretic, if the mind is trained to regard such a man as devoid of all claim to any earthly possession, not excluding life itself? Surely theft is no theft! Conscience may tolerate such mischievous designs. If the would-be thief is a servant, may he not appropriate to himself his master's property, on the plea that he is only taking his own, not having received what he conceives to be sufficient wages for his service. Such morality is actually taught by the conscience-perverters to whom we have referred. The solemnity of an oath disappears under their manipulation, for faith is not to be kept with heretics. When the man breaks his oath, an ordinary

conscience is aroused to charge the soul with great guilt, but so perverted may the conscience become under such moulding that the man may have no peace of mind until he has broken the oath, because the oath is now regarded as a great sin. Ordinary lying may be made to appear as a virtue, and receive the approbation of conscience, because certain results said to be beneficial flow from it. And as for covetousness, its repulsive aspect, when closely inspected, as the mother of many enormities, may be so changed as to wear a most attractive countenance, a saintly mein, and a heavenly garb. Then conscience —deluded conscience—says, Go near and embrace her, she will do you good and not evil. Every sin against God or man may be so dressed up by human ingenuity, aided by the experience of past ages, that it will be made to appear totally different from what it really is, and if the reality can be concealed from the mind, and the apparent accepted as true, the conscience may, in the course of time, be brought, against its original inclination, not only to acquiesce in the doing of what is notoriously wrong, but to impel to the commission of great crimes. It sanctions or impels to nothing *as wrong*, though it may be violently wrong or sinful. The wrong must be made to appear the right, then, and then only can it secure the approbation of conscience. When thus deranged or seduced from the realities of right and wrong, it is perverted.

3. Torpid.—In this state the normal faculty is dull, dormant, unfeeling, seared. The torpidity exists in various stages, from drowsiness to deep sleep, from partial insensibility to an entire loss of feeling, from temporary sluggishness to confirmed torpidity. It is not

natural, it is acquired. The street robber puts his hand upon the mouth of his victim lest he should give an alarm; the surgeon binds firmly the limb whose muscles must remain for some time unmoved; and the patient is dosed with sedatives when acute sensibility would be destroyed. Natural speech, action, and feeling are restrained or destroyed. So it happens with the normal faculty. Its voice is hushed by stifling violently its remonstrance. Its action is obstructed, when it would bar the progress of the sinner in the path of destruction. The policeman is kept back until the purpose of mischief is accomplished. And a less violent, more insidious, and more dangerous expedient is resorted to when the conscience is set asleep by the steady instilling of plausible but fatally false doctrines. This stifling and benumbing work is not accomplished in a day. It is often extended over years, it may be the greater part of a lifetime. The difficulty is proportionate to the amount of resistance arising from the superior enlightenment of the understanding, and consequent vitality or activity of the conscience, and the facility is proportionate to the power of the repressive agency that may be steadily and perseveringly employed. The perfect and continuous benumbing of conscience is rare. Seasons of torpidity, on the other hand, are very common. It is not the enormity of any one crime that prostrates the power of conscience, for the shock sustained by the soul gazing on some unusual crime or folly of great magnitude which it has perpetrated, or by the discovery of such crime or folly by the world, often arouses the normal faculty from the stupor in which it long lay, and restores a vitality and energy such as had not been experienced for years. Just as a drowsy traveller, driven

under cover of night, may be lulled asleep by the ordinary rattling of the coach; but is immediately awaked by a sudden jolt that has almost capsized the conveyance. The drowsiness has fled and will not return by a simple effort of the will. Conscience will not be quieted for some time to come after such an awakening. It sometimes happens that the Holy Spirit, grieved by man, withdraws the restraint against which the soul had chafed, and permits such a fall as will arouse the man to a sense of the course of sin which he has been pursuing. A strictly moral education in early life increases the activity and power of conscience, and will retard the benumbing process of a life of sin. On the other hand, a youth spent in the utter neglect of moral discipline leaves a conscience an easy prey to the repressing power of bad habits. In like manner, torpidity may be prevented or accelerated by frequenting the faithful ministrations of God's word, or by totally avoiding them. The man who wishes to keep awake will not be averse to the striking of the clock—the man who wishes to sleep will deprecate the slightest disturbance.

Torpidity of conscience may be produced in three ways. First, by a continual engrossment in worldly business. In this a man generally sets one object before him, and makes all else bend to that. It may be at one time buying, at another time selling; at one time planting, at another, reaping. The pursuit is allowed to absorb the energies of the man, to the exclusion of all other considerations. He has no time for anything else. When conscience would say, Let me speak a little, the reply is, I cannot hear you just now. When it would hint some unfair dealing, some sharp practice, some extortion, some incorrect calculations, some unjust

accounts, it is answered by a promise of future consideration when it can find time. In the meantime he persists in putting self-aggrandisement above every other subject of thought, and says to conscience as to all others when it would threaten to retard the soul in its grand purpose, Stand aside, and speak when I invite you. Conscience is overborne. It is crowded out. Its authority is not denied, but it is repressed. Its direction is not sought, and its interference is resented as somewhat impertinent. Like one calling at a public office, the chief officer answers the request for an interview with a message that he is specially engaged just now, and invites to call again. The call is repeated at a short interval, when the officer is found to be not less occupied than before. The process is repeated, with the same result. The conclusion is soon reached, that the interview is not desired, and that the officer will avoid it if he can. The visitor will cease to call, unless some business of pressing personal interest will demand it. Or like a partial judge, the man will hear any witness but the one whose testimony will be most damaging to the cause which he favours, and he frames one excuse after another to prevent his testimony from being heard till the hour of adjournment puts an end to the business for the day. There is a promise, and it may be a prospect, of a future hearing and attention, and with this it may be more difficult to deal than with a point blank refusal. The normal faculty at length grows dull and drowsy in waiting, and at last falls asleep, and permits the man to pursue his chosen course undisturbed. He has turned his back to the cataract towards which he is rapidly gliding, and refusing to look forward because of the smooth waters and green banks now seen on either side, he will awake

to his danger by the rough tossings which immediately precede the fatal plunge, but awake when escape is impossible.

Second, the normal faculty grows torpid under the persistent repression of a course of active wickedness. In this, opposition to conscience is more marked than in the former. It is not, "I will hear you again"; but, "I will not hear you at all." In many cases no excuse can be framed for the evil deed, and the sinner promptly refuses to hear conscience. It is not, however, an easy matter to escape from so close and so importunate an applicant. In single combat conscience will compel a hearing. The man then rushes for help to gay and wicked companions, to scenes of amusement, or to the stupidity of intoxication. Sheltered behind these, he escapes many of the strokes of conscience. Another occasion will find him linked with wicked companions in the perpetration of evil, when the attempt will be made to meet the accusations of conscience by a division of the guilt, or some other equally worthless expedient. One sin makes way for another. Where a man could not plant his foot without sinking, we may soon place a ton weight without depression. The heart grows hard by perpetual sinning. For a time the man proves too strong for his faithful monitor within. The love of sin, unlawful gain, unholy pleasure, prevails over the normal regulating faculty, set originally in harmony with the holy nature of the Creator. The mastering of the one is the humiliation of the other. As the one grows strong the other becomes weak. Conscience that would at one time have made the man's face as crimson for the stealing of a penny, leaves him without a pang for the fraudulent appropriation of thousands of pounds. When

crime began its course, a stroke with the fist called forth an inward rebuke, but at length the deadly thrust with the assassin's dagger awakens no remorse. In early youth the neglect of prayer night or morning had been followed by a disturbed feeling not easily set at rest; but now grown old in sin, profanity, Sabbath-breaking, and open licentiousness are prosecuted with callous indifference. Continuous repression of speech by persistent sinning has resulted in deep silence, but it is the stillness which precedes the hurricane. A steady depression of the branch which once pointed heavenward is followed by a permanent bent downwards to the earth. A powerful reanimation can alone restore it to its original position. Self-confidence has discarded the brake on the wheels of life; and now in the shades of approaching night, and on the steep declivities of old age, it cannot be brought into action, and the driver must face the consequences of his folly in irretrievable ruin.

Third, the silence and slumber of conscience is secured by false doctrines. Let a man persuade himself that there is no such thing as sin, that what men call offences against God are only the weaknesses of human nature, that man is not immortal, that there is no future world, that the dissolution of the body is the end of existence, and that man has nothing more to look to but his own individual happiness while he can live, he will not fail to rebuke the voice of conscience as a silly weakness of which he must get rid, as one of the trammels of superstition or a false education imposed on him by ignorant though well-meaning instructors. The task will not be so easy as he may imagine. When he supposes that he has heard the last of an inward accuser, he finds, on the perpetration of some folly, a

self-accusation rising anew to disturb him. The cherished opinions of others so contrary to his own, will give countenance to the voice within. He will unavoidably meet from time to time what will militate strongly against his unnatural process, and retard the consummation on which his heart is set. But he may succeed at length. By avoiding the light, by refusing to read the Bible or attend the house of prayer, by fondly cherishing every idea in favour of his theories, he may bring himself to believe what he desires to believe, and for a time the silence of a torpid conscience may reign within. But the delusion vanishes with the lifting up of the pall of night; and the light of eternity revealing a guilty soul and a sin-avenging God, conscience awakes to sleep no more, and its imposed restraints removed, it assumes the post of an unsilenceable accuser and an unpitying tormentor.

4. Troubled.—When trouble begins, torpidity ends. But there may be trouble without previous torpidity. The human soul is familiar with the trouble of an accusing conscience. It may be the ruffle of a passing breeze, or the continuous heaving of a prolonged tempest. With many the days of storm greatly outnumber the days of calm. What produces this agitation, distress, and alarm? A sense of guilt for duties neglected or positive sins committed. Conscience does not trouble a man for the sins of others. He may be distressed in connection with the sin of another, but if his conscience has originated the distress, it is because he has had some share in the guilt by exposing the fallen to temptation, or countenancing in some form what has resulted in the crime. It is just so far as he has been one of the con-

tributing causes to the evil result that his conscience charges him with guilt, and occasions internal distress. It is possible that a tender conscience may go farther. A question may be started such as this—"What have I done to prevent such crimes? Might I not have hung a lamp near that pit into which the thief has fallen? Might I not have set up a fence on the edge of that cliff over which the drunkard has staggered?" If we are troubled for our many positive sins, what shall we say to the charge of our innumerable sins of neglect? Sins of omission are acts of disobedience. Each command has a double face. It requires a man to do, and not to do. The command not to kill, is also a command to take great care of life. The command not to commit adultery is a command to preserve purity of thought, speech, and action. The command not to make a false oath is a command to speak the truth with all fairness and accuracy. If a man limit his conception of any command to the special act condemned, he may have an idea of his innocence totally aside from the truth. He may have peace of conscience from his ignorance, but it is a false peace. It is from a true apprehension of the spirituality and extent of the divine law that a troubled conscience often springs. How can it be otherwise? Who can estimate the number of his errors? A man may turn his eyes away from them, but that will not diminish their number, nor prevent his appearance at the bar of judgment to answer for them.

Parental neglect has allowed a youth to break the Sabbath and go with bad companions. It has proved the ruin of the youth, and has planted a thorn in the conscience of the parent which cannot be extracted. Or a girl has disregarded the earnest admonitions of her

mother, and forms a connection against the parent's will. She has gained her object, but has also secured a troubled conscience, from which she cannot relieve herself.

Inhumanity has turned a poor beggar from the door without a particle of food. The starving wanderer has sought the shelter of an out-house, and exhausted nature has sunk into the silence of death. The beggar will knock no more at the door, but another monitor will repeat his knocks from time to time on the memory of the cold-hearted mortal.

Cruelty has refused a widow's request to allow her a little time to secure a shelter for herself and her little ones, before she is turned out from the house which she once called her own, but of which fraud has now deprived her. The house is abandoned, but the proprietor has secured more than the property—a troubled conscience makes it a dear possession.

Base selfishness and cowardice have impelled the captain and crew of a steamer disabled and sinking, to escape from death by taking the only boat, and leaving the passengers to perish. They may have thought that as dead men tell no tales their heartlessness would never be known, and they could form their own tale on reaching the land. Several perished, but a few were floated ashore on a piece of the wreck. The crew were all saved, but the outcries of those abandoned to death by them did not cease with their drowning voice, but found a response in the conscience of the cowardly crew from which it was a hard task to free themselves.

Culpable sloth has loitered by the way when life and honor demanded haste. Relief has come, but it is too late. The city has surrendered to the foe; death has

seized its victim, and its grasp cannot be relaxed. One hour sooner and all would be saved. Two hours might have been saved by a refusal to turn aside from the way to enjoy a mis-timed hospitality. Who is guilty? What will conscience continue to say for many a long day on the mention of the name of the deceased.

Who can enumerate the sources of trouble from positive transgressions? They are like the sands on the sea shore, innumerable. When our first parents transgressed the law of God they were troubled in conscience, and when they heard the voice of God calling to them, they trembled even in their hiding-place. When their first-born son murdered his brother, his inward distraction was great, as seen from his answers given to God. The remembrance of Jacob's deception greatly troubled him in the prospect of meeting with Esau on his return to Canaan. When Joseph's brethren were harshly treated in Egypt they were reminded of the cruel treatment shown to their brother when they sold him as a slave for that very country, and their conscience smote them afresh for their wickedness as it had often done before. When Achan saw the lots cast to discover who had appropriated the accursed spoil of Jericho, and found the dissevering lines approaching nearer and nearer himself, he must have felt the eye of God upon him and that his sin was before his eyes. So felt the prophet Jonah, when standing among sailors on the deck of the tossing ship. He saw the lot come out against him. Though conscious of guilt, a manly courage seized him, and he was ready to brave death rather than see all hands perish on his account. When Elisha looked Gehazi in the face and asked him, on his return from his lying expedition after Naaman the

Syrian, whither he had gone, he mustered up courage to reply, "Nowhere!" But when his master presented the whole scene of his pursuit of the Syrian, his troubled conscience came out in the downcast look, and in this case the crimson of shame gave place to the whiteness of leprosy. How troubled in conscience was Judas when he saw that his Master was condemned to die. He may not have anticipated any such result from the betrayal. He loved money more than his Master; and he may have expected that the chief priests would lose their money, and their prey would easily escape their grasp, as he had often done before. But this was not to be, and Judas must have known that his Master often foretold his death at the hands of the Jews. If his conscience had been dumb during the short interval of trial, which we do not imagine, it spoke in tones of thunder when he saw him condemned and led away to Pilate, with a demand for his execution. The wretched betrayer was overwhelmed in the sea of his trouble.

But distress of conscience is not confined to the wicked. When the righteous go astray their trouble of mind is often extreme. What distress could surpass that of David, when fully aroused to the enormity of his guilt? How often did Peter mourn his denial of his Master? How was Saul of Tarsus troubled in conscience during those three days and three nights in which he neither eat nor drank, but spent the time praying in sadness of heart and in the gloom of blindness. He had been a blasphemer, a persecutor, and a participator in the guilt of murder. But, without descending to the level of great transgressions, how often are the truly godly troubled in mind by reason of

many shortcomings and neglects. They see what others do not, and are distressed by what occasions no trouble to less enlightened and less sensitive minds.

A troubled conscience has frequently led to the discovery of sin and the confession of guilt. It creates a feeling of anxiety and alarm that cannot always be concealed. An unusual whistle in a crowd has turned the head of a criminal and led to his arrest on suspicion. Curiosity might have led to the same result, but there was in his look something more than curiosity, and led the experienced detective at once to mark the man. Sometimes the demands of conscience will not be satisfied until the slanderer has made full confession, until the thief has made full restoration, and until the murderer has surrendered himself and received the due reward of his crime. It is well for society that the normal faculty does not totally lose its power, and it is often well for the individual that he is thus reminded of his guilt, that he may repent and seek forgiveness and do works meet for repentance before he appears at the bar of the great Judge. Conscience may unnecessarily occasion distress, but its admonitions are almost ever the just indications of contracted guilt in some form.

5. Quiescent.—We distinguish the quiescent state from the torpid. The one is a natural, and, it may be, legitimate repose; the other is an unnatural and constrained stillness. As a guardian, the normal faculty sits at rest and smiles approbation when all duty is faithfully and regularly performed. This quiet complacence depends upon the light possessed and followed by the soul. The conscience may err in speaking peace when in truth the soul has not peace with the great King;

and it may destroy rest and peace when in truth there is no call for the disquietude and trouble. If duty is not attended to, as apprehended by the soul, the rest is disturbed; conscience is agitated, and will give the soul no peace. If sin is committed a similar result ensues. Hence we may see how the quiescent state is restored and maintained. Let duty be discharged according to obligation, and the conscience which had risen to reprove, resumes its seat in quietness. If sin has been committed or injury sustained by a fellow man, conscience refuses to let the soul rest till satisfaction has been rendered. A false statement has been made before a human tribunal; this faculty speaks authoritatively to the man, and says, "You must go and recall that statement; you must acknowledge your error, and remove the false impression, and if you do not, I will continue to scourge you, and give you no rest." Conscience is obeyed, and the judge within expresses satisfaction. A fraud has been committed. A fellow man has been deprived of a certain sum justly belonging to him, and a receipt has been obtained for a full discharge. But conscience refuses to discharge the man. It says, "There is a sum which you have not paid, and yet you have marked it down as paid. I will not sit still, nor will I suffer you to rest till you go and rectify that account, and restore to the man what belongs to him." The dishonest man may attempt to reason with his conscience. He may silence it by constraint and the pressure of business. But it refuses its acquiescence, and utters, under the constraint imposed, a threat that it will speak again of this matter when it cannot be put off. It is not unlikely that the man in such circumstances will promise a future rectification of the mistake, in order to

secure present peace. A man has lost his life by what some may call an accident. But the event touches the conscience of one deeply concerned. He presented a gun to the deceased, and pulled the trigger, not thinking that the gun was loaded, and shot the man dead. A widow and family have been left unprovided for. What now can be done to repair the loss? Conscience will not suffer the man who was the instrument of this misfortune and loss to rest till he has done what he can, both to console and relieve the bereaved family. When all is done that can be done, it may be said to be appeased, but not satisfied. The heedlessness or recklessness that could so endanger life has left a sting behind which will be felt for years to come.

When God is the offended party, conscience demands satisfaction before it will consent to rest. If promises of future amendment will not be accepted for the past, recourse is taken to expressions of regret, and the question is asked, "What reparation can I make for the evil that I have done?" All the religious knowledge possessed by the man is then pressed into service, to give advice in this serious condition. If the man believes in the priestly authority of the church of Rome, he will go and confess his sins to the priest, do penance, pay the required sums for special masses, secure the intercession of the priest with supernal powers, and receive absolution for all the past. It may be that he will now return home with a light heart, his conscience having, in the darkness of his mind, accepted the combined services as satisfactory. But if he has enjoyed the illumination of scripture, he will know that every sin deserves God's wrath and curse, both in this life and that which is to come, that no services now performed can make up for past

neglect, seeing that they are all required for the present, that no mere sorrow for sin can meet the demands of justice which calls for punishment on the offender, as no human government accepts the mere regrets of a culprit as an atonement for his crime, that the punishment demanded is nothing short of eternal banishment from the presence of God, and that if the past were forgiven, all his experience goes to prove that he would speedily incur again the same wrath and curse for sin—and hence he is shut up to the conclusion, "I am undone, I cannot save myself; no man, himself a sinner, can save me. *God be merciful to me.*" But can God show mercy when his truth and justice bar the door of the sinner's prison? These bars cannot be broken, nor can the sinner remove them. We are at a stand. Conscience knows no mercy; it sees no way of escape. Then the sinner's Friend, Immanuel, appears. He offers satisfaction. His atoning blood, his meritorious death is set opposite in the divine record to the demands for death to the sinner. His righteousness, in a life of perfect obedience to the divine law, is offered in the room of the perfect obedience demanded from the creature. This is what gives rest to the conscience. A sacrifice that can take away sin, for it makes full amends for the dishonour done to God; and can assuage wrath, for it grants all that justice can demand; and can liberate the condemned, for it glorifies the truth of God, meets every possible claim of the enlightened conscience for satisfaction for the past. Conscience asks, "Is that sacrifice yours?" The sinner replies, "I have made it my own by accepting as a gift what I could never purchase, and what was freely offered." Conscience exclaims, "I am

satisfied, I am indeed satisfied," and settles down into profound but joyful quiescence.

But this rest is yet to be disturbed. The heart of man is prone to sin. He is surrounded by tempters, and falls under their influence. Then conscience again accuses, and with a bitterness unknown before. The accusations are met by a fresh acceptance of the merits of the sacrifice, still within the sinner's reach, and again conscience resumes the quiescent state. This is repeated as often as the consciousness of guilt distresses the soul. But more is wanted than satisfaction for transgression. The law demands a full and constant obedience. Conscience condemns defective obedience. The Lord our Righteousness is again the sinner's refuge. He offers not only atonement, but the robe of perfect obedience ; the sinner accepts this robe, and clothing himself with it, presents himself before conscience. Satisfied beyond expression and delighted, the conscience breathes the most perfect acquiescence. Let mortal man hold fast this faith, and the good conscience which follows a faithful performance of its duties, and his peace may flow like a river, and his righteousness be as the waves of the sea.

CHAPTER XL.

ITS RESTORATION BY GRACE.

The whole animate material creation exhibits, when injured, powers of self-restoration within certain limits. Beyond these limits, the injury proves fatal to the plant or animal, unless aided by some power external to itself. You may cut off the branch of a tree, but it may be replaced by the tree sending forth another equally large, closely contiguous to the root of the amputated member. You may curtail its dimensions by cutting its branches all around, but its power of self-restoration may in a few months more than repair the injury. You may wound it severely by cutting into its trunk, but it may maintain its vitality, heal the wound, and cover from sight the scar, by the production of new wood; you may even cut off some of its main roots, but if you leave others, it will continue to grow and send out fresh roots to seek nourishment in the place of those of which it has been deprived. But the process of diminution or of wounding may be carried too far. If you cut off all the branches it may die, although the trunk is uninjured. The loss of the whole breathing apparatus at a certain season of the year may reduce the vitality beyond the power of restoration. The constitution receives a shock, as an animal frame under a severe amputation from which it cannot rally. The branches may be left untouched, but if you girdle the tree, and thus prevent the sap from

ascending, it will die. The same result will follow a too great deprivation of the roots. It need scarcely be remarked that some trees and vegetables have immensely greater powers of vitality than others. The leaf-less limb of a willow tree, if not deprived of its sap, will take root if driven into congenial soul. And the lowly but valuable strawberry plant will display great tenacity of life after its roots have been split and torn by continuous transplanting. But there is a point in each plant beyond which vitality recedes, under injuries received, till life is extinct, when the utmost attention and culture prove futile.

If an animal is wounded, the vital fluid is immediately directed to the wounded part to repair the injury. If the blood is pure, and not weakened or poisoned by the use of alcohol, unwholesome food, or impure air, the healing process proceeds rapidly, if within the power of nature's unaided resources. Nature, within her own province, is the best physician. But her powers of restoration are restricted. The amputated limb will not grow again. The remaining one may acquire additional skill and aptitude by practice; but the lost cannot be replaced. The branch that is cut off does not again grow at the point of excision, but near to it. When hearing is lost nature seeks to repair, in some measure, the defect, by increasing the ocular discernment; and, when sight is lost, by increasing the power of hearing. When a bone is broken it will grow together if fairly set and properly bandaged. Here the necessity for aid becomes manifest. Within a certain limit nature will restore unaided; within a wider circle it will heal and build up when receiving intelligent assistance. A wound may be received from which the sufferer will

bleed to death if aid is not afforded, for nature cannot stop the flow from every wound. The internal system may be so obstructed by widely distributed impurities and poisons that it cannot, unaided, throw off the disease; but give it assistance, without superseding its proper action, and health may be restored.

Does this law of self-restoration, unaided and aided, which pervades the animate material world, both vegetable and animal, extend to the spiritual? Reasoning from analogy, we should conclude that it does, within certain limits. That as wounds, injuries, or defects of an external or superficial character, and of a limited internal nature, may thus be cured in the vegetable or animal, so certain defects or injuries affecting some of the faculties of the immaterial spirit, such as the emotional or intellectual, may be restored and cured by the inherent vitality and energy of the spirit, aided or unaided. And as a severe wound to the vegetable, and a simple piercing of the brain or heart of the animal, may exceed all the restorative power of such animate existence, so an injury may be inflicted on some chief department or faculty of the spirit, from which no restoration can be found within the resources of the spirit. As the human soul in this life operates through a material frame, whatever affects that frame favourably or unfavourably so far affects the soul. A diseased stomach or liver will so far influence the brain, through impure blood and sympathy of action, as to affect materially the emotional and intellectual powers; while a heavy stroke on the head will paralyse all mental effort, if it do not destroy the connection between mind and body. If mental derangement, intellectual or emotional, is the effect of disease in the material organs, the removal of the disease is the

restoration of the mind to a normal and healthy state. So far the law of self-restoration operates in the man as a spiritual being.

It is when we consider the spirit as removed from a material frame that the difficulty of determining the operation of this law begins. Experience here fails us. We can only reason from analogy. Can we conceive of an intellectual or emotional defect or injury befalling a pure spirit, which defect or injury may be remedied or cured in the exercise of that spirit's own powers, or with the aid of some other pure created spirit? Is the moral nature alone incurable by creature effort? Can the intellectual and emotional be injured without the moral being affected? The injury of the moral affects the whole soul; can as much be said of either of the other departments? These questions are shrouded in mystery. We know that holy angels contend with unholy angels without a loss of integrity or purity, but we know not how far other powers may be impaired in the conflict. Their strength is limited. They are not almighty, and hence their strength may fail under the assault of a superior power, unless succored by their great Captain. If capable of exhaustion or wounding, reason may conclude that they possess, while the moral nature remains untouched, a recuperative and restorative power. We can go no further.

Man's moral nature has been wounded, deeply wounded. All experience proves this. Is this wound fatal? We have seen that certain wounds, such as injuries to brain or heart, transcend the restorative powers both of animal nature and of rational skill as possessed by the creature. Is the injury sustained by man's moral nature of that class that all the skill and energy displayed by

humanity have failed to repair it? We may say that it is. As no sinless mortal has yet been seen on this earth since Adam's moral nature was first smitten by sin, we may conclude that the wound is incurable by human ingenuity and power. The dislocation cannot be adjusted by human strength. The heavenly magnetism that drew the soul Godward cannot be restored by created skill. The disease which has penetrated the soul is not removable by any earthly physician. But does it defy creative skill? Impossible. He who has made can certainly remake. Infinite power is guided by infinite wisdom; and infinite wisdom is ever in accordance with infinite goodness and truth. If truth and holiness, in other words, the moral nature of God, do not bar the exercise of power, infinite wisdom can find a way for the outgoing of that power for the accomplishment of the desired end. If not only within the power, but within the truth and holiness of God to restore the fallen soul of man, is it probable that he would so far interest himself in his fallen creature as to exercise, in a legitimate way, his wisdom and power for man's spiritual recovery? It is not improbable, provided his own glory is promoted thereby. He exercised creative power and skill for his own glory in the formation of man; for the same grand end the exercise might be repeated. He glorified himself in giving life at first; he might restore life when lost if his own glory would be equally or more fully displayed. His goodness is manifest everywhere. Pity is an element in goodness. Might it not find an outgoing towards this fallen race if truth and justice opened the way. The injury was not an accident. It was a self-inflicted wound in direct disobedience to express orders. Punishment was threatened for disobedience; and truth demands that

it should be inflicted, How then can man escape? Who can heal his wound?

The case was peculiar. The man stood not only for himself, but all his posterity; and hence countless millions were plunged into misery and woe by his disobedience. Of these a vast multitude have been unconscious infants. Here was a state of helpless misery fitted to touch infinite compassion. If one could bring so much misery on many—could not one occupy a similar representative position, bear the punishment and repair the injury? It is done. Let Immanuel deliver his own message: "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotton Son, that whosoever believeth on him should not perish, but have everlasting life." What a shout of welcome should the earth raise to such a a visitant! How eagerly should the glad tidings be accepted, and passed along from shore to shore, and round and round our globe, till every corner was filled with the joyful sound!

We open the sacred volume, and ask how is the normal faculty restored to its original place and power? The answer is given: "God, who at first commanded the light to shine out of darkness, hath shined in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ." The work is attributed to the original fountain of light, the restorer of order, and the infuser of life. The Holy Spirit is the first cause of these marvellous effects. To Him belongs the glory of ordering and beautifying the spiritual creation. And if the preparation of the earth for the abode of man was a restoration of order subsequent to a previous order that existed, wherein there was a primal display of vegetable and animal life of great luxuriance, but which was over-

thrown by great internal convulsions, as geology would seem to indicate; this restoration of the soul of man to a state of order, fitting it for loyal subjection to the glorious dominion of Him who is the second Adam, Son of God, and son of man, after a violent spiritual overthrow, which followed a brief but glorious display of intellectual and spiritual life, has had a striking illustration and analogy in the material operations of the great Spirit.

The restoration is spoken of as an illumination, a birth, and a creation. These terms illustrate distinct features of the work. There is light, for knowledge and truth attend the goings of God. He is light, and his gracious presence diffuses light wherever he goes. The birth is an entrance on a new state of existence. It pre-supposes life, both the infusion of life, and the operation of life external to the person born. Life is infused, or, speaking of man as one with the original fountain of humanity, restored by the Spirit, who gave life to all animated existence, and the revived or quickened soul is brought out of darkness into the light of a new world —the kingdom of God. There is then the creation, that is, a reforming or restoration, after the secondary sense of the word. Adam is said to be created when he was formed of pre-existing material—the dust of the earth; and Eve was created when formed from a part of man. The term is not confined to a calling into existence of something out of nothing. The creation of which we speak is not the production of a new existence out of nothing, but the reforming or restoration of the human soul from a previously disordered or dilapidated condition.

In this restoration the re-invigoration of the conscience attends the illumination of the intellect. And

possessed of new life and energy, it reins up the impetuous soul from sins after which it has eagerly run, disturbs the soul when sin is contemplated, kindles impatience and indignation when the attempt is made to seduce the soul from the path of integrity, and generally claims to rule and regulate the whole man, as a governor newly installed into office. It was in office before; but its diseased and weakened condition resulted in a very disordered, negligent, or spasmodic government. If it was bad the other faculties were even worse. The understanding was darkened, for the sun had gone down, as the records of heathendom may testify, although the feeble lamp of reason was burning, and the emotional nature was thoroughly perverted by the habitual indulgence of evil affections, and the executive power, the will, fairly represented the directive and impulsive forces of the soul. But now, with the restoration of the conscience to new life and power, comes the illumination of the mind and the purification and elevation of the emotions. The conscience rules over a renewed soul, disposed in every part to respond to the Divine will. Absolute health may not at once be enjoyed by any part, but the whole soul is convalescent. As the work of material creation or restoration was progressive, till man, the glory of this lower creation, appeared: so the work of spiritual creation or restoration is progressive, till the Son of man, the glory of the higher creation, appears. The Spirit who began the work carries it on. The Sun of righteousness arises upon the soul with increasing splendour till the noon-tide glory is reached. The strength of the new man steadily advances notwithstanding many apparent decays, till the maturity and vigour of spiritual manhood are attained. The jarring of

disorder gradually decreases until the whole machinery works with facility and smoothness under the regulating power of an enlightened conscience. In this up-building of the normal faculty in authority and power the Spirit employs, as a main instrument, the inspired word. By its application the spiritual magnetism of the conscience is constantly increased, or restored when impaired by the presence of sin. That holy word not only invigorates conscience, but enlightens the understanding and purifies the affections, that the rule of conscience may be both natural and pleasant. Its constant use, under the Divine blessing, heals and brightens the whole soul, until the man receives the seal of perfect and eternal conformity to the Divine image.

CHAPTER XLI.

THE DIVINE PSYCHOLOGY.

When the Divine moralist would point out the perfection and extent of that duty which man owes to his Maker, he uses four distinct terms as descriptive of the human soul, over all which the principle of obedience inculcated must hold sway. Thus, in replying to the question,—"Which is the first commandment of all?" from a learned man of more than ordinary religious discernment, he said,—"Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength: this is the first commandment."—Mark xii. 30. What are we to understand by these four terms—*heart*, *soul*, *mind*, and *strength?* Did infinite wisdom, in using them, intend to refer to four distinct departments or capacities of the human soul?—or is the language to be understood as simply a full and varied form of expressing the whole nature of man without respect to any distinct capacities or powers? Or if some distinction is allowed as between heart and mind, may not the term "soul" be regarded as explanatory, and the term "strength" as referring to physical energy rather than spiritual capacity? The principle either of explanation or of distinction must be carried throughout. If we adopt that of explanation, the three terms which follow "heart" must go together as an exposition of the first term. If we choose that of distinction, then we

regard our Saviour as referring to four distinct capacities or powers, as spiritual departments, which embrace the whole human soul.

A distinction was early made among the operations of the soul. As a necessary result separate terms were chosen to express these operations, or the spiritual capacities which originated or controlled them. Hence the earliest form of this great command, in Deuteronomy vi. 5, embraced three separate terms, "heart," "soul," and "might." The Seventy, in rendering this verse in Greek, seem to have felt that the understanding or mind should not be excluded, and have translated the Hebrew *lebhabh*, "heart," by διανοια (*dianoia*) "understanding," or mind, and not by καρδια (*kardia*) "heart." It may be, that in their judgment διανοια had a more expansive property than καρδια, and was better fitted to take the place of *lebhabh*, which, beyond question, was used by the Hebrews to express the ideas which are conveyed to us by the words, conscience, heart, and understanding. In two subsequent chapters, Deut. x. 12, xi. 13, the same writer connects this command with the two terms, "heart" and "soul," the former of which is rendered in both cases by the Seventy by καρδια. It thus appears that the ancient Hebrew employed three separate terms, and the Greek four, to express the extent of this command over the spiritual nature of man. To the one term *lebhabh* the Seventy gave the double interpretation διανοια and καρδια, not regarding these terms as synonymous, for they use the both in one verse (Jere. xxxi. 33, Eng. xxxviii. 33, Sep.) in reference to the powers of the soul. The propriety of the course adopted need not be questioned from the latitude allowed by the Hebrews to the word *lebhabh*.

We may now consider the terms used by our Lord. As he spoke the Hebrew of that age we may suppose that he used the terms employed by Moses, with the slight alteration of form and accent, and the insertion of the fourth term, that for "mind," not used by Moses. The words in order of speech would then be—*lebhabh*, *nephesh*, *binah*, *m'odh* — heart, soul, mind, strength. These are the terms employed by Moses in Deut. vi. 5, with the addition of *binah*, "mind." This last term had come prominently into use in the days of Solomon, and occurs frequently in the book of Proverbs, where it is translated "understanding," both as knowledge attained, and the faculty by which knowledge is attained. The word for strength, *m'odh*, seems to point to energy, might, power to weigh down or bend, and is fairly applicable to the firm resolution of the will which presses its decision, and desires to bend all to its determinations.

Regarding then these four terms *Lebhabh*, *Nephesh*, *Binah*, and *M'odh*, as representing four distinct departments of the human spirit, what idea would we attach to each? The first we regard as intended by our divine Teacher to represent the conscience or normal faculty, the second the emotional department, the third the intellectual capacity, and the fourth the executive department or will.

We believe, after all the mental application that we have given to the subject, that it is not possible in strict accuracy to resolve any one of these powers into another, and that there is no mental exercise which does not belong directly or originally to one of these capacities, singly or to two or more combined. In other words, that there are four, and only four, distinct, original departments or spiritual capacities in the creature Man.

It is no small satisfaction to find the result of abstruse philosophical investigation confirmed by the voice of Infinite intelligence.

But may it not be premature to announce such a conclusion? There is another language equally inspired with the Hebrew, what is its voice on this important subject? Its terms are: "καρδια, ψυχη, διανοια, and ισχυς," (Mark xii. 30). Of καρδια (*kardia*) "heart," we have already spoken in a former chapter. It was then seen to be a term chosen by inspired writers to express the idea of a spiritual faculty which accuses, reproves, and condemns—which is the normal faculty, conscience. One of the chief meanings assigned to ψυχη (*psuche*) "soul," is the emotional nature of man, the seat of the affections or feelings. It corresponds to the Hebrew *nephesh*, which is the term for soul as possessed of animation, feeling, desire. The third term διανοια (*dianoia*) "mind," has a definite meaning. It is restricted to intellect or intellectual exercise. It does not include either conscience or feeling. The fourth term ισχυς (*ischus*) "strength," is applied to bodily or mental strength. The ancient Greeks used the term in connection with mental feelings, as when Thucidides speaks of the strength of hope, and the sacred writers employ it when speaking of the power of purely spiritual beings as God and the angels.—Eph. i. 19, vi. 10; 2 Pet. ii. 11. It is therefore aptly applied when used to express that faculty which is both the exponent and the embodiment of the power, might, or energy of the human spirit, and which so readily controls the physical energy of the man.

If these distinct capacities or spiritual departments exist, there is a propriety and utility in naming them; if

they do not exist, the naming of them seems both uncalled for and improper, as fitted to bewilder. They do exist, and therefore they receive distinct recognition from the lips of Him who knew what powers the spirit of man possessed. The propriety and utility of their distinct recognition is readily apprehended. We may direct a gardener to water a certain tree. In naming the tree we may be understood as embracing all belonging to it. But, wishing to be particular, we may say, Water the roots and stock; or, with greater minuteness, Water the root, stock, and branches; or, anxious that the watering should be thorough, we may prefer to say—Water the root, stock, branches, and leaves. The term "tree" includes all, and in certain circumstances might be held as sufficient; but for our purpose we prefer to be minute, and distinguish the essential departments. In the same way the term "spirit" may include all the attributes of the divine Being, or of an angel, or the human intelligence; but the special mention of the powers or capacities of either may have at times its appropriate interest and power. Therefore the command assumed the form of—"Thou shalt love the Lord with all thy heart, with all thy soul, with all thy mind, and with all thy strength," and not simply: Thou shalt love the Lord with thy whole spirit. The meaning is—love to God, as thy God, shall pervade, overflow, and control at all times, thy conscience, emotions, intellect, and will. The order of the terms is not of material importance. The soul is one. But if distinction of place is allowed, conscience, or the normal faculty retains, by right, the first place; the intellect may claim the second; the emotional nature, the third place, as moved by the operations of the intellect and conscience; and the will, or executive power,

the fourth and last place, as called into exercise by conscience, the intellect, and the emotional nature, and as immediately preceding external action—no other mental state necessarily intervening between the decision of the spirit and its outward exhibition.

If our conceptions of the departmental arrangement of the human spirit are true to nature, we may expect to find traces of this *tessarene* or four-one order (if we may add a new term to our stock of English words) in the operations and organizations which had their origin with man's Maker, but the management of which has been committed to human capacity. Man stamps his own image, often unconsciously, on his own operations. He frequently delights to do so. He not only calls his estate and home and children by his own name, but he engraves his image and handwriting on his manufactures and productions. In ways less visible he leaves his impress in his writings, and on the human spirits with whom he frequently comes in contact. He seeks to mould after his own feelings and notions. His organizations will partake of his character and capacity. In Divine operations and organizations we expect to find a certain uniformity in beings of the same order—they will have an essential unity. Nature reveals such facts. And in organizations committed to creature agency we shall find an adaptation to the capacities and powers at the disposal of the creature. The world teems with illustrations from the lowest forms of animal life up to man. To man we must confine our attention. There is a body politic and a body ecclesiastic, both founded by infinite wisdom, but entrusted for management to human capacity. Are there any traces of this tessarene order in their organization, and consequent adaptation to suc-

cessful development and control by the creature man ? There are striking analogies testifying to a common origin, involving a skilful and benevolent adaptation at once to the necessities and capacities of the controlling agent.

The State is a political body, a corporate existence ordained by God for the guidance, improvement, and preservation of society. How is this body moved and regulated ? The answer might be in many dissimilar ways. But when we modify the question, and ask how does civilised, enlightened, and educated man conduct his political organization ? The reply may be, " By an approximation to the original design, by a natural process of evolution from his own spiritual nature." In that corporate existence the four departments attain a marked prominence.

A head is indispensable. It matters not what name he receives—Governor, President, Sovereign, or Emperor. From him the supreme commands go forth. He is the object of final appeal. In his name laws are promulgated. By his authority rewards are bestowed and punishments inflicted. He is the representative of the Normal faculty in man.

A legislative department was found indispensable. The head needed light and information. One or two assemblies meet, and deliberate for the making, revising, or altering of statutes which may become laws when they receive the consent of the head of authority. In this department of combined wisdom, counsel, and information, we see the evolution and counterpart of man's Intellectual capacity.

The people are the great source of power. They move and are moved by the Legislative assemblies. When

they are strongly excited, legislation may be expedited or impeded in a great degree. They are the fountain of action in many important measures. Though not the governing authority, their influence is powerfully felt both in initiating and in modifying governmental proceedings. Distinguished as the ruled from the rulers, they are an essential part of the corporate existence, the spring and support of action and power in every great enterprise. In them the Emotional nature of man obtains a striking resemblance.

An executive is needed. Neither the governor nor the legislature, nor the people, can undertake this work. It pertains to a class of officers. It is theirs to carry into execution conclusions reached by the agreement of the other three. They are clothed with authority, but they are not the fountains of authority. They are its exponents. Behind them are the law-makers, and the head of influence in whose name they act. The whole machinery of government is manipulated by them. It is theirs to keep in working order all its parts. In this the counterpart of the human Will is clearly apprehended. The will carries out the pleasure of the emotions, the intellect, or the conscience, or the choice or conclusion of any two of them, or the judgment of the three combined. Harmony is secured when the will is the expression of the three. So does the executive of a country work with general satisfaction when they carry out what are not the demands of one department in opposition to the others, but the wishes of the people, the legislature, and the sovereign.

The Church is an ecclesiastical body, a corporate existence organised for a special purpose by the supreme Ruler. That purpose is his own glory, and the restora-

tion and salvation of men. In this organization the four departments have their appropriate place.

There is a Head, the fountain of law and order, the bestower of rewards and punishments, the person of ultimate appeal, and the supreme Arbiter. What the normal faculty is to the spirit of man, and much more, Christ is to his church, as its sole and supreme Head.

There is a legislative department in the complete record of the Divine will. In its construction man has performed his part. The legislators were human, and yet their laws are inspired, as they were chosen of God, and guided by His counsel. Their human peculiarities are, however, apparent in all portions of the Record. The laws are Divine in origin and substance, but they bear the traces of the human spirits through which they have passed. Ecclesiastical legislation is now limited to the interpretation of Divine laws, and to the rectification of human conduct according to these laws. Such is the counterpart of man's intellectual directory, the fountain of information, intelligence, and counsel.

The body of believers have also their potent influence. To them belongs the right, as to the people in the body politic, of electing their own officers and representatives. They move by petitions the legislative assembly and the governing Head. They impel their officers to action, and prevail by the vehemence of their desires with the avenging Judge. As they are possessed by courage and hope, the church prevails. When filled with peace and joy, prosperity marks the condition of the ecclesiastical body. If they are strong, it is strong ; if they are feeble and faltering, its movements are languid as the actions of a man devoid of feeling. Here is the representative of man's emotional susceptibility. As the emotional

nature of a man gives tone and character to his whole conduct so the majority of believers in a church stamp the character and operations of that church.

The Church has also her earthly executive. These are rulers chosen by the people, but sanctioned by the sovereign. To him they vow fidelity and allegiance while promoting at once the sovereign's honour and the people's welfare. Christ calls some to bear rule in His house. To them he gives authority, and commands the people to obey them while carrying out his laws. They are not, however, to be lords over God's heritage, nor to assume titles, or claim homage unauthorised by their king. When they exceed their powers they deserve to be disregarded, and the body of believers may make choice of others who will strictly adhere to the sovereign's will and the people's rights. This is the corporate will that corresponds to the individual will. As the latter is often swayed by false notions, by some feeling or passion, and not by an enlightened conscience, so may the executive of church or state turn aside from the path of natural order, the united impulse of authority, wisdom, and right feeling, and obey the dictation of error and caprice.

To some these analogues may appear obscure, if not strained. Let such exercise the patience of the inquisitive and penetrating, and they will discover wonderful lines of order and symmetry pervading the works of God. The works of God are the mirror of his character. When they are intelligent creatures bearing his image, it may be expected that *their* productions will bear their image, by a law apparently co-extensive with creation. The analogue is what might be anticipated. If these four departments or capacities were deemed requisite

for the right government and employment of the individual existence, the creation of God, is it not reasonable that something corresponding to them should be deemed requisite for the right government and employment of the corporate existence of state and church, founded by God but managed by man? The analogue is apparent to the intelligent investigator. There are analogies of a higher nature which open to our vision, but this is not the place to attempt their exploration.

Over this spirit of tessarene endowments the principle of love, by divine command, must hold perfect sway. What is love? It is delight in and attachment to some object. The object of love embraced by this command is the great God. He, the alone self-existent and all-sustaining, is the very centre and glory of all excellence, and is therefore most fitted to call forth and sustain for ever this powerful feeling. It is moreover as our God, that we are to love Him. A special relationship to or property in him, as the sum of all our possessions is to engage our heart, and rivet our affections. Love is happiness. The command to exercise it is a command to secure the purest bliss of which the creature can be capable. And to exercise it on One unchangeably glorious is to secure happiness as enduring as the existence allotted to the creature. This love is to rule and control the whole man. It is to clothe the soul as with a garment; it is to animate it as a spirit; it is to pervade it as the pure, health-imparting and glowing life current. Under such an influence the normal faculty points steadily heavenward, detects and corrects the slightest deviation from the centre of attraction, and draws the soul upward to its natural resting-place. The intellect is prompted to seek out the excellencies and fulness of this

great Being, and combining them or presenting them singly, to engage the admiration of the soul, and with that its perfect satisfaction in its supreme portion. The emotional nature is absorbed by this most potent emotion. Its evil propensities are subdued, and all its benevolent and agreeable feelings fostered and developed. Love sits upon the throne of this department as her peculiar seat, and holds in her hands the reins of human potency. Over every faculty prompted by emotion, her benign sway extends. The will, the last to yield, bows meekly to this heavenly power. Long controlled by pride and selfishness in direct antagonism to the very nature of divine love, it required the powerful glow of celestial benevolence to reverse the whole current of the soul. But it is reversed. And now the last to yield assumes a prominence, and bends the whole powers of the soul to obedience to the master emotion. The executive capacity reveals its claim to be regarded as a distinct power by grasping, binding, and regulating all under its power in entire subservience to what is not only the dominant feeling of the soul, but its animating and guiding principle. The man is free, as any creature can be; but he is also bound by the silken cords of the most ennobling and enduring passion; in the atmosphere of which the rational creature lives and breathes most freely; and in which it attains its highest development and bliss. For this perfection let us all ardently aspire.

DEPARTMENT V.

HABITUDES.

CHAPTER XLII.

INTELLECTUAL HABITUDES.

1. CLEARNESS OF APPREHENSION.—2. QUICKNESS IN CALCULATION. — 3. READINESS IN COMPOSITION. — 4. ACUTENESS IN DISTINCTION.—5. COMPREHENSIVENESS IN GRASP.—6. PROMPTNESS IN JUDGMENT.

With our last chapter terminated our survey of the natural endowments of the human spirit. But no system of psychology can be considered complete which does not take cognizance of certain acquired states of mind or spirit. These acquired states we have chosen to designate Habitudes. They are often, in the expressive terms in common use, "a second nature." Acquiring such prominence and importance they claim our attention. Some are the result of the exercise and development, in an excessive measure, of some one faculty or power; others are the effect of the exercise, in a special manner, of two or more faculties. To ordinary observers this acquired power may appear original; and the habitude which is the fruit of the exercise of two or more distinct original powers may assume, in the estimation of such, the place of a separate original

faculty. Hence the propriety of this brief investigation of our mental habitudes. Apart from the philosophical or theoretical, the consideration of these mental habitudes is of great practical importance.

Following the natural order of man's endowments, we are led to consider first—the Intellectual habitudes. In general, it may be affirmed that the steady and continuous exercise of any faculty will result in a facility in use, and an expansion of power. But the exercise must not be too severe or protracted, else the very opposite results will follow. The faculty will become slow in movement and feeble in power. So far as we can judge man does not come into being with matured mental powers, the material organs, through which the spirit operates, being also immature. We regard the faculties of the infant spirit as complete in number, but immature and undeveloped. They are like the opening bud, the beauty, fragrance, and utility are yet to appear. The development of the spirit's energies, though closely connected with the development of the material frame through which it works, is independent of it in a great measure. In a body stationary in height and expansion, the mind may continue to display great expansion of powers. After the brain had apparently reached maturity, the race of intellectual renown with many had only begun. In some cases children display an early intellectual development with very little corresponding bodily development; in other cases both expand together; in all, mental expansion is expected with an increase of age, whatever progress the body may attain. It is clear that cultivation expands the intellectual powers, so that what was at one time beyond compre-

hension becomes readily apprehended by the matured or trained intellect.

This leads us to notice Intuitions. By some writers much has been made of intuitions. The intellectual capacity has been restricted in a large measure to intuitive work. This is the folly of rushing to extremes. Some would represent man as born with the germs of all manner of ideas in his infant spirit; others, leaning to the school of materialists, regard him as wholly dependent on the development of matter for intellectual progress—as born not only without ideas, but without high spiritual capacities independent of place and matter. The truth lies here. Man is born without ideas, notions, or conceptions, but with the germs of high spiritual and eternal *capacities*, intellectual, emotional, executive, and moral. By these germs we mean mental or spirit powers in embryo, waiting for expansion or development, as time and circumstances will allow. In ordinary circumstances this mental development corresponds with the growth of the body and the increase of time up to a certain and indefinite period; but we are led to believe that mental maturity may be attained not only without the ordinary maturity of the body, but apart from the body altogether. We do not suppose that infant spirits which leave our earth remain through eternity in an immature state, or with undeveloped powers. If there is expansion of a high class awaiting the earth-matured spirit in the celestial regions, reason would say that that heavenly world, with all its facilities for the enjoyment of life, cannot be unfit for the expansion of the faculties of infant spirits of earth? But what are intuitions? —They are simply intellectual apprehensions. We do

not regard it as appropriate to speak of the decisions or impulses of the normal faculty as intuitions. We would confine the term to the intellect. But to what class of apprehensions do intuitions belong ?—To that which embraces fundamental truths. When the mind apprehends or conceives a fundamental truth, one beyond which human penetration cannot go, that apprehension or conception, or intellectual cognition, is called an intuition. On such simple, unprovable apprehensions, knowledge is built up. In the very nature of things, and according to the faculty for acquiring knowledge given to us, we perceive that certain things are true without any process of proof, and as not calling for any such process, as that a whole made up of several parts is greater than any one part of it,—that two straight lines parallel to each other extended ever so far can never meet, or that the two sides of a triangle must be greater than the third. In one direction the plummet of the human intellect soon reaches the bottom ; in another the spirit soars on the wings of immensity, or sails in the ocean of space, without finding limit or shore.

What is Space, and what is Time ? Men have racked their brains to answer these simple questions. The one may fairly be defined the region occupied by the material creation of God; the other, the period allotted for the existence of the human race on earth. The obscurity raised about these terms is equalled only by the dense mists which are made to surround the terms—" infinite " and " absolute." When men lose themselves in the fogs of their own creating, it is no wonder if men of common sense refuse to follow them ; and it cannot be a matter of surprise if the speculations of such learned men cease to have any value in the eyes

of the great bulk of humanity. The application of the terms "infinite" and "absolute," to the Almighty, must ever be with a limitation of meaning. The action of the Almighty is limited to what is consistent with his character, as the just, and the true, and the good ; its infinitude is in everything great and holy, and wise and good. And from the moment of creation, his relation to what is external to Himself begins, and the "absolute" receives its needed modification. Up to this point human apprehension can soar ; beyond it lies the limitless domain of imagination.

It is very doubtful if mental science has gained anything by the introduction of such terms as "intuition" and "cognition" for perception and apprehension. It is well to improve the nomenclature of the science ; but is not intuition a perception ? and is not cognition an apprehension ? There are fundamental truths—let us adhere to them. With the term "intuition" an idea of individual capacity is associated, and we all know how varied individual capacities are. What may be intuitive to one may be far from intuitive to another. Hence the impossibility of enumerating intuitions. There are self-evident truths ; but some are apprehensible as such only by highly-cultivated minds. What are intuitions to one are not to another, for the capacity of one is often greatly superior to that of another. As the intellect is cultivated man's apprehension becomes clearer and stronger, and his field of intuition becomes enlarged. It is undesirable to be for ever shifting the foundation stones of a science. It is time that psychology received a permanent basis, on which a perfect superstructure might gradually be reared.

The following are ordinary Intellectual Habitudes :—

1. Clearness of Apprehension.—The intellect is improved by what may be called sharpening and burnishing. Without cultivation or training it is blunt or dimmed, even where there is superior natural power. When sharpened by exercise and furnished with information, it is able by a glance to apprehend what before was incomprehensible. Reaching this stage, by very moderate attention it retains its clearness of perception. That attention, however, includes a careful regard to the laws of health. A cool head, with a supply of pure blood to the brain, will greatly facilitate intellectual exercises of all kinds, and especially clear conceptions of intricate subjects. This state is generally reached by the mature intellect, and is frequently witnessed when men are dealing with subjects to which they have given particular attention, as a skilled financier with the revenue of a country, or an experienced merchant with the laws of trade, a linguist with the particular language which he has made a subject of profound study, or a philosopher with his favourite science. In such cases there is a double result; the intellect is whetted and the mind is supplied with information of a particular kind. On other subjects there may be a lack of intelligence; but the capacity for readily acquiring any knowledge has been improved. Hence the marked difference in comprehending a subject between the educated and the uneducated. The vision of the one is sharp; the other must be operated upon, or furnished with magnifying glasses, that he may see. In natural capacity the latter may be equal to the former; but the former has reached, by means of training, an intellectual state or habitude not attained by the latter.

2. Quickness in Calculation.—This is readily perceived in the experienced accountant and in the school-boy drilled in mental arithmetic. Three mental faculties are called into play—apprehension, construction, and retrospection or memory. Facility is acquired in the exercise of each of these powers. By apprehension the accountant seizes the subject and keeps it before the mind; by construction he builds on the foundation, taking down or putting up materials as may be required; and by retrospection he looks back for each point required, that it may come forward in its own place and contribute to the desired result. Great aptness in this exercise is the result of many repeated efforts. It corresponds in some measure to the mechanical art of type-setting. How slowly are the types taken up one by one and examined by the lad who for the first time stands before a case to learn the art of the compositor. But see the same lad some years hence. He can seize the types with a rapidity and an accuracy surprising to the untaught observer. The school-boy, by drilling in the class of mental arithmetic, has got certain faculties into easy working order; they come at call, and move with a swiftness astonishing even to himself. The clerk who stands behind the counter is ashamed to be seen hesitating as to the cost of a variety of common articles purchased by a customer. He must acquire the art of quick calculation or suffer disgrace. This acquirement, so important in all the details of trade, is attained by ordinary intellects without any uncommon effort.

3. Readiness in composition, or fluency in speaking and writing.—To many this is a difficult attainment. Nor should it occasion surprise. Four or five distinct

intellectual powers have to be called into operation. These are application, penetration, construction, retrospection, and deduction. Without application there is no laying hold on the subject. Without penetration its meaning is not reached. To gather up and arrange the ideas and language is the work of construction. For its aid retrospection must ever be in service. And deduction is the right hand help of construction. The executive power is the will, but the prominent intellectual faculty is construction, in setting forth by speech or writing the ideas, conceptions, or deductions gathered up or attained by the exercise of various powers. The difficulty is mainly attributable to the number of faculties demanded for this exercise. It is much easier to control and drive one or two ordinary horses than five or six. The music which has the widest range and highest combination of notes is ever more difficult than the ordinary range of single notes. When we increase the keys of an accordeon we add to the difficulty of the performer. But the readiness of composition is attainable. The man who, on a first attempt at public speaking, could only stutter out a few words, and these borrowed, before his tongue became motionless, has become an accomplished orator, capable of arresting the attention of a multitude, and pouring forth torrents of well-arranged sentences, charged with sound arguments and glowing thoughts. And the man who could not put together in many days, without the greatest difficulty, a few pages of manuscript, acquires the skill and aptitude of composition to such an extent that the production of a volume of light literature is to him a pleasant pastime. It is said that deep thought is opposed to fluency of speech or writing. It is not always so. For,

like our quartz veins, the gold is generally more abundant the farther down we go, and those who get down in thought, provided they do not lose themselves in a labyrinth, have frequently an inexhaustible supply of ideas. Obscure writing sometimes passes for great depth of thought, while clear writing, of great penetration and grasp, is deemed by the unreflecting shallow and ordinary. Like other habitudes, this facility may be lost, in some measure, by disuse. It is, however, speedily regained, if a marked prominence had formerly been secured. Exercise is indispensable to fluency, and great care to accuracy.

4. Acuteness in Distinctions.—This important habitude is the result of the diligent exercise of two intellectual faculties—penetration and distinction. Its grand arena is the field of controversy, specially the law courts. No one can question the prominent intellectual state of the accomplished lawyer. Whatever difficulties may attend the collection of information and its skilful arrangement, the art of acute distinction is an attainment within the reach of most. The finer distinctions may indeed belong to a select class of minds, but ordinary acuteness is easily acquired. Uncultivated minds often show an aptness in making distinctions, when but partially acquainted with controversy. In this, as in other qualities, much must depend on the original mental endowment. Beyond question some are endowed with powers of penetration and analysis not possessed by others. To such the attainment of which we speak is easy. Acuteness is valuable in preventing deception and escaping from the entanglements of error. Yet some are impeded in action by the very sharpness of their wit. To counteract the undue exercise of this habit, another power

must be called into play. We must learn to generalize as well as analyse. After using the microscope, it is well to employ for a brief period the telescope. We shall then remember that there is a world beyond the minute points to which our attention has been so ardently directed. Discussion and controversy, with the perusal of logical writings, are the best means for the attainment of acuteness. In the conflict of minds, the intellectual weapons are not only burnished, but sharpened. If the hospital is one of the best schools for the medical student, the debating club is one of the best stepping-stones to the law courts.

5. Comprehensiveness of Grasp.—It is interesting to mark how the mind of man, when possessed of decided capacity, rises to the necessities of an extensive command. When young, the play-ground exercised all his ingenuity; and now, when grey-haired, he rules an empire. There were many stepping-stones. What would have overpowered him at one time by its very complicity, falls into order before him, at the touch of enlarged experience. He controls a household, then a municipality, then a province, and then a kingdom. He directs the movements of a company, then of a battalion, then of a regiment, then of a brigade, and lastly of an army. He who once paddled his own canoe on the banks of his native river, commands successively the schooner, the barque, the corvette, and the monster ironclad. The mind has expanded with the demands made upon it, until it embraces in its grasp the high and the low, the minute and the widely-extended, and is at home in directing the one as in detailing the duties of the other. It is admitted that all men are not endowed with this capacity. It pertains to a decided minority.

Few are called to occupy the high places of field or cabinet. And even these few obtain their ruling capacity by stages of experience. Here, too, development is varied in time. One man is as fit to take command of an army or an empire, at forty, as another at sixty years of age. The attainment is only reached by the active exercise, within progressive limits, of almost every intellectual power. Apprehension, in its widest form of comprehension, application, construction, distribution, deduction, and retention, have, with others, to occupy a prominent place. Decided superiority of intellect is therefore indispensable to the efficient and successful command of an extensive and diversified charge. And to the natural ability must be added the habitude of grasp and management, only secured by proper and progressive experience. The capacity is in an essential degree a growth, the result of cultivation of a peculiar kind in a special field.

6. Promptness in Judgment.—One who has frequently attended a magistrate's court, on the bench of which sat an experienced judge of human conduct, will have witnessed on many occasions a promptness in deciding on the merits of a case fitted to produce astonishment if not doubt. Before an ordinary observer begins to make up his mind on the preponderance of evidence on one side, the decision is announced. Not only is the law open before the judge, detailing the requirements of the case in respect to duty, or the penalty for the disregard of the laws, but his experience has put him quickly in possession of the key to the problem, the design of the action, or the real defaulter in the case. He is not infallible, but his extensive knowledge of human nature in many similar circumstances, and his

perfect acquaintance with the law which he has to administer leaves little room for doubt what the decision must be, if truth and justice are to guide his conduct. His mind is trained to grasp with ease the salient points of the case submitted, and he quickly deduces the legitimate conclusion from established premises. He reaches in a few minutes what the inexperienced could not grasp for hours. By a similar acquirement the experienced sea captain, when suddenly overtaken by a tempest, amid many things demanding instant attention, decides on what must first be done, that all others may follow in natural order, without a moment's delay. Great judgment, with equal promptness, are at times demanded from those who have charge of ships amidst the uncertainties of dangerous seas or stormy winds. See also the able physician, when suddenly called to attend a man severely injured. Experience he has; but every case has its peculiarity; and here it is that his judgment has scope. Instant decision is demanded. The proper remedy brings life to the wounded man; a mistake in choice of applications results in certain death. Clear apprehension, keen distinction, and prompt deduction are called into exercise. Their diligent cultivation under a variety of circumstances produces the specified attainment.

Such are the ordinary habitudes which result from the continuous exercise and healthy development of certain intellectual faculties.

CHAPTER XLIII.

EMOTIONAL HABITUDES.

Division I.—From Single Emotions.

1. PIETY.—2. SELF-SUSTENANCE.—3. PATRIOTISM.—4. BENEVOLENCE.—5. HAPPINESS.—6. CONFIDENCE.—7. THANKFULNESS.—8. HAUGHTINESS.—9. COMPASSION. 10.—ENTHUSIASM.—11. CURIOSITY.—12. COVETOUSNESS.—13. TIMIDITY.—14. MODESTY.—15. IRRITABILITY.—16. SADNESS.

From the fountain of man's emotional nature channels are easily formed. That fountain stands generally brimfull, seldom below that level, and often overflowing. The size of the channel is proportioned to the volume of feeling made to run through it. It expands and deepens as emotional power finds an easy and continuous outlet. These channels are Emotional Habitudes. The illustration is necessarily imperfect. The spirit is not matter in which a channel may be dug. It is a substance immaterial and pre-eminently elastic. But it is capable of receiving and retaining for eternity a bias in one direction or another. In the rightly-ordered nature each proper emotion has its outlet, and is not allowed to displace another or deprive it of its appropriate influence. But the nature being one, emotions that are not antagonistic, or mutually destructive, often contribute of their strength to some particular emotion that has been called into exercise. This particular emotion frequently exercised forms a

habitude, and that state or condition takes the name from the prominent or prevailing emotion. In other cases the habitude is the result of the exercise of two or more emotions in almost equal prominence, and cannot assume the name of one to the exclusion of the other. As these habitudes are interwoven with the employments of life, they deserve a brief enumeration. The elucidation of each emotion in its proper place in the second Department of this work, renders it unnecessary here to do more than state the essential features of each case.

We will first notice the Habitudes which have their origin in the special exercise and development of one prominent emotion ; and then those which are the result of the combination of two or more emotions.

Of the first class each of the following emotions is the parent of one or more Habitudes, viz. :—Love, Joy, Hope, Gratitude, Pride, Sympathy, Zeal, Wonder, Desire, Fear, Shame, Anger, and Grief. In the formation of the second class, Desire and Zeal, Hope and Fear, Pride and Envy, Hatred and Anger, Joy and Hope, combine their powers.

From the noble emotion of Love, in its different outgoings, we have not less than four important Habitudes.

1. Piety.—This habitude claims the first place. It is devotion to the honour and service of God. It has its root in love to God. According to the strength and extent of the root is the height and expansion of the tree. Piety expands as love to God grows and extends. Other elements are combined, as the emotions of wonder, gratitude, and fear, in some of their manifestations ; but love is the presiding and constraining power. Other faculties of the soul, as the intellect, conscience, and will, take their

part in the duties of piety; but this master-feeling of delight in, and as its consequence cleaving to, an object, ever inspiring and ever refreshing the soul in action for the one beloved, leads all the others captive, and moulds the soul for itself. God is Love. He that dwells in love dwells in God, and God in him. Let this stream overflow for ever.

2. Self-sustenance. — This is the product of self-love. It is seen strongly developed in the love of life, and in the consequent efforts to preserve and sustain life. It might appear to some that the love of life is rather an instinct of the soul, as the desire for food is an instinct or appetite of the body. There is a quick apprehension of danger, producing an almost instinctive dread of injury or death, which contributes to self-sustinence or the preservation of life; but may it not be found that below this lies love of self prompting to activity, vigilance, and care? Some speak of self-love as if it were a fault; but the command, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," proceeds on the very foundation of the existence of such a self-love. We are to love ourselves. Nature teaches us to do so. But it must be within proper limits. When it exceeds these, it becomes selfishness, one of the worst and most repulsive traits of fallen nature. Self-sustinence is the proper fruit of self-love. Within its ample domain the man will take care of soul and body, of life, character, and property.

3. Patriotism.—This is absorbing attention to, and concern for, the honour, safety, and welfare of one's country. It springs from love of country. Unless the inhabitants of a country have treated a native coldly, unjustly, or cruelly, there is found implanted in his breast an attachment to the land that gave him birth

which is not felt for any other. As time wears on, and his hold on another land which he has made his home deepens, the place of his birth may sink in his interest or concern, and the new home become the country loved; but there is ever felt a peculiar tie to the spot which gave him first the breath of life which no other land can claim. This is universally recognised. Men expect that a man will befriend the place of his birth, if he can, after he has become the citizen of another country. This is wisely ordered. It contributes to the safety and prosperity of a country. We are attached to the spot which we call home, which affords us shelter and comforts, and from whose soil we draw our necessary support. Patriotism is considered superior to self-love. Hence the phrase in time of war—*Dulce pro patria mori.* If necessary, life is sacrificed for the defence of country. This is the greatest sacrifice which man can make, and when voluntarily made, it proves the strength of this habitude. We do not suppose that all who die in defence of their country are so moved. A great variety of influences lead to the post of danger on the battle-field, and impel to the deadly struggle in which life is lost. But patriotism holds its place in noble souls; and men that could shirk danger and death will not do so, when the honour of their country demands the exposure. A high type of patriotism is exhibited in promoting the moral and material prosperity of a country, and in keeping her honourably out of war, as well as in defending her rights by the sword.

4. Benevolence. — This habitude consists in an abiding kindness and good will to man as a fellow creature. It results from obeying the command, "Thou

shall love thy neighbour as thyself." In some circumstances sympathy may contribute to strengthen this trait of character, but not always. A man may cherish a feeling of benevolence towards those with whose condition, conduct, and character he can have no sympathy. Moved by kindness or love to man, he rejoices in his prosperity, and aids him in his adversity. He will go out of his way to afford help, and risk his life in endeavours to save. Some touching illustrations come to us from time to time from life on the ocean. One ship has stood by another in great distress, through a dark and stormy night, and when it was impossible to keep the one afloat till daylight, every possible risk was generously encountered in the storm and darkness, to save the lives of the perishing. And when the dismantled ship and her starving crew have been overtaken, how readily has food and clothing been shared with the destitute ? In such cases sympathy swells the stream of benevolence. But there are enemies, criminals, and victims of vile indulgence, which claim our benevolence when they cannot claim our sympathy. If this display of love has had scope in the formation of our character, we will be prompted to do good to all the race, and injury to none. Benevolence is next to piety, the noblest trait of humanity. Let it prevail, and crime disappears, and wars cease. The cultivation of benevolence as the development of an agreeable emotion gladdens the heart, checks the growth of improper feelings, and sheds over the life a benign and attractive influence. A benevolent man commands our respect. Even the selfish are ashamed to do him injury. His character makes way for him.

From the cultivation of the emotion of Joy comes,—

5. Happiness.—This agreeable state requires little elucidation. To be understood it must be felt. The man is happy in whom the emotion of joy is ever welling up and overflowing, leaving a deep impress on the soul to mark its prevalence and power. Very varied may be the source of the joy. The exuberance of health, the favouring tide of worldly prosperity, the comfort of domestic relations, the high esteem of fellow mortals, above all a soul at peace with God, and filled with the presence of that Spirit who is the fountain of bliss to all creation, may cause the outflow of this desirable feeling. Let joy flow in a steady stream from day to day and happiness becomes enstamped as a feature of the soul, in which the very countenance will participate. To be pure it must have its foundation in moral excellence, and to be lasting it must have its chosen source in God. The happiness which results from unlawful pleasure or dishonest gains, or the applause of the wicked, is worthless and shortlived. No earthly cistern can afford either a soul-satisfying or an everlasting supply of joy. The fountain head is the throne of grace. To it the poorest and the humblest of our race have as free access as the richest and the highest. Why is man not happy?—Sin, the disturbing element, is within him.

From the agreeable emotion, Hope, comes,—

6. Confidence.—It may be said that this important Habitude is the result of faith, not of hope. There are many acts of the human soul in which several powers co-operate. And there are terms in our language which express the exercise of two rather than one faculty. Of faith it may be said that it is an exercise of the soul, in which both the intellect and emotional nature have a part.

The intellect perceives the qualities which inspire hope; but we may not say that this bare perception of revealed excellencies, or of important and beneficial relations is faith; faith is something in advance of intellectual perception; it is the confiding or resting of the soul on the one in whom reliable qualities have been apprehended. Confidence is, therefore, not the result of faith, but faith itself; and that faith or confidence is the direct fruit or result of hope, and the indirect result of the perception of excellent and reliable qualities. Thus by psychological investigation we find ourselves unexpectedly landed in the definition of faith given by the learned apostle Paul. With him faith is the substance of things hoped for, and the evidence of things not seen. Considerable confusion of ideas is the result of applying the term faith to the intellectual perception of qualities fitted to inspire hope, and also to the result of the exercise of hope. What precedes and what follows hope has been called faith. Hence it appears at one time as the root, and at another as the fruit of hope. There is what is called faith which stops short of hope, as the faith of the multitude in Jesus, John ii. 23. And there is what is called faith which saves the soul, for it is a confidence in Christ, the result of hoping in his mercy. The substantial is distinguished from the visionary, the visible proof from the invisible things. The apostle says, faith is in a sense, the substance, the present realization of the things hoped for, the visible proof or present conviction of things unseen. It is clear that with the apostle faith or confidence is the result of an antecedent hope. Hope is the stretching out of the arms of the soul after some desired object on which it fastens a claim by exhibition, offer, or promise. When the expectation is strong, the

confidence reposed is equally strong. They act and react, supporting each other. Thus a man may say, I confide in my physician, for he has raised my hopes of recovery by showing me the proofs of his success in cases similar to mine. With equal propriety could he say, I hope for a recovery for I confide in my physician. When goods are given on credit, faith is exercised in the integrity of the purchaser, and hope of payment is raised. On hopes such as this the merchant rests or confides that when his day of payment arrives he may have what will meet all demands. Here confidence, rest, peace of mind, have as their foundation what are considered well-founded hopes. It may be said that confidence rests on the promises of payment. That is true, but the promises have awakened hopes, and by them confidence is upheld. If the promise of payment is the foundation, the hopes produced are the pillars, and confidence is the roof resting on these pillars. Take away all hope, and where is confidence? It ceases. While hope covers the head as with a helmet, it is held erect; for confidence has stamped an impress on the heart. Confidence may become fool-hardiness from the indulgence of vain hopes; but even then it reveals the power of hope; the mistake lies in a wrong apprehension of the capacity or veracity of what has originated hope. The indulgence or development of hope on a wrong foundation produces a confidence that ends in disappointment or ruin; while confidence, the product of well-founded hopes, gives steadiness and strength in the discharge of duty which meet in due time the full realization of reward. To the Christian it may well be said—Cast not away, then, your confidence, which hath great recompense of reward, for the hopes which you

cherish will never end in shame, because the love God is shed abroad in your heart by the Holy Ghost.

From the emotion of Gratitude, we have the Habitude of—

7. Thankfulness.—This state of soul or stamp of character is most commendable. It is not very common. Men are more prone to look at their wants, than to consider their many and great mercies. All have cause for thankfulness who are in the receipt of daily blessings undeserved. When gratitude is fostered by habitual contemplation of the kindness of God, and by a repeated summing up of mercies and favours, not only is an agreeable emotion strengthened, but a state of mind is gradually formed, a habitude produced which ennobles the soul and enhances all the comforts of life.

From Pride is matured the Habitude of—

8. Haughtiness.—It is an inflated self-esteem, injurious to its possessor and offensive to others. It is a display of pride which seldom fails in evoking pride, if not resentment also. No man should cherish high thoughts of himself. Every frail mortal is ballasted with so many stains, follies, and shortcomings, that he should forbear to spread the wings of pride, and invite the inspection of the world. The proud cannot see afar off. Haughtiness is a burden. It is also a serious obstruction in the way of prosperity. It is a blemish on the character that should be wiped off; and an excrescence that demands a sharp knife. It is, however, natural to a child of earth who regards himself as possessed of marked superiority in wealth, position, or talents over others. And it is of rapid growth. Unlike other habitudes of great utility, the human soul takes this impress with facility and loses it with difficulty.

We have seen a sudden elevation stamp a man with *hauteur* which he seemed for ever after to retain. Beware of pride. It brought a star of light of superior magnitude into the guilt of rebellion and the gloom of despair.

To the precious emotion of Sympathy, we owe the Habitude of—

9. Compassion.—This tenderness of feeling softens the asperities of men. It restrains from harsh proceedings when they might be justified. It prompts to mild, generous, and benevolent action when the stern would measure out severity. It feels for the destitute, the neglected, and the wretched. The sight of poverty, the cry of distress, and the sighing of the prisoner awakens this benign sensibility. It belongs to a suffering world. It has no scope for action where all is satisfaction and all is bliss. It is thus, as commonly understood, the result of sympathy as restricted to the suffering. It is not a term chosen to express the result of sympathy with the rejoicing. Our world needs a large number of compassionate men, for the number of the needy and the suffering is very great. To such we look for the spread of the kingdom of righteousness among those who are, and have long been, the victims of error, superstition, and crime. Without compassion, the human character has a marked defect. "Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy." Infinite compassion fills a large space in the inspired representations of the character of our Creator. It is one of the primary colours in that rainbow of glory which surrounds the eternal Throne, and has with propriety found a separate place in the enumerations of the perfections of Deity in every known standard of orthodoxy. When man

recovers a resemblance to his Maker, genuine compassion will not be the least prominent feature.

To the development of Zeal, we are indebted for the Habitude of—

10. Enthusiasm.—Some men are endowed with great ardour. When a question of moment takes possession of such, they cannot refrain from pressing it on the attention of all. Zeal is a fire. It spreads as it burns. It makes a wide path for itself. Let zeal be kept alive on any subject, and the man soon becomes an enthusiast. The subject that fills his thoughts commands the service of every power of mind and body. His time and strength are given to it. Such men are needed from time to time. Reformers must often be enthusiasts, if their ideas are to make way through formidable opposition. The world now needs enthusiasts to overcome some of its formidable evils. The disbanding of standing armies which are a reproach to civilization, the universal spread of the vice of intoxication, and the traffic and manufacture which originate and sustain it, and the evangelization of the heathen world by the arousing of cold, selfish, and slumbering Christendom, call for men of fire, whose souls are aglow with enthusiasm from the burning ideas which they foster in their breasts. And may we not add that the churches require some enthusiastic evangelist baptized with the Holy Ghost, to do the work performed by the seraphic Whitefield during last century. Enthusiasm requires control. The subject must be good which demands it; and its exercise must never degenerate into wild-fire. Reason must control the most fervid animation.

From the emotion of Wonder we have the common Habitude of—

11. Curiosity.—If enthusiasm is rare, curiosity is very common. It is easily produced and easily sustained. The emotion of wonder rises in the youngest child, and excites even the grey head. On it the novelists trade. Without it the theatre would have many empty seats. Like other habitudes this one enlarges almost indefinitely, confirming the words of the wise man who long ago observed that the eye, by which he meant the mind inflamed with curiosity, was not satisfied with seeing. How readily do crowds rush to gaze on some reputed wonder. While useful in a high degree in the pursuit of science, or in the investigation of the unknown, it should never be expended on the unprofitable, the vain, or the vicious. Intended to facilitate progress in the path of wisdom, it should never be perverted to expedite the deluded in the path of disappointment and ruin.

From Desire we have the powerful Habitude of—

12. Covetousness.—This habitude results from the constant exercise of Desire in the securing of worldly possessions. The emotion has a much wider range, as is the case with sympathy and its consequence, compassion, but this is a common and notable result. The Desire that first trickled in drops now rushes in a steady stream that almost defies any obstruction which the soul can raise. It is the master passion in the breasts of many who would be ashamed to own it. We may well beware of the letting out of this water; it deepens a channel before men are aware; it acquires a power of which they are not conscious till the attempt is made to interfere with the acquisition of gain or the storing up of wealth. So strong is this desire that it tramples down many noble considerations that it may grasp the coveted object. Truth, honour, justice,

patriotism, the respect of men and the favour of God, are all disregarded at the dictation of his habitude. The acquisition of wealth is both honourable and legitimate. But covetousness is the prostration of the soul before mammon. The service of mammon unfits the soul for the duties of humanity and the worship of God.

From frequent indulgence in the emotion of Fear we acquire the Habitude called—

13. Timidity.—When fear is often evoked by sudden alarms, the mind becomes subject to disturbance by very trivial sounds. Let a man be frequently startled by the ringing of a fire-bell announcing an actual fire, the sound of any loud bell at night thrills him with fear of another conflagration. Let the footsteps of a burglar be heard more than once at the dead hour of night about his premises, filling him with such dread that he trembled, the recurrence of the sound will call up with greater ease the same dread. If a mother suffers herself to be agitated with fear whenever she hears the sudden cry of anguish from her child, she will become subject to frequent and distressing alarms if separated from the object of her care, as often as the sound of sorrow reaches her ear. Timidity may so far prevail that the sound of rustling leaves, or of a footstep at an unwonted time or place, or the shadow of a tree or post may agitate the heart, disturb the nerves, or possibly cause the hair of the head to stand erect. Fear within due bounds is wise and wholesome; timidity results from frequent and excessive fear, and is a weakness and defect which should be resisted and overcome.

To Shame we owe the gentle Habitude of—

14. Modesty. — Some appear naturally modest. They possess a retiring and unassuming demeanour. If introduced into company they are flushed with shame,

and desire to retire out of sight. They have no desire to stand forth before a multitude to be gazed upon. It is a relief when they pass along unnoticed. Modesty is good. It is especially becoming in the young and inexperienced. It is the very ornament of woman. She attracts when she retires, and repels when she approaches unsought and undesired. Still the goodness of modesty may be overdone in this selfish world. If man does not sometimes dash it aside, rude and unjust men would drive him from his place. Let shame have a moderate and regulated sway, and its attendant habitude will claim for us the respect of the intelligent and wise.

Indulgence in the emotion of Anger ends in the troublesome Habitude of—

15. Irritability. — This is a common infirmity. Many things occur to displease us. Some things are extremely provoking. If we give place to anger, it will demand a concession on the next provocation. As often as we suffer ourselves to be overcome by it, we facilitate its future rising, or widen the channel for its outflow. A character for impatience or irritability is soon formed, and we dread coming in opposition to such a man. He is said to explode in an instant; or, that he cannot bear opposition; or, that the slightest thing puts him out of temper; or, that you cannot get a pleasant word from him if you offend him. Such men need to watch over the first movements of this emotion, or keep a heavy weight on the valve that allows the escape of the overflow. A word may be hastily spoken, or an act performed, which pride will not suffer the man to recall or undo, which will leave a wound which years will not heal. It is well sometimes to be angry. Its absence

on some occasions would betray a weak and ignoble character; but let not this form an excuse for indulging in habitual impatience, or conceding to a powerful emotion that license which will speedily form the troublesome and frequently injurious habitude of irritability. "Let not the sun go down upon your wrath." Let it cease before sunset. "Be ye angry and sin not." Let it be legitimate in cause and effect.

To the prevalence of Grief we owe the Habitude of—

16. Sadness.—A severe bereavement brooded over will weigh down the spirit. Let this continue for months, and the countenance will betray the internal trouble preying upon the heart. Sadness will mark the look, speech, and action. A succession of troubles in the shape of disappointments and losses will frequently have the same effect. It is almost impossible to wear a pleasant face when all things seem to go against a man. In the majority of cases dullness, depression, and even sadness, will appear. Sadness is seldom protracted over years. Some may, indeed, say with the bereaved Jacob, "I will go to my grave bewailing my loss"; but such is the elasticity of the human spirit, that the use of ordinary means serves to relieve the heart of its burden, and restores, in some measure, the former animation. The loss of health is a common cause of sadness. In this case there may be no extreme sorrow, but there is a steady, though silent overflow of grief, which, from its frequent pressure, results in the Habitude that becomes apparent to every acquaintance. It is well, amidst the trials unavoidable in our journey through life, to cultivate, as a counteracting influence, an intimate acquaintance with the fountain of permanent joy.

CHAPTER XLIV.

EMOTIONAL HABITUDES—*Continued.*

Division II.—From Combined Emotions.

17. INDUSTRY. — 18. COURAGE. — 19. AMBITION. — 20. REVENGE.—21. CHEERFULNESS.

The following Habitudes are the result of the combined operation of two or more Emotions in prominent exercise :—

From the combination of the Emotions of Desire and Zeal, we have the important Habitude of—

17. Industry.—From either Desire or Zeal we may have activity, but mere activity is not industry. In industry we have a desire to possess goods or property, and we have a zeal in the employment of means regarded as adequate to attain the desired end. The diligent hand will generally secure a competence if not wealth. The habitude of industry is most profitable to individuals and to a community. It accords with the Divine admonition—"Not slothful in business." Without industry in any undertaking, we have no reason to look for success. In the exercise of sound judgment, a proper end should be selected on which to set our hearts, and the best means chosen to reach that end; and then the motive power of these strong emotions should be applied to the working of the means. Their combined influence will cut a channel for a free outlet

of the active energies of the man, which will render indolence or inactivity both a burden and a bondage. A pressure similar to the steady gravitating power of the weight of a clock will impel to a regular and constant occupation which, if not overdone, will be productive of health, wealth, and reputation.

To the combined influence of the Emotions of Hope and Fear, we owe the useful Habitude of—

18. Courage.—By fear we are excited, aroused, and all the energies of the man brought to the very point of action. By hope we see a way of escape from present disadvantage, difficulty, or danger, either possible, probable or certain. By the blending of the two we resist with all our might the evil, and seize with all our energy the good. Fear, without hope, might only paralyze; hope, without fear, might be deficient in energy. May we not have courage without fear? Is it not the very absence of fear? We may not have courage without the animation or inspiration of fear, for courage respects danger; and where there is danger, fear is the natural emotion. But when the sense of danger has roused the emotion of fear, the energies of the man are called up, and there is scope for the counteractive influence of any other power. If fear prevails, although the energies of the man are aroused, he may display timidity, and not courage. But if, when danger has been fully apprehended, and the man all alive to it, the emotion of hope rises to influence, and swells up to paramount authority, the fear of being overborne and crushed, and the hope of successful resistance and victory combine, the one in its native tendency to resist the enemy, or the danger; the other in its native tendency to grasp the vantage ground, the victory, and the

safety, and the man of genuine courage rises to our view. Two of the strongest powers unite in forming the noble habitude of courage. If we give fear the first place in point of time, we ascribe to hope the highest place in point of authority. It lifts the head in the hour of battle, but it needs the ardour of fear to nerve the arm. If there is no fear we may have vain confidence, or fool-hardiness with its usual consequence. If there is no hope, we are overcome by fear, or sink in despair, or await in silent firmness the issue. To this honourable attribute of the human soul we owe much of the progress, political and moral, scientific and religious of our race.

From Pride and Envy we may derive the daring Habitude of—

19. Ambition.—In war, politics, science, and even religion, this habitude has displayed its power. A man is filled with the emotion of self-esteem in one of its objectionable forms, and casting his eye around beholds another, in the same line of business or occupation with himself, occupying a higher seat, wielding more influence, receiving more homage, or accumulating more wealth ; envy is evoked, and it uniting with pride, an aspiration linked to a resolution is formed, to win the higher place and secure the coveted prize. There is a species of ambition, as there is a species of pride and of covetousness, which is both legitimate and praiseworthy. This honourable ambition is the result of Pride and Desire combining within a certain limited range. When men desire to excel in art, in speech, in writing, or in moral rectitude, there is a form of ambition ; for with the emotion of Desire there is blended beyond question a perceptible measure of self-esteem,

one of the forms of pride. But when envy is blended with pride, the compound ceases to be praiseworthy, for it is dangerous. There is no good in envy. And yet it is a very common and powerful emotion. Men and women are envied for their wealth, position, houses, equipage, personal appearance and even dress. Let pride lend a helping hand to this emotion, and the aspiration or ambition is formed to rival the object envied. If pride is at the bottom, envy cannot keep its head down. The two emotions blend with ease. And they form a powerful impulse to action. That action has often been the natural fruit of such roots. Men are willing to pull down others that they may mount up ; and if they cannot ascend, they strive to reduce others to their own level that envy may be appeased. How many have been goaded on by this evil influence to their own ruin. Dissatisfied with their condition and envious of those above them, they have given the reins to an evil ambition which has landed them in inextricable difficulties.

In the blending of the Emotions of Hatred and Anger we have the destructive Habitude of—

20. Revenge.—We may be angry without hating ; and we may hate without being angry. But when we both hate and are angry with the same person, we are roused to strong antagonism. In revenge there is a determination to have satisfaction, generally by inflicting injury for some real or supposed wrong done to us or to those whose cause we make our own. We look at the injury, and we are displeased with the offender ; our displeasure may attain to the height of wrath, if the injury is great. We consider the motive, and if the deed is regarded as the result of malice and cherished

ill-will, we dislike the offender and our dislike may attain the height of extreme loathing. Anger and hatred prompt retaliation for injury. That retaliation is revenge. Anger alone often prompts retaliation. A man gets a blow on the head. If irritable or subject to the impulses of anger it is probable that he will be prompted to retaliate on the spot, by striking back, in revenge, the man who struck him. So, too, the man who is defamed in the public press is provoked by his keen displeasure to retaliate on his defamer by an exposure of *his* evil deeds, or on the publisher for spreading, so iniquitously, such defamation. If anger kindles the fire, hatred will keep it burning. Both are often cruel as the grave. Revenge generally assumes the form of resolute and prolonged retaliation. It is not the mere blending of the emotions anger and hatred, but the ordinary result of both united. Men who give way to both are generally cruel and revengeful. A powerful restraint should be put upon revenge, by a restraint upon both anger and hatred. Revenge belongs to God. We are incompetent, in most cases, to deal with it. This, however, does not apply to the exercise of public justice. What is unbecoming in the individual member of society may be perfectly legitimate to its constituted authorities.

And from the pleasurable Emotions of Joy and Hope we have the agreeable Habitude of—

21. Cheerfulness.—The cultivation of Joy is happiness. When Hope blends with it the volume of bliss is not only stronger but there is added the brightness of pleasing expectation. Let these be our favourite emotions, and cheerfulness will leave its impress broad and deep upon our souls. And let this also be our care

that the spring of both lie deep in the abiding love of God, and the faithful discharge of every known duty.

We do not profess to have enumerated all the Emotional Habitudes; but these may be regarded as a satisfactory, if not a perfect, exhibition. There are Habitudes the result of the defective development of emotions, as Indolence and Apathy, but we do not deem them deserving a separate consideration.

CHAPTER XLV.

EXECUTIVE HABITUDES.

INTRODUCTION :—

1. SWIFTNESS.—2. SLOWNESS.—3. FIRMNESS.—4. FICKLENESS.—5. ORDERLINESS.—6. DISORDERLINESS.

A LITTLE close thought will reveal to us that the human spirit throws itself, its person, strength, and energy, into any of the four departments, predominantly and specially exercised. If the Intellect is predominantly exercised, it seems to take up its position for a time, as if its residence, in that department. If the Emotional susceptibility is specially exercised by any one feeling overspreading the soul, the personality of the spirit seems to rest there, as if absorbed in the emotion. If the Will is called to work with marked determination on any settled project, the whole man seems to take up his abode in the Will. He does visit the other departments, but it is in subserviency to the project in hand, and he returns to assume his seat and control all movements. If the Normal faculty has been aroused to take cognizance of some transaction deeply affecting the relation of man to his supreme Judge, in a moment the whole spirit is absorbed in the department of conscience ; whatever belongs to the essentials of the person, as a separate undivided intelligence, in plain terms, the spirit, the man, assumes the throne of conscience, and

impels or restrains every other faculty in subservience to what is now felt to be the path of duty.

The want of attention to these facts, for they are facts and not mere phantoms, has led some writers in mental science to present a partial and so far defective view of psychology. With some writers the intellect receives the place of honour, the Reason is the *Ego* or the personal individual spirit, and all other powers are subsidiary. With others, the Will is the man; it is the head, the chief authority, without whom nothing has any claim for attention or compensation; it is the *Ego*, the seat of morality, and of all responsibility. Now the truth is, the Emotional and Normal Departments belong as much to the man, the *Ego*, the indivisible spirit, as the Intellectual and Executive Departments, although they may in most individuals be less prominent; and the spirit may be influenced by, occupied with, and for the time apparently seated in any one of the four. The human spirit, under the sustaining power of the creating, omnipresent Spirit, is self-acting, and, as a rule, incessantly moving. It has no existence separate from its faculties. Its existence is a combination of faculties, living and self-acting. Any one faculty is not the spirit. The human spirit is a union of the whole. A spirit might have other faculties. While we distinguish in thought the faculties from the life which animates them, we cannot imagine the faculties as existing apart from life, nor a spiritual life devoid of faculties. We do not know that thought can reach farther.

During waking hours the Executive power or will is almost incessantly occupied. It is either attending to the ten thousand incidents of thought and feeling as they arise, or following out some settled purpose in

regular and continuous work. Most men have their ordinary employment. To the performance of its duties the will sets the powers of the mind and body to work as a thing already determined upon. The intellect is mainly occupied along with the physical powers of the body, but the emotional and normal departments have often their turn of exercise, as the carpenter in planeing his boards may be led to admire the beautiful cellular tissue of the wood, and the merchant may be arrested by conscience in the act of disposing of his goods for an exaggerated statement in regard to the price or quality of the article.

The will is subject to the ordinary law respecting the exercise of powers. The exercise of any power or faculty in any particular form, with due moderation, results in an increased facility of action, and that action becoming regular and continuous for a period of time, produces a Habitude. The movements of the Executive power may be described in respect to time as swift or slow ; in respect to strength, as firm or fickle ; and in respect to manner, as orderly or disorderly. Hence the Habitudes which may deserve our brief consideration are Swiftness and Slowness, Firmness and Fickleness, Orderliness and Disorderliness.

1. Swiftness.—This Habitude is of two kinds. The one results from constant regularly defined action, as the slater or shingler driving his nails with the uniform number of blows. The other results from swift determinations in irregular and varying actions within a defined circle or occupation. Certain callings necessitate swift determinations if disgrace and disaster would be avoided. The fiery movements of the battle field can scarcely be brought in as illustrations, for they are

clearly exceptional. But the prompt action of sea captains, engine drivers, and drill sergeants, proved to be competent for their undertaking, may be referred to. Where there is ever-recurring danger, and specially at irregular intervals, disaster can only be avoided by the power of swift determination. That power may be acquired, and become a valuable habitude. It must be attended with keen discernment and sound judgment, or the swiftness may illustrate the old saying,—"The more hurry, the less speed." Rightly exercised it is of unquestionable service. The man who has what is called "presence of mind," which really is the power of cool but swift determination, to seize the unexploded shell and throw it into the sea or over the parapet, or grasp the wheel and, by a rapid whirl, in the moment of extreme peril, save his ship from instant collision, or smother, by the closing of a door, at great personal risk, the devouring element ready to burst into a general conflagration, shows the value of such a habitude. It is often the immediate antecedent of safety, honor, and wealth. While generally profitable under all circumstances, its cultivation is imperative in undertakings that are perilous, and where activity is indispensable.

2. Slowness.—Where dullness of intellect or extreme caution exists, the habitude of Slowness of determination is readily formed. Not perceiving what should be done at once man moves slowly; not comprehending what is best amidst a variety of things, he may not make up his mind without a seeming tedious delay. This habitude is not wholly injurious. It has its advantages as an offset to its disadvantages. If the man moves or works slowly and deliberately he is not likely to wear out or break down so soon as the swift-moving. And if he

is very cautious in determining any course of action, he is not so liable to commit blunders as the more inconsiderate or hasty. As the will depends so largely on the intellect, the slowness of the former is, in truth, the result of the slowness of the latter. The man who is dim in perception, or slow in apprehension, will be slow in volition. The disadvantages arising from this habitude greatly overbalance the advantages. Loss of time, temper, money, character, and even life, may be frequent results. In some occupations slowness becomes intolerable. The patience of those who wait for the execution of the promised work is worn out. Take for illustration the conduct of some lawyers. They accept a task committed to their care; but when will it leave their hands? How many fruitless visits to an office with the same provoking indecision and delay of settlement? While some are hesitating others step forward and win the prize. Let us strive to combine calmness of judgment with prompt decision and active exertion.

3. Firmness.—This is an essential element in greatness. Without firmness no man can acquire that solidity and stability which are the foundation of true moral worth. Hence this habitude is one of the most valuable that man can possess. It may seem a natural rather than an acquired power. Beyond question, as some are, by nature, distinguished above others for intellectual capacity, so some are, by nature, possessed of greater executive power than others. Some are naturally vacillating, others are obstinate. But firmness has been and may be acquired; and has, by right, a place among the most useful habitudes of the human soul.

By it the child adheres to the admonitions of his parent or teacher, and refuses to steal the attractive

object lying in his way, or to utter a statement opposed to the truth ; the youth rejects the temptation to taste the intoxicating glass, or join in the pleasure excursion on the holy Sabbath, though strongly pressed to do so ; the man of business has the power to repel the suggestion of acquiring wealth by means of fraud ; and the man of principle holds his own while torrents of oppositions dash wildly against him. By it the martyr held fast to the truth while his bones were dislocated by the rack, and while the faggots were piled around his feet at the stake. By it the hero holds his ground on the field of battle, or on the parapet of the fort, while deadly bullets fall fast around him. By it the man of honest industry adheres to his calling, unmoved by the splendour of some who have become suddenly rich by hazardous speculations. And by it the man of literature and science prosecutes his investigations and researches with a tenacity of purpose that is often injurous to mind and body, but which seldom fails of results highly beneficial to others.

This habitude is an anchor which may save the ship from being either driven out to sea, or dashed on the rocks in time of tempest or of current. As the anchor should be dropped, if possible, in good holding ground, where there is safe anchorage, so we should take hold on safe, sound principles, and adhere to them with intelligence and firmness. The extreme of obstinancy should be avoided. This is an unreasonable and blind tenacity of purpose. There is a time to yield as well as to stand firm. When men are all wise, and always wise, yielding may be unnecessary ; till then, man should be open to conviction, and willing to receive instruction. The safety and honour

of many depend on their abandoning positions which they have long held in the face of strong opposition, but which, nevertheless, are false and ruinous positions. We are to stand fast on the foundation of truth, not of error; and to hold our ground in a position of integrity and honour, not of fraud and dishonour. Firmness acquires strength by cultivation and successful resistance to opposition; but its growth must be watched, that intelligence may keep pace with it; and the positions assumed as safe and correct be ever subject to faithful and strict review.

4. Fickleness.—This is the opposite in some respects to Firmness. It is readily acquired. Let a man be easily driven from half-a-dozen positions, or persuaded to abandon three or four different occupations, and he becomes a rolling stone which "gathers no moss," a changeable man who secures no property. The gold-fields of Australasia have afforded many exhibitions of this habitude in one of its common forms, a roving disposition. Like the common sailor or servant who likes frequent changes, the gold-digger is often a land rover, who has no heart to stay long in one place. Fickleness in opinions plays some strange pranks. The man who turns with every wind of doctrine may be seen "boxing the compass" every twelve months. And the man who cannot settle himself down to any steady occupation, is tailor, shoemaker, blacksmith, and carpenter, by turns. This habitude is weakness. It has nothing to commend it. It fails in securing respect. Success or prosperity is almost impossible. Men are not expected to advance when they are performing circles. Fickleness is not change but changeableness. Change is often wise and necessary. But frequent

changes are not profitable, and seldom desirable. The tree that will not take root cannot bear fruit. The fickle man carries no weight in the community in which he dwells. You cannot place your foot with safety on a rolling stone. Let the strong brace up the fickle, as the newly-planted tree is tied to stakes until it can take root. The feeble weed bending to every wind may become the goodly olive, if not the sturdy cedar.

5. Orderliness.—This Habitude is one of the essential elements of success amid the active occupations of life. Order relieves the mind from perplexity and facilitates work. It leaves open paths through the thicket of engagements, instead of compelling the traveller to explore and force his way at every call of duty. Order reigns in the material universe, and therefore has its fountain in the Creator. The human spirit is endowed with a high capacity for order. While common intellects delight in classification and order, the very highest rank find congenial occupation in tracing the loftier displays of this development of wisdom. Were it not that sloth and carelessness are deeply embedded in many constitutions, this most useful habitude could be readily acquired, as it accords with a deep-seated instinct or natural proclivity.

Orderliness saves time, strength, and temper. In large establishments progress is impossible without it. Government, war, politics, law, fall into the greatest confusion unless the leading minds in these occupations are under its regulating influence. Its demands are simple, yet all-embracing. They are a time and a place for every important work, and every such work in its time and place. In the formation and maintenance of this habitude, the intellect has a prominent part.

Under its suggestions the will is excited to volition. And by its links of association one thing follows another in the order in which they have been arranged, leading to the assumption of each work in its time and place. In every executive habitude the intellect may be regarded as an introductory and co-operative agent. Punctuality and form are part aspects of orderliness. The one may be looked upon as essential, the other is a valuable assistant. Form enters largely into order. We like to operate after a model. Similarity in effects produces facility in action.

It is possible to carry order to excess. The mind has become in a measure enslaved when a man cannot work out of his accustomed grove, or depart from a form to which he has been accustomed, or employ a tool with which he has had no familiarity. Men may become punctilious. In such cases time and strength gained by the habitude within due limits are needlessly expended. Hence the intellect must be kept free to look beyond the limited circle of action, that volitions may receive from time to time such modifications as prudence may direct. With an intellect kept wide awake to improvements, orderliness presents a beauty, strength, facility, and attractiveness which should secure its adoption by all involved in the activities of life, ordinary or professional.

6. Disorderliness.—This is the habitual performance of ordinary work, without respect to time or place. It is the opposite of the preceding, and has nothing to recommend it. It is generally the result of constant inattention and carelessness. No proper estimate of the value of time and strength can be formed where it constantly prevails. It is not chosen by the mind as

something desirable, but it is often submitted to, apparently from necessity; the mind not possessing sufficient executive power to restore order amid ever recurring disorder, or the person being subjected to such irregular disturbances at his work as to disarrange any plan that can be adopted.

In its worst form this habitude is the effect of sheer indifference; in its most excusable form, it is the result of circumstances. In both cases it is an injury and loss. Progress in importaut undertakings is at best greatly retarded, and is sometimes impossible. The character is weakened. The intellect suffers in perfect development. A regard for form, neatness, and personal attraction disappears. Trouble is a regular attendant. Dissatisfaction with self and all others is frequent. The displacement of one important duty is the displacement of all that hangs upon it. And time repeatedly lost at irregular intervals produces confusion. Peace is a stranger, and happiness is a rare guest. If work presses, hurry is inevitable and imperfection certain. As the habitude is developed, the man becomes the creature of impulse rather than of calm reflection; and his will is adapted to fitful exertion rather than steady and continuous action. Disorderliness, therefore, tends to the weakness of intellect, will, and physical aptitude for profitable employment. Let us apprehend what our duties are, and firmly resolve to do them at the proper time and in the best manner.

CHAPTER XLVI.

NORMAL HABITUDES.

1. SUBJECTION.—2. AUTHORITY.

Although the Normal faculty has peculiarities which widely distinguish it from other faculties, as its power to impel, its authority to command, and its severity to punish, it is subject to the consequences of restraint or development, repression or exercise, which appear natural to the powers of a spirit linked to matter. Prolonged restraint or continuous freedom leaves permanent results. As the influence of the Normal faculty is directed to the regulation of conduct amidst the constant changes and varied duties of life, its operations are most readily traced where it has acquired settled control. But as lasting consequences follow from the steady repression as well as the regular exertion of a faculty, the habitudes formed in both cases may claim a common designation, though not on precisely the same grounds, and may deserve a contiguous presentation. It is thus with conscience. A moral habitude is formed by the constant repression of this faculty, as well as by its unfettered exercise. These spiritual states may be termed Subjection and Authority. The middle ground is occupied by a great multitude, who do not persistently refuse to listen to the voice of conscience, but who are equally indisposed to subject

their conduct to its control; they refuse, and they obey, according to the strength of passing influences; and hence no habitude can be formed unless moral irregularity can be classed as such. Leaving out of consideration what is necessarily so indefinite, we shall briefly notice the two Normal habitudes named.

1.—Subjection.—A contest has taken place in the human soul. Sin has triumphed. The evil has prevailed over the good. The struggle has been repeated, and with the same results. Repeated triumphs has given sin an established supremacy. Conscience is not destroyed. The state of which we speak is constant if not invariable subjection without extinction of opposition. The Normal faculty is neither torpid, and thus indifferent to the conduct pursued, nor perverted, and thus approving of wrong. It has been conquered, and put down from authority, and is now held in subjection. In this state its feeble opposition is overborne. If it would speak silence is enjoined. The feeble hand raised to prevent entering on a sinful course is pushed aside without ceremony. Its testimony is discarded as unworthy of credit. Its attempts at reproof are met with instant rebuke.

Hence the man who has habituated himself to false statements, prevaricates, exaggerates, or lies, with the bold countenance of one who feels his superiority over all internal opposition. The man who steals by pilfering, dishonesty, or extortion, may hear a low whisper in his bosom, that his conduct is not just; but having often heard and hushed the same voice in similar circumstances, he now simply says,—"What matters it?" and holds on his way. The Sabbath-breaker, who, in early life had often read the words—"Remem-

ber the Sabbath day to keep it holy"—but who, in later years, by evil example and the solicitations of ungodly companions, had overborne the remonstrances of conscience, and made the day one of mere sloth or worldly pleasure, now accepts an invitation for a pleasure excursion on that day with a courage and assurance that says to conscience—Don't open your lips or whisper a breath of dissent. In the same way the person following a licentious course hears from time to time earnest admonitions, as of an aggrieved friend, in his own bosom; but rejects the advice, yields to the temptation, and accelerates his progress to corruption by the double process of increasing the power of sin, by indulgence, and weakening the power of resistance, by habitual subjection of conscience to the dominant lust.

This Habitude reveals a state of marked guilt. The man is manifestly and unmistakeably a sinner. He is at war with his own higher nature, is in opposition to the moral law which governs rational creatures, and must be in rebellion against the Being who made and governs him. Peace he has not, and cannot have, till he rids himself of this department of his nature, which is as impossible as to annihilate himself. Poor guilty man! Sin has obtained dominion. To yield submission to it is to plunge into perdition. For effectual resistance he can find no strength. "*Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor.*"

2. Authority.—The case is reversed. Help has come from the merciful Creator. Sin has lost its dominion. Grace has triumphed. The Normal power has received fresh life from the great Fountain of order and rectitude. It reassumes the throne of the creature to regulate the moral conduct. To it the renewed man is generally and

habitually subject. Then the life flows evenly and quietly along with the silent and gentle gliding of a deep and placid stream. The voice of conscience may be seldom heard while its authority is readily acquiesced in by a constant and careful obedience to the law of truth, honesty, and holiness. But let duty be neglected or moral mistakes committed, immediately the corrector's voice is heard, and his demands are a prompt attention to duty and a full reparation of the injury. The authority is recognised, and obedience follows, conjoined with feelings of regret for the past shortcomings. While a careful comparison of this internal authority with the external revealed will of God may be required, there is no desire to resist conscience, no complaint for its rebukes, but a wish to honour and respect the faithful monitor. It is regarded as a friend, not an enemy; and so long as it accords with the mind of the supreme Ruler, and repeats his will or pleasure, the man is willingly and cheerfully submissive.

To such the term "conscientious" belongs. He may not be always right, for no man is infallible, but he aims to be right. And he claims respect from his known integrity even when he is seen to be wrong. His will is to rob neither God nor man of what is justly his, but to render to both what is their due. The fear of God is before his eyes, and therefore the fear of man will not deter him from doing what is seen and felt to be right. Under the direction of an enlightened conscience his settled purpose is to "deny himself to ungodliness and worldly lusts, and to live soberly, righteously, and godly in this present evil world." His character has a decidedly negative, as well as a resolutely positive, side. He steadfastly refuses the evil, and firmly adheres to the

good. The one he abhors under strong persuasions to the contrary, the other he delights in, in the face of opposition or apathy. Let such men of honour, of principle, and of rectitude, possess a land, and its moral power will carry an influence over the earth which no extent of riches or strength of armies can ever procure. There is a power in goodness with which numbers and physical energy cannot compete, which wealth cannot equal, and with which talent cannot be compared. The Almighty stands on the side of rectitude. God is with the righteous. And his influence outweighs all creation. But let no man make his own conscience the supreme standard of duty. The only infallible standard on earth is the revealed word of God. As the careful mariner, before proceeding to sea, takes his compass to the standard compass established by government, of unquestionable power and trueness, to have it compared, tested, and rectified if necessary, so the conscientious man before proceeding to any important duty should bring his conscience to the great standard of rectitude for comparison and adjustment. And as the magnetic power of the compass may be restored or increased by the use of the loadstone, so may the spiritual power and sensibility of conscience be increased or restored by fervent prayer to the great all-pervading Spirit, while exploring his word for the certainty of truth. Happy is the man whose conduct is habitually regulated by a conscience under the influence of an enlightened reason and a heaven-born faith.

CHAPTER XLVII.

CONCLUSION :—

MORAL DISPOSITIONS PROGRESSIVE AND DETERMINATIVE.

MAN is destined for eternity. The human spirit is immortal. The deductions of reason from the aspirations, tendencies, and capacities of man's nature are amply confirmed by the clearest declarations of a divine revelation. That eternity is shaped and determined by the moral dispositions of the present life. Man's moral nature is the highest part of his being. Through it the chief end of his existence is attained. All other powers or faculties are subservient to it. Its condition, tendency, or disposition defines the relationship subsisting between the being and his Creator. If the normal faculty, the regulating power of all that is moral in man is possessed of life and light, and is promptly responsive to the will of the Supreme, not only does harmony subsist between the creature and his Maker, but the full purposes of being are accomplished to the delight of God and the perfect happiness of man. But if the normal faculty is blighted, darkened, and deadened, and ceases to respond to the will of God, and has lost control over the subordinate faculties of the soul, the man is alienated from his Maker, he is in rebellion against his authority, the natural purposes of existence are not accomplished, the creature becomes offensive and repulsive in the sight of the Creator, and his very

being filled with dissatisfaction, distress, and anguish. Life illumines and matures the one; death holds its dark and corrupting sway over the other.

Creation is subject to change. The Creator, while unchangeable in character and purpose, operates with endless variety throughout his empire. Inanimate matter, so far as it comes within man's observation, is liable to incessant alteration in quantity, quality, form, or colour. Vegetable and animal life have their limit, beyond which they cannot go. Like the arrow shot upward, when the impelling force is exhausted, another power prevails, and it is brought back to the earth. In the life of both there is a stretching after maturity; a pressing upward in development to reach a destined natural goal; beyond this, instinct has no want unsatisfied. And yet how great the variety in the duration of both vegetable and animal life. One plant may reach its maturity in a few months, another may continue to grow for centuries. An insect may finish its natural life in a few days, an elephant in scores of years. Up to a certain point development extends, and life prevails. Beyond that a new power acquires supreme force, and the once animated structure is brought back to its original unorganised matter.

Rational or spirit life is greatly superior to mere animal life, and has an unending existence allotted to it. Its perfect development it is impossible for us fully to comprehend. But there is a determinative stage of development which we may apprehend. Some trees and animals live long after they have reached their full height, and laterally expand and otherwise mature. In like manner the human spirit may reach a stage of upward or downward progress, in which life or death

may obtain unfettered sway, without absolutely terminating development in either case. A man may struggle successfully with disease until the last trace of it is eradicated from his constitution; or disease may struggle successfully with him until it has overpowered the last element of vitality in the system, and the body is dead. In both cases a marked and determinative stage of development is reached; but in neither case does the dominant power cease to operate; on the contrary, its accelerated action still goes on though it may be in a modified form. A spirit from earth, raised to heaven and perfected in life by having the last stain of sin removed, may continue to enjoy an intellectual and emotional expansion with their corresponding results, through an indefinite period. And one of the same race, perfectly subdued by sin and steeped in corruption, without an element of goodness remaining, may, sealed under condemnation and imprisoned in darkness, develope through countless ages such faculties as a consciousness of guilt, banishment, degradation, and remorse can foster.

The moral disposition, or the determined bias of the normal faculty, indicates the dominant power in the human soul, and its heaven-ward or hell-ward tendency. The normal faculty is in itself a controlling and regulating faculty; but it is controlled by one of two superior powers which may be designated sin and grace, death and life. Sin is disease, moral death, and embryotic damnation; grace is vitality, spiritual life, and embryotic glory. As disease is an active power, and prevails according to its strength, so life is an active power and subdues all opposition within its control. As a deplorable but undeniable fact, sin a moral disease maturing

in unending woe, has seized upon and prevails over the human spirit. On the other hand, within, as yet, a limited circle of the adult population of our globe, grace, heavenly vitality terminating in everlasting glory, has descended upon and taken possession of spirits of the same race. Prevailing vital power progresses. Life is activity, and activity is progress. Opposition to prevailing power developes fresh activity; and victory confirms authority and influence.

By nature inherited from fallen parents all our race are under the dominion of this moral disease, sin, which reigns unto death. Through its prevailing influence the normal faculty is neutralized, overcome, or perverted, so that it cannot regulate or keep the soul according to the will of God. It may retard, but cannot restrain the ravages of sin, which spreads like a cancer and consumes like a flame. Man is mortally diseased beyond the power of human remedy. But where sin abounded, grace has superabounded. A physician from heaven has visited our world. He is the Prince of Life, and communicates the grace of life to whom he pleases. He offers as a gift vitality, spiritual life, and eternal glory to all who will personally apply with true faith. This spiritual life, once received, asserts supremacy in the human soul, resists, overthrows, and eventually expels sin from the whole nature. Thus on this earth, at the same time, these two prevailing powers, sin and grace, moral disease and spiritual vitality, operating within the moral nature of man, are maturing their respective subjects, the one for woe, the other for bliss—the one for dishonour, the other for glory.

There is a limit to opposition from a subdued force. By a double process, the diminution of its strength and

the increase of power to the dominant influence, the time may soon arrive when opposition disappears. This is true of man's moral history. Sin and grace both prevail over all opposition within the brief period allowed to man on earth. In the one case, sin having so long and so far prevailed, all opposition to the downward career from the providence and Spirit of God is withdrawn ; and the voice of the supreme Judge is heard proclaiming—Let him that is unjust be unjust still, and let him that is filthy be filthy still, and for ever. In the other, grace having so long and so far prevailed, all opposition from the world, the flesh, and the devil for ever ceases by the removal of the soul to a region of perfect life and holiness ; when in effect, the same voice proclaims—Let him that is righteous be righteous still, and let him that is holy be holy still, and for ever. The moral character has determined the state and position of the soul during its future and everlasting existence. In the nature of things the triumph of sin, without restraint, must render the one eternally wretched ; and the triumph of grace, without opposition, render the other eternally blessed. May the reader, with the writer, know the blessedness of existence perfected by grace and perpetuated in glory.

THE END.

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